second epilogue-第10节

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the　simpler　the　action　we　are　observing　and　the　less　complex　the

character　and　mind　of　the　man　in　question；　the　more　subject　to

inevitability　and　the　less　free　do　our　actions　and　those　of　others

appear。

　　When　we　do　not　at　all　understand　the　cause　of　an　action；　whether　a

crime；　a　good　action；　or　even　one　that　is　simply　nonmoral；　we

ascribe　a　greater　amount　of　freedom　to　it。　In　the　case　of　a　crime　we

most　urgently　demand　the　punishment　for　such　an　act；　in　the　case　of

a　virtuous　act　we　rate　its　merit　most　highly。　In　an　indifferent　case

we　recognize　in　it　more　individuality；　originality；　and

independence。　But　if　even　one　of　the　innumerable　causes　of　the　act

is　known　to　us　we　recognize　a　certain　element　of　necessity　and　are

less　insistent　on　punishment　for　the　crime；　or　the　acknowledgment　of

the　merit　of　the　virtuous　act；　or　the　freedom　of　the　apparently

original　action。　That　a　criminal　was　reared　among　male　factors

mitigates　his　fault　in　our　eyes。　The　self…sacrifice　of　a　father　or

mother；　or　self…sacrifice　with　the　possibility　of　a　reward；　is　more

comprehensible　than　gratuitous　self…sacrifice；　and　therefore　seems

less　deserving　of　sympathy　and　less　the　result　of　free　will。　The

founder　of　a　sect　or　party；　or　an　inventor；　impresses　us　less　when

we　know　how　or　by　what　the　way　was　prepared　for　his　activity。　If　we

have　a　large　range　of　examples；　if　our　observation　is　constantly

directed　to　seeking　the　correlation　of　cause　and　effect　in　people's

actions；　their　actions　appear　to　us　more　under　compulsion　and　less

free　the　more　correctly　we　connect　the　effects　with　the　causes。　If

we　examined　simple　actions　and　had　a　vast　number　of　such　actions　under

observation；　our　conception　of　their　inevitability　would　be　still

greater。　The　dishonest　conduct　of　the　son　of　a　dishonest　father；　the

misconduct　of　a　woman　who　had　fallen　into　bad　company；　a　drunkard's

relapse　into　drunkenness；　and　so　on　are　actions　that　seem　to　us　less

free　the　better　we　understand　their　cause。　If　the　man　whose　actions　we

are　considering　is　on　a　very　low　stage　of　mental　development；　like　a

child；　a　madman；　or　a　simpleton…　then；　knowing　the　causes　of　the　act

and　the　simplicity　of　the　character　and　intelligence　in　question；　we

see　so　large　an　element　of　necessity　and　so　little　free　will　that　as

soon　as　we　know　the　cause　prompting　the　action　we　can　foretell　the

result。

　　On　these　three　considerations　alone　is　based　the　conception　of

irresponsibility　for　crimes　and　the　extenuating　circumstances　admitted

by　all　legislative　codes。　The　responsibility　appears　greater　or　less

according　to　our　greater　or　lesser　knowledge　of　the　circumstances　in

which　the　man　was　placed　whose　action　is　being　judged；　and　according

to　the　greater　or　lesser　interval　of　time　between　the　commission　of

the　action　and　its　investigation；　and　according　to　the　greater　or

lesser　understanding　of　the　causes　that　led　to　the　action。

EP2｜CH10

　　CHAPTER　X



　　Thus　our　conception　of　free　will　and　inevitability　gradually

diminishes　or　increases　according　to　the　greater　or　lesser

connection　with　the　external　world；　the　greater　or　lesser　remoteness

of　time；　and　the　greater　or　lesser　dependence　on　the　causes　in

relation　to　which　we　contemplate　a　man's　life。

　　So　that　if　we　examine　the　case　of　a　man　whose　connection　with　the

external　world　is　well　known；　where　the　time　between　the　action　and

its　examination　is　great；　and　where　the　causes　of　the　action　are

most　accessible；　we　get　the　conception　of　a　maximum　of　inevitability

and　a　minimum　of　free　will。　If　we　examine　a　man　little　dependent　on

external　conditions；　whose　action　was　performed　very　recently；　and　the

causes　of　whose　action　are　beyond　our　ken；　we　get　the　conception　of

a　minimum　of　inevitability　and　a　maximum　of　freedom。

　　In　neither　case…　however　we　may　change　our　point　of　view；　however

plain　we　may　make　to　ourselves　the　connection　between　the　man　and

the　external　world；　however　inaccessible　it　may　be　to　us；　however　long

or　short　the　period　of　time；　however　intelligible　or

incomprehensible　the　causes　of　the　action　may　be…　can　we　ever　conceive

either　complete　freedom　or　complete　necessity。

　　（1）　To　whatever　degree　we　may　imagine　a　man　to　be　exempt　from　the

influence　of　the　external　world；　we　never　get　a　conception　of

freedom　in　space。　Every　human　action　is　inevitably　conditioned　by　what

surrounds　him　and　by　his　own　body。　I　lift　my　arm　and　let　it　fall。　My

action　seems　to　me　free；　but　asking　myself　whether　I　could　raise　my

arm　in　every　direction；　I　see　that　I　raised　it　in　the　direction　in

which　there　was　least　obstruction　to　that　action　either　from　things

around　me　or　from　the　construction　of　my　own　body。　I　chose　one　out

of　all　the　possible　directions　because　in　it　there　were　fewest

obstacles。　For　my　action　to　be　free　it　was　necessary　that　it　should

encounter　no　obstacles。　To　conceive　of　a　man　being　free　we　must

imagine　him　outside　space；　which　is　evidently　impossible。

　　（2）　However　much　we　approximate　the　time　of　judgment　to　the　time

of　the　deed；　we　never　get　a　conception　of　freedom　in　time。　For　if　I

examine　an　action　committed　a　second　ago　I　must　still　recognize　it

as　not　being　free；　for　it　is　irrevocably　linked　to　the　moment　at　which

it　was　committed。　Can　I　lift　my　arm？　I　lift　it；　but　ask　myself：

could　I　have　abstained　from　lifting　my　arm　at　the　moment　that　has

already　passed？　To　convince　myself　of　this　I　do　not　lift　it　the　next

moment。　But　I　am　not　now　abstaining　from　doing　so　at　the　first

moment　when　I　asked　the　question。　Time　has　gone　by　which　I　could　not

detain；　the　arm　I　then　lifted　is　no　longer　the　same　as　the　arm　I　now

refrain　from　lifting；　nor　is　the　air　in　which　I　lifted　it　the　same

that　now　surrounds　me。　The　moment　in　which　the　first　movement　was　made

is　irrevocable；　and　at　that　moment　I　could　make　only　one　movement；　and

whatever　movement　I　made　would　be　the　only　one。　That　I　did　not　lift　my

arm　a　moment　later　does　not　prove　that　I　could　have　abstained　from

lifting　it　then。　And　since　I　could　make　only　one　movement　at　that

single　moment　of　time；　it　could　not　have　been　any　other。　To　imagine　it

as　free；　it　is　necessary　to　imagine　it　in　the　present；　on　the　boundary

between　the　past　and　the　future…　that　is；　outside　time；　which　is

impossible。

　　（3）　However　much　the　difficulty　of　understanding　the　causes　may　be

increased；　we　never　reach　a　conception　of　complete　freedom；　that　is；

an　absence　of　cause。　However　inaccessible　to　us　may　be　the　cause　of

the　expression　of　will　in　any　action；　our　own　or　another's；　the

first　demand　of　reason　is　the　assumption　of　and　search　for　a　cause；

for　without　a　cause　no　phenomenon　is　conceivable。　I　raise　my　arm　to

perform　an　action　independently　of　any　cause；　but　my　wish　to　perform

an　action　without　a　cause　is　the　cause　of　my　action。

　　But　even　if…　imagining　a　man　quite　exempt　from　all　influences；

examining　only　his　momentary　action　in　the　present；　unevoked　by　any

cause…　we　were　to　admit　so　infinitely　small　a　remainder　of

inevitability　as　equaled　zero；　we　should　even　then　not　have　arrived　at

the　conception　of　complete　freedom　in　man；　for　a　being　uninfluenced　by

the　external　world；　standing　outside　of　time　and　independent　of　cause；

is　no　longer　a　man。

　　In　the　same　way　we　can　never　imagine　the　action　of　a　man　quite

devoid　of　freedom　and　entirely　subject　to　the　law　of　inevitability。

　　（1）　However　we　may　increase　our　knowledge　of　the　conditions　of　space

in　which　man　is　situated；　that　knowledge　can　never　be　complete；　for

the　number　of　those　conditions　is　as　infinite　as　the　infinity　of

space。　And　therefore　so　long　as　not　all　the　conditions　influencing　men

are　defined；　there　is　no　complete　inevitability　but　a　certain

measure　of　freedom　remains。

　　（2）　However　we　may　prolong　the　period　of　time　between　the　action

we　are　examining　and　the　judgment　upon　it；　that　period　will　be　finite；

while　time　is　infinite；　and　so　in　this　respect　too　there　can　never

be　absolute　inevitability。

　　（3）　However　accessible　may　be　the　chain　of　causation　of　any

action；　we　shall　never　know　the　whole　chain　since　it　is　endless；　and

so　again　we　never　reach　absolute　inevitability。

　　But　besides　this；　even　if；　admitting　the　remaining　minimum　of

freedom　to　equal　zero；　we　assumed　in　some　given　case…　as　for

instance　in　that　of　a　dying　man；　an　unborn　babe；　or　an　idiot…　complete

absence　of　freedom；　by　so　doing　we　should　destroy　the　very

conception　of　man　in　the　case　we　are　examining；　for　as　soon　as　there

is　no　freedom　there　is　also　no　man。　And　so　the　conception　of　the

action　of　a　man　subject　solely　to　the　law　of　inevitability　without　any

element　of　freedom　is　just　as　impossible　as　the　conception　of　a

man's　completely　free　action。

　　And　so　to　imagine　the　action　of　a　man　entirely　subject　to　the　law　of

inevitability　without　any　freedom；　we　must　assume　the　knowledge　of

an　infinite　number　of　space　relations；　an　infinitely　long　period　of

time；　and　an　infinite　series　of　causes。

　　To　imagine　a　man　perfectly　free　and　not　subject　to　the　law　of

inevitability；　we　must　imagine　him　all　alone；　beyond　space；　beyond

time；　and　fr