prior analytics-第30节

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the　universal　or　of　the　particulars。　Thus　then　he　knows　that　C



contains　two　right　angles　with　a　knowledge　of　the　universal；　but　not



with　a　knowledge　of　the　particulars；　consequently　his　knowledge　will



not　be　contrary　to　his　ignorance。　The　argument　in　the　Meno　that



learning　is　recollection　may　be　criticized　in　a　similar　way。　For　it



never　happens　that　a　man　starts　with　a　foreknowledge　of　the



particular；　but　along　with　the　process　of　being　led　to　see　the　general



principle　he　receives　a　knowledge　of　the　particulars；　by　an　act　（as　it



were）　of　recognition。　For　we　know　some　things　directly；　e。g。　that



the　angles　are　equal　to　two　right　angles；　if　we　know　that　the　figure



is　a　triangle。　Similarly　in　all　other　cases。



　　By　a　knowledge　of　the　universal　then　we　see　the　particulars；　but



we　do　not　know　them　by　the　kind　of　knowledge　which　is　proper　to



them；　consequently　it　is　possible　that　we　may　make　mistakes　about



them；　but　not　that　we　should　have　the　knowledge　and　error　that　are



contrary　to　one　another：　rather　we　have　the　knowledge　of　the　universal



but　make　a　mistake　in　apprehending　the　particular。　Similarly　in　the



cases　stated　above。　The　error　in　respect　of　the　middle　term　is　not



contrary　to　the　knowledge　obtained　through　the　syllogism；　nor　is　the



thought　in　respect　of　one　middle　term　contrary　to　that　in　respect　of



the　other。　Nothing　prevents　a　man　who　knows　both　that　A　belongs　to　the



whole　of　B；　and　that　B　again　belongs　to　C；　thinking　that　A　does　not



belong　to　C；　e。g。　knowing　that　every　mule　is　sterile　and　that　this



is　a　mule；　and　thinking　that　this　animal　is　with　foal：　for　he　does　not



know　that　A　belongs　to　C；　unless　he　considers　the　two　propositions



together。　So　it　is　evident　that　if　he　knows　the　one　and　does　not



know　the　other；　he　will　fall　into　error。　And　this　is　the　relation　of



knowledge　of　the　universal　to　knowledge　of　the　particular。　For　we　know



no　sensible　thing；　once　it　has　passed　beyond　the　range　of　our



senses；　even　if　we　happen　to　have　perceived　it；　except　by　means　of　the



universal　and　the　possession　of　the　knowledge　which　is　proper　to　the



particular；　but　without　the　actual　exercise　of　that　knowledge。　For



to　know　is　used　in　three　senses：　it　may　mean　either　to　have



knowledge　of　the　universal　or　to　have　knowledge　proper　to　the　matter



in　hand　or　to　exercise　such　knowledge：　consequently　three　kinds　of



error　also　are　possible。　Nothing　then　prevents　a　man　both　knowing



and　being　mistaken　about　the　same　thing；　provided　that　his　knowledge



and　his　error　are　not　contrary。　And　this　happens　also　to　the　man　whose



knowledge　is　limited　to　each　of　the　premisses　and　who　has　not



previously　considered　the　particular　question。　For　when　he　thinks　that



the　mule　is　with　foal　he　has　not　the　knowledge　in　the　sense　of　its



actual　exercise；　nor　on　the　other　hand　has　his　thought　caused　an　error



contrary　to　his　knowledge：　for　the　error　contrary　to　the　knowledge



of　the　universal　would　be　a　syllogism。



　　But　he　who　thinks　the　essence　of　good　is　the　essence　of　bad　will



think　the　same　thing　to　be　the　essence　of　good　and　the　essence　of　bad。



Let　A　stand　for　the　essence　of　good　and　B　for　the　essence　of　bad；



and　again　C　for　the　essence　of　good。　Since　then　he　thinks　B　and　C



identical；　he　will　think　that　C　is　B；　and　similarly　that　B　is　A；



consequently　that　C　is　A。　For　just　as　we　saw　that　if　B　is　true　of



all　of　which　C　is　true；　and　A　is　true　of　all　of　which　B　is　true；　A



is　true　of　C；　similarly　with　the　word　'think'。　Similarly　also　with　the



word　'is'；　for　we　saw　that　if　C　is　the　same　as　B；　and　B　as　A；　C　is　the



same　as　A。　Similarly　therefore　with　'opine'。　Perhaps　then　this　is



necessary　if　a　man　will　grant　the　first　point。　But　presumably　that



is　false；　that　any　one　could　suppose　the　essence　of　good　to　be　the



essence　of　bad；　save　incidentally。　For　it　is　possible　to　think　this　in



many　different　ways。　But　we　must　consider　this　matter　better。







　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　22







　　Whenever　the　extremes　are　convertible　it　is　necessary　that　the



middle　should　be　convertible　with　both。　For　if　A　belongs　to　C



through　B；　then　if　A　and　C　are　convertible　and　C　belongs　everything　to



which　A　belongs；　B　is　convertible　with　A；　and　B　belongs　to



everything　to　which　A　belongs；　through　C　as　middle；　and　C　is



convertible　with　B　through　A　as　middle。　Similarly　if　the　conclusion　is



negative；　e。g。　if　B　belongs　to　C；　but　A　does　not　belong　to　B；



neither　will　A　belong　to　C。　If　then　B　is　convertible　with　A；　C　will　be



convertible　with　A。　Suppose　B　does　not　belong　to　A；　neither　then



will　C：　for　ex　hypothesi　B　belonged　to　all　C。　And　if　C　is



convertible　with　B；　B　is　convertible　also　with　A；　for　C　is　said　of



that　of　all　of　which　B　is　said。　And　if　C　is　convertible　in　relation　to



A　and　to　B；　B　also　is　convertible　in　relation　to　A。　For　C　belongs　to



that　to　which　B　belongs：　but　C　does　not　belong　to　that　to　which　A



belongs。　And　this　alone　starts　from　the　conclusion；　the　preceding



moods　do　not　do　so　as　in　the　affirmative　syllogism。　Again　if　A　and　B



are　convertible；　and　similarly　C　and　D；　and　if　A　or　C　must　belong　to



anything　whatever；　then　B　and　D　will　be　such　that　one　or　other　belongs



to　anything　whatever。　For　since　B　belongs　to　that　to　which　A



belongs；　and　D　belongs　to　that　to　which　C　belongs；　and　since　A　or　C



belongs　to　everything；　but　not　together；　it　is　clear　that　B　or　D



belongs　to　everything；　but　not　together。　For　example　if　that　which



is　uncreated　is　incorruptible　and　that　which　is　incorruptible　is



uncreated；　it　is　necessary　that　what　is　created　should　be



corruptible　and　what　is　corruptible　should　have　been　created。　For



two　syllogisms　have　been　put　together。　Again　if　A　or　B　belongs　to



everything　and　if　C　or　D　belongs　to　everything；　but　they　cannot　belong



together；　then　when　A　and　C　are　convertible　B　and　D　are　convertible。



For　if　B　does　not　belong　to　something　to　which　D　belongs；　it　is



clear　that　A　belongs　to　it。　But　if　A　then　C：　for　they　are　convertible。



Therefore　C　and　D　belong　together。　But　this　is　impossible。　When　A



belongs　to　the　whole　of　B　and　to　C　and　is　affirmed　of　nothing　else；



and　B　also　belongs　to　all　C；　it　is　necessary　that　A　and　B　should　be



convertible：　for　since　A　is　said　of　B　and　C　only；　and　B　is　affirmed



both　of　itself　and　of　C；　it　is　clear　that　B　will　be　said　of　everything



of　which　A　is　said；　except　A　itself。　Again　when　A　and　B　belong　to



the　whole　of　C；　and　C　is　convertible　with　B；　it　is　necessary　that　A



should　belong　to　all　B：　for　since　A　belongs　to　all　C；　and　C　to　B　by



conversion；　A　will　belong　to　all　B。



　　When；　of　two　opposites　A　and　B；　A　is　preferable　to　B；　and



similarly　D　is　preferable　to　C；　then　if　A　and　C　together　are



preferable　to　B　and　D　together；　A　must　be　preferable　to　D。　For　A　is　an



object　of　desire　to　the　same　extent　as　B　is　an　object　of　aversion；



since　they　are　opposites：　and　C　is　similarly　related　to　D；　since



they　also　are　opposites。　If　then　A　is　an　object　of　desire　to　the



same　extent　as　D；　B　is　an　object　of　aversion　to　the　same　extent　as　C



（since　each　is　to　the　same　extent　as　each…the　one　an　object　of



aversion；　the　other　an　object　of　desire）。　Therefore　both　A　and　C



together；　and　B　and　D　together；　will　be　equally　objects　of　desire　or



aversion。　But　since　A　and　C　are　preferable　to　B　and　D；　A　cannot　be



equally　desirable　with　D；　for　then　B　along　with　D　would　be　equally



desirable　with　A　along　with　C。　But　if　D　is　preferable　to　A；　then　B



must　be　less　an　object　of　aversion　than　C：　for　the　less　is　opposed



to　the　less。　But　the　greater　good　and　lesser　evil　are　preferable　to



the　lesser　good　and　greater　evil：　the　whole　BD　then　is　preferable　to



the　whole　AC。　But　ex　hypothesi　this　is　not　so。　A　then　is　preferable　to



D；　and　C　consequently　is　less　an　object　of　aversion　than　B。　If　then



every　lover　in　virtue　of　his　love　would　prefer　A；　viz。　that　the



beloved　should　be　such　as　to　grant　a　favour；　and　yet　should　not



grant　it　（for　which　C　stands）；　to　the　beloved's　granting　the　favour



（represented　by　D）　without　being　such　as　to　grant　it　（represented　by



B）；　it　is　clear　that　A　（being　of　such　a　nature）　is　preferable　to



granting　the　favour。　To　receive　affection　then　is　preferable　in　love



to　sexual　intercourse。　Love　then　is　more　dependent　on　friendship



than　on　intercourse。　And　if　it　is　most　dependent　on　receiving



affection；　then　this　is　its　end。　Intercourse　then　either　is　not　an　end



at　all　or　is　an　end　relative　to　the　further　end；　the　receiving　of



affection。　And　indeed　the　same　is　true　of　the　other　desires　and　arts。