criminal psychology-第69节
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ends on the essence of image and of object； on the other it depends on the alteration which the image undergoes even during perception as well as during all the ensuing time。 Everybody knows this distinction。 Whoever has seen anything under certain circumstances； or during a certain period of his life； may frequently produce an image of it varying in individual characteristics； but in its general character constant。 If he sees it later under different conditions； at a different age； when memory and imaginative disposition have exercised their alterative influence； image and object fail to correspond in various directions。 The matter is still worse with regard to images of things and events that have never been seen。 I can imagine the siege of Troy； a dragon； the polar night and Alexander the Great； but how different will the image be from the object！
This is especially obvious when we have perceived something which did not appear to us altogether correct。 We improve the thing； i。 e。； we study how it might have been better； and we remember it as improved； then the more frequently this object as imagined recurs； the more fixed its form becomes； but not its actual form； only its altered form。 We see this with especial clearness in the case of drawings that in some way displease us。 Suppose I do not like the red dress of a woman in some picture and I prefer brown。 If later I recall the picture the image will become progressively browner and browner； and finally I see the picture as brown； and when I meet the real object I wonder about the red dress。＇1＇
＇1＇ H。 Gross： Korregierte Vorstellungen。 In H。 Gross's Archiv X； 109。
We get this situation in miniature each time we hear of a crime； however barren the news may be；no more than a telegraphic word。 The event must naturally have some degree of importance； because； if I hear merely that a silver watch has been stolen； I do not try to imagine that situation。 If； however； I hear that near a hostelry in X； a peasant was robbed by two traveling apprentices I immediately get an image which contains not only the unknown region； but also the event of the robbery； and even perhaps the faces of those concerned。 It does not much matter that this image is completely false in practically every detail； because in the greater number of cases it is corrected。 The real danger lies in the fact that this correction is frequently so bad and often fails altogether and that； in consequence； the first image again breaks through and remains the most vigorous。＇2＇ The vigor is the greater because we always attach such imagination to something actual or approximately real； and inasmuch as the latter thing is either really seen； or at least energetically imagined； the first image acquires renewed power of coming up。 According to Lipps； ‘‘Reproductive images presuppose dispositions。 Dispositions ensue upon perceptions that they imply； still there are reproductive images and imagined wholes which imply no preceding perceptions。 This contradiction is solved when dispositions are contained in other things at the same time。 A finite number of dispositions may in this way be also infinite。。。。 Dispositions are transformed power itself； power transformed in such a way as to be able to respond actively to inner stimulations。''
＇2＇ C。 de Lagrave： L'Autosuggestion Naturelle。 Rev。 d'Hypnot。 1889； XIV； 257。
The process is similar in the reproduction of images during speech。 The fact that this reproduction is not direct but depends on the sequence of images； leads to the garrulity of children； old men； and uneducated people； who try to present the whole complex of relations belonging to any given image。 But such total recall drives the judge to despair； not only because he loses time； but because of the danger of having the attention turned from important to unimportant things。 The same thing is perceived in judicial documents which often reveal the fact that the dictator permitted himself to be led astray by unskilful witnesses； or that he had himself been responsible for abstruse； indirect memories。 The real thinker will almost always be chary of words； because he retains； from among the numberless images which are attached to his idea； only those most closely related to his immediate purpose。 Hence good protocols are almost always comparatively short。 It is even as instructive as amusing to examine certain protocols； with regard to what ought to be omitted； and then with regard to the direct representations； i。 e。； to everything that appertains to the real illumination of the question。 It is astounding how little of the latter thing is indicated； and how often it enters blindly because what was important has been forgotten and lost。
Of course； we must grant that the essence of representation involves very great difficulties。 By way of example consider so ordinary a case as the third dimension。 We are convinced that according to its nature it is much more complex than it seems to be。 We are compelled to believe that distance is not a matter of sensation and that it requires to be explained。＇1＇
＇1＇ Several sentences are here omitted。
Psychologists indicate that the representation of the third dimension would be tremendously difficult without the help of experience。 But experience is something relative； we do not know how much experience any man possesses； or its nature。 Hence； we never can know clearly to what degree a man's physical vision is correct if we do not see other means of verification。 Consider now what is required in the assumption of the idea of the fourth dimension。 Since its introduction by Henry More； this idea should quite have altered our conception of space。 But we do not know how many cling to it unconsciously； and we should make no mistake if we said that nobody has any knowledge of how his neighbor perceives space。＇1＇
＇1＇ Cf。 E。 Storch： ber des rumliche Sehen； in Ztschrft。 v。 Ebbinghaus u。 Nagel XXIX； 22。
Movement is another thing difficult to represent or imagine。 You can determine for yourself immediately whether you can imagine even a slightly complicated movement。 I can imagine one individual condition of a movement after another； sequentially； but I can not imagine the sequence。 As Herbart says somewhere； a successive series of images is not a represented succession。 But if we can not imagine this latter； what do we imagine is not what it ought to be。 According to Stricker；＇2＇ the representation of movement is a _quale_ which can not be given in terms of any other sensory quality； and no movement can be remembered without the brain's awakening a muscle…movement。 Experience verifies this theory。 The awakening of the muscular sense is frequently obvious whenever movement is thought of； and we may then perceive how； in the explanation or description of a movement； the innervation which follows the image in question； occurs。 This innervation is always true。 It agrees at least with what the witness has himself perceived and now tries to renew in his story。 When we have him explain； for example； how some man had been choked； we may see movements of his hands which； however slight and obscure； still definitely indicate that he is trying to remember what he has seen； and this irrelevantly of what he is saying。 This makes it possible to observe the alterations of images in the individual in question； an alteration which always occurs when the images are related to movements。
＇2＇ S。 Stricker： Studien ber die Bewegungsvorstellungen。 Tbingen 1868。
It follows further from the fact that movements are difficult to represent that the witness ought not to be expected accurately to recall them。 Stricker says that for a long time he could not image a snow…fall； and succeeded only in representing one single instant of it。 Now what is not capable of representation； can not well be recalled； and so we discover that it merely causes trouble to ask the witness to describe point by point even a simple sequence。 The witness has only successive images； and even if the particular images are correct； he has nothing objective for the succession itself； nothing rooted in the sequence。 He is helped； merely； by the logic of events and his memoryif these are scanty； the succession of images is scanty； and therefore the reproduction of the event is inadequate。 Hence this scantiness is as little remarkable as the variety of description in various witnesses； a variety due to the fact that the sequentialization is subjective。
Drawing is a confirmation of the fact that we represent only a single instant of motion； for a picture can never give us a movement； but only a single state within that movement。 At the same time we are content with what the picture renders； even when our image contains only this simple moment of movement。 ‘‘What is seen or heard； is immediately； in all its definiteness； content of consciousness'' （Schuppe）but its movement is not。
The influence of time upon images is hardly indifferent。 We have to distinguish the time necessary for the construction of an image； and the time during which an image lasts with uniform vividness。 Maudsley believes the first question difficult to answer。 He leans on Darwin； who points out
