criminal psychology-第52节
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ond proposition。
Suppose that we take these propositions concretely：
（1） I have discovered that bread made of corn has a nourishing effect。
（2） I foresee that other apparently similar objects； e。 g。； wheat； will have a like effect。
I could not make various experiments with the same corn in case （1）。 I could handle corn taken as such from one point of view； or considered as such from another； i。 e。； I could only experiment with very similar objects。 I can therefore make these experiments with corn from progressively remoter starting points； or soils； and finally with corn from Barbary and East Africa； so that there can no longer be any question of identity but only of similarity。 And finally I can compare two harvests of corn which have less similarity than certain species of corn and certain species of wheat。 I am therefore entitled to speak of identical or similar in the first proposition as much as in the second。 One proposition has led into another and the connection between them has been discovered。
The criminological importance of this ‘‘connection'' lies in the fact that the correctness of our inferences depends upon its discovery。 We work continuously with these two Humian propositions； and we always make our assertion； first； that some things are related as cause and effect； and we join the present case to that because we consider it similar。 If it is really similar； and the connection of the first and the second proposition are actually correct； the truth of the inference is attained。 We need not count the unexplained wonders of numerical relations in the result。 D'Alembert asserts： ‘‘It seems as if there were some law of nature which more frequently prevents the occurrence of regular than irregular combinations； those of the first kind are mathematically； but not physically； more probable。 When we see that high numbers are thrown with some one die； we are immediately inclined to call that die false。'' And John Stuart Mill adds； that d'Alembert should have set the problem in the form of asking whether he would believe in the die if； after having examined it and found it right； somebody announced that ten sixes had been cast with it。
We may go still further and assert that we are generally inclined to consider an inference wrong which indicates that accidental matters have occurred in regular numerical relation。 Who believes the hunter's story that he has shot 100 hares in the past week； or the gambler's that he has won 1000 dollars； or the sick man's； that he was sick ten times？ It will be supposed at the very least that each is merely indicating an approximately round sum。 Ninety…six hares； 987 dollars； and eleven illnesses will sound more probable。 And this goes so far that during examinations； witnesses are shy of naming such ‘‘improbable ratios；'' if they at all care to have their testimony believed。 Then again； many judges are in no wise slow to jump at such a number and to demand an ‘‘accurate statement；'' or eves immediately to decide that the witness is talking only ‘‘about。'' How deep…rooted such views are is indicated by the circumstance that bankers and other merchants of lottery tickets find that tickets with ‘‘pretty numbers'' are difficult to sell。 A ticket of series 1000； number 100 is altogether unsalable； for such a number ‘‘can not possibly be sold。'' Then again； if one has to count up a column of accidental figures and the sum is 1000； the correctness of the sum is always doubted。
Here are facts which are indubitable and unexplained。 We must therefore agree neither to distrust so…called round numbers； nor to place particular reliance on quite irregular figures。 Both should be examined。
It may be that the judgment of the correctness of an inference is made analogously to that of numbers and that the latter exercise an influence on the judgment which is as much conceded popularly as it is actually combated。 Since Kant； it has been quite discovered that the judgment that fools are in the majority must lead through many more such truths in judgingand it is indifferent whether the judgment dealt with is that of the law court or of a voting legislature or mere judgments as such。
Schiel says； ‘‘It has been frequently asserted that a judgment is more probably correct according to the number of judges and jury。 Quite apart from the fact that the judge is less careful； makes less effort； and feels less responsibility when he has associates； this is a false inference from an enormous average of cases which are necessarily remote from any average whatever。 And when certain prejudices or weaknesses of mind are added； the mistake multiplies。 Whoever accurately follows； if he can avoid getting bored； the voting of bodies； and considers by themselves individual opinions about the subject； they having remained individual against large majorities and hence worthy of being subjected to a cold and unprejudiced examination； will learn some rare facts。 It is especially interesting to study the judgment of the full bench with regard to a case which has been falsely judged； surprisingly often only a single individual voice has spoken correctly。 This fact is a warning to the judge in such cases carefully to listen to the individual opinion and to consider that it is very likely to deserve study just because it is so significantly in the minority。
The same thing is to be kept in mind when a thing is asserted by a large number of witnesses。 Apart from the fact that they depend upon one another； that they suggest to one another； it is also easily possible； especially if any source of error is present； that the latter shall have influenced all the witnesses。
Whether a judgment has been made by a single judge or is the verdict of any number of jurymen is quite indifferent since the correctness of a judgment does not lie in numbers。 Exner says； ‘‘The degree of probability of a judgment's correctness depends upon the richness of the field of the associations brought to bear in establishing it。 The value of knowledge is judicially constituted in this fact； for it is in essence the expansion of the scope of association。 And the value is proportional to the richness of the associations between the present fact and the knowledge required。'' This is one of the most important of the doctrines we have to keep in mind； and it controverts altogether those who suppose that we ought to be satisfied with the knowledge of some dozens of statutes； a few commentaries； and so and so many precedents。
If we add that ‘‘every judgment is an identification and that in every judgment we assert that the content represented is identical in spite of two different associative relationships；''＇1＇ it must become clear what dangers we undergo if the associative relationships of a judge are too poor and narrow。 As Mittermaier said seventy years ago： ‘‘There are enough cases in which the weight of the evidence is so great that all judges are convinced of the truth in the same way。 But in itself what determines the judgment is the essential character of him who makes it。'' What he means by essential character has already been indicated。
＇1＇ H。 Mnsterberg： Beitrge zur experimentellen Psychologie； III。 Freiburg。
We have yet to consider the question of the value of inferences made by a witness from his own combinations of facts； or his descriptions。 The necessity； in such cases； of redoubled and numerous examinations is often overlooked。 Suppose； for example； that the witness does not know a certain important date； but by combining what he does know； infers it to have been the second of June； on which day the event under discussion took place。 He makes the inference because at the time he had a call from A； who was in the habit of coming on Wednesdays； but there could be no Wednesday after June seventh because the witness had gone on a long journey on that day； and it could not have been May 26 because this day preceded a holiday and the shop was open late； a thing not done on the day A called。 Nor； moreover； could the date have been May 20； because it was very warm on the day in question； and the temperature began to rise only after May 20。 In view of these facts the event under discussion must have occurred upon June 2nd and only on that day。
As a rule； such combinations are very influential because they appear cautious； wise and convincing。 They impose upon people without inclination toward such processes。 More so than they have a right to； inasmuch as they present little difficulty to anybody who is accustomed to them and to whom they occur almost spontaneously。 As usually a thing that makes a great impression upon us is not especially examined； but is accepted as astounding and indubitable； so here。 But how very necessary it is carefully to examine such things and to consider whether the single premises are sound； the example in question or any other example will show。 The individual dates； the facts and assumptions may easily be mistaken； and the smallest oversight may render the result false； or at least not convincing。
The examination of manuscripts is still more difficult。 What is written has a certain convincing power； not only on others but on the writer； and much as we may be will
