parmenides-第4节
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truth and wisdom。 And therefore； Parmenides； I join in the request
of Socrates； that I may hear the process again which I have not
heard for a long time。
When Zeno had thus spoken； Pythodorus； according to Antiphon's
report of him； said； that he himself and Aristoteles and the whole
company entreated Parmenides to give an example of the process。 I
cannot refuse； said Parmenides； and yet I feel rather like Ibycus；
who； when in his old age； against his will； he fell in love；
compared himself to an old racehorse； who was about to run in a
chariot race； shaking with fear at the course he knew so well…this was
his simile of himself。 And I also experience a trembling when I
remember through what an ocean of words I have to wade at my time of
life。 But I must indulge you； as Zeno says that I ought； and we are
alone。 Where shall I begin？ And what shall be our first hypothesis； if
I am to attempt this laborious pastime？ Shall I begin with myself； and
take my own hypothesis the one？ and consider the consequences which
follow on the supposition either of the being or of the not being of
one？
By all means； said Zeno。
And who will answer me？ he said。 Shall I propose the youngest？ He
will not make difficulties and will be the most likely to say what
he thinks； and his answers will give me time to breathe。
I am the one whom you mean； Parmenides； said Aristoteles； for I am
the youngest and at your service。 Ask； and I will answer。
Parmenides proceeded： If one is； he said； the one cannot be many？
Impossible。
Then the one cannot have parts； and cannot be a whole？
Why not？
Because every part is part of a whole； is it not？
Yes。
And what is a whole？ would not that of which no part is wanting be a
whole？
Certainly。
Then； in either case； the one would be made up of parts； both as
being a whole； and also as having parts？
To be sure。
And in either case； the one would be many； and not one？
True。
But； surely； it ought to be one and not many？
It ought。
Then； if the one is to remain one； it will not be a whole； and
will not have parts？
No。
But if it has no parts； it will have neither beginning； middle；
nor end； for these would of course be parts of it。
Right。
But then； again； a beginning and an end are the limits of
everything？
Certainly。
Then the one； having neither beginning nor end； is unlimited？
Yes； unlimited。
And therefore formless； for it cannot partake either of round or
straight。
But why？
Why； because the round is that of which all the extreme points are
equidistant from the centre？
Yes。
And the straight is that of which the centre intercepts the view
of the extremes？
True。
Then the one would have parts and would be many； if it partook
either of a straight or of a circular form？
Assuredly。
But having no parts； it will be neither straight nor round？
Right。
And； being of such a nature； it cannot be in any place； for it
cannot be either in another or in itself。
How so？
Because if it were in another； it would be encircled by that in
which it was； and would touch it at many places and with many parts；
but that which is one and indivisible； and does not partake of a
circular nature； cannot be touched all round in many places。
Certainly not。
But if； on the other hand； one were in itself； it would also be
contained by nothing else but itself； that is to say； if it were
really in itself； for nothing can be in anything which does not
contain it。
Impossible。
But then； that which contains must be other than that which is
contained？ for the same whole cannot do and suffer both at once； and
if so； one will be no longer one； but two？
True。
Then one cannot be anywhere； either in itself or in another？
No。
Further consider； whether that which is of such a nature can have
either rest or motion。
Why not？
Why； because the one； if it were moved； would be either moved in
place or changed in nature； for these are the only kinds of motion。
Yes。
And the one； when it changes and ceases to be itself； cannot be
any longer one。
It cannot。
It cannot therefore experience the sort of motion which is change of
nature？
Clearly not。
Then can the motion of the one be in place？
Perhaps。
But if the one moved in place； must it not either move round and
round in the same place； or from one place to another？
It must。
And that which moves in a circle must rest upon a centre； and that
which goes round upon a centre must have parts which are different
from the centre； but that which has no centre and no parts cannot
possibly be carried round upon a centre？
Impossible。
But perhaps the motion of the one consists in change of place？
Perhaps so； if it moves at all。
And have we not already shown that it cannot be in anything？
Yes。
Then its coming into being in anything is still more impossible；
is it not？
I do not see why。
Why； because anything which comes into being in anything； can
neither as yet be in that other thing while still coming into being；
nor be altogether out of it； if already coming into being in it。
Certainly not。
And therefore whatever comes into being in another must have
parts； and then one part may be in； and another part out of that
other； but that which has no parts can never be at one and the same
time neither wholly within nor wholly without anything。
True。
And is there not a still greater impossibility in that which has
no parts； and is not a whole； coming into being anywhere； since it
cannot come into being either as a part or as a whole？
Clearly。
Then it does not change place by revolving in the same spot； not
by going somewhere and coming into being in something； nor again； by
change in itself？
Very true。
Then in respect of any kind of motion the one is immoveable？
Immoveable。
But neither can the one be in anything； as we affirm。
Yes； we said so。
Then it is never in the same？
Why not？
Because if it were in the same it would be in something。
Certainly。
And we said that it could not be in itself； and could not be in
other？
True。
Then one is never in the same place？
It would seem not。
But that which is never in the same place is never quiet or at rest？
Never。
One then； as would seem； is neither rest nor in motion？
It certainly appears so。
Neither will it be the same with itself or other； nor again； other
than itself or other。
How is that？
If other than itself it would be other than one； and would not be
one。
True。
And if the same with other； it would be that other； and not
itself； so that upon this supposition too； it would not have the
nature of one； but would be other than one？
It would。
Then it will not be the same with other； or other than itself？
It will not。
Neither will it be other than other； while it remains one； for not
one； but only other； can be other than other； and nothing else。
True。
Then not by virtue of being one will it be other？
Certainly not。
But if not by virtue of being one； not by virtue of itself； and if
not by virtue of itself； not itself； and itself not being other at
all； will not be other than anything？
Right。
Neither will one be the same with itself。
How not？
Surely the nature of the one is not the nature of the same。
Why not？
It is not when anything becomes the same with anything that it
becomes one。
What of that？
Anything which becomes the same with the many； necessarily becomes
many and not one。
True。
But； if there were no difference between the one and the same；
when a thing became the same； it would always become one； and when
it became one； the same？
Certainly。
And； therefore； if one be the same with itself； it is not one with
itself； and will therefore be one and also not one。
Surely that is impossible。
And therefore the one can neither be other than other； nor the
same with itself。
Impossible。
And thus the one can neither be the same； nor other； either in
relation to itself or other？
No。
Neither will the one be like anything or unlike itself or other。
Why not？
Because likeness is sameness of affections。
Yes。
And sameness has been shown to be of a nature distinct from oneness？
That has been shown。
But if the one had any other affection than that of being one； it
would be affected in such a way as to be more than one； which is
