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which　maintained　a　family。　In　some　places　it　is　so　at　this　day；

nor　will　money　at　present　purchase　a　greater　quantity　of

commodities　there　than　in　other　places。　In　a　country　where　the

surplus　produce　of　a　large　estate　must　be　consumed　upon　the

estate　itself；　it　will　frequently　be　more　convenient　for　the

proprietor　that　part　of　it　be　consumed　at　a　distance　from　his　own

house　provided　they　who　consume　it　are　as　dependent　upon　him　as

either　his　retainers　or　his　menial　servants。　He　is　thereby　saved

from　the　embarrassment　of　either　too　large　a　company　or　too　large

a　family。　A　tenant　at　will；　who　possesses　land　sufficient　to

maintain　his　family　for　little　more　than　a　quit…rent；　is　as

dependent　upon　the　proprietor　as　any　servant　or　retainer　whatever

and　must　obey　him　with　as　little　reserve。　Such　a　proprietor；　as

he　feeds　his　servants　and　retainers　at　his　own　house；　so　he　feeds

his　tenants　at　their　houses。　The　subsistence　of　both　is　derived

from　his　bounty；　and　its　continuance　depends　upon　his　good

pleasure。

　　　　　Upon　the　authority　which　the　great　proprietor　necessarily

had　in　such　a　state　of　things　over　their　tenants　and　retainers

was　founded　the　power　of　the　ancient　barons。　They　necessarily

became　the　judges　in　peace；　and　the　leaders　in　war；　of　all　who

dwelt　upon　their　estates。　They　could　maintain　order　and　execute

the　law　within　their　respective　demesnes；　because　each　of　them

could　there　turn　the　whole　force　of　all　the　inhabitants　against

the　injustice　of　any　one。　No　other　persons　had　sufficient

authority　to　do　this。　The　king　in　particular　had　not。　In　those

ancient　times　he　was　little　more　than　the　greatest　proprietor　in

his　dominions；　to　whom；　for　the　sake　of　common　defence　against

their　common　enemies；　the　other　great　proprietors　paid　certain

respects。　To　have　enforced　payment　of　a　small　debt　within　the

lands　of　a　great　proprietor；　where　all　the　inhabitants　were　armed

and　accustomed　to　stand　by　one　another；　would　have　cost　the　king；

had　he　attempted　it　by　his　own　authority；　almost　the　same　effort

as　to　extinguish　a　civil　war。　He　was；　therefore；　obliged　to

abandon　the　administration　of　justice　through　the　greater　part　of

the　country　to　those　who　were　capable　of　administering　it；　and

for　the　same　reason　to　leave　the　command　of　the　country　militia

to　those　whom　that　militia　would　obey。

　　　　　It　is　a　mistake　to　imagine　that　those　territorial

jurisdictions　took　their　origin　from　the　feudal　law。　Not　only　the

highest　jurisdictions　both　civil　and　criminal；　but　the　power　of

levying　troops；　of　coining　money；　and　even　that　of　making

bye…laws　for　the　government　of　their　own　people；　were　all　rights

possessed　allodially　by　the　great　proprietors　of　land　several

centuries　before　even　the　name　of　the　feudal　law　was　known　in

Europe。　The　authority　and　jurisdiction　of　the　Saxon　lords　in

England　appear　to　have　been　as　great　before　the　Conquest　as　that

of　any　of　the　Norman　lords　after　it。　But　the　feudal　law　is　not

supposed　to　have　become　the　common　law　of　England　till　after　the

Conquest。　That　the　most　extensive　authority　and　jurisdictions

were　possessed　by　the　great　lords　in　France　allodially　long

before　the　feudal　law　was　introduced　into　that　country　is　a

matter　of　fact　that　admits　of　no　doubt。　That　authority　and　those

jurisdictions　all　necessarily　flowed　from　the　state　of　property

and　manners　just　now　described。　Without　remounting　to　the　remote

antiquities　of　either　the　French　or　English　monarchies；　we　may

find　in　much　later　times　many　proofs　that　such　effects　must

always　flow　from　such　causes。　It　is　not　thirty　years　ago　since

Mr。　Cameron　of　Lochiel；　a　gentleman　of　Lochabar　in　Scotland；

without　any　legal　warrant　whatever；　not　being　what　was　then

called　a　lord　of　regality；　nor　even　a　tenant　in　chief；　but　a

vassal　of　the　Duke　of　Argyle；　and　without　being　so　much　as　a

justice　of　peace；　used；　notwithstanding；　to　exercise　the　highest

criminal　jurisdiction　over　his　own　people。　He　is　said　to　have

done　so　with　great　equity；　though　without　any　of　the　formalities

of　justice；　and　it　is　not　improbable　that　the　state　of　that　part

of　the　country　at　that　time　made　it　necessary　for　him　to　assume

this　authority　in　order　to　maintain　the　public　peace。　That

gentleman；　whose　rent　never　exceeded　five　hundred　pounds　a　year；

carried；　in　1745；　eight　hundred　of　his　own　people　into　the

rebellion　with　him。

　　　　　The　introduction　of　the　feudal　law；　so　far　from　extending；

may　be　regarded　as　an　attempt　to　moderate　the　authority　of　the

great　allodial　lords。　It　established　a　regular　subordination；

accompanied　with　a　long　train　of　services　and　duties；　from　the

king　down　to　the　smallest　proprietor。　During　the　minority　of　the

proprietor；　the　rent；　together　with　the　management　of　his　lands；

fell　into　the　hands　of　his　immediate　superior；　and；　consequently；

those　of　all　great　proprietors　into　the　hands　of　the　king；　who

was　charged　with　the　maintenance　and　education　of　the　pupil；　and

who；　from　his　authority　as　guardian；　was　supposed　to　have　a　right

of　disposing　of　him　in　marriage；　provided　it　was　in　a　manner　not

unsuitable　to　his　rank。　But　though　this　institution　necessarily

tended　to　strengthen　the　authority　of　the　king；　and　to　weaken

that　of　the　great　proprietors；　it　could　not　do　either

sufficiently　for　establishing　order　and　good　government　among　the

inhabitants　of　the　country；　because　it　could　not　alter

sufficiently　that　state　of　property　and　manners　from　which　the

disorders　arose。　The　authority　of　government　still　continued　to

be；　as　before；　too　weak　in　the　head　and　too　strong　in　the

inferior　members；　and　the　excessive　strength　of　the　inferior

members　was　the　cause　of　the　weakness　of　the　head。　After　the

institution　of　feudal　subordination；　the　king　was　as　incapable　of

restraining　the　violence　of　the　great　lords　as　before。　They　still

continued　to　make　war　according　to　their　own　discretion；　almost

continually　upon　one　another；　and　very　frequently　upon　the　king；

and　the　open　country　still　continued　to　be　a　scene　of　violence；

rapine；　and　disorder。

　　　　　But　what　all　the　violence　of　the　feudal　institutions　could

never　have　effected；　the　silent　and　insensible　operation　of

foreign　commerce　and　manufactures　gradually　brought　about。　These

gradually　furnished　the　great　proprietors　with　something　for

which　they　could　exchange　the　whole　surplus　produce　of　their

lands；　and　which　they　could　consume　themselves　without　sharing　it

either　with　tenants　or　retainers。　All　for　ourselves　and　nothing

for　other　people；　seems；　in　every　age　of　the　world；　to　have　been

the　vile　maxim　of　the　masters　of　mankind。　As　soon；　therefore；　as

they　could　find　a　method　of　consuming　the　whole　value　of　their

rents　themselves；　they　had　no　disposition　to　share　them　with　any

other　persons。　For　a　pair　of　diamond　buckles；　perhaps；　or　for

something　as　frivolous　and　useless；　they　exchanged　the

maintenance；　or　what　is　the　same　thing；　the　price　of　the

maintenance　of　a　thousand　men　for　a　year；　and　with　it　the　whole

weight　and　authority　which　it　could　give　them。　The　buckles；

however；　were　to　be　all　their　own；　and　no　other　human　creature

was　to　have　any　share　of　them；　whereas　in　the　more　ancient　method

of　expense　they　must　have　shared　with　at　least　a　thousand　people。

With　the　judges　that　were　to　determine　the　preference　this

difference　was　perfectly　decisive；　and　thus；　for　the

gratification　of　the　most　childish；　the　meanest；　and　the　most

sordid　of　all　vanities；　they　gradually　bartered　their　whole　power

and　authority。

　　　　　In　a　country　where　there　is　no　foreign　commerce；　nor　any　of

the　finer　manufactures；　a　man　of　ten　thousand　a　year　cannot　well

employ　his　revenue　in　any　other　way　than　in　maintaining；　perhaps；

a　thousand　families；　who　are　all　of　them　necessarily　at　his

command。　In　the　present　state　of　Europe；　a　man　of　ten　thousand　a

year　can　spend　his　whole　revenue；　and　he　generally　does　so；

without　directly　maintaining　twenty　people；　or　being　able　to

command　more　than　ten　footmen　not　worth　the　commanding。

Indirectly；　perhaps；　he　maintains　as　great　or　even　a　greater

number　of　people　than　he　could　have　done　by　the　ancient　method　of

expense。　For　though　the　quantity　of　precious　productions　for

which　he　exchanges　his　whole　revenue　be　very　small；　the　number　of

workmen　employed　in　collecting　and　preparing　it　must　necessarily

have　been　very　great。　Its　great　price　generally　arises　from　the

wages　of　their　labour；　and　the　profits　of　all　their　immediate

employers。　By　paying　that　price　he　indirectly　pays　all　those

wages　and　profits　and　thus　indirectly　contributes　to　the

maintenance　of　all　the　workmen　and　their　employers。　He　generally

contributes；　however；　but　a　very　small　proportion　to　that　of

each；　to　very　few　perhaps　a　tenth；　to　many　not　a　hundredth；　and

to　some　not　a　thousandth；　nor　even　a　ten…thousandth　part　of　their

whole　annual　maintenance。　Though　he　contributes；　therefore；　to

the　maintenance　of　them　all；　they　are　all　more　or　less

independent　of　him；　because　generally　they　can　all　be　maintained

without　him。

　　　　　When　the　great　proprietors　of　land　spend　their　rents　in

m