introduction to the metaphysic of morals-µÚ5½Ú
°´¼üÅÌÉÏ·½Ïò¼ü ¡û »ò ¡ú ¿É¿ìËÙÉÏÏ·ҳ£¬°´¼üÅÌÉ쵀 Enter ¼ü¿É»Øµ½±¾ÊéĿ¼ҳ£¬°´¼üÅÌÉÏ·½Ïò¼ü ¡ü ¿É»Øµ½±¾Ò³¶¥²¿£¡
¡ª¡ª¡ª¡ªÎ´ÔĶÁÍꣿ¼ÓÈëÊéÇ©ÒѱãÏ´μÌÐøÔĶÁ£¡
feeling¡£¡¡We¡¡do¡¡not£»¡¡however£»¡¡take¡¡the¡¡moral¡¡feelings¡¡or¡¡sentiments
into¡¡account¡¡in¡¡considering¡¡the¡¡practical¡¡laws¡¡of¡¡reason¡£¡¡For¡¡they
do¡¡not¡¡form¡¡the¡¡foundation¡¡or¡¡principle¡¡of¡¡practical¡¡laws¡¡of¡¡reason£»
but¡¡only¡¡the¡¡subjective¡¡effects¡¡that¡¡arise¡¡in¡¡the¡¡mind¡¡on¡¡the¡¡occasion
of¡¡our¡¡voluntary¡¡activity¡¡being¡¡determined¡¡by¡¡these¡¡laws¡£¡¡And¡¡while
they¡¡neither¡¡add¡¡to¡¡nor¡¡take¡¡from¡¡the¡¡objective¡¡validity¡¡or
influence¡¡of¡¡the¡¡moral¡¡laws¡¡in¡¡the¡¡judgement¡¡of¡¡reason£»¡¡such
sentiments¡¡may¡¡vary¡¡according¡¡to¡¡the¡¡differences¡¡of¡¡the¡¡individuals
who¡¡experience¡¡them¡£
¡¡¡¡The¡¡following¡¡conceptions¡¡are¡¡common¡¡to¡¡jurisprudence¡¡and¡¡ethics
as¡¡the¡¡two¡¡main¡¡divisions¡¡of¡¡the¡¡metaphysic¡¡of¡¡morals¡£
¡¡¡¡Obligation¡¡is¡¡the¡¡necessity¡¡of¡¡a¡¡free¡¡action¡¡when¡¡viewed¡¡in¡¡relation
to¡¡a¡¡categorical¡¡imperative¡¡of¡¡reason¡£¡¡An¡¡imperative¡¡is¡¡a¡¡practical
rule¡¡by¡¡which¡¡an¡¡action£»¡¡otherwise¡¡contingent¡¡in¡¡itself£»¡¡is¡¡made
necessary¡£¡¡It¡¡is¡¡distinguished¡¡from¡¡a¡¡practical¡¡law¡¡in¡¡that¡¡such¡¡a
law£»¡¡while¡¡likewise¡¡representing¡¡the¡¡action¡¡as¡¡necessary£»¡¡does¡¡not
consider¡¡whether¡¡it¡¡is¡¡internally¡¡necessary¡¡as¡¡involved¡¡in¡¡the
nature¡¡of¡¡the¡¡agent¡¡¡say¡¡as¡¡a¡¡holy¡¡being¡¡¡or¡¡is¡¡contingent¡¡to¡¡him£»
as¡¡in¡¡the¡¡case¡¡of¡¡man¡¡as¡¡we¡¡find¡¡him£»¡¡for¡¡where¡¡the¡¡first¡¡condition
holds¡¡good£»¡¡there¡¡is¡¡in¡¡fact¡¡no¡¡imperative¡£¡¡Hence¡¡an¡¡imperative¡¡is¡¡a
rule¡¡which¡¡not¡¡only¡¡represents¡¡but¡¡makes¡¡a¡¡subjectively¡¡contingent
action¡¡necessary£»¡¡and¡¡it£»¡¡accordingly£»¡¡represents¡¡the¡¡subject¡¡as¡¡being
£¨morally£©¡¡necessitated¡¡to¡¡act¡¡in¡¡accordance¡¡with¡¡this¡¡rule¡£¡¡A
categorical¡¡or¡¡unconditional¡¡imperative¡¡is¡¡one¡¡which¡¡does¡¡not
represent¡¡the¡¡action¡¡in¡¡any¡¡way¡¡immediately¡¡through¡¡the¡¡conception
of¡¡an¡¡end¡¡that¡¡is¡¡to¡¡be¡¡attained¡¡by¡¡it£»¡¡but¡¡it¡¡presents¡¡the¡¡action
to¡¡the¡¡mind¡¡as¡¡objectively¡¡necessary¡¡by¡¡the¡¡mere¡¡representation¡¡of¡¡its
form¡¡as¡¡an¡¡action£»¡¡and¡¡thus¡¡makes¡¡it¡¡necessary¡£¡¡Such¡¡imperatives
cannot¡¡be¡¡put¡¡forward¡¡by¡¡any¡¡other¡¡practical¡¡science¡¡than¡¡that¡¡which
prescribes¡¡obligations£»¡¡and¡¡it¡¡is¡¡only¡¡the¡¡science¡¡of¡¡morals¡¡that¡¡does
this¡£¡¡All¡¡other¡¡imperatives¡¡are¡¡technical£»¡¡and¡¡they¡¡are¡¡altogether
conditional¡£¡¡The¡¡ground¡¡of¡¡the¡¡possibility¡¡of¡¡categorical
imperatives¡¡lies¡¡in¡¡the¡¡fact¡¡that¡¡they¡¡refer¡¡to¡¡no¡¡determination¡¡of
the¡¡activity¡¡of¡¡the¡¡will¡¡by¡¡which¡¡a¡¡purpose¡¡might¡¡be¡¡assigned¡¡to¡¡it£»
but¡¡solely¡¡to¡¡its¡¡freedom¡£
¡¡¡¡Every¡¡action¡¡is¡¡allowed¡¡£¨licitum£©¡¡which¡¡is¡¡not¡¡contrary¡¡to
obligation£»¡¡and¡¡this¡¡freedom¡¡not¡¡being¡¡limited¡¡by¡¡an¡¡opposing
imperative£»¡¡constitutes¡¡a¡¡moral¡¡right¡¡as¡¡a¡¡warrant¡¡or¡¡title¡¡of
action¡¡£¨facultas¡¡moralis£©¡£¡¡From¡¡this¡¡it¡¡is¡¡at¡¡once¡¡evident¡¡what
actions¡¡are¡¡disallowed¡¡or¡¡illicit¡¡£¨illicita£©¡£
¡¡¡¡Duty¡¡is¡¡the¡¡designation¡¡of¡¡any¡¡action¡¡to¡¡which¡¡anyone¡¡is¡¡bound¡¡by¡¡an
obligation¡£¡¡It¡¡is¡¡therefore¡¡the¡¡subject¡matter¡¡of¡¡all¡¡obligation¡£¡¡Duty
as¡¡regards¡¡the¡¡action¡¡concerned¡¡may¡¡be¡¡one¡¡and¡¡the¡¡same£»¡¡and¡¡yet¡¡we
may¡¡be¡¡bound¡¡to¡¡it¡¡in¡¡various¡¡ways¡£
¡¡¡¡The¡¡categorical¡¡imperative£»¡¡as¡¡expressing¡¡an¡¡obligation¡¡in¡¡respect
to¡¡certain¡¡actions£»¡¡is¡¡a¡¡morally¡¡practical¡¡law¡£¡¡But¡¡because¡¡obligation
involves¡¡not¡¡merely¡¡practical¡¡necessity¡¡expressed¡¡in¡¡a¡¡law¡¡as¡¡such£»
but¡¡also¡¡actual¡¡necessitation£»¡¡the¡¡categorical¡¡imperative¡¡is¡¡a¡¡law
either¡¡of¡¡command¡¡or¡¡prohibition£»¡¡according¡¡as¡¡the¡¡doing¡¡or¡¡not
doing¡¡of¡¡an¡¡action¡¡is¡¡represented¡¡as¡¡a¡¡duty¡£¡¡An¡¡action¡¡which¡¡is
neither¡¡commanded¡¡nor¡¡forbidden¡¡is¡¡merely¡¡allowed£»¡¡because¡¡there¡¡is¡¡no
law¡¡restricting¡¡freedom£»¡¡nor¡¡any¡¡duty¡¡in¡¡respect¡¡of¡¡it¡£¡¡Such¡¡an¡¡action
is¡¡said¡¡to¡¡be¡¡morally¡¡indifferent¡¡£¨indifferens£»¡¡adiaphoron£»¡¡res
merae¡¡facultatis£©¡£¡¡It¡¡may¡¡be¡¡asked¡¡whether¡¡there¡¡are¡¡such¡¡morally
indifferent¡¡actions£»¡¡and¡¡if¡¡there¡¡are£»¡¡whether¡¡in¡¡addition¡¡to¡¡the
preceptive¡¡and¡¡prohibitive¡¡law¡¡£¨lex¡¡praeceptiva¡¡et¡¡prohibitiva£»¡¡lex
mandati¡¡et¡¡vetiti£©£»¡¡there¡¡is¡¡also¡¡required¡¡a¡¡permissive¡¡law¡¡£¨lex
permissiva£©£»¡¡in¡¡order¡¡that¡¡one¡¡may¡¡be¡¡free¡¡in¡¡such¡¡relations¡¡to¡¡act£»
or¡¡to¡¡forbear¡¡from¡¡acting£»¡¡at¡¡his¡¡pleasure£¿¡¡If¡¡it¡¡were¡¡so£»¡¡the¡¡moral
right¡¡in¡¡question¡¡would¡¡not£»¡¡in¡¡all¡¡cases£»¡¡refer¡¡to¡¡actions¡¡that¡¡are
indifferent¡¡in¡¡themselves¡¡£¨adiaphora£©£»¡¡for¡¡no¡¡special¡¡law¡¡would¡¡be
required¡¡to¡¡establish¡¡such¡¡a¡¡right£»¡¡considered¡¡according¡¡to¡¡moral
laws¡£
¡¡¡¡An¡¡action¡¡is¡¡called¡¡an¡¡act¡¡¡or¡¡moral¡¡deed¡¡¡in¡¡so¡¡far¡¡as¡¡it¡¡is
subject¡¡to¡¡laws¡¡of¡¡obligation£»¡¡and¡¡consequently¡¡in¡¡so¡¡far¡¡as¡¡the
subject¡¡of¡¡it¡¡is¡¡regarded¡¡with¡¡reference¡¡to¡¡the¡¡freedom¡¡of¡¡his
choice¡¡in¡¡the¡¡exercise¡¡of¡¡his¡¡will¡£¡¡The¡¡agent¡¡¡as¡¡the¡¡actor¡¡or¡¡doer¡¡of
the¡¡deed¡¡¡is¡¡regarded¡¡as£»¡¡through¡¡the¡¡act£»¡¡the¡¡author¡¡of¡¡its¡¡effect£»
and¡¡this¡¡effect£»¡¡along¡¡with¡¡the¡¡action¡¡itself£»¡¡may¡¡be¡¡imputed¡¡to
him£»¡¡if¡¡be¡¡previously¡¡knew¡¡the¡¡law¡¡in¡¡virtue¡¡of¡¡which¡¡an¡¡obligation
rested¡¡upon¡¡him¡£
¡¡¡¡A¡¡person¡¡is¡¡a¡¡subject¡¡who¡¡is¡¡capable¡¡of¡¡having¡¡his¡¡actions¡¡imputed
to¡¡him¡£¡¡Moral¡¡personality¡¡is£»¡¡therefore£»¡¡nothing¡¡but¡¡the¡¡freedom¡¡of
a¡¡rational¡¡being¡¡under¡¡moral¡¡laws£»¡¡and¡¡it¡¡is¡¡to¡¡be¡¡distinguished
from¡¡psychological¡¡freedom¡¡as¡¡the¡¡mere¡¡faculty¡¡by¡¡which¡¡we¡¡become
conscious¡¡of¡¡ourselves¡¡in¡¡different¡¡states¡¡of¡¡the¡¡identity¡¡of¡¡our
existence¡£¡¡Hence¡¡it¡¡follows¡¡that¡¡a¡¡person¡¡is¡¡properly¡¡subject¡¡to¡¡no
other¡¡laws¡¡than¡¡those¡¡he¡¡lays¡¡down¡¡for¡¡himself£»¡¡either¡¡alone¡¡or¡¡in
conjunction¡¡with¡¡others¡£
¡¡¡¡A¡¡thing¡¡is¡¡what¡¡is¡¡incapable¡¡of¡¡being¡¡the¡¡subject¡¡of¡¡imputation¡£
Every¡¡object¡¡of¡¡the¡¡free¡¡activity¡¡of¡¡the¡¡will£»¡¡which¡¡is¡¡itself¡¡void¡¡of
freedom£»¡¡is¡¡therefore¡¡called¡¡a¡¡thing¡¡£¨res¡¡corporealis£©¡£
¡¡¡¡Right¡¡or¡¡wrong¡¡applies£»¡¡as¡¡a¡¡general¡¡quality£»¡¡to¡¡an¡¡act¡¡£¨rectum
aut¡¡minus¡¡rectum£©£»¡¡in¡¡so¡¡far¡¡as¡¡it¡¡is¡¡in¡¡accordance¡¡with¡¡duty¡¡or
contrary¡¡to¡¡duty¡¡£¨factum¡¡licitum¡¡aut¡¡illicitum£©£»¡¡no¡¡matter¡¡what¡¡may¡¡be
the¡¡subject¡¡or¡¡origin¡¡of¡¡the¡¡duty¡¡itself¡£¡¡An¡¡act¡¡that¡¡is¡¡contrary¡¡to
duty¡¡is¡¡called¡¡a¡¡transgression¡¡£¨reatus£©¡£
¡¡¡¡An¡¡unintentional¡¡transgression¡¡of¡¡a¡¡duty£»¡¡which¡¡is£»¡¡nevertheless£»
imputable¡¡to¡¡a¡¡person£»¡¡is¡¡called¡¡a¡¡mere¡¡fault¡¡£¨culpa£©¡£¡¡An
intentional¡¡transgression¡¡¡that¡¡is£»¡¡an¡¡act¡¡accompanied¡¡with¡¡the
consciousness¡¡that¡¡it¡¡is¡¡a¡¡transgression¡¡¡constitutes¡¡a¡¡crime¡¡£¨dolus£©¡£
¡¡¡¡Whatever¡¡is¡¡juridically¡¡in¡¡accordance¡¡with¡¡external¡¡laws¡¡is¡¡said
to¡¡be¡¡just¡¡£¨jus£»¡¡instum£©£»¡¡and¡¡whatever¡¡is¡¡not¡¡juridically¡¡in
accordance¡¡with¡¡external¡¡laws¡¡is¡¡unjust¡¡£¨unjustum£©¡£
¡¡¡¡A¡¡collision¡¡of¡¡duties¡¡or¡¡obligations¡¡£¨collisio¡¡officiorum¡¡s¡£
obligationum£©¡¡would¡¡be¡¡the¡¡result¡¡of¡¡such¡¡a¡¡relation¡¡between¡¡them¡¡that
the¡¡one¡¡would¡¡annul¡¡the¡¡other£»¡¡in¡¡whole¡¡or¡¡in¡¡part¡£¡¡Duty¡¡and
obligation£»¡¡however£»¡¡are¡¡conceptions¡¡which¡¡express¡¡the¡¡objective
practical¡¡necessity¡¡of¡¡certain¡¡actions£»¡¡and¡¡two¡¡opposite¡¡rules
cannot¡¡be¡¡objective¡¡and¡¡necessary¡¡at¡¡the¡¡same¡¡time£»¡¡for¡¡if¡¡it¡¡is¡¡a
duty¡¡to¡¡act¡¡according¡¡to¡¡one¡¡of¡¡them£»¡¡it¡¡is¡¡not¡¡only¡¡no¡¡duty¡¡to¡¡act
according¡¡to¡¡an¡¡opposite¡¡rule£»¡¡but¡¡to¡¡do¡¡so¡¡would¡¡even¡¡be¡¡contrary
to¡¡duty¡£¡¡Hence¡¡a¡¡collision¡¡of¡¡duties¡¡and¡¡obligations¡¡is¡¡entirely
inconceivable¡¡£¨obligationes¡¡non¡¡colliduntur£©¡£¡¡There¡¡may£»¡¡however£»¡¡be
two¡¡grounds¡¡of¡¡obligation¡¡£¨rationes¡¡obligandi£©£»¡¡connected¡¡with¡¡an
individual¡¡under¡¡a¡¡rule¡¡prescribed¡¡for¡¡himself£»¡¡and¡¡yet¡¡neither¡¡the
one¡¡nor¡¡the¡¡other¡¡may¡¡be¡¡sufficient¡¡to¡¡constitute¡¡an¡¡actual¡¡obligation
£¨rationes¡¡obligandi¡¡non¡¡obligantes£©£»¡¡and¡¡in¡¡that¡¡case¡¡the¡¡one¡¡of
them¡¡is¡¡not¡¡a¡¡duty¡£¡¡If¡¡two¡¡such¡¡grounds¡¡of¡¡obligation¡¡are¡¡actually
in¡¡collision¡¡with¡¡each¡¡other£»¡¡practical¡¡philosophy¡¡does¡¡not¡¡say¡¡that
the¡¡stronger¡¡obligation¡¡is¡¡to¡¡keep¡¡the¡¡upper¡¡hand¡¡£¨fortior¡¡obligatio
vincit£©£»¡¡but¡¡that¡¡the¡¡stronger¡¡ground¡¡of¡¡obligation¡¡is¡¡to¡¡maintain¡¡its
place¡¡£¨fortior¡¡obligandi¡¡ratio¡¡vincit£©¡£
¡¡¡¡Obligatory¡¡Laws¡¡for¡¡which¡¡an¡¡external¡¡legislation¡¡is¡¡possible¡¡are
called¡¡generally¡¡external¡¡laws¡£¡¡Those¡¡external¡¡laws£»¡¡the
obligatoriness¡¡of¡¡which¡¡can¡¡be¡¡recognised¡¡by¡¡reason¡¡a¡¡priori¡¡even
without¡¡an¡¡external¡¡legislation£»¡¡are¡¡called¡¡natural¡¡laws¡£¡¡Those
laws£»¡¡again£»¡¡which¡¡are¡¡not¡¡obligatory¡¡without¡¡actual¡¡external
legislation£»¡¡are¡¡called¡¡positive¡¡laws¡£¡¡An¡¡external¡¡legislation£»
containing¡¡pure¡¡natural¡¡laws£»¡¡is¡¡therefore¡¡conceivable£»¡¡but¡¡in¡¡that
case¡¡a¡¡previous¡¡natural¡¡law¡¡must¡¡be¡¡presupposed¡¡to¡¡establish¡¡the
authority¡¡of¡¡the¡¡lawgiver¡¡by¡¡the¡¡right¡¡to¡¡subject¡¡others¡¡to¡¡obligation
through¡¡his¡¡own¡¡act¡¡of¡¡will¡£
¡¡¡¡The¡¡principle¡¡which¡¡makes¡¡a¡¡certain¡¡action¡¡a¡¡duty¡¡is¡¡a¡¡practical
law¡£¡¡The¡¡rule¡¡of¡¡the¡¡agent¡¡or¡¡actor£»¡¡which¡¡he¡¡forms¡¡as¡¡a¡¡principle¡¡for
himself¡¡on¡¡subjective¡¡grounds£»¡¡is¡¡called¡¡his¡¡maxim¡£¡¡Hence£»¡¡even¡¡when
the¡¡law¡¡is¡¡one¡¡and¡¡invariable£»¡¡the¡¡maxims¡¡of¡¡the¡¡agent¡¡may¡¡yet¡¡be¡¡very
different¡£
¡¡¡¡The¡¡categorical¡¡imperative¡¡only¡¡expresses¡¡generally¡¡what¡¡constitutes
obligation¡£¡¡It¡¡may¡¡be¡¡rendered¡¡by¡¡the¡¡following¡¡formula£º¡¡¡¨Act
according¡¡to¡¡a¡¡maxim¡¡which¡¡can¡¡be¡¡adopted¡¡at¡¡the¡¡same¡¡time¡¡as¡¡a
universal¡¡law¡£¡¨¡¡Actions¡¡must¡¡therefore¡¡be¡¡considered£»¡¡in¡¡the¡¡first
place£»¡¡according¡¡to¡¡their¡¡subjective¡¡principle£»¡¡but¡¡whether¡¡this
principle¡¡is¡¡also¡¡valid¡¡objectively¡¡can¡¡only¡¡be¡¡known¡¡by¡¡the¡¡criterion
of¡¡the¡¡categorical¡¡imperative¡£¡¡For¡¡reason¡¡brings¡¡the¡¡principle¡¡or
maxim¡¡of¡¡any¡¡action¡¡to¡¡the¡¡test£»¡¡by¡¡calling¡¡upon¡¡the¡¡agent¡¡to¡¡think¡¡of
himself¡¡in¡¡connection¡¡with¡¡it¡¡as¡¡at¡¡the¡¡same¡¡time¡¡laying¡¡down¡¡a
universal¡¡law£»¡¡and¡¡to¡¡consider¡¡whether¡¡his¡¡action¡¡is¡¡so¡¡qualified¡¡as
to¡¡be¡¡fit¡¡for¡¡entering¡¡into¡¡such¡¡a¡¡universal¡¡legislation¡£
¡¡¡¡The¡¡simplicity¡¡of¡¡this¡¡law£»¡¡in¡¡comparison¡¡with¡¡the¡¡great¡¡and
manifold¡¡consequences¡¡which¡¡ma