introduction to the metaphysic of morals-第4节

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by　practical　rules。　By　the　second　element；　the　obligation　so　to　act　is

connected　in　the　subject　with　a　determining　principle　of　the　will　as

such。　All　legislation；　therefore；　may　be　differentiated　by　reference

to　its　motive…principle。*　The　legislation　which　makes　an　action　a

duty；　and　this　duty　at　the　same　time　a　motive；　is　ethical。　That

legislation　which　does　not　include　the　motive…principle　in　the　law；

and　consequently　admits　another　motive　than　the　idea　of　duty　itself；

is　juridical。　In　respect　of　the　latter；　it　is　evident　that　the　motives

distinct　from　the　idea　of　duty；　to　which　it　may　refer；　must　be　drawn

from　the　subjective　（pathological）　influences　of　inclination　and　of

aversion；　determining　the　voluntary　activity；　and　especially　from

the　latter；　because　it　is　a　legislation　which　has　to　be　compulsory；

and　not　merely　a　mode　of　attracting　or　persuading。　The　agreement　or

non…agreement　of　an　action　with　the　law；　without　reference　to　its

motive；　is　its　legality；　and　that　character　of　the　action　in　which　the

idea　of　duty　arising　from　the　law　at　the　same　time　forms　the　motive　of

the　action；　is　its　morality。



　　*This　ground　of　division　will　apply；　although　the　action　which　it

makes　a　duty　may　coincide　with　another　action　that　may　be　otherwise

looked　at　from　another　point　of　view。　For　instance；　actions　may　in　all

cases　be　classified　as　external。



　　Duties　specially　in　accord　with　a　juridical　legislation　can　only

be　external　duties。　For　this　mode　of　legislation　does　not　require　that

the　idea　of　the　duty；　which　is　internal；　shall　be　of　itself　the

determining　principle　of　the　act　of　will；　and　as　it　requires　a

motive　suitable　to　the　nature　of　its　laws；　it　can　only　connect　what　is

external　with　the　law。　Ethical　legislation；　on　the　other　hand；　makes

internal　actions　also　duties；　but　not　to　the　exclusion　of　the

external；　for　it　embraces　everything　which　is　of　the　nature　of　duty。

And　just　because　just　because　ethical　legislation　includes　within

its　law　the　internal　motive　of　the　action　as　contained　in　the　idea

of　duty；　it　involves　a　characteristic　which　cannot　at　all　enter　into

the　legislation　that　is　external。　Hence；　ethical　legislation　cannot　as

such　be　external；　not　even　when　proceeding　from　a　Divine　will；

although　it　may　receive　duties　which　rest　on　an　external　legislation

as　duties；　into　the　position　of　motives；　within　its　own　legislation。

　　From　what　has　been　said；　it　is　evident　that　all　duties；　merely

because　they　are　duties；　belong　to　ethics；　and　yet　the　legislation

upon　which　they　are　founded　is　not　on　that　account　in　all　cases

contained　in　ethics。　On　the　contrary；　the　law　of　many　of　them　lies

outside　of　ethics。　Thus　ethics　commands　that　I　must　fulfil　a　promise

entered　into　by　contract；　although　the　other　party　might　not　be　able

to　compel　me　to　do　so。　It　adopts　the　law　（pacta　sunt　servanda）　and　the

duty　corresponding　to　it；　from　jurisprudence　or　the　science　of

right；　by　which　they　are　established。　It　is　not　in　ethics；

therefore；　but　in　jurisprudence；　that　the　principle　of　the　legislation

lies；　that　〃promises　made　and　accepted　must　be　kept。〃　Accordingly；

ethics　specially　teaches　that　if　the　motive…principle　of　external

compulsion　which　juridical　legislation　connects　with　a　duty　is　even

let　go；　the　idea　of　duty　alone　is　sufficient　of　itself　as　a　motive。

For　were　it　not　so；　and　were　the　legislation　itself　not　juridical；　and

consequently　the　duty　arising　from　it　not　specially　a　duty　of　right　as

distinguished　from　a　duty　of　virtue；　then　fidelity　in　the

performance　of　acts；　to　which　the　individual　may　be　bound　by　the　terms

of　a　contract；　would　have　to　be　classified　with　acts　of　benevolence

and　the　obligation　that　underlies　them；　which　cannot　be　correct。　To

keep　one's　promise　is　not　properly　a　duty　of　virtue；　but　a　duty　of

right；　and　the　performance　of　it　can　be　enforced　by　external

compulsion。　But　to　keep　one's　promise；　even　when　no　compulsion　can

be　applied　to　enforce　it；　is；　at　the　same　time；　a　virtuous　action；　and

a　proof　of　virtue。　jurisprudence　as　the　science　of　right；　and　ethics

as　the　science　of　virtue；　are　therefore　distinguished　not　so　much　by

their　different　duties；　as　rather　by　the　difference　Of　the　legislation

which　connects　the　one　or　the　other　kind　of　motive　with　their　laws。

　　Ethical　legislation　is　that　which　cannot　be　external；　although　the

duties　it　prescribes　may　be　external　as　well　as　internal。　Juridical

legislation　is　that　which　may　also　be　external。　Thus　it　is　an　external

duty　to　keep　a　promise　entered　into　by　contract；　but　the　injunction　to

do　this　merely　because　it　is　a　duty；　without　regard　to　any　other

motive；　belongs　exclusively　to　the　internal　legislation。　It　does　not

belong　thus　to　the　ethical　sphere　as　being　a　particular　kind　of　duty

or　a　particular　mode　of　action　to　which　we　are　bound…　for　it　is　an

external　duty　in　ethics　as　well　as　in　jurisprudence…　but　it　is　because

the　legislation　in　the　case　referred　to　is　internal；　and　cannot　have

an　external　lawgiver；　that　the　obligation　is　reckoned　as　belonging

to　ethics。　For　the　same　reason；　the　duties　of　benevolence；　although

they　are　external　duties　as　obligations　to　external　actions；　are；　in

like　manner；　reckoned　as　belonging　to　ethics；　because　they　can　only　be

enjoined　by　legislation　that　is　internal。　Ethics　has　no　doubt　its

own　peculiar　duties…　such　as　those　towards　oneself…　but　it　bas　also

duties　in　common　with　jurisprudence；　only　not　under　the　same　mode　of

obligation。　In　short；　the　peculiarity　of　ethical　legislation　is　to

enjoin　the　performance　of　certain　actions　merely　because　they　are

duties；　and　to　make　the　principle　of　duty　itself…　whatever　be　its

source　or　occasion…　the　sole　sufficing　motive　of　the　activity　of　the

will。　Thus；　then；　there　are　many　ethical　duties　that　are　directly

such；　and　the　inner　legislation　also　makes　the　others…　all　and　each　of

them…　indirectly　ethical。

　　The　deduction　of　the　division　of　a　system　is　the　proof　of　its

completeness　as　well　as　of　its　continuity；　so　that　there　may　be　a

logical　transition　from　the　general　conception　divided　to　the

members　of　the　division；　and　through　the　whole　series　of　the

subdivisions　without　any　break　or　leap　in　the　arrangement　（divisio　per

saltum）。　Such　a　division　is　one　of　the　most　difficult　conditions　for

the　architect　of　a　system　to　fulfil。　There　is　even　some　doubt　as　to

what　is　the　highest　conception　that　is　primarily　divided　into　right

and　wrong　（aut　fas　aut　nefas）。　It　is　assuredly　the　conception　of　the

activity　of　the　free…will　in　general。　In　like　manner；　the　expounders

of　ontology　start　from　something　and　nothing；　without　perceiving

that　these　are　already　members　of　a　division　for　which　the　highest

divided　conception　is　awanting；　and　which　can　be　no　other　than　that　of

thing　in　general。





　　　　　IV。　GENERAL　PRELIMINARY　CONCEPTIONS　DEFINED　AND　EXPLAINED。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（Philosophia　practica　universalis）。



　　The　conception　of　freedom　is　a　conception　of　pure　reason。　It　is

therefore　transcendent　in　so　far　as　regards　theoretical　philosophy；

for　it　is　a　conception　for　which　no　corresponding　instance　or

example　can　be　found　or　supplied　in　any　possible　experience。

Accordingly　freedom　is　not　presented　as　an　object　of　any　theoretical

knowledge　that　is　possible　for　us。　It　is　in　no　respect　a　constitutive；

but　only　a　regulative　conception；　and　it　can　be　accepted　by　the

speculative　reason　as　at　most　a　merely　negative　principle。　In　the

practical　sphere　of　reason；　however；　the　reality　of　freedom　may　be

demonstrated　by　certain　practical　principles　which；　as　laws；　prove　a

causality　of　the　pure　reason　in　the　process　of　determining　the

activity　of　the　will　that　is　independent　of　all　empirical　and　sensible

conditions。　And　thus　there　is　established　the　fact　of　a　pure　will

existing　in　us　as　the　source　of　all　moral　conceptions　and　laws。

　　On　this　positive　conception　of　freedom　in　the　practical　relation

certain　unconditional　practical　laws　are　founded；　and　they　specially

constitute　moral　laws。　In　relation　to　us　as　human　beings；　with　an

activity　of　will　modified　by　sensible　influences　so　as　not　to　be

conformable　to　the　pure　will；　but　as　often　contrary　to　it；　these

laws　appear　as　imperatives　commanding　or　prohibiting　certain

actions；　and　as　such　they　are　categorical　or　unconditional

imperatives。　Their　categorical　and　unconditional　character

distinguishes　them　from　the　technical　imperatives　which　express　the

prescriptions　of　art；　and　which　always　command　only　conditionally。

According　to　these　categorical　imperatives；　certain　actions　are

allowed　or　disallowed　as　being　morally　possible　or　impossible；　and

certain　of　them　or　their　opposites　are　morally　necessary　and

obligatory。　Hence；　in　reference　to　such　actions；　there　arises　the

conception　of　a　duty　whose　observance　or　transgression　is

accompanied　with　a　pleasure　or　pain　of　a　peculiar　kind；　known　as　moral

feeling。　We　do　not；　however；　take　the　moral　feelings　or　sentiments

into