on memory and reminiscence-第3节
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(of some objective series)。 For; in order of succession; the
mnemonic movements are to one another as the objective facts (from
which they are derived)。 Accordingly; things arranged in a fixed
order; like the successive demonstrations in geometry; are easy to
remember (or recollect) while badly arranged subjects are remembered
with difficulty。
Recollecting differs also in this respect from relearning; that
one who recollects will be able; somehow; to move; solely by his own
effort; to the term next after the starting…point。 When one cannot
do this of himself; but only by external assistance; he no longer
remembers (i。e。 he has totally forgotten; and therefore of course
cannot recollect)。 It often happens that; though a person cannot
recollect at the moment; yet by seeking he can do so; and discovers
what he seeks。 This he succeeds in doing by setting up many movements;
until finally he excites one of a kind which will have for its
sequel the fact he wishes to recollect。 For remembering (which is
the condicio sine qua non of recollecting) is the existence;
potentially; in the mind of a movement capable of stimulating it to
the desired movement; and this; as has been said; in such a way that
the person should be moved (prompted to recollection) from within
himself; i。e。 in consequence of movements wholly contained within
himself。
But one must get hold of a starting…point。 This explains why it is
that persons are supposed to recollect sometimes by starting from
mnemonic loci。 The cause is that they pass swiftly in thought from one
point to another; e。g。 from milk to white; from white to mist; and
thence to moist; from which one remembers Autumn (the 'season of
mists'); if this be the season he is trying to recollect。
It seems true in general that the middle point also among all things
is a good mnemonic starting…point from which to reach any of them。 For
if one does not recollect before; he will do so when he has come to
this; or; if not; nothing can help him; as; e。g。 if one were to have
in mind the numerical series denoted by the symbols A; B; G; D; E;
Z; I; H; O。 For; if he does not remember what he wants at E; then at E
he remembers O; because from E movement in either direction is
possible; to D or to Z。 But; if it is not for one of these that he
is searching; he will remember (what he is searching for) when he
has come to G if he is searching for H or I。 But if (it is) not (for H
or I that he is searching; but for one of the terms that remain); he
will remember by going to A; and so in all cases (in which one
starts from a middle point)。 The cause of one's sometimes recollecting
and sometimes not; though starting from the same point; is; that
from the same starting…point a movement can be made in several
directions; as; for instance; from G to I or to D。 If; then; the
mind has not (when starting from E) moved in an old path (i。e。 one
in which it moved first having the objective experience; and that;
therefore; in which un…'ethized' phusis would have it again move);
it tends to move to the more customary; for (the mind having; by
chance or otherwise; missed moving in the 'old' way) Custom now
assumes the role of Nature。 Hence the rapidity with which we recollect
what we frequently think about。 For as regular sequence of events is
in accordance with nature; so; too; regular sequence is observed in
the actualization of kinesis (in consciousness); and here frequency
tends to produce (the regularity of) nature。 And since in the realm of
nature occurrences take place which are even contrary to nature; or
fortuitous; the same happens a fortiori in the sphere swayed by
custom; since in this sphere natural law is not similarly established。
Hence it is that (from the same starting…point) the mind receives an
impulse to move sometimes in the required direction; and at other
times otherwise; (doing the latter) particularly when something else
somehow deflects the mind from the right direction and attracts it
to itself。 This last consideration explains too how it happens that;
when we want to remember a name; we remember one somewhat like it;
indeed; but blunder in reference to (i。e。 in pronouncing) the one we
intended。
Thus; then; recollection takes place。
But the point of capital importance is that (for the purpose of
recollection) one should cognize; determinately or indeterminately;
the time…relation (of that which he wishes to recollect)。 There
is;…let it be taken as a fact;…something by which one distinguishes
a greater and a smaller time; and it is reasonable to think that one
does this in a way analogous to that in which one discerns (spacial)
magnitudes。 For it is not by the mind's reaching out towards them;
as some say a visual ray from the eye does (in seeing); that one
thinks of large things at a distance in space (for even if they are
not there; one may similarly think them); but one does so by a
proportionate mental movement。 For there are in the mind the like
figures and movements (i。e。 'like' to those of objects and events)。
Therefore; when one thinks the greater objects; in what will his
thinking those differ from his thinking the smaller? (In nothing;)
because all the internal though smaller are as it were proportional to
the external。 Now; as we may assume within a person something
proportional to the forms (of distant magnitudes); so; too; we may
doubtless assume also something else proportional to their
distances。 As; therefore; if one has (psychically) the movement in AB;
BE; he constructs in thought (i。e。 knows objectively) GD; since AG and
GD bear equal ratios respectively (to AB and BE); (so he who
recollects also proceeds)。 Why then does he construct GD rather than
ZH? Is it not because as AG is to AB; so is O to I? These movements
therefore (sc。 in AB; BE; and in O:I) he has simultaneously。 But if he
wishes to construct to thought ZH; he has in mind BE in like manner as
before (when constructing GD); but now; instead of (the movements of
the ratio) O:I; he has in mind (those of the ratio K:L; for
K:L::ZA:BA。 (See diagram。)
When; therefore; the 'movement' corresponding to the object and that
corresponding to its time concur; then one actually remembers。 If
one supposes (himself to move in these different but concurrent
ways) without really doing so; he supposes himself to remember。
For one may be mistaken; and think that he remembers when he
really does not。 But it is not possible; conversely; that when one
actually remembers he should not suppose himself to remember; but
should remember unconsciously。 For remembering; as we have conceived
it; essentially implies consciousness of itself。 If; however; the
movement corresponding to the objective fact takes place without
that corresponding to the time; or; if the latter takes place
without the former; one does not remember。
The movement answering to the time is of two kinds。 Sometimes in
remembering a fact one has no determinate time…notion of it; no such
notion as that e。g。 he did something or other on the day before
yesterday; while in other cases he has a determinate notion…of the
time。 Still; even though one does not remember with actual
determination of the time; he genuinely remembers; none the less。
Persons are wont to say that they remember (something); but yet do not
know when (it occurred; as happens) whenever they do not know
determinately the exact length of time implied in the 'when'。
It has been already stated that those who have a good memory are not
identical with those who are quick at recollecting。 But the act of
recollecting differs from that of remembering; not only
chronologically; but also in this; that many also of the other animals
(as well as man) have memory; but; of all that we are acquainted with;
none; we venture to say; except man; shares in the faculty of
recollection。 The cause of this is that recollection is; as it were
a mode of inference。 For he who endeavours to recollect infers that he
formerly saw; or heard; or had some such experience; and the process
(by which he succeeds in recollecting) is; as it were; a sort of
investigation。 But to investigate in this way belongs naturally to
those animals alone which are also endowed with the faculty of
deliberation; (which proves what was said above); for deliberation
is a form of inference。
That the affection is corporeal; i。e。 that recollection is a
searching for an 'image' in a corporeal substrate; is proved by the
fact that in some persons; when; despite the most strenuous
application of thought; they have been unable to recollect; it (viz。
the anamnesis = the effort at recollection) excites a feeling of
discomfor