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马基雅维里 君主论英文prince-第8节

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citizen makes a foundation there; and persuades himself that the people

will free him when he is oppressed by his enemies or by the magistrates;

wherein he would find himself very often deceived; as happened to the

Gracchi in Rome and to Messer Giorgio Scali in Florence。 But granted a

prince who has established himself as above; who can mand; and is a

man of courage; undismayed in adversity; who does not fail in other

qualifications; and who; by his resolution and energy; keeps the whole

people encouraged  such a one will never find himself deceived in

them; and it will be shown that he has laid his foundations well。



These principalities are liable to danger when they are passing from the

civil to the absolute order of government; for such princes either rule

personally or through magistrates。 In the latter case their government

is weaker and more insecure; because it rests entirely on the goodwill

of those citizens who are raised to the magistracy; and who; especially

in troubled times; can destroy the government with great ease; either by

intrigue or open defiance; and the prince has not the chance amid

tumults to exercise absolute authority; because the citizens and

subjects; accustomed to receive orders from magistrates; are not of a

mind to obey him amid these confusions; and there will always be in

doubtful times a scarcity of men whom he can trust。 For such a prince

cannot rely upon what he observes in quiet times; when citizens had need

of the state; because then every one agrees with him; they all promise;

and when death is far distant they all wish to die for him; but in

troubled times; when the state has need of its citizens; then he finds

but few。 And so much the more is this experiment dangerous; inasmuch as

it can only be tried once。 Therefore a wise prince ought to adopt such a

course that his citizens will always in every sort and kind of

circumstance have need of the state and of him; and then he will always

find them faithful。



CHAPTER X



CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH THE STRENGTH OF ALL PRINCIPALITIES OUGHT TO

BE MEASURED



IT IS necessary to consider another point in examining the character of

these principalities: that is; whether a prince has such power that; in

case of need; he can support himself with his own resources; or whether

he has always need of the assistance of others。 And to make this quite

clear I say that I consider those are able to support themselves by

their own resources who can; either by abundance of men or money; raise

a sufficient army to join battle against any one who es to attack

them; and I consider those always to have need of others who cannot show

themselves against the enemy in the field; but are forced to defend

themselves by sheltering behind walls。 The first case has been

discussed; but we will speak of it again should it recur。 In the second

case one can say nothing except to encourage such princes to provision

and fortify their towns; and not on any account to defend the country。

And whoever shall fortify his town well; and shall have managed the

other concerns of his subjects in the way stated above; and to be often

repeated; will never be attacked without great caution; for men are

always adverse to enterprises where difficulties can be seen; and it

will be seen not to be an easy thing to attack one who has his town well

fortified; and is not hated by his people。



The cities of Germany are absolutely free; they own but little country

around them; and they yield obedience to the emperor when it suits them;

nor do they fear this or any other power they may have near them;

because they are fortified in such a way that every one thinks the

taking of them by assault would be tedious and difficult; seeing they

have proper ditches and walls; they have sufficient artillery; and they

always keep in public depots enough for one year's eating; drinking; and

firing。 And beyond this; to keep the people quiet and without loss to

the state; they always have the means of giving work to the munity in

those labours that are the life and strength of the city; and on the

pursuit of which the people are supported; they also hold military

exercises in repute; and moreover have many ordinances to uphold them。



Therefore; a prince who has a strong city; and had not made himself

odious; will not be attacked; or if any one should attack he will only

be driven off with disgrace; again; because that affairs of this world

are so changeable; it is almost impossible to keep an army a whole year

in the field without being interfered with。 And whoever should reply: If

the people have property outside the city; and see it burnt; they will

not remain patient; and the long siege and self…interest will make them

forget their prince; to this I answer that a powerful and courageous

prince will overe all such difficulties by giving at one time hope to

his subjects that the evil will not be for long; at another time fear of

the cruelty of the enemy; then preserving himself adroitly from those

subjects who seem to him to be too bold。



Further; the enemy would naturally on his arrival at once burn and ruin

the country at the time when the spirits of the people are still hot and

ready for the defence; and; therefore; so much the less ought the prince

to hesitate; because after a time; when spirits have cooled; the damage

is already done; the ills are incurred; and there is no longer any

remedy; and therefore they are so much the more ready to unite with

their prince; he appearing to be under obligations to them now that

their houses have been burnt and their possessions ruined in his

defence。 For it is the nature of men to be bound by the benefits they

confer as much as by those they receive。 Therefore; if everything is

well considered; it wilt not be difficult for a wise prince to keep the

minds of his citizens steadfast from first to last; when he does not

fail to support and defend them。



CHAPTER XI



CONCERNING ECCLESIASTICAL PRINCIPALITIES



IT ONLY remains now to speak of ecclesiastical principalities; touching

which all difficulties are prior to getting possession; because they are

acquired either by capacity or good fortune; and they can be held

without either; for they are sustained by the ordinances of religion;

which are so all…powerful; and of such a character that the

principalities may be held no matter how their princes behave and live。

These princes alone have states and do not defend them; they have

subjects and do not rule them; and the states; although unguarded; are

not taken from them; and the subjects; although not ruled; do not care;

and they have neither the desire nor the ability to alienate themselves。

Such principalities only are secure and happy。 But being upheld by

powers; to which the human mind cannot reach; I shall speak no more of

them; because; being exalted and maintained by God; it would be the act

of a presumptuous and rash man to discuss them。



Nevertheless; if any one should ask of me how es it that the Church

has attained such greatness in temporal power; seeing that from

Alexander backwards the Italian potentates (not only those who have been

called potentates; but every baron and lord; though the smallest) have

valued the temporal power very slightly  yet now a king of France

trembles before it; and it has been able to drive him from Italy; and to

ruin the Venetians  although this may be very manifest; it does not

appear to me superfluous to recall it in some measure to memory。



Before Charles; King of France; passed into Italy; this country was

under the dominion of the Pope; the Venetians; the King of Naples; the

Duke of Milan; and the Florentines。 These potentates had two principal

anxieties: the one; that no foreigner should enter Italy under arms; the

other; that none of themselves should seize more territory。 Those about

whom there was the most anxiety were the Pope and the Venetians。 To

restrain the Venetians the union of all the others was necessary; as it

was for the defence of Ferrara; and to keep down the Pope they made use

of the barons of Rome; who; being divided into two factions; Orsini and

Colonna; had always a pretext for disorder; and; standing with arms in

their hands under the eyes of the Pontiff; kept the pontificate weak and

powerless。 And although there might arise sometimes a courageous pope;

such as Sixtus 'IV'; yet neither fortune nor wisdom could rid him of

these annoyances。 And the short life of a pope is also a cause of

weakness; for in the ten years; which is the average life of a pope; he

can with difficulty lower one of the factions; and if; so to speak; one

pope should almost destroy the Colonna; another would arise hostile to

the Orsini; who would support their opponents; and yet would not have

time to ruin the Orsini。 This was the reason why the temporal powers of

the pope were little esteemed in Italy。



Alexander VI arose 

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