orthodoxy-第8节

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The　young　sceptic　says；　〃I　have　a　right　to　think　for　myself。〃　



But　the　old　sceptic；　the　complete　sceptic；　says；　〃I　have　no　right



to　think　for　myself。　　I　have　no　right　to　think　at　all。〃







　　　　　There　is　a　thought　that　stops　thought。　　That　is　the　only　thought



that　ought　to　be　stopped。　　That　is　the　ultimate　evil　against　which



all　religious　authority　was　aimed。　　It　only　appears　at　the　end　of



decadent　ages　like　our　own：　　and　already　Mr。　H。G。Wells　has　raised　its



ruinous　banner；　he　has　written　a　delicate　piece　of　scepticism　called



〃Doubts　of　the　Instrument。〃　　In　this　he　questions　the　brain　itself；



and　endeavours　to　remove　all　reality　from　all　his　own　assertions；



past；　present；　and　to　come。　　But　it　was　against　this　remote　ruin



that　all　the　military　systems　in　religion　were　originally　ranked



and　ruled。　　The　creeds　and　the　crusades；　the　hierarchies　and　the



horrible　persecutions　were　not　organized；　as　is　ignorantly　said；



for　the　suppression　of　reason。　　They　were　organized　for　the　difficult



defence　of　reason。　　Man；　by　a　blind　instinct；　knew　that　if　once



things　were　wildly　questioned；　reason　could　be　questioned　first。　



The　authority　of　priests　to　absolve；　the　authority　of　popes　to　define



the　authority；　even　of　inquisitors　to　terrify：　　these　were　all　only　dark



defences　erected　round　one　central　authority；　more　undemonstrable；



more　supernatural　than　allthe　authority　of　a　man　to　think。　



We　know　now　that　this　is　so；　we　have　no　excuse　for　not　knowing　it。　



For　we　can　hear　scepticism　crashing　through　the　old　ring　of　authorities；



and　at　the　same　moment　we　can　see　reason　swaying　upon　her　throne。　



In　so　far　as　religion　is　gone；　reason　is　going。　　For　they　are　both



of　the　same　primary　and　authoritative　kind。　　They　are　both　methods



of　proof　which　cannot　themselves　be　proved。　　And　in　the　act　of



destroying　the　idea　of　Divine　authority　we　have　largely　destroyed



the　idea　of　that　human　authority　by　which　we　do　a　long…division　sum。　



With　a　long　and　sustained　tug　we　have　attempted　to　pull　the　mitre



off　pontifical　man；　and　his　head　has　come　off　with　it。







　　　　　Lest　this　should　be　called　loose　assertion；　it　is　perhaps　desirable；



though　dull；　to　run　rapidly　through　the　chief　modern　fashions



of　thought　which　have　this　effect　of　stopping　thought　itself。　



Materialism　and　the　view　of　everything　as　a　personal　illusion



have　some　such　effect；　for　if　the　mind　is　mechanical；



thought　cannot　be　very　exciting；　and　if　the　cosmos　is　unreal；



there　is　nothing　to　think　about。　　But　in　these　cases　the　effect



is　indirect　and　doubtful。　　In　some　cases　it　is　direct　and　clear；



notably　in　the　case　of　what　is　generally　called　evolution。







　　　　　Evolution　is　a　good　example　of　that　modern　intelligence　which；



if　it　destroys　anything；　destroys　itself。　　Evolution　is　either



an　innocent　scientific　description　of　how　certain　earthly　things



came　about；　or；　if　it　is　anything　more　than　this；　it　is　an　attack



upon　thought　itself。　　If　evolution　destroys　anything；　it　does　not



destroy　religion　but　rationalism。　　If　evolution　simply　means　that



a　positive　thing　called　an　ape　turned　very　slowly　into　a　positive



thing　called　a　man；　then　it　is　stingless　for　the　most　orthodox；



for　a　personal　God　might　just　as　well　do　things　slowly　as　quickly；



especially　if；　like　the　Christian　God；　he　were　outside　time。　



But　if　it　means　anything　more；　it　means　that　there　is　no　such



thing　as　an　ape　to　change；　and　no　such　thing　as　a　man　for　him



to　change　into。　　It　means　that　there　is　no　such　thing　as　a　thing。　



At　best；　there　is　only　one　thing；　and　that　is　a　flux　of　everything



and　anything。　　This　is　an　attack　not　upon　the　faith；　but　upon



the　mind；　you　cannot　think　if　there　are　no　things　to　think　about。　



You　cannot　think　if　you　are　not　separate　from　the　subject　of　thought。　



Descartes　said；　〃I　think；　therefore　I　am。〃　　The　philosophic　evolutionist



reverses　and　negatives　the　epigram。　　He　says；　〃I　am　not；　therefore　I



cannot　think。〃







　　　　　Then　there　is　the　opposite　attack　on　thought：　　that　urged　by



Mr。　H。G。Wells　when　he　insists　that　every　separate　thing　is　〃unique；〃



and　there　are　no　categories　at　all。　　This　also　is　merely　destructive。　



Thinking　means　connecting　things；　and　stops　if　they　cannot　be　connected。　



It　need　hardly　be　said　that　this　scepticism　forbidding　thought



necessarily　forbids　speech；　a　man　cannot　open　his　mouth　without



contradicting　it。　　Thus　when　Mr。　Wells　says　（as　he　did　somewhere）；



〃All　chairs　are　quite　different；〃　he　utters　not　merely　a　misstatement；



but　a　contradiction　in　terms。　　If　all　chairs　were　quite　different；



you　could　not　call　them　〃all　chairs。〃







　　　　　Akin　to　these　is　the　false　theory　of　progress；　which　maintains



that　we　alter　the　test　instead　of　trying　to　pass　the　test。　



We　often　hear　it　said；　for　instance；　〃What　is　right　in　one　age



is　wrong　in　another。〃　　This　is　quite　reasonable；　if　it　means　that



there　is　a　fixed　aim；　and　that　certain　methods　attain　at　certain



times　and　not　at　other　times。　　If　women；　say；　desire　to　be　elegant；



it　may　be　that　they　are　improved　at　one　time　by　growing　fatter　and



at　another　time　by　growing　thinner。　　But　you　cannot　say　that　they



are　improved　by　ceasing　to　wish　to　be　elegant　and　beginning　to　wish



to　be　oblong。　　If　the　standard　changes；　how　can　there　be　improvement；



which　implies　a　standard？　　Nietzsche　started　a　nonsensical　idea　that



men　had　once　sought　as　good　what　we　now　call　evil；　if　it　were　so；



we　could　not　talk　of　surpassing　or　even　falling　short　of　them。　



How　can　you　overtake　Jones　if　you　walk　in　the　other　direction？　



You　cannot　discuss　whether　one　people　has　succeeded　more　in　being



miserable　than　another　succeeded　in　being　happy。　　It　would　be



like　discussing　whether　Milton　was　more　puritanical　than　a　pig



is　fat。







　　　　　It　is　true　that　a　man　（a　silly　man）　might　make　change　itself　his



object　or　ideal。　　But　as　an　ideal；　change　itself　becomes　unchangeable。　



If　the　change…worshipper　wishes　to　estimate　his　own　progress；　he　must



be　sternly　loyal　to　the　ideal　of　change；　he　must　not　begin　to　flirt



gaily　with　the　ideal　of　monotony。　　Progress　itself　cannot　progress。　



It　is　worth　remark；　in　passing；　that　when　Tennyson；　in　a　wild　and　rather



weak　manner；　welcomed　the　idea　of　infinite　alteration　in　society；



he　instinctively　took　a　metaphor　which　suggests　an　imprisoned　tedium。　



He　wrote







　　　　　〃Let　the　great　world　spin　for　ever　down　the　ringing　grooves



of　change。〃







He　thought　of　change　itself　as　an　unchangeable　groove；　and　so　it　is。　



Change　is　about　the　narrowest　and　hardest　groove　that　a　man　can



get　into。







　　　　　The　main　point　here；　however；　is　that　this　idea　of　a　fundamental



alteration　in　the　standard　is　one　of　the　things　that　make　thought



about　the　past　or　future　simply　impossible。　　The　theory　of　a



complete　change　of　standards　in　human　history　does　not　merely



deprive　us　of　the　pleasure　of　honouring　our　fathers；　it　deprives



us　even　of　the　more　modern　and　aristocratic　pleasure　of　despising　them。







　　　　　This　bald　summary　of　the　thought…destroying　forces　of　our



time　would　not　be　complete　without　some　reference　to　pragmatism；



for　though　I　have　here　used　and　should　everywhere　defend　the



pragmatist　method　as　a　preliminary　guide　to　truth；　there　is　an　extreme



application　of　it　which　involves　the　absence　of　all　truth　whatever。　



My　meaning　can　be　put　shortly　thus。　　I　agree　with　the　pragmatists



that　apparent　objective　truth　is　not　the　whole　matter；　that　there



is　an　authoritative　need　to　believe　the　things　that　are　necessary



to　the　human　mind。　　But　I　say　that　one　of　those　necessities



precisely　is　a　belief　in　objective　truth。　　The　pragmatist　tells



a　man　to　think　what　he　must　think　and　never　mind　the　Absolute。　



But　precisely　one　of　the　things　that　he　must　think　is　the　Absolute。　



This　philosophy；　indeed；　is　a　kind　of　verbal　paradox。　　Pragmatism　is



a　matter　of　human　needs；　and　one　of　the　first　of　human　needs



is　to　be　something　more　than　a　pragmatist。　　Extreme　pragmatism



is　just　as　inhuman　as　the　determinism　it　so　powerfully　attacks。　



The　determinist　（who；　to　do　him　justice；　does　not　pretend　to　be



a　human　being）　makes　nonsense　of　the　human　sense　of　actual　choice。　



The　pragmatist；　who　professes　to　be　specially　human；　makes　nonsense



of　the　human　sense　of　actual　fact。







　　　　　To　sum　up　our　contention　so　far；　we　may　say　that　the　most



characteristic　current　philosophies　have　not　only　a　touch　of　mania；



but　a　touch　of　suicidal　mania。　　The　mere　questioner　has　knoc