defence of usury-第3节

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e　to　be　the　race　which　prodigals；　who　have　spent　their　all；　run　at　present；　under　the　present　system　of　restraining　laws：　and　this；　and　no　other；　I　take　it；　would　be　the　race　they　would　run；　were　those　laws　out　of　the　way。　　　　　Another　consideration　there　is；　I　think；　which　will　compleat　your　conviction；　if　it　was　not　compleat　before；　of　the　inefficacy　of　these　laws；　as　to　the　putting　any　sort　of　restraint　upon　prodigality。　This　is；　that　there　is　another　set　of　people　from　whom　prodigals　get　what　they　want；　and　always　will　get　it；　so　long　as　credit　lasts；　in　spite　of　all　laws　against　high　interest；　and；　should　they　find　it　necessary；　at　an　expence　more　than　equal　to　an　excess　of　interest　they　might　otherwise　have　to　give。　I　mean　the　tradesmen　who　deal　in　the　goods　they　want。　Every　body　knows　it　is　much　easier　to　get　goods　than　money。　People　trust　goods　upon　much　slenderer　security　than　they　do　money：　it　is　very　natural　they　should　do　so：　ordinary　profit　of　trade　upon　the　whole　capital　employed　in　a　man's　trade；　even　after　the　expence　of　warehouse…rent；　journeymen's　wages；　and　other　such　general　charges　are　taken　into　the　account；　and　set　against　it；　is　at　least　equal　to　double　interest；　say　10　per　cent。　Ordinary　profit　upon　any　particular　parcel　of　goods　must　therefore　be　a　great　deal　more；　say　at　least　triple　interest；　15　per　cent：　in　the　way　of　trading；　then；　a　man　can　afford　to　be　at　least　three　times　as　adventurous；　as　he　can　in　the　way　of　lending；　and　with　equal　prudence。　So　long；　then；　as　a　man　is　looked　upon　as　one　who　will　pay；　he　can　much　easier　get　the　goods　he　wants；　than　he　could　the　money　to　buy　them　with；　though　he　were　content　to　give　for　it　twice；　or　even　thrice　the　ordinary　rate　of　interest。　　　　　Supposing　any　body；　for　the　sake　of　extraordinary　gain；　to　be　willing　to　run　the　risk　of　supplying　him；　although　they　did　not　look　upon　his　personal　security　to　be　equal　to　that　of　another　man；　and　for　the　sake　of　the　extraordinary　profit　to　run　the　extraordinary　risk；　in　the　trader；　in　short　in　every　sort　of　trader　whom　he　was　accustomed　to　deal　with　in　his　solvent　days；　he　sees　a　person　who　may　accept　of　any　rate　of　profit；　without　the　smallest　danger　from　any　laws　that　are；　or　can　be　made　against　usury。　How　idle；　then；　to　think　of　stopping　a　man　from　making　six；　or　seven；　or　eight　per　cent　interest；　when；　if　he　chuses　to　run　a　risk　proportionable；　he　may　in　this　way　make　thirty　or　forty　per　cent　or　any　rate　you　please。　And　as　to　the　prodigal；　if　he　cannot　get　what　he　wants　upon　these　terms；　what　chance　is　there　of　his　getting　it　upon　any　terms；　supposing　the　laws　against　usury　to　be　away？　This　then　is　another　way；　in　which；　instead　of　serving；　it　injures　him；　by　narrowing　his　option；　and　driving　him　from　a　market　which　might　have　proved　less　disadvantageous；　to　a　more　disadvantageous　one。　　　　　As　far　as　prodigality；　then；　is　concerned；　I　must　confess；　I　cannot　see　the　use　of　stopping　the　current　of　expenditure　in　this　way　at　the　fosset；　when　there　are　so　many　unpreventable　ways　of　letting　it　run　out　of　the　bung…hole。　　　　　Whether　any　harm　is　done　to　society；　upon　the　whole；　by　letting　so　much　money　drop　at　once　out　of　the　pockets　of　the　prodigal；　who　would　have　gone　on　wasting　it；　into　the　till　of　the　frugal　tradesman；　who　will　lay　it　up；　is　not　worth　the　enquiry　for　the　present　purpose：　what　is　plain　is；　that；　so　far　as　the　saving　the　prodigal　from　paying　at　an　extraordinary　rate　for　what　he　gets　to　spend；　is　the　object　of　the　law；　that　object　is　not　at　all　promoted；　by　fixing　the　rate　of　interest　upon　money　borrowed。　On　the　contrary；　if　the　law　has　any　effect；　it　runs　counter　to　that　object：　since；　were　he　to　borrow；　it　would　only　be；　in　as　far　as　he　could　borrow　at　a　rate　inferior　to　that　at　which　otherwise　he　would　be　obliged　to　buy。　Preventing　his　borrowing　at　an　extra…rate；　may　have　the　effect　of　increasing　his　distress；　but　cannot　have　the　effect　of　lessening　it：　allowing　his　borrowing　at　such　a　rate；　might　have　the　effect　of　lessening　his　distress；　but　could　not　have　the　effect　of　increasing　it。　　　　　To　put　a　stop　to　prodigality；　if　indeed　it　be　worth　while；　I　know　but　of　one　effectual　course　that　can　be　taken；　in　addition　to　the　incompleat　and　insufficient　courses　at　present　practicable。　and　that　is；　to　put　the　convicted　prodigal　under　an　interdict；　as　was　practised　formerly　among　the　Romans；　and　is　still　practised　among　the　French；　and　other　nations　who　have　taken　the　Roman　law　for　the　ground…work　of　their　own。　But　to　discuss　the　expediency；　or　sketch　out　the　details　of　such　an　institution。　belongs　not　to　the　present　purpose。

LETTER　IV　Reasons　for　Restraint。　　Protection　of　Indigence。

　　　　Besides　prodigals；　there　are　three　other　classes　of　persons；　and　but　three；　for　whose　security　I　can　conceive　these　restrictive　laws　to　have　been　designed。　I　mean　the　indigent；　the　rashly　enterprizing；　and　the　simple：　those　whose　pecuniary　necessities　may　dispose　them　to　give　an　interest　above　the　ordinary　rate。　rather　than　not　have　it；　and　those　who；　from　rashness；　may　be　disposed　to　venture　upon　giving　such　a　rate；　or　from　carelessness　combined　with　ignorance；　may　be　disposed　to　acquiesce　in　it。　　　　　In　speaking　of　these　three　different　classes　of　persons；　I　must　beg　leave　to　consider　one　of　them　at　a　time：　and　accordingly；　in　speaking　of　the　indigent；　I　must　consider　indigence　in　the　first　place　as　untinctured　with　simplicity。　On　this　occasion。　I　may　suppose；　and　ought　to　suppose；　no　particular　defect　in　a　man's　judgment；　or　his　temper；　that　should　mislead　him；　more　than　the　ordinary　run　of　men。　He　knows　what　is　his　interest　as　well　as　they　do；　and　is　as　well　disposed　and　able　to　pursue　it　as　they　are。　　　　　I　have　already　intimated；　what　I　think　is　undeniable。　that　there　are　no　one　or　two　or　other　limited　number　of　rates　of　interest；　that　can　be　equally　suited　to　the　unlimited　number　of　situations；　in　respect　of　the　degree　of　exigency；　in　which　a　man　is　liable　to　find　himself：　insomuch　that　to　the　situation　of　a　man；　who　by　the　use　of　money　can　make　for　example　11　per　cent；　six　per　cent　is　as　well　adapted；　as　5　per　cent　is　to　the　situation　of　him　who　can　make　but　10；　to　that　of　him　who　can　make　12　per　cent　seven　and　so　on。　So；　in　the　case　of　his　wanting　it　to　save　himself　from　a　loss；　（which　is　that　which　is　most　likely　to　be　in　view　under　the　name　of　exigency）　if　that　loss　would　amount　to　11　per　cent　6　per　cent　is　as　well　adapted　to　his　situation；　as　5　per　cent　would　be　to　the　situation　of　him；　who　had　but　a　loss　amounting　to　ten　per　cent　to　save　himself　from　by　the　like　means。　And　in　any　case。　though。　in　proportion　to　the　amount　of　the　loss；　the　rate　of　interest　were　even　so　great；　as　that　the　clear　saving　should　not　amount　to　more　than　one　per　cent　or　any　fraction　per　cent　yet　so　long　as　it　amounted　to　any　thing；　he　would　be　just　so　much　the　better　for　borrowing；　even　on　such　comparatively　disadvantageous　terms。　If；　instead　of　gain；　we　put　any　other　kind　of　benefit　or　advantage　　if：　instead　of　loss。　we　put　any　other　kind　of　mischief　or　inconvenience；　of　equal　value；　the　result　will　be　the　same。　　　　　A　man　is　in　one　of　these　situations；　suppose；　in　which　it　would　be　for　his　advantage　to　borrow。　But　his　circumstances　are　such；　that　it　would　not　be　worth　any　body's　while　to　lend　him；　at　the　highest　rate　which　it　is　proposed　the　law　should　allow；　in　short；　he　cannot　get　it　at　that　rate。　If　he　thought　he　could　get　it　at　that　rate；　most　surely　he　would　not　give　a　higher：　he　may　he　trusted　for　that：　for　by　the　supposition　he　has　nothing　defective　in　his　understanding。　But　the　fact　is；　he　cannot　get　it　at　that　lower　rate。　At　a　higher　rate；　however　he　could　get　it：　and　at　that　rate；　though　higher；　it　would　be　worth　his　while　to　get　it：　so　he　judges；　who　has　nothing　to　hinder　him　from　judging　right；　who　has　every　motive　and　every　means　for　forming　a　right　judgment；　who　has　every　motive　and　every　means　for　informing　himself　of　the　circumstances；　upon　which　rectitude　of　judgment；　in　the　case　in　question；　depends。　The　legislator；　who　knows　nothing；　nor　can　know　any　thing；　of　any　one　of　all　these　circumstances；　who　knows　nothing　at　all　about　the　matter；　comes　and　says　to　him　　〃It　signifies　nothing；　you　shall　not　have　the　money：　for　it　would　be　doing　you　a　mischief　to　let　you　borrow　it　upon　such　terms。〃　　And　this　out　of　prudence　and　loving…kindness！　　There　may　be　worse　cruelty。　but　can　there　be　greater　folly？　　　　　The　folly　of　those　who　persist；　as　is　supposed；　without　reason；　in　not　taking　advice；　has　been　much　expatiated　upon。　But　the　folly　of　those　who　persist；　without　reason；　in　forcing　their　advice　upon　others；　has　been　but　little　dwelt　upon；　though　it　is；　perhaps；　the　more　frequent；　and　the　more　flagrant　of　the　two。　It　is　not　often　that　one　man　is　a　better　judge　for　another；　than　that　other　is　for　himself；　even　in　Cases　where　the　adviser　will　take　the　trouble　to　make　himself　master　of　as　many　of　the　materials　for　judging；　as　are　within　the　reach　of　the　person　to　be　advised。　But　the　legislator　is　not；　can　not　be；　in　the　possession　of　any　one　of　these　materials。　　What　private；　can　be　equal　to　such　public　folly？　　　　　I　should　now　speak　of　the　enterprizing　class　of　borrowers：　those。　who；　when　characterized　by　a　single　term；　are　distinguished　by