defence of usury-第1节

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Defence　of　Usury


by　Jeremy　Bentham


1787


Defence　of　Usury；　Shewing　the　Impolity　of　the　Present　Legal　Restraints　on　the　Terms　of　Pecuniary　Bargains　In　a　Series　of　Letters　to　a　Friend　To　Which　is　Added　A　Letter　to　Adam　Smith；　Esq；　LL。D。　On　the　Discouragements　opposed　by　the　above　Restraints　to　the　Progress　of　Inventive　Industry　1787

LETTER　I。　　Introduction　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Crichoff；　in　White　Russia；　January　1787

　　　　Among　the　various　species　or　modifications　of　liberty；　of　which　on　different　occasions　we　have　heard　so　much　in　England；　I　do　not　recollect　ever　seeing　any　thing　yet　offered　in　behalf　of　the　liberty　of　making　one's　own　terms　in　money…bargains。　From　so　general　and　universal　a　neglect；　it　is　an　old　notion　of　mine；　as　you　well　know；　that　this　meek　and　unassuming　species　of　liberty　has　been　suffering　much　injustice。　　　　　A　fancy　has　taken　me；　just　now；　to　trouble　you　with　my　reasons：　which；　if　you　think　them　capable　of　answering　any　good　purpose；　you　may　forward　to　the　press：　or　in　the　other　case；　what　will　give　you　less　trouble；　to　the　fire。　　　　　In　a　word；　the　proposition　I　have　been　accustomed　to　lay　down　to　myself　on　this　subject　is　the　following　one；　viz。　that　no　man　of　ripe　years　and　of　sound　mind；　acting　freely；　and　with　his　eyes　open；　ought　to　be　hindered；　with　a　view　to　his　advantage；　from　making　such　bargain；　in　the　way　of　obtaining　money；　as　he　thinks　fit：　nor；　（what　is　a　necessary　consequence）　any　body　hindered　from　supplying　him；　upon　any　terms　he　thinks　proper　to　accede　to。　　　　　This　proposition；　were　it　to　be　received；　would　level；　you　see；　at　one　stroke；　all　the　barriers　which　law；　either　statute　or　common；　have　in　their　united　wisdom　set　up；　either　against　the　crying　sin　of　Usury；　or　against　the　hard…named　and　little…heard…of　practice　of　Champerty；　to　which　we　must　also　add　a　portion　of　the　multifarious；　and　as　little　heard…of　offence；　of　Maintenance。　　　　　On　this　occasion；　were　it　any　individual　antagonist　I　had　to　deal　with；　my　part　would　be　a　smooth　and　easy　one。　〃You；　who　fetter　contracts；　you；　who　lay　restraints　on　the　liberty　of　man；　it　is　for　you〃　（I　should　say）　〃to　assign　a　reason　for　your　doing　so。〃　That　contracts　in　general　ought　to　be　observed；　is　a　rule；　the　propriety　of　which；　no　man　was　ever　yet　found　wrong…headed　enough　to　deny：　if　this　case　is　one　of　the　exceptions　（for　some　doubtless　there　are）　which　the　safety　and　welfare　of　every　society　require　should　be　taken　out　of　that　general　rule；　in　this　case。　as　in　all　those　others；　it　lies　upon　him；　who　alledges　the　necessity　of　the　exception；　to　produce　a　reason　for　it。　　　　　This；　I　say；　would　be　a　short　and　very　easy　method　with　an　individual：　but；　as　the　world　has　no　mouth　of　its　own　to　plead　by；　no　certain　attorney　by　which　it　can　〃come　and　defend　this　force　and　injury；〃　I　must　even　find　arguments　for　it　at　a　venture；　and　ransack　my　own　imagination　for　such　phantoms　as　I　can　find　to　fight　with。　　　　　In　favour　of　the　restraints　opposed　to　the　species　of　liberty　I　contend　for；　I　can　imagine　but　five　arguments。　　　　　1。　Prevention　of　usury。　　　　　2。　Prevention　of　prodigality。　　　　　3。　Protection　of　indigence　against　extortion。　　　　　4。　Repression　of　the　temerity　of　projectors。　　　　　5。　Protection　of　simplicity　against　imposition。　Of　all　these　in　their　order。


LETTER　II　Reasons　for　Restraint。　　Prevention　of　Usury。

　　　　I　will　begin　with　the　prevention　of　usury：　because　in　the　sound　of　the　word　usury　lies；　I　take　it；　the　main　strength　of　the　argument：　or；　to　speak　strictly；　of　what　is　of　more　importance　than　all　argument；　of　the　hold　which　the　opinion　I　am　combating　has　obtained　on　the　imaginations　and　passions　of　mankind。　　　　　Usury　is　a　bad　thing；　and　as　such　ought　to　be　prevented：　usurers　are　a　bad　sort　of　men；　a　very　bad　sort　of　men；　and　as　such　ought　to　be　punished　and　suppressed。　These　are　among　the　string　of　propositions　which　every　man　finds　handed　down　to　him　from　his　progenitors：　which　most　men　are　disposed　to　accede　to　without　examination；　and　indeed　not　unnaturally　nor　even　unreasonably　disposed；　for　it　is　impossible　the　bulk　of　mankind　should　find　leisure；　had　they　the　ability；　to　examine　into　the　grounds　of　an　hundredth　part　of　the　rules　and　maxims；　which　they　find　themselves　obliged　to　act　upon。　Very　good　apology　this　for　John　Trot：　but　a　little　more　inquisitiveness　may　be　required　of　legislators。　　　　　You；　my　friend；　by　whom　the　true　force　of　words　is　so　well　understood；　have；　I　am　sure；　gone　before　me　in　perceiving；　that　to　say　usury　is　a　thing　to　be　prevented；　is　neither　more　nor　less　than　begging　the　matter　in　question。　I　know　of　but　two　definitions　that　can　possibly　be　given　of　usury：　one　is；　the　taking　of　a　greater　interest　than　the　law　allows　of：　this　may　be　stiled　the　political　or　legal　definition。　The　other　is　the　taking　of　a　greater　interest　than　it　is　usual　for　men　to　give　and　take：　this　may　be　stiled　the　moral　one：　and　this；　where　the　law　has　not　interfered；　is　plainly　enough　the　only　one。　It　is　plain；　that　in　order　for　usury　to　be　prohibited　by　law；　a　positive　description　must　have　been　found　for　it　by　law；　fixing；　or　rather　superseding；　the　moral　one。　To　say　then　that　usury　is　a　thing　that　ought　to　be　prevented；　is　saying　neither　more　nor　less；　than　that　the　utmost　rate　of　interest　which　shall　be　taken　ought　to　be　fixed；　and　that　fixation　enforced　by　penalties；　or　such　other　means；　if　any；　as　may　answer　the　purpose　of　preventing　the　breach　of　it。　A　law　punishing　usury　supposes；　therefore；　a　law　fixing　the　allowed　legal　rate　of　interest：　and　the　propriety　of　the　penal　law　must　depend　upon　the　propriety　of　the　simply…prohibitive；　or；　if　you　please；　declaratory　one。　　　　　One　thing　then　is　plain；　that；　antecedently　to　custom　growing　from　convention；　there　can　be　no　such　thing　as　usury：　for　what　rate　of　interest　is　there　that　can　naturally　be　more　proper　than　another？　what　natural　fixed　price　can　there　be　for　the　use　of　money　more　than　for　the　use　of　any　other　thing？　Were　it　not　then　for　custom；　usury；　considered　in　a　moral　view；　would　not　then　so　much　as　admit　of　a　definition：　so　far　from　having　existence；　it　would　not　so　much　as　be　conceivable：　nor　therefore　could　the　law；　in　the　definition　it　took　upon　itself　to　give　of　such　offence；　have　so　much　as　a　guide　to　steer　by。　Custom　therefore　is　the　sole　basis；　which；　either　the　moralist　in　his　rules　and　precepts；　or　the　legislator　in　his　injunctions；　can　have　to　build　upon。　But　what　basis　can　be　more　weak　or　unwarrantable；　as　a　ground　for　coercive　measures；　than　custom　resulting　from　free　choice？　My　neighbours；　being　at　liberty；　have　happened　to　concur　among　themselves　in　dealing　at　a　certain　rate　of　interest。　I；　who　have　money　to　lend；　and　Titius；　who　wants　to　borrow　it　of　me；　would　be　glad；　the　one　of　us　to　accept；　the　other　to　give；　an　interest　somewhat　higher　than　theirs：　why　is　the　liberty　they　exercise　to　be　made　a　pretence　for　depriving　me　and　Titius　of　ours？　　　　　Nor　has　blind　custom；　thus　made　the　sole　and　arbitrary　guide；　any　thing　of　steadiness　or　uniformity　in　its　decisions：　it　has　varied；　from　age　to　age；　in　the　same　country：　it　varies；　from　country　to　country；　in　the　same　age：　and　the　legal　rate　has　varied　along　with　it：　and　indeed；　with　regard　to　times　past；　it　is　from　the　legal　rate；　more　readily　than　from　any　other　source；　that　we　collect　the　customary。　Among　the　Romans；　till　the　time　of　Justinian；　we　find　it　as　high　as　12　per　cent：　in　England；　so　late　as　the　time　of　Hen。　VIII；　we　find　it　at　10　per　cent：　succeeding　statutes　reduced　it　to　8；　then　to　6；　and　lastly　to　5；　where　it　stands　at　present。　Even　at　present　in　Ireland　it　is　at　6　per　cent；　and　in　the　West…Indies　at　8　per　cent；　and　in　Hindostan；　where　there　is　no　rate　limited　by　law；　the　lowest　customary　rate　is　10　or　12。　At　Constantinople；　in　certain　cases；　as　I　have　been　well　informed；　thirty　per　cent　is　a　common　rate。　Now；　of　all　these　widely　different　rates；　what　one　is　there；　that　is　intrinsically　more　proper　than　another？　What　is　it　that　evidences　this　propriety　in　each　instance？　what　but　the　mutual　convenience　of　the　parties；　as　manifested　by　their　consent？　It　is　convenience　then　that　has　produced　whatever　there　has　been　of　custom　in　the　matter：　What　can　there　then　be　in　custom；　to　make　it　a　better　guide　than　the　convenience　which　gave　it　birth？　and　what　is　there　in　convenience；　that　should　make　it　a　worse　guide　in　one　case　than　in　another？　It　would　be　convenient　to　me　to　give　6　per　cent　for　money：　I　wish　to　do　so。　〃No；〃　（says　the　law）　〃you　shan't。〃　…　Why　so？　〃Because　it　is　not　convenient　to　your　neighbour　to　give　above　5　for　it。〃　Can　any　thing　be　more　absurd　than　such　a　reason？　　　　　Much　has　not　been　done；　I　think；　by　legislators　as　yet　in　the　way　of　fixing　the　price　of　other　commodities：　and；　in　what　little　has　been　done；　the　probity　of　the　intention　has；　I　believe；　in　general；　been　rather　more　unquestionable　than　the　rectitude　of　the　principle；　or　the　felicity　of　the　result。　Putting　money　out　at　interest；　is　exchanging　present　money　for　future：　but　why　a　policy；　which；　as　applied　to　exchanges　in　general；　would　be　generally　deemed　absurd　and　mischievous；　should　be　deemed　necessary　in　the　instance　of　this　particular　kind　of　exchange；　mankind　are　as　yet　to　learn。　For　him　who　takes　as　much　as　he　can