liberty-第7节
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hewed in the next Chapter。
Chap。 II。
Of the Law of Nature concerning Contracts。
I。 All Authors agree not concerning the definition of the Naturall Law； who notwithstanding doe very often make use of this terme in their Writings。 The Method therefore； wherein we begin from definitions； and exclusion of all equivocation； is only proper to them who leave no place for contrary Disputes； for the rest； if any man say； that somwhat is done against the Law of Nature； one proves it hence； because it was done against the generall Agreement of all the most wise； and learned Nations： But this declares not who shall be the judg of the wisdome and learning of all Nations： Another hence； That it was done against the Generall consent of all Man…kind； which definition is by no means to be admitted； for then it were impossible for any but Children； and Fools； to offend against such a Law； for sure； under the notion of Man…kind； they comprehend all men actually endued with Reason。 These therefore either doe Naught against it； or if they doe Ought； it is without their joint accord； and therefore ought to be excus'd； but to receive the Lawes of Nature from the Consents of them； who oftner Break； then Observe them； is in truth unreasonable： besides； Men condemne the same things in others； which they approve in themselves； on the other side； they publickly commend what they privately condemne； and they deliver their Opinions more by Hear…say； then any Speculation of their own； and they accord more through hatred of some object； through fear； hope； love； or some other perturbation of mind； then true Reason。 And therefore it comes to passe； that whole Bodyes of people often doe those things by Generall accord； or Contention； which those Writers most willingly acknowledge to be against the Law of Nature。 But since all doe grant that is done by RIGHT； which is not done against Reason； we ought to judg those Actions onely wrong； which are repugnant to right Reason； （i。e。） which contradict some certaine Truth collected by right reasoning from true Principles； but that Wrong which is done； we say it is done against some Law： therefore True Reason is a certaine Law； which （since it is no lesse a part of Humane nature； then any other faculty； or affection of the mind） is also termed naturall。 Therefore the Law of Nature； that I may define it； is the Dictate of right Reason； conversant about those things which are either to be done； or omitted for the constant preservation of Life； and Members； as much as in us lyes。 Right Reason。＇ By Right Reason in the naturall state of men； I understand not； as many doe； an infallible faculty； but the act of reasoning； that is； the peculiar and true ratiocination of every man concerning those actions of his which may either redound to the dammage； or benefit of his neighbours。 I call it Peculiar； because although in a Civill Government the reason of the Supreme （i。e。 the Civill Law） is to be received by each single subject for the right； yet being without this Civill Government； （in which state no man can know right reason from false； but by comparing it with His owne） every mans owne reason is to be accounted not onely the rule of His owne actions which are done at His owne perill； but also for the measure of another mans reason； in such things as doe concerne him。 I call it True； that is； concluding from true principles rightly fram'd； because that the wHole breach of the Lawes of Nature consists in the false reasoning； or rather folly of those men who see not those duties they are necessarily to performe toward others in order to their owne conservation； but the Principles of Right reasoning about such like duties are those which are explained in the 2； 3； 4； 5； 6； and 7。 articles of the first Chapter。
II。 But the first and fundamentall Law of Nature is； That Peace is to be sought after where it may be found； and where not； there to provide our selves for helps of War： For we shewed in the last Article of the foregoing Chapter； that this precept is the dictate of right reason； but that the Dictates of right reason are naturall Lawes； that hath been newly prov'd above； But this is the first； because the rest are deriv'd from this； and they direct the wayes either to Peace； or self…defence。
III。 But one of the Naturall Lawes deriv'd from this fundamentall one is this； That the right of all men； to all things； ought not to be retain'd； but that some certain rights ought to be transferr'd； or relinquisht： for if every one should retain his right to all things； it must necessarily follow； that some by right might invade； and others； by the same right； might defend themselves against them； （for every man； by naturall necessity； endeavours to defend his Body； and the things which he judgeth necessary towards the protection of his Body） therefore War would follow。 He therefore acts against the reason of Peace； （i。e。） against the Law of Nature； whosoever he be； that doth not part with his Right to all things。 IV。 But he is said to part with his right； who either absolutely renounceth it； or conveys it to another。 He absolutely renounceth it； who by some sufficient Signe； or meet Tokens； declares that he is willing that it shall never be lawfull for him to doe that again； which before； by Right； he might have done； but he conveys it to another； who by some sufficient Signe； or meet Tokens； declares to that other； that he is willing it should be unlawfull for him to resist him； in going about to do somewhat in the performance where he might before； with Right； have resisted him； but that the conveyance of Right consists meerly in not resisting； is understood by this； that before it was convey'd； he； to whom he convey'd it； had even then also a right to all； whence he could not give any new Right： But the resisting Right he had； before he gave it； by reason whereof the other could not freely enjoy his Rights； is utterly abolisht： Whosoever therefore acquires some Right in the naturall state of men； he onely procures himself security； and freedome from just molestation in the enjoyment of his Primitive Right： As for example； if any man shall sell； or give away a Farme； he utterly deprives himself only from all Right to this Farme； but he does not so from others also。 V。 But in the conveyance of Right the will is requisite not onely of him that conveys； but of him also that accepts it。 If either be wanting； the Right remaines： for if I would have given what was mine； to one who refus'd to accept of it； I have not therefore either simply renounc'd my Right； or convey'd it to any man； for the cause which mov'd me to part with it to this Man was in him onely； not in others too。 VI。 But if there be no other Token extant of our will either to quit； or convey our Right； but onely Words； those words must either relate to the present； or time past； for if they be of the future onely； they convey nothing： for example； he that speaks thus of the time to come； I will give to morrow； declares openly that yet he hath not given it； so that all this day his right remains； and abides to morrow too； unlesse in the interim he actually bestowes it： for what is mine； remains mine till I have parted with it。 But if I shall speak of the time present； suppose thus； I doe give； or have given you this to be received to morrow； by these words is signified that I have already given it； and that his Right to receive it to morrow； is conveyed to him by me to day。 VII。 Neverthelesse； although words alone are not sufficient tokens to declare the Will； if yet to words relating to the future； there shall some other signes be added； they may become as valid； as if they had been spoken of the present： If therefore； as by reason of those other signes； it appear； that he that speaks of the future； intends those words should be effectuall toward the perfect transferring of his Right； they ought to be valid； for the conveyance of right depends not on words； but （as hath been instanc'd in the 4。 Article） on the declaration of the Will。 VIII。 If any man conveigh some part of his right to another； and doth not this for some certain benefit received； or for some compact； a conveighance in this kind is called a Gift； or free Donation。 But in free donation those words onely oblige us which signifie the present； or the time past； for if they respect the future； they oblige not as words； for the reason given in the foregoing Article： It must needs therefore be； that the Obligation arise from some other tokens of the Will： But； because whatsoever is voluntarily done； is done for some good to him that wils it； there can no other token be assigned of the Will to give it； except some benefit either already receiv'd； or to be acquir'd； but is suppos'd； that no such benefit is acquired； nor any compact in being； for if so； it would cease to be a free gift： It remains therefore； that a mutuall good turne without agreement be expected； but no signe can be given； that he； who us' d future words toward him who was in no sort engag'd to return a benefit； should desire to have his words so understood； as to oblige himselfe thereby。 Nor is it suitable to Reason； that those who are easily enclined to doe well to others； should be oblig'd by every promise；
