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se between him and the parties whose Iudge he is appointed； by vertue whereof he may be engaged to speak in favour of either part； nay； or be oblig'd to judge according to equity； or to pronounce such sentence as he shall truly judge to be equall。 The Judge is indeed bound to give such sentence as he shall judge to be equall by the Law of Nature re…counted in the 15。 Article。 To the obligation of which Law nothing can be added by way of Compact。 Such compact therefore would be in vain。 Besides； if giving wrong judgement； he should contend for the equity of it； except such Compact be of no force； the Controversie would remain after Judgement given； which is contrary to the constitution of an Arbiter； who is so chosen； as both parties have oblig'd themselves to stand to the judgement which he should pronounce。 The Law of Nature therefore commands the Judge to be dis…engaged； which is its 19 precept。 XXV。 Farthermore； forasmuch as the Lawes of Nature are nought else but the dictates of Reason； so as； unlesse a man endeavour to preserve the faculty of right reasoning； he cannot observe the Lawes of Nature； it is manifest； that he； who knowingly； or willingly； doth ought； whereby the rationall faculty may be destroyed； or weakned； he knowingly； and willingly； breaks the Law of nature： For there is no difference between a man who performes not his Duty； and him who does such things willingly； as make it impossible for him to doe it。 But they destroy and weaken the reasoning faculty； who doe that which disturbs the mind from its naturall state； that which most manifestly happens to Drunkards and Gluttons； we therefore sin in the 20 place against the Law of Nature by Drunkennesse。 XXVI。 Perhaps some man； who sees all these precepts of Nature deriv'd by a certain artifice from the single dictate of Reason advising us to look to the preservation； and safegard of our selves； will say； That the deduction of these Lawes is so hard； that it is not to be expected they will be vulgarly known； and therefore neither will they prove obliging： for Lawes； if they be not known； oblige not； nay； indeed are not Lawes。 To this I answer； it's true； That hope； fear； anger； ambition； covetousnesse； vain glory； and other perturbations of mind； doe hinder a man so； as he cannot attaine to the knowledge of these Lawes； whilst those passions prevail in him： But there is no man who is not sometimes in a quiet mind； At that time therefore there is nothing easier for him to know； though he be never so rude and unlearn'd； then this only Rule； That when he doubts； whether what he is now doing to another； may be done by the Law of Nature； or not； he conceive himselfe to be in that others stead。 Here instantly those perturbations which perswaded him to the fact； being now cast into the other scale； disswade him as much： And this Rule is not onely easie； but is Anciently celebrated in these words； Quod tibi fieri non vis； alteri ne feceris： Do not that to others； you would not have done to your self。 XXVII。 But because most men； by reason of their perverse desire of present profit； are very unapt to observe these Lawes； although acknowledg'd by them； if perhaps some others more humble then the rest should exercise that equity and usefulnesse which Reason dictates； those not practising the same； surely they would not follow Reason in so doing； nor would they hereby procure themselves peace； but a more certain quick destruction； and the keepers of the Law become a meer prey to the breakers of it。 It is not therefore to be imagin'd； that by Nature； （that is； by Reason） men are oblig'd to the exercise of all these Lawes in that state of men wherein they are not practis'd by others。 We are oblig'd yet in the interim to a readinesse of mind to observe them whensoever their observation shall seeme to conduce to the end for which they were ordain'd。 We must therefore conclude； that the Law of Nature doth alwayes； and every where oblige in the internall Court； or that of Conscience； but not alwayes in the externall Court； but then onely when it may be done with safety。 The exercise of all these Lawes＇ Nay among these Lawes some things there are； the omission whereof （provided it be done for Peace； or Self…preservation） seemes rather to be the fulfilling； then breach of the Naturall Law； for he that doth all things against those that doe all things； and plunders plunderers； doth equity； but on the other side； to doe that which in Peace is an handsome action； and becomming an honest man； is dejectednesse； and Poornesse of spirit； and a betraying of ones self in the time of War； But there are certain naturall Lawes； whose exercise ceaseth not even in the time of War it self； for I cannot understand what drunkennesse； or cruelty （that is； Revenge which respects not the future good） can advance toward Peace； or the preservation of any man。 Briefly； in the state of nature； what's just； and unjust； is not to be esteem'd by the Actions； but by the Counsell； and Conscience of the Actor。 That which is done out of necessity； out of endeavour for Peace； for the preservation of our selves； is done with Right； otherwise every damage done to a man would be a breach of the naturall Law； and an injury against God。 XXVIII。 But the Lawes which oblige Conscience； may be broken by an act； not onely contrary to them； but also agreeable with them； if so be that he who does it be of another opinion： for though the act it self be answerable to the Lawes； yet his Conscience is against them。 XXIX。 The Lawes of Nature are immutable； and eternall； What they forbid； can never be lawfull； what they command； can never be unlawfull： For pride； ingratitude； breach of Contracts （or injury）； inhumanity； contumely； will never be lawfull； nor the contrary vertues to these ever unlawfull； as we take them for dispositions of the mind； that is； as they are considered in the Court of Conscience； where onely they oblige； and are Lawes。 Yet actions may be so diversified by circumstances； and the Civill Law； that what's done with equity at one time； is guilty of iniquity at another； and what suits with reason at one time； is contrary to it another。 Yet Reason is still the same； and changeth not her end； which is Peace； and Defence； nor of the minde which the meanes to attaine them； to wit； those vertues we have declar'd above； and which cannot be abrogated by any Custome； or Law whatsoever。 XXX。 It's evident by what hath hitherto been said； how easily the Lawes of Nature are to be observ'd； because they require the endeavour onely； （but that must be true and constant） which who so shall performe； we may rightly call him JUST。 For he who tends to this with his whole might； namely； that his actions be squar'd according to the precepts of Nature； he shewes clearly that he hath a minde to fulfill all those Lawes； which is all we are oblig'd to by rationall nature。 Now he that hath done all he is oblig'd to； is a Just Man。 XXXI。 All Writers doe agree that the Naturall Law is the same with the Morall。 Let us see wherefore this is true。 We must know therefore； that Good and Evill are names given to things to signifie the inclination； or aversion of them by whom they were given。 But the inclinations of men are diverse； according to their diverse Constitutions； Customes； Opinions； as we may see in those things we apprehend by sense； as by tasting； touching； smelling； but much more in those which pertain to the common actions of life； where what this man commends； （that is to say； calls Good） the other undervalues； as being Evil； Nay； very often the same man at diverse times； praises； and dispraises the same thing。 Whilst thus they doe； necessary it is there should be discord； and strife： They are therefore so long in the state of War； as by reason of the diversity of the present appetites； they mete Good and Evill by diverse measures。 All men easily acknowledge this state； as long as they are in it； to be evill； and by consequence that Peace is good。 They therefore who could not agree concerning a present； doe agree concerning a future Good； which indeed is a work of Reason； for things present are obvious to the sense； things to come to our Reason only。 Reason declaring Peace to be good； it followes by the same reason； that all the necessary means to Peace be good also； and therefore； that Modesty； Equity； Trust； Humanity； Mercy （which we have demonstrated to be necessary to Peace） are good Manners； or habits； （that is） Vertues。 The Law therefore； in the means to Peace； commands also Good Manners； or the practise of Vertue： And therefore it is call'd Morall。 XXXII。 But because men cannot put off this same irrationall appetite； whereby they greedily prefer the present good （to which； by strict consequence； many unfore…seen evills doe adhere） before the future； it happens； that though all men doe agree in the commendation of the foresaid vertues； yet they disagree still concerning their Nature； to wit； in what each of them doth consist； for as oft as anothers good action displeaseth any man； that action hath the name given of some neighbouring vice； likewise the bad actions； which please them； are ever entituled to some Vertue； whence it comes to passe that the same Action is prais'd by these； and call'd V
