phenomenology of mind-第79节

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


mere　result：　its　own　movement　and　reality　are　not　yet　set　forth；　it　is　here　in　its　immediacy　as
something　purely　and　simply　implicit。　Negativity；　however；　which　is　the　same　as　what　appears　as
movement　and　process；　is　inherent　in　this　implicit　state　as　a　determinate　quality；　and　being；　i。e。　the
simple　implicit　state；　comes　to　be　a　determinate　compass　or　range　of　being。　Individuality　confronts
us；　therefore；　as　an　original　determinate　nature：　original；　in　virtue　of　its　being　implicit：　originally
determinate；　in　virtue　of　the　negative　moment　lying　in　that　implicitness；　which　negative　element　is
thereby　a　quality。　This　limitation　cannot；　however；　limit　the　action　of　consciousness；　for　this
consists　at　the　present　stage　in　thorough　and　complete　relation　of　itself　to　itself：　relation　to　what　is
other　than　itself；　which　its　limitation　would　involve；　is　now　overcome。　The　character　inherent
originally　by　nature　is　thus　merely　an　undefined　（simple）　principle；　a　transparent　universal　element
in　which　individuality　finds　itself　free　and　at　one　with　itself；　as　well　as　unfolds　its　diversity　without
restraint；　and　in　realizing　itself　is　simply　in　reciprocal　relation　with　itself。　We　have　here　something
similar　to　what　we　find　in　the　case　of　indeterminate　animal　life：　this　breathes　the　breath　of　life；　let　us
say；　into　water　as　its　element；　or　air　or　earth；　and　within　these　again　into　still　more　determinate
conditions：　every　aspect　of　its　life　is　affected　by　the　specific　element；　and　yet　animal　life　still　keeps
these　aspects　within　its　power　and　itself　a　unity　in　spite　of　the　limitations　of　the　element；　and
remains　qua　the　given　particular　organization　animal　life　throughout；　the　same　general　fact　of　animal
life。

This　determinate　original　nature　of　consciousness；　in　which　it　finds　itself　freely　and　wholly；　appears
as　the　immediate　and　only　proper　content　of　the　purpose　of　the　individual。　That　content　is　indeed　a
definite　content；　but　is　only　content　so　far　as　we　take　the　implicit　nature　in　isolation。　In　truth；
however；　it　is　reality　（Realit？t）　permeated　by　individuality：　actuality　（Wirklichkeit）　in　the　way
consciousness　qua　individual　contains　this　within　itself；　and　is　to　begin　with　taken　as　existing；　but
not　yet　as　acting。　So　far　as　action　is　concerned；　however；　that　determinateness　is；　in　one　respect；
not　a　limitation　it　wants　to　overcome；　for；　looked　at　as　an　existent　quality；　that　determinateness　is
simply　the　colour　of　the　element　where　it　moves：　in　another　respect；　however；　the　negativity　is
determinateness　merely　in　the　case　of　what　〃exists〃。　But　acting　is　nothing　else　than　negativity。
Hence　when　individuality　acts；　its　specific　determinateness　is　dissipated　into　the　general　process　of
negation；　into　the　sum　and　substance　of　all　determinateness。

The　simple　〃original　nature〃　now　breaks　up；　in　action　and　the　consciousness　of　action；　into　the
distinction　which　action　implies。　To　begin　with；　action　is　here　an　object；　an　object；　too；　still
belonging　to　consciousness；　it　is　present　as　a　purpose；　and　thus　opposed　to　a　given　reality。　The
other　moment　is　the　process　of　this　statically　presented　purpose；　the　process　of　actualization　of　the
purpose；　bringing　the　purpose　to　bear　on　the　entirely　formal　reality；　and　hence　is　the　idea　of　the
transition　itself。　In　other　words；　this　second　moment　is　the　〃means〃。　The　third　moment　is；　finally；
the　object；　no　longer　as　immediately　and　subjectively　presented　purpose；　but　as　brought　to　light
and　established　as　something　other　than　and　external　to　the　acting　subject。

These　various　aspects　must　be　viewed　in　the　light　of　the　general　principle　of　this　sphere　of
consciousness。　The　content　throughout　remains　the　same；　without　any　difference；　whether　between
individuality　and　existence　in　general；　or　between　purpose　as　against　individuality　in　the　sense　of　an
〃original　nature〃；　or　between　purpose　and　the　given　reality：　or　between　the　means　and　that　reality
as　absolute　purpose：　or　finally　between　the　reality　moulded　by　the　agent　as　against　the　purpose；
the　〃original　nature〃；　of　the　means。

At　the　outset；　then；　the　nature　of　individuality　in　its　original　determinate　form；　its　immediate
essence；　is　not　yet　affirmed　as　active；　and　in　this　shape　is　called　special　capacity；　talent；　character；
and　so　on。　This　peculiar　colouring　of　mind　must　be　looked　at　as　the　only　content　of　its　purpose；
and　as　the　sole　and　only　reality。　If　we　thought　of　consciousness　as　going　beyond　that；　as　seeking　to
bring　into　reality　another　content；　then　we　should　think　of　it　as　a　nothing　working　away　towards
nothing。

This　original　nature　is；　moreover；　not　merely　the　substance　of　its　purpose；　but　implicitly　the　reality
as　well；　which　otherwise　assumes　the　appearance　of　being　a　given　material　on　which　to　act；　of
being　found　ready　at　hand　for　action　to　work　up　into　some　determinate　form。　That　is　to　say；　acting
is　simply　transferring　from　a　state　not　yet　explicitly　expressed　to　one　fully　expressed；　the　inherent
being　of　that　reality　opposed　to　consciousness　has　sunk　to　the　level　of　a　mere　empty　appearance；
a　mere　seeming。　This　mode　of　consciousness；　by　determining　itself　to　act；　thereby　refuses　to　be　led
astray　by　the　semblance　of　reality　on　the　part　of　what　is　presented　to　it；　and　has　likewise　to
abandon　its　dealings　with　idle　thoughts　and　purposes；　and　keep　its　hold　on　the　original　content　of
its　own　nature。　No　doubt　this　content　first　exists　as　a　fact　for　consciousness；　when　it　has　made　that
content　actual；　but　the　distinction　between　something　which　while　for　consciousness　is　only　inside
itself；　and　a　reality　outside　consciousness　existing　in　itself；　has　broken　down。　Consciousness　must
act　solely　that　what　it　inherently　and　implicitly　is；　may　be　for　it　explicitly；　or；　acting　is　just　the
process　of　mind　coming　to　be　qua　consciousness。　What　it　is　implicitly；　therefore；　it　knows　from　its
actual　reality。　Hence　it　is　that　an　individual　cannot　know　what　he　is　till　he　has　made　himself　real　by
action。

Consciousness；　however；　seems　on　this　view　to　be　unable　to　determine　the　purpose　of　its　action
before　action　has　taken　place；　but　before　action　occurs　it　must；　in　virtue　of　being　consciousness；
have　the　act　in　front　of　itself　as　entirely　its　own；　i。e。　as　a　purpose。　The　individual；　therefore；　who　is
going　to　act　seems　to　find　himself　in　a　circle；　where　each　moment　already　presupposes　the　others；
and　hence　seems　unable　to　find　a　beginning；　because　it　only　gets　to　know　its　own　original　nature；
the　nature　which　is　to　be　its　purpose　by　first　acting；　while　in　order　to　act　it　must　have　that　purpose
beforehand。　But　just　for　that　reason　it　has　to　start　straight　away　and；　whatever　the　circumstances
are；　without　troubling　further　about　beginning；　means；　or　end；　proceed　to　action　at　once。　For　its
essential　and　implicit　（ansichseyende）　nature　is　beginning；　means；　and　end　all　in　one。　As
beginning；　it　is　found　in　the　circumstances　of　the　action；　and　the　interest　which　the　individual　finds
in。　something　is　just　the　answer　to　the　question；　〃whether　he　should　act　and　what　is　to　be　done　in　a
given　case〃。　For　what　seems　to　be　a　reality　confronting　him　is　implicitly　his　own　original
fundamental　nature；　which　has　merely　the　appearance　of　an　objective　being　—　an　appearance
which　lies　in　the　notion　of　action　involving　as　this　does　self…diremption；　but　which　expressly　shows
itself　to　be　his　own　original　nature　by　the　interest　the　individual　finds　therein。　Similarly　the　how；　the
means；　is　determined　as　it　stands　（an　und　für　sich）。　Talent　is　likewise　nothing　but　individuality
with　a　definite　original　constitution　looked　at　as　the　subjective　internal　means；　or　transition　of
purpose　into　actuality。　The　actual　means；　however　and　the　real　transition　are　the　unity　of　talent　with
the　nature　of　the　fact　as　present　in　the　interest　felt。　The　former　＇talent＇　expresses　that　aspect　of　the
means　which　concerns　action；　the　latter　＇the　fact　found　of　interest＇　that　which　concerns　content：
both　are　individuality　itself；　as　a　fused　whole　of　acting　and　existing。　What　we　find；　then；　is　first
circumstances　given　ready　to　hand；　which　are　implicitly　the　original　nature　of　the　individual；　next
the　interest　which　affirms　them　as　its　own　or　as　its　purpose；　and　finally　the　connexion　and
sublation　of　these　opposite　elements　in　the　means。　This　connexion　itself　still　falls　within
consciousness；　and　the　whole　just　considered　is　one　side　of　an　opposition。　This　appearance　of
opposition　which　still　remains　is　removed　by　the　transition；　i。e。　by　the　means。　For　the　means　is　a
unity　of　inner　and　outer；　the　antithesis　of　the　determinate　character　it　has　qua　inner　means　（viz。
talent）：　it　therefore　abolishes　this　character；　and　makes　itself　—　this　unity　of　action　and　existence　—
equally　an　outer；　viz。：　the　actually　realized　individuality；　i。e。　individuality　which　is　established　for
individuality　itself　as　the　objectively　existent。　The　entire　act　in　this　way　does　not　go　beyond　itself；
either　as　circumstances；　or　as　purpose；　or　means；　or　as　work　performed。

In　this　notion　of　work；　however；　the　distinction　which　lay　within　the　original　nature　seems　to　enter。
The　work　done　is　something　determinate；　like　the　original　nature　it　expr