phenomenology of mind-第65节

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lineaments；　and　places　its　real　nature　in　the　work　done。　Herein　it　contradicts　the　relationship　which
the　instinct　of　reason；　engaged　in　observing　self…conscious　individuality；　establishes　in　regard　to
what　its　inner　and　outer　should　be。　This　point　of　view　brings　us　to　the　special　idea　at　the　basis　of
the　science　of　physiognomy…if　we　care　to　call　it　a　〃science〃。　The　opposition　this　form　of
observation　comes　upon　is　in　form　the　opposition　of　practical　and　theoretical；　both　falling　inside
the　practical　aspect　itself　—　the　opposition　of　individuality；　making　itself　real　in　action　（in　the　most
general　sense　of　action）；　and　individuality　as　being　in　this　action　at　the　same　time　reflected　thence
into　self；　and　taking　the　action　for　its　object。　Observation　apprehends　and　accepts　this　opposition
in　the　same　inverted　form　in　which　it　is　when　it　makes　its　appearance。　To　observation；　the　deed
itself　and　the　performance；　whether　it　be　that　of　speech　or　a　more　solid　reality；　stand　for　the
nonessential　outer；　while　the　individuality's　existence　within　itself　passes　for　the　essential　inner。　Of
the　two　aspects　which　the　practical　mind　involves；　intention　and　act　（the　〃meaning〃　regarding　the
action　and　the　action　itself）；　observation　selects　the　former　as　the　true　inner；　this　（i。e。　the　intention
or　true　inner）　is　supposed　to　have　its　more　or　less　unessential　externalization　in　the　act；　while　its
true　outer　expression　is　to　be　had　in　the　form　in　which　the　individual　is　embodied。　This　latter
expression　is　a　sensuous　immediate　presence　of　the　individual　mind：　the　inwardness；　which　is
intended　to　be　the　true　internal　aspect；　is　the　particular　point　of　the　intention；　and　the　singleness　of
self…existence：　both　together　the　mind　subjectively　〃meant〃　Thus；　what　observation　takes　for　its
objects　is　an　existence　that　is　〃meant〃；　and　within　this　sphere　it　looks　for　laws。

The　primary　way　of　making　conjectures　（meinen）　regarding　the　〃presumptive〃　presence　of　mind　is
everyday　（natürlich）　physiognomy；　hasty　judgment　formed　at　a　glance　about　the　inner　nature　and
the　character　of　its　outer　form　and　shape。　The　object　of　this　guesswork　thinking　（4）　is　of　such　a
kind　that　its　very　essence　involves　its　being　in　truth　something　else　than　merely　sensuous　and
immediate。　Certainly　what　is　really　present　is　just　this　condition　of　being　in　sensuous　form　reflected
out　of　sense　into　self；　it　is　the　visible　as　a　sensuous　presentment　of　the　invisible；　which　constitutes
the　object　of　observation。　But　this　very　sensuous　immediate　presence　is　the　mind's　reality〃　as　that
reality　is　approved　by　mere　conjecture　（Meinung）；　and　observation　from　this　point　of　view
occupies　itself　with　its　〃presumed〃　（gemeint）　existence；　with　physiognomy；　handwriting；　sound　of
voice；　etc。

Observation　relates　such　and　such　a　sensuous　fact　to　just　such　a　supposed　or　presumed
（gemeintes）　inner。　It　is　not　the　murderer；　the　thief；　that　is　to　be　known；　it　is　the　capacity　to　be　a
murderer；　a　thief。　The　definitely　marked　abstract　attribute　is　thereby　lost　in　the　concrete　indefinite
characteristic　nature　of　the　particular　individual；　which　now　demands　more　skilful　delineations　than
the　former　qualifications　supply。　Such　skilful　delineations　no　doubt　say　more　than　the　qualification；
〃murderer〃；　〃thief〃；　or　〃good…hearted〃；　〃unspoiled〃；　and　so　on；　but　are　a　long　way　short　of　their
aim；　which　is　to　express　the　being　that　is　〃meant〃；　the　single　individuality；　as　far　short　as　the
delineations　of　the　form　and　shape；　which　go　further　than　a　〃flat　brow〃；　a　〃long　nose〃；　etc。　For　the
individual　shape　and　form；　like　the　individual　self…consciousness；　is　qua　something　〃meant〃；
inexpressible。　The　〃science　of　knowing　men〃；　（5）　which　is　concerned　about　the　supposed　human
being；　like　the　〃science〃　of　physiognomy；　which　deals　with　his　presumed　reality　and　seeks　to　raise
to　the　level　of　knowledge　uncritical　assertions　of　everday　（natürlich）　physiognomy；　（6）　is　therefore
something　with　neither　foundation　nor　finality；　it　cannot　manage　to　say　what　it　〃means〃　because　it
merely　〃means〃；　and　its　content　is　merely　what　is　〃presumed〃　or　〃meant〃。

The　so…called　〃laws〃；　this　kind　of　science　sets　out　to　find；　are　relations　holding　between　these　two
presumed　or　supposed　aspects；　and　hence　can　amount　to　no　more　than　an　empty　〃fancying〃
（meinen）。　Again　since　this　presumed　knowledge；　which　takes　upon　itself　to　deal　with　the　reality　of
mind；　finds　its　object　to　be　just　the　fact　that　mind　is　reflected　from　sense　existence　back　into　self；
and　that；　for　mind；　a　specific　bodily　expression　is　an　indifferent　accident；　it　is　therefore　bound　to　be
aware　at　once　that　by　the　so…called　〃laws〃　discovered　it　really　says　nothing　at　all；　but　that；　strictly
speaking；　this　is　mere　chatter；　or　merely　giving　out　a　〃fancy〃　or　〃opinion〃　（Meinung）　of　its　own　—
（an　assertion　which　has　this　amount　of　truth　that　to　state　one's　〃opinion〃；　one's　〃fancy〃；　and　not　to
convey　thereby　the　fact　itself；　but　merely　a　〃fancy　of　one's　own〃；　are　one　and　the　same　thing）。　In
content；　however；　such　observations　cannot　differ　in　value　from　these：　〃It　always　rains　at　our
annual　fair；　says　the　dealer；　〃And　every　time；　too；〃　says　the　housewife；　〃when　I　am　drying　my
washing。〃

Lichtenberg；　who　characterizes　physiognomic　observation　in　this　way；　adds　this　remark：　〃If　any
one　said；　'You　act；　certainly；　like　an　honest　man；　but　I　can　see　from　your　face　you　are　forcing
yourself　to　do　so；　and　are　a　rogue　at　heart；'　without　a　doubt　every　brave　fellow　to　the　end　of　time
when　accosted　in　that　fashion　will　retort　with　a　box　on　the　ear。〃

This　retort　is　to　the　point；　for　the　reason　that　it　refutes　the　fundamental　assumption　of　such　a
〃science〃　of　conjecture　（meinen）；　viz。　that　the　reality　of　a　man　is　his　face；　etc。

The　true　being　of　a　man　is；　on　the　contrary；　his　act；　individuality　is　real　in　the　deed；　and　a　deed　it　is
which　cancels　both　the　aspects　of　what　is　〃meant〃　or　〃presumed〃　to　be。　In　the　one　aspect　where
what　is　〃presumed〃　or　〃imagined〃　takes　the　form　of　a　passive　bodily　being；　individuality　puts　itself
forward　in　action　as　the　negative　essence　which　only　is　so　far　as　it　cancels　bring。　Then
furthermore　the　act　does　away　with　the　inexpressibleness　of　what　self…conscious　individuality　really
〃means〃；　in　regard　to　such　〃meaning〃；　individuality　is　endlessly　determined　and　determinable。　This
false　infinite；　this　endless　determining；　is　abolished　in　the　completed　act。　The　act　is　something
simply　determinate；　universal；　to　be　grasped　as　an　abstract；　distinctive　whole；　it　is　murder；　theft；　a
benefit；　a　deed　of　bravery；　and　so　on；　and　what　it　is　can　be　said　of　it。

It　is　such　and　such；　and　its　being　is　not　merely　a　symbol；　it　is　the　fact　itself。　It　is　this；　and　the
individual　human　being　is　what　the　act　is。　In　the　simple　fact　that　the　act　is；　the　individual　is　for
others　what　he　really　is　and　with　a　certain　general　nature；　and　ceases　to　be　merely　something　that
is　〃meant〃　or　〃presumed〃　to　be　this　or　that。　No　doubt　he　is　not　put　there　in　the　form　of　mind；　but
when　it　is　a　question　of　his　being　qua　being；　and　the　twofold　being　of　bodily　shape　and　act　are
pitted　against　one　another；　each　claiming　to　be　his　true　reality；　the　deed　alone；　is　to　be　affirmed　as
his　genuine　being　—　not　his　figure　or　shape；　which　would　express　what　he　〃means〃　to　convey　by
his　acts；　or　what　any　one　might　〃conjecture〃　he　merely　could　do。　In　the　same　way；　on　the　other
hand；　when　his　performance　and　his　inner　possibility；　capacity；　or　intention　are　opposed；　the
former　alone　is　to　be　regarded　as　his　true　reality；　even　if　he　deceives　himself　on　the　point　and；
after　he　has　turned　from　his　action　into　himself；。　means　to　be　something　else　in　his　〃inner　mind〃　than
what　he　is　in　the　act。　Individuality；　which　commits　itself　to　the　objective　element；　when　it　passes
over　into　a　deed　no　doubt　puts　itself　to　the　risk　of　being　altered　and　perverted。　But　what　settles　the
character　of　the　act　is　just　this　—　whether　the　deed　is　a　real　thing　that　holds　together；　or　whether　it
is　merely　a　pretended　or　〃supposed〃　performance；　which　is　in　itself　null　and　void　and　passes　away。
Objectification　does　not　alter　the　act　itself；　it　merely　shows　what　the　deed　is；　i。e。　whether　it　is　or
whether　it　is　nothing。

The　breaking　up　of　this　real　being　into　intentions；　and　subtleties　of　that　sort；　by　which　the　real　man；
i。e。　his　deed；　is　to　be　reduced　again　to；　and　explained　in　terms　of；　a　〃conjectured〃　being；　as　even
the　individual　himself　may　produce　out　of　himself　particular　intentions　concerning　his　reality　—　all
this　must　be　left　to　idle　〃fancying　and　presuming〃　to　furnish　at　its　leisure。　If　this　idle　thinking　will　set
its　ineffective　wisdom　to　work；　and　will　deny　the　agent　the　character　of　reason；　and　use　him　so
badly　as　to　want　to　declare　his　figure　and　his　lineaments　to　be　his　real　being　instead　of　his　act；　then
it　may　expect　to　get　the　retort　above　spoken　of；　a　retort　which　shows　that　figure　is　not　the　inherent
being；　but　is　on　the　contrary　an　object　sufficiently　on　the　surface　to　be　roughly　handled。

If　we　look　now　at　the　range　of　relations　as　a　whole　in　which　self…conscious　individuality　can　be
observed　standing　towards　its　outer　aspect；　there　will　be　one