phenomenology of mind-第62节

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the　unity　of　self…consciousness；　contradicts　the　unity　of　thought　and　form　in　general。　What　is
declared　to　be　a　fixed　and　inherently　constant　law　can　be　merely　a　moment　of　the　self…referring；
self…reflecting　unity；　can　come　on　the　scene　merely　as　a　vanishing　element。　When　extricated；
however；　by　the　process　of　considering　them；　from　the　movement　imposing　this　continuous
connexion；　and　when　set　out　individually　and　separately；　it　is　not　content　that　they　lack；　for　they
have　a　specific　content；　they　lack　rather　form；　which　is　their　essential　nature。　In　point　of　fact　it　is
not　for　the　reason　that　they　are　to　be　merely　formal　and　are　not　to　have　any　content；　that　these
laws　are　not　the　truth　of　thought；　it　is　rather　for　the　opposite　reason。　It　is　because　in　their
specificity；　i。e。　just　as　a　content　with　the　form　removed；　they　want　to　pass　for　something　absolute。
In　their　true　nature；　as　vanishing　moments　in　the　unity　of　thought；　they　would　have　to　be　taken　as
knowledge　or　as　thinking　process；　but　not　as　laws　of　knowledge。　Observing；　however；　neither　is
nor　knows　that　knowledge　itself；　observation　converts　its　nature　into　the　shape　of　an　objective
being；　i。e。　apprehends　its　negative　character　merely　as　laws　of　being。

It　is　sufficient　for　our　purpose　here　to　have　indicated　the　invalidity　of　the　so…called　laws　of　thought
from　the　consideration　of　the　general　nature　of　the　case。　It　falls　to　speculative　philosophy　to　go
more　intimately　and　fully　into　the　matter；　and　there　they　show　themselves　to　be　what　in　truth　they
are；　single　vanishing　moments；　whose　truth　is　simply　the　whole　of　the　think　process；　knowledge
itself。

This　negative　unity　of　thought　exists　for　its　own　sake；　or　rather　it　is　just　being　for　itself　and　on　its
own　account；　the　principle　of　individuality；　and　its　reality　consists　in　exercising　a　function；　it　is　an
active　consciousness。　Consequently　the　mental　attitude　of　observation　will　by　the　nature　of　the
case　be　led　on　towards　this　as　being　the　reality　of　those　laws　of　thought。　Since　this　connexion　is
not　a　fact　for　observation；　the　latter　supposes　that　thought　with　its　laws　remains　standing　separately
on　one　side；　and　that；　on　the　other　side；　it　obtains　another　objective　being　in　what　is　now　the
object　observed；　viz。　that　acting　consciousness；　which　exists　for　itself　in　such　a　way　as　to　cancel
otherness　and　find　its　reality　in　this　direct　awareness　of　itself　as　the　negative。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　2。　Psychological　Laws

In　the　active　practical　reality　of　consciousness；　observation　thus　finds　opened　up　before　it　a　new
field。　Psychology　contains　the　collection　of　laws　in　virtue　of　which　the　mind　takes　up　different
attitudes　towards　the　different　forms　of　its　reality　given　and　presented　to　it　in　a　condition　of
otherness。　The　mind　adopts　these　various　attitudes　partly　with　a　view　to　receiving　these　modes　of
its　reality　into　itself；　and　conforming　to　the　habits；　customs；　and　ways　of　thinking　it　thus　comes
across；　as　being　that　wherein　mind　is　reality　and　as　such　object　to　itself；　partly　with　a　view　to
knowing　its　own　spontaneous　activity　in　opposition　to　them；　to　follow　the　bent　of　its　own
inclinations；　affections；　and　emotions；　and　carry　off　thence　what　is　merely　of　particular　and　special
moment　for　itself；　and　thus　make　what　is　objective　conform　to　itself。　In　the　former　it　behaves
negatively　towards　itself　as　single　and　individual　mind；　in　the　latter　negatively　towards　itself　as　the
universal　being。

In　the　former　aspect　independence　＇or　self…dependence＇　gives　what　is　met　with　merely　the　form　of
conscious　individuality　in　general；　and　as　regards　the　content　remains　within　the　general　reality
given；　in　the　second　aspect；　however；　it　gives　the　reality　at　least　a　certain　special　modification；
which　does　not　contradict　its　essential　content；　or　even　a　modification　by　which　the　individual　qua
particular　reality　and　peculiar　content　sets　itself　against　the　general　reality。　This　opposition
becomes　a　form　of　wrongdoing　when　the　individual　cancels　that　reality　in　a　merely　particular
manner；　or　when　it　does　so　in　a　manner　that　is　general　and　thus　for　all；　when　it　puts　another　world；
another　right；　law；　and　custom　in　place　of　those　already　there。

Observational　psychology；　which　in　the　first　instance　states　what　observation　finds　regarding　the
general　forms　brought　to　its　notice　in　the　active　consciousness；　discovers　all　sorts　of　faculties；
inclinations；　and　passions；　and　since；　while　narrating　what　this　collection　contains；　the
remembrance　of　the　unity　of　self…consciousness　is　not　to　be　suppressed；　observational　psychology
is　bound　to　get　the　length　at　least　of　wonderment　that　such　a　lot　and　such　a　miscellany　of　things　can
happen　to　be　somehow　alongside　one　another　in　the　mind　as　in　a　kind　of　bag；　more　especially
when　they　are　seen　to　be　not　lifeless　inert　things；　but　restless　active　processes。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　3。　The　Law　of　Indiviuality

In　telling　over　these　various　faculties　observation　keeps　to　the　universal　aspect：　the　unity　of　these
multifarious　capacities　is　the　opposite　aspect　to　this　universality；　is　the　actual　concrete　individuality。

To　take　up　again　thus　the　different　concrete　individualities；　and　to　describe　how　one　man　has　more
inclination　for　this　the　other　for　that；　how　one　has　more　intelligence　than　the　other　—　all　this　is；
however；　something　much　more　uninteresting　than　even　to　reckon　up　the　species　of　insects；
mosses；　and　so　on。　For　these　latter　give　observation　the　right　to　take　them　thus　individually　and
disconnectedly　（begrifflos）；　because　they　belong　essentially　to　the　sphere　of　fortuitous　detailed
particulars。　To　take　conscious　individuality　on　the　other　hand；　as　a　particular　phenomenal　entity；
and　treat　it　in　so　wooden　a　fashion；　is　self…contradictory；　because　the　essential　nature　of
individuality　lies　in　the　universal　element　of　mind。　Since；　however；　the　process　of　apprehending　it
causes　it　at　the　same　time　to　pass　into　the　form　of　universality；　to　apprehend　it　is　to　find　its　law；
and　seems　in　this　way　to　have　a　rational　purpose　in　view；　and　a　necessary　function　to　fulfil。

The　moments　constituting　the　content　of　the　law　are　on　the　one　hand　individuality　itself；　on　the
other　its　universal　inorganic　nature；　viz。　the　given　circumstances；　situation；　habits；　customs；　religion；
and　so　forth；　from　these　the　determinate　individuality　is　to　be　understood　and　comprehended。
They　contain　something　specific；　determinate；　as　well　as　universal；　and　are　at　the　same　time
something　lying　at　hand；　which　furnishes　material　for　observation　and　on　the　other　side　expresses
itself　in　the　form　of　individuality。

The　law　of　this　relation　of　the　two　sides　has　now　to　contain　and　express　the　sort　of　effect　and
influence　these　determinate　circumstances　exert　on　individuality。　This　individuality；　however　just
consists　both　in　being　the　universal；　and　hence　in　passively　and　directly　assimilating　and　blending
with　the　given　universals；　the　customs；　habits；　etc。；　thus　becoming　conformed　to　them；　as　also　in
taking　up　an　attitude　of　opposition　towards　them　and　thus　transforming　and　transmuting　them；　and
again　in　behaving　towards　them　in　its　individual　character　with　complete　indifference；　neither
allowing　them　to　exert　an　influence　over　it；　nor　setting　itself　actively　against　them。　On　that　account
what　is　to　have　an　influence　on　individuality；　and　what　sort　of　influence　it　is　to　have　—　which；
properly　speaking；　mean　the　same　thin…depend　entirely　on　individuality　itself：　to　say　that　by　such
and　such　an　influence　this　individuality　has　become　this　specifically　determinate　individuality　means
nothing　else　than　saying　it　has　been　this　all　along。　Circumstances；　situation；　customs；　and　so　on；
which　show　themselves　on　one　side　as　something　given；　and　on　the　other　as　within　this　specific
individuality；　reveal　merely　indeterminate　nature　of　individuality；　which　is　not　the　point　under
consideration。　If　these　circumstances；　style　of　thought；　customs；　the　whole　state　of　the　world；　in
short；　had　not　been；　then　assuredly　the　individual　would　not　have　been　what　he　is；　for　all　the
elements　that　find　a　place　in　this　〃　state　of　the　world　〃　constitute　this　universal　substance。

By　the　way；　however；　in　which　the　state　of　the　world　has　affected　in　particular　any　given　individual
—　and　it　is　such　an　individual　that　has　to　be　comprehended　—　it　must　itself　have　assumed　a
particular　shape　on　its　own　account；　and　have　operated　upon　the　individual　in　the　specific
character　which　it　assumed。　Only　so　could　it　have　made　the　individual　the　specific　particular
individual　he　is。　If　the　external　element　is　so　constituted　in　and　for　itself　as　it　appears　in
individuality；　the　latter　would　be　comprehended　from　the　nature　of　the　former。　We　should　have　a
double　gallery　of　pictures；　one　of　which　would　be　the　reflexion　of　the　other：　the　one　the　gallery　of
external　circumstance　completely　encompassing；　circumscribing；　and　determining　the　individual；
the　other　the　same　gallery　translated　into　the　form　in　which　those　circumstances　are　in　the
conscious　individual：　the　former　the　spherical　surface；　the　latter　the　centre　reflectively　representing
that　surface　within　it。