phenomenology of mind-第55节

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merely　the　semblance　of　a　distinction；　and　consequently　it　is　a　notion　in　its　very　nature。　

This　is　exactly；　however；　the　way　self…consciousness　is　constituted。　It　distinguishes　itself　in　like
manner　from　itself；　without　any　distinction　being　thereby　established。　Hence　it　is　that　it　finds　in
observation　of　organic　nature　nothing　else　than　this　kind　of　reality；　it　finds　itself　in　the　form　of　a
thing；　as　a　life；　and　yet；　between　what　it　is　itself　and　what　it　has　found；　draws　a　distinction　which
is；　however；　no　distinction。　Just　as　the　instinct　of　an　animal　is　to　seek　and　consume　food；　but
thereby　elicits　nothing　except　itself；　similarly　too　the　instinct　of　reason　in　its　search　merely　finds
reason　itself。　An　animal　ends　with　self…feeling。　The　instinct　of　reason；　on　the　other　hand；　is　at　the
same　time；　self…consciousness。　But　because　it　is　merely　instinct；　it　is　put　on　one　side　as　against
consciousness；　and　in　the　latter　finds　its　opposite。　Its　satisfaction　is；　therefore；　broken　in　two　by
this　opposite；　it　finds　itself；　viz。　the　purpose；　and　also　finds　this　purpose　in　the　shape　of　a　thing。　But
the　purpose　is　seen　to　lie；　in　the　first　instance；　apart　from　the　thing　presenting　itself　as　a　purpose。　In
the　second　place；　this　purpose　qua　purpose　is　at　the　same　time　objective；　it　is　taken　to　fall；　there。
fore；　not　within　the　observing　consciousness；　but　within　another　intelligence。　

Looked　at　more　closely；　this　character　lies　also　just　as　much　in　the　notion　of　the　thingthat　of
being　in　itself　purpose。　It　preserves　itself；　this　means　at　one　and　the　same　time　it　is　its　nature　to
conceal　the　controlling　necessity　and　to　present　that　necessity　in　the　form　of　a　contingent　relation。
For　its　freedom；　its　being　on　its　own　account；　means　just　that　it　behaves　towards　its　necessary
condition　as　something　indifferent。　It　thus　presents　itself　as　if　it　were　something　whose　notion　falls
apart　from　its　existence。　In　this　way　reason　is　compelled　to　look　on　its　own　proper　notion　as　falling
outside　it；　to　look　at　it　as　a　thing；　as　that　towards　which　it　is　indifferent；　and　which　in　consequence
is　reciprocally　indifferent　towards　it　＇reason＇　and　towards　its　own　notion。　Qua　instinct　it　continues
to　remain　within　this　state　of　being；　this　condition　of　indifference；　and　the　thing　expressing　the
notion　remains　for　it　something　other　than　this　notion；　and　the　notion　other　than　the　thing。　Thus　for
reason　the　thing　organized　is　only　per　se　a　purpose　in　the　sense　that　the　necessity；　which　is
presented　as　concealed　within　the　action　of　the　thingfor　the　active　agency　there　takes　up　the
attitude　of　being　indifferent　and　independentfalls　outside　the　organism　itself。　

Since；　however；　the　organic　qua　purpose　per　se　can　not　behave　in　any　other　way　than　as　organic；
the　fact　of　its　being　per　se　a　purpose　is　also　apparent　and　sensibly　present；　and　as　such　it　is
observed。　What　is　organic　shows　itself　when　observed　to　be　something　self…preserving；　returning
and　returned　into　itself。　But　in　this　state　of　being；　observation　does　not　recognize　the　concept　of
purpose；　or　does　not　know　that　the　notion　of　purpose　is　not　in　an　intelligence　anywhere　else；　but
just　exists　here　and　in　the　form　of　a　thing。　Observation　makes　a　distinction　between　the　concept　of
purpose　and　self…existence　and　self…preservation；　which　is　not　a　distinction　at　all。　That　it　is　no
distinction　is　something　of　which　it　is　not　aware；　what　it　is　aware　of　is　an　activity　which　appears
contingent　and　indifferent　towards　what　is　brought　about　by　that　activity；　and　towards　the　unity
which　is　all　the　while　the　principle　connecting　both；　that　activity　and　this　purpose　are　taken　to　fall
asunder。　

On　this　view　the　special　function　of　the　organic　is　the　inner　operating　activity　lying　between　its　first
and　last　stage；　so　far　as　this　activity　implies　the　character　of　singleness。　So　far；　however；　as　the
activity　has　the　character　of　universality；　and　the　active　agent　is　equated　with　what　is　the　outcome
of　its　operation；　this　purposive　activity　as　such　would　not　belong　to　organic　beings。　That　single
activity；　which　is　merely　a　means；　comes；　owing　to　its　individual　form；　to　be　determined　by　an
entirely　individual　or　contingent　necessity。　What　an　organic　being　does　for　the　preservation　of　itself
as　an　individual；　or　of　itself　qua　genus；　is；　therefore；　quite　lawless　as　regards　this　immediate
content：　for　notion　and　universal　fall　outside　it。　Its　activity　would　accordingly　be　empty　functioning
without　any　content　in　it；　it　would　not　even　be　the　functioning　of　a　machine；　for　this　has　a　purpose
and　its　activity　in　consequence　a　definite　content。　If　it　were　deserted　in　this　way　by　the　universal；　it
would　be　an　activity　of　a　mere　being　qua　being；　i。e。　would　be　an　activity　like　that　of　an　acid　or　a
base；　not　forthwith　reflected　into　itself…a　function　which　could　not　be　cut　off　from　its　immediate
existence；　nor　give　up　this　existence　（which　gets　lost　in　the　relation　to　its　opposite）；　but　could
preserve　itself。　The　kind　of　being　whose　functioning　is　here　under　consideration　is；　however；　set
down　as　a　thing　preserving　itself　in　its　relation　to　its　opposite。　The　activity　as　such　is　nothing　but　the
bare　insubstantial　form　of　its　independent　existence　on　its　own　account；　and　the　purpose　of　the
activity；　its　substancessubstance；　which　is　not　simply　a　determinate　being；　but　the　universal…does
not　fall　outside　the　activity。　It　is　an　activity　reverting　into　itself　by　its　own　nature；　and　is　not　turned
back　into　itself　by　any　alien；　external　agency。　

This　union　of　universality　and　activity；　however；　is　not　a　matter　for　this　attitude　of　observation；
because　that　unity　is　essentially　the　inner　movement　of　what　is　organic；　and　can　only　be
apprehended　conceptually。　Observation；　however；　seeks　the　moments　in　the　form　of　existence
and　duration；　and　because　the　organic　whole　consists　essentially　in　not　containing　the　moments　in
that　form；　and　in　not　letting　them　be　found　within　it　in　that　way；　this　observing　consciousness；　by　its
way　of　looking　at　the　matter；　transforms　the　opposition　into　one　which　conforms　and　is　adapted　to
its　own　point　of　view。　

An　organism　comes　before　the　observing　consciousness　in　this　manner　as　a　relation　of　two　fixed
and　existing　momentsas　a　relation　of　elements　in　an　opposition；　whose　two　factors　seem　in　one
respect　really　given　in　observation；　while　in　another　respect；　as　regards　their　content；　they　express
the　opposition　of　the　organic　concept　of　purpose　and　actual　reality。　But　because　the　notion　as　such
is　there　effaced；　this　takes　place　in　an　obscure　and　superficial　way；　where　thought　sinks　to　the　level
of　mere　ideal　presentation。　Thus　we　see　the　notion　taken　much　in　the　sense　of　what　is　inner；　reality
in　the　sense　of　what　is　outer；　and　their　relation　gives　rise　to　the　law　that　〃the　outer　is　the　expression
of　the　inner〃。　

Let　us　consider　more　closely　this　inner　with　its　opposite　and　their　relation　to　one　another。　In　the
first　place　we　find　that　the　two　factors　of　the　law　no　longer　have　such　an　import　as　we　found　in　the
case　of　previous　laws；　where　the　elements　appeared　as　independent　things；　each　being　a　particular
body；　nor；　again；　in　the　second　place；　do　we　find　that　the　universal　is　to　have　its　existence
somewhere　else　outside　what　actually　is。　On　the　contrary；　the　organic　being　is；　in　undivided
oneness　and　as　a　whole；　the　fundamental　fact；　it　is　the　content　of　inner　and　outer；　and　is　the　same
for　both。　The　opposition　is　on　that　account　of　a　purely　formal　character；　its　real　sides　have　the
same　ultimate　principle　inherently　constituting　them　what　they　are。　At　the　same　time；　however；
since　inner　and　outer　are　also　opposite　realities　and　each　is　a　distinct　being　for　observation；　they
each　seem　to　observation　to　have　a　peculiar　content　of　their　own。　This　peculiar　content；　since　it
consists　of　the　same　substance；　or　the　same　organic　unity；　can；　however；　in　point　of　fact；　be　only　a
different　form　of　that　unity；　of　that　substance；　and　this　is　indicated　by　observation　when　it　says　that
the　outer　is　merely　the　expression　of　the　inner。　

We　have　seen　in　the　case　of　the　concept　of　purpose　the　same　characteristic　features　of　the
relation；　viz。　the　indifferent　independence　of　the　diverse　factors；　and　their　unity　in　that
independence；　a　unity　in　which　they　disappear。　

We　have　now　to　see　what　shape　and　embodiment　inner　and　outer　assume　in　actually　existing。　The
inner　as　such　must　have　an　outer　being　and　an　embodiment；　just　as　much　as　the　outer　as　such；　for
the　inner　is　an　object；　or　is　affirmed　as　being；　and　as　present　for　observation　to　deal　with。　

The　organic　substance　qua　inner　is　the　Soul　simply；　the　pure　notion　of　purpose　or　the　universal
which　in　dividing　into　its　discrete　elements　remains　all　the　same　a　universal　fluent　continuity；　and
hence　in　its　being　appears　as　activity　or　the　movement　of　vanishing　reality；　while；　on　the　other
hand；　the　outer；　opposed　to　that　existing　inner；　subsists　in　the　passive　being　of　the　organic。　The
law；　as　the　relation　of　that　inner　to　this　outer；　consequently　expresses　it　content；　now　by　setting
forth　universal　moments；　or　simple　essential　elements；　and　again　by　setting　forth　the　realized
essentia