phenomenology of mind-第53节

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dominating　one　another；　sees　confusions　formed　and　transitions　made　from　one　to　another；　here　it
finds　united　what　it　took　at　first　to　be　absolutely　separated；　and　there　separated　what　it　considered
connected。　Hence；　when　observation　thus　holds　by　the　unbroken　self…sameness　of　being；　it　has
here；　just　in　the　most　general　determinations　given…e。g。　in　the　case　of　the　essential　marks　of　an
animal　or　a　plant…to　see　itself　tormented　with　instances；　which　rob　it　of　every　determination；　silence
the　universality　it　reached；　and　reduce　it　again　to　unreflective　observation　and　description。　

Observation；　which　confines　itself　in　this　way　to　what　is　simple；　or　restricts　the　sensuously
dispersed　elements　by　the　universal；　thus　finds　its　principle　confused　by　its　object；　because　what　is
determined　must　by　its　very　nature　get　lost　in　its　opposite。　Reason；　therefore；　must　pass　from　that
inert　characteristic　which　had　the　semblance　of　stability；　and　go　on　to　observe　it　as　it　really　is　in
truth；　viz。　as　relating　itself　to　its　opposite。　What　are　called　essential　marks　are　passive
characteristics；　which；　when　expressed　and　apprehended　as　simple；　do　not　bring　out　what
constitutes　their　real　naturewhich　is　to　be　vanishing　moments　of　its　process　of　withdrawing　and
betaking　itself　into　itself。　Since　the　instinct　of　reason　now　arrives　at　the　point　of　looking　for　the
characteristic　in　the　light　of　its　true　naturethat　of　essentially　passing　over　into　its　opposite　and　not
existing　apart　by　itself　and　for　its　own　sakeit　seeks　after　the　Law　and　the　notion　of　law。　It　seeks
for　them；　moreover；　as　existing　reality；　but　this　feature　of　concrete　reality　will　in　point　of　fact
disappear　before　reason；　and　the　aspects　of　the　law　will　become　for　it　mere　moments　or
abstractions；　so　that　the　law　comes　to　light　in　the　nature　of　the　notion；　which　has　destroyed　within
itself　the　indifferent　subsistence　of　sensuous　reality。　

To　the　consciousness　observing；　the　truth　of　the　law　is　given　in　〃experience〃；　in　the　way　that　sense
existence　is　object　for　consciousness；　the　truth　is　not　given　in　and　itself。　If；　however；　the　law　does
not　have　its　truth　for　in　the　notion；　it　is　something　contingent；　not　a　necessity；　in　fact；　not　a　law。　But
its　being　essentially　in　the　form　of　a　notion　does　not　merely　not　contradict　its　being　present　for
observation　to　deal　with；　but　really　gives　it　on　that　account　necessary　existence；　and　makes　it　an
object　for　observation。　The　universal　in　the　sense　of　a　rational　universality　is　also　universal　in　the
sense　implied　in　the　above　notion：　its　being　is　for　consciousness；　it　presents　itself　there　as　the　real；
the　objective　present；　the　notion　sets　itself　forth　in　the　form　of　thinghood　and　sensuous　existence。
But　it　does　not；　on　that　account；　lose　its　nature　and　fall　into　the　condition　of　immovable　subsisting
passivity；　or　mere　adventitious　（gleichgültig）　succession。　What　is　universally　valid　is　also
universally　effective：　what　ought　to　be；　as　a　matter　of　fact；　is　too；　and　what　merely　should　be；　and
is　not；　has　no　real　truth。　The　instinct　of　reason　is　entirely　within　its　rights　when　it　stands　firm　on　this
point；　and　refuses　to　be　led　astray　by　entia　intellectus　which　merely　ought　to　be　and；　qua　ought；
should　be　allowed　to　have　truth　even　though　they　are　to　be　met　with　nowhere　in　experience；　and
declines　to　be　turned　aside　by　the　hypothetical　suggestions　and　all　the　other　impalpable　unrealities
designed　in　the　interest　of　an　everlasting　〃ought　to　be〃　which　never　is。　（1）　For　reason　is　just　this
certainty　of　having　reality；　and　what　consciousness　is　not　aware　of　as　a　real　self　（Selbstwesen）；　i。e。
what　does　not　appear；　is　nothing　for　consciousness　at　all。　

The　true　nature　of　law；　viz。：　that　it　essentially　is　reality；　no　doubt　again　assumes　for　consciousness
which　remains　at　the　level　of　observation；　the　form　of　an　opposite　over　against　the　notion　and　the
inherently　universal；　in　other　words；　this　consciousness　does　not　take　such　an　object　as　its　law　to
be　a　reality　of　reason；　it　thinks　it　has　got　there　something　external　and　foreign。　But　it　contradicts　its
own　idea　by　actually　and　in　fact　not　taking　its　universality　to　mean　that　all　individual　things　of　sense
must　have　given　evidence　of　the　law　to　enable　the　truth　of　the　law　to　be　asserted。　The　assertion
that　stones；　when　raised　from　the　ground　and　lot　go；　fall；　does　not　at　all　require　us　to　make　the
experiment　with　all　stones。　It　means　most　likely　that　this　experiment　must　have　been　tried　at　least
with　a　good　many；　and　from　that　we　can　by　analogy　draw　an　inference　about　the　rest　with　the
greatest　probability　or　with　perfect　right。　Yet　analogy　not　only　gives　no　perfect　right；　but；　on
account　of　its　nature；　contradicts　itself　so　often　that　the　inference　to　be　drawn　from　analogy　itself
rather　is　that　analogy　does　not　permit　an　inference　to　be　drawn。　Probability；　which　is　what　analogy
would　come　to；　loses；　when　face　to　face　with　truth；　every　distinction　of　less　and　greater；　be　the
probability　as　great　as　it　may　it　is　nothing　as　against　truth。　The　instinct　of　reason；　however；　takes；
as　a　matter　of　fact；　laws　of　that　sort　for　truth。　It　is　when　reason　does　not　find　necessity　in　them　that
it　resorts　to　making　this　distinction；　and　lowers　the　truth　of　the　matter　to　the　level　of　probability；　in
order　to　bring　out　the　imperfect　way　in　which　truth　is　presented　to　the　consciousness　that　as　yet
has　no　insight　into　the　pure　notion；　for　universality　is　before　it　there　merely　in　the　form　of　simple
immediate　universality。　But；　at　the　same　time；　on　account　of　this　universality；　the　law　has　truth　for
consciousness。　That　a　stone　falls　is　true　for　consciousness；　because　it　is　aware　of　the　stone　being
heavy；　i。e。　because　in　weight；　taken　by　itself　as　such；　the　stone　has　that　essential　relation　to　the
earth　expressed　in　the　fact　of　falling。　Consciousness　thus　finds　in　experience　the　objective　being　of
the　law；　but　has　it　there　in　the　form　of　a　notion　as　well；　and　only　because　of　both　factors　together　is
the　law　true　for　consciousness。　The　law；　therefore；　is　accepted　as　a　law　because　it　presents　itself　in
the　sphere　of　appearance　and　is；　at　the　same　time；　in　its　very　nature　a　notion。　

The　instinct　of　reason　in　this　type　of　consciousness；　because　the　law　is　at　the　same　time　inherently
a　notion；　proceeds　to　give　the　law　and　its　moments　a　purely　conceptual　form；　and　proceeds　to　do
this　of　necessity；　but　without　knowing　that　this　is　what　it　seeks　to　do。　It　puts　the　law　to　the　test　of
experiment。　As　the　law　first　appears；　it　is　enveloped　in　particulars　of　sense；　and　the　notion
constituting　its　nature　is　involved　with　empirical　elements。　The　instinct　of　reason　sets　to　work　to
find　out　by　experiment　what　follows　in　such　and　such　circumstances。　By　so　doing　the　law　seems
only　to　be　plunged　still　further　into　sense；　but　sense　existence　really　gets　lost　in　the　process。　The
inner　purport　of　this　investigation　is　to　find　pure　conditions　of　the　law；　and　this　means　nothing　else
（even　if　the　consciousness　stating　the　fact　were　to　think　it　meant　something　different）　than
completely　to　bring　out　the　law　in　conceptual　shape　and　detach　its　moments　entirely　from
determinate　specific　existence。　For　example；　negative　electricity；　which　is　known　at　first；　say；　in　the
form　of　resin…electricity；　while　positive　electricity　comes　before　us　as　glass…electricitythese；　by
means　of　experiments；　lose　altogether　such　a　significance；　and　become　purely　positive　and
negative　electricity；　neither　of　which　is　bound　up　any　longer　with　things　of　a　particular　kind；　and　we
can　no　longer　say　that　there　are　bodies　which　are　electrical　positively；　others　electrical　negatively。
In　the　same　way　the　relationship　of　acid　and　base　and　their　reaction　constitute　a　law　in　which　these
opposite　factors　appear　as　bodies。　Yet　these　sundered　things　have　no　reality；　the　power　which
tears　them　apart　cannot　prevent　them　from　entering　forthwith　into　a　process；　for　they　are　merely
this　relation。　They　cannot　subsist　and　be　indicated　by　themselves　apart；　like　a　tooth　or　a　claw。　That
it　is　their　very　nature　to　pass　over　directly　into　a　neutral　product　makes　their　existence　lie　in　being
cancelled　and　superseded；　or　makes　it　into　a　universal；　and　acid　and　base　possess　truth　merely
qua　Universal。　Just；　then；　as　glass　and　resin　can　be　equally　well　positively　as　negatively　electrified；
in　the　same　way　acid　and　base　are　not　attached　as　properties　or　qualities　to　this　or　that　reality；
each　thing　is　only　relatively　acidulate　and　basic；　what　seems　to　be　an　absolute　base　or　an　absolute
acid　gets　in　the　so…called　Synsomates　（2）　the　opposite　significance　in　relation　to　an　other。　

The　result　of　the　experiments　is　in　this　way　to　cancel　the　moments　or　inner　significations　as
properties　of　specific　things；　and　free　the；　predicates　from　their　subjects。　These　predicates　are
found　merely　as　universal；　and　in　truth　that　is　what　they　are。　Because　of　this　self　subsistence　they
therefore　get　the　name　of　kinds　of　〃matter〃；　which　is　neither　a　body　nor　a　property　of　a　body；
certainly　no　one　would　call　acid；　positive　and　negative　electricity；　heat；　（3）　etc。；　bodies。　

Matter；　on　the　contrary；　is　not　a　thing　that　exists；　it　is　being