phenomenology of mind-第52节

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procedure　contradicts　this　idea；　for　it　knows　things；　it　transforms　their　sensuous　character　into
conceptions；　i。e。　just　into　a　kind　of　being　which　at　the　same　time　is　ego；　it　transforms　thought　into
an　existent　thought；　or　being　into　a　thought…constituted　being；　and；　in　fact；　asserts　that　things　have
truth　merely　as　conceptions。　In　this　process；　it　is　only　what　the　things　are　that　consciousness　in
observation　becomes　aware　of；　we；　however　＇who　are　tracing　the　nature　of　this　experience＇；
become　aware　of　what　conscious　observation　itself　is。　The　outcome　of　its　process；　however；　will
be　that　this　consciousness　becomes　aware　of　being　for　itself　what　it　is　in　itself　＇i。e。　becomes　aware
of　being　to　itself　what；　in　the　meantime；　it　is　to　us＇。　

We　have　to　consider　the　operation　of　this　observational　phase　of　reason　in　all　the　various　moments
of　its　activity。　It　takes　up　this　attitude　towards　Nature；　Mind；　and　finally　towards　the　relation　of
both　in　the　form　of　sense…existence；　and　in　all　these　it　seeks　to　find　itself　as　a　definitely　existing
concrete　actuality。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　



1。　v。　p。　154　ff。　




a　（1）
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Observation　of　Nature

WHEN　the　unreflective　consciousness　speaks　of　observation　and　experience　as　being　the　fountain
of　truth；　the　phrase　may　possibly　sound　as　if　the　whole　business　were　a　matter　of　tasting；　smelling；
feeling；　hearing；　and　seeing。　It　forgets；　in　its　zeal　for　tasting；　smelling；　etc。；　to　say　that；　in　point　of
fact；　it　has　really　and　rationally　determined　for　itself　already　the　object　thus　sensuously
apprehended；　and　this　determination　of　the　object　is　at　least　as　important　for　it　as　that
apprehension。　It　will　also　as　readily　admit　that　its　whole　concern　is　not　simply　a　matter　of
perceiving；　and　will　not　allow；　e。g；。　the　perception　that　this　penknife　lies　beside　this　snuff…box　to
pass　for　an　〃observation〃。　What　is　perceived　should；　at　least；　have　the　significance　of　a　universal；
and　not　of　a　sensuous　particular　〃this〃。　

The　universal；　here　regarded；　is；　only　in　the　first　instance；　what　remains　identical　with　itself；　its
movement　is　merely　the　uniform　recurrence　of　the　same　operation。　The　consciousness；　which　thus
far　finds　in　the　object　merely　universality　or　the　abstract　〃mine〃；　must　take　upon　itself　the
movement　peculiar　to　the　object；　and；　since　it　is　not　yet　at　the　stage　of　understanding　that　object；　it
must；　at　least；　be　the　recollection　of　it；　a　recollection　which　expresses　in　a　universal　way　what；　in
actual　fact；　is　merely　present　in　a　particular　form。　This　superficial　way　of　educing　from　particularity；
and　the　equally　superficial　form　of　universality　into　which　the　sense　element　is　merely　taken　up；
without　the　sense　element　having　in　itself　become　a　universalthis　description　of　things　is　not　as　yet
a　process　effected　in　the　object　itself。　The　process　really　takes　place　solely　in　the　function　of
describing。　The　object　as　it　is　described　has　consequently　lost　interest；　when　one　object　is　being
described　another　must　be　taken　in　hand　and　ever　sought；　so　as　not　to　put　a　stop　to　the　process　of
description。　If　it　is　no　longer　easy　to　find　new　and　whole　things；　then　there　is　nothing　for　it　but　to
turn　back　upon　those　already　found；　in　order　to　divide　them　still　further；　break　them　up　into
component　parts　and　look　out　for　any　new　aspects　of　thinghood　that　still　remain　in　them。　There
can　never　be　an　end　to　the　material　at　the　disposal　of　this　restlessly　active　instinct。　To　find　a　new
genus　of　distinctive　significance；　or　even　to　discover　a　new　planet；　which　although　an　individual
entity　yet　possesses　the　nature　of　a　universal；　can　only　fall　to　the　lot　of　those　who　are　lucky
enough。　But　the　boundary　line　of　what；　like　elephant；　oak；　gold；　is　markedly　distinctive；　the　line　of
demarcation　of　what　is　genus　and　species　passes　through　many　stages　into　the　endless
particularization　of　the　chaos　of　plants　and　animals；　kinds　of　rocks；　or　of　metals；　forms　of　earth；
etc。；　etc。；　that　only　force　and　craft　can　bring　to　light。　In　this　realm　where　universality　means
indeterminateness；　where　particularity　now　approximates　to　singleness；　and　again　at　this　point　and
that　even　descends　to　it　entirely；　there　is　offered　an　inexhaustible　supply　of　material　for　observation
and　description　to　deal　with。　Here；　where　a　boundless　field　is　opened　up；　at　the　boundary　line　of
the　universal　it　can　have　found　not　an　immeasurable　wealth；　but　instead；　merely　the　limitations　of
nature　and　of　its　own　operation。　It　can　no　longer　know　whether　what　seems　to　have　being　per　se
is　not　a　chance　accident。　What　bears　the　impress　of　a　confused　or　immature　feeble　structure；
barely　evolving　from　the　stage　of　elementary　indeterminateness；　cannot　claim　even　to　be
described。　

While　this　seeking　and　describing　seem　to　be　concerned　merely　with　things；　we　see　that　in　point　of
fact　it　does　not　continue　in　the　form　of　sense…perception。　Rather；　what　enables　things　to　be　known
is　more　important　for　description　than　the　range　of　sense　properties　still　left　over；　qualities　which；
of　course；　the　thing　itself　cannot　do　without；　but　which　consciousness　dispenses　with。　Through　this
distinction　into　what　is　essential　and　what　is　unessential；　the　notion　rises　out　of　the　dispersion　of
sensibility；　and　knowledge　thereby　makes　it　clear　that　it　has　to　do　at　least　quite　as　essentially　with
its　own　self　as　with　things。　This　twofold　essentiality　produces　a　certain　hesitation　as　to　whether
what　is　essential　and　necessary　for　knowledge　is　also　so　in　the　case　of　the　things。　On　the　one　hand；
the　qualifying　〃marks〃　have　merely　to　serve　the　purpose　of　knowledge　in　distinguishing　things　inter
se；　on　the　other　hand；　however；　it　is　not　the　unessential　quality　of　things　that　has　to　be　known；　but
that　feature　in　virtue　of　which　they　themselves　break　away　from　the　general　continuity　of　being　as　a
whole；　separate　themselves　from　others　and　stand　by　themselves。　The　distinguishing　〃marks〃　must
not　only　have　an　essential　relation　to　knowledge　but　also　be　the　essential　characteristics　of　the
things；　and　the　system　of　marks　devised　must　conform　to　the　system　of　nature　itself；　and　merely
express　this　system。　This　follows　necessarily　from　the　very　principle　and　meaning　of　reason；　and
the　instinct　of　reasonfor　it　operates　in　this　process　of　observation　merely　as　an　instincthas　also
in　its　systems　attained　this　unity；　a　unity　where　its　objects　are　so　constituted　that　they　carry　their
own　essential　reality　with　them；　involve　an　existence　on　their　own　account；　and　are　not　simply　an
incident　of　a　given　particular　time；　or　a　particular　place。　The　distinguishing　marks　of　animals；　for
example；　are　taken　from　their　claws　and　teeth；　for；　in　point　of　fact；　not　only　does　knowledge
distinguish　thus　one　animal　from　another；　but　each　animal　itself　separates　itself　off　thereby；　it
preserves　itself　independently　by　means　of　these　weapons；　and　keeps　itself　detached　from　the
universal　nature。　A　plant；　on　the　other　hand；　never　gets　the　length　of　existing　for　itself；　it　touches
merely　the　boundary　line　of　individuality。　This　line　is　where　plants　show　the　semblance　of
diremption　and　separation　by　the　possession　of　different　sex…characters；　this　furnishes；　therefore；
the　principle　for　distinguishing　plants　inter　se。　What；　however；　stands　on　a　still　lower　level　cannot
of　itself　any　longer　distinguish　itself　from　another；　it　gets　lost　when　the　contrast　comes　into　play。
Quiescent　being　and　being　in　a　relation　come　into　conflict　with　one　another；　a　〃thing〃　in　the　latter
case　is　something　different　from　a　〃thing〃　in　the　former　state；　whereas　the　〃individuum〃　consists　in
preserving　itself　in　relation　to　another。　What；　however；　is　incapable　of　this　and　becomes　in
chemical　fashion　something　other　than　it　is　empirically；　confuses　knowledge　and　gives　rise　to　the
same　doubt　as　to　whether　knowledge　is　to　hold　to　the　one　side　or　the　other；　since　the　thing　has
itself　no　self…consistency；　and　these　two　sides　fall　apart　within　it。　

In　those　systems　where　the　elements　involve　general　self…sameness；　this　character　connotes　at
once　the　self…sameness　of　knowledge　and　of　things　themselves　as　well。　But　this　expansion　of　these
self…identical　characteristics；　each　of　which　describes　undisturbed　the　entire　circuit　of　its　course
and　gets　full　scope　to　do　as　it　likes；　necessarily　leads　as　readily　to　its　very　opposite；　leads　to　the
confusion　of　these　characteristics。　For　the　qualifying　mark；　the　general　characteristic　is　the　unity　of
opposite　factors；　viz。　of　what　is　determinate；　and　of　what　is　per　se　universal。　It　must；　therefore；
break　asunder　into　this　opposition。　If；　now；　on　one　side　the　characteristic　overmasters　the
universality　in　which　its　essence　lies；　on　the　other　side；　again；　this　universality　equally　keeps　that
characteristic　under　control；　forces　the　latter　on　to　its　boundary　line；　and　there　mingles　together　its
distinctions　and　its　essential　constituents。　Observation　which　kept　them　apart　in　orderly　fashion；
and　thought　it　had　hold　there　of　something　stable　and　fixed；　finds　the　principles　overlapping　and
dominating　one　another；　sees　confusions　formed　and　transitions　made　from　one　to　another；　here　it
finds　u