phenomenology of mind-第30节

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also　tart；；　and　so　on；　in　other　words；　the　thing　is　the　〃also〃；　the　general　medium；　wherein　the　many
properties　subsist　externally　to　one　another；　without　touching　or　affecting　one　another；　and　without
canceling　one　another；　and；　so　taken；　the　thing　is　taken　as　what　it　truly　is。　

Now；　on　this　mode　of　perception　arising；　consciousness　is　at　the　same　time　aware　that　it　reflects
itself　also　into　itself；　and　that；　in　perceiving；　the　opposite　moment　to　the　〃also〃　crops　up。　This
moment；　however；　is　the　unity　of　the　thing　with　itself；　a　unity　which　excludes　distinction　from　itself。
It　is　consequently　this　unity　which　consciousness　has　to　take　upon　itself　；　for　the　thing　as　such　is　the
subsistence　of　many　different　and　independent　properties。　Thus　we　say　of　the　thing；　〃it　is　white；
and　also　cubical；　and　also　tart〃；　and　so　on。　But　so　far　as　it　is　white　it　is　not　cubical；　and　so　far　as　it
is　cubical　and　also　white　it　is　not　tart；　and　so　on。　Putting　these　properties　into　a　〃one〃　belongs
solely　to　consciousness；　which；　therefore；　has　to　avoid　letting　them　coincide　and　be　one　（i。e。　one
and　the　same　property）　in　the　thing。　For　that　purpose　it　introduces　the　idea　of　〃in…so…far〃　to　meet
the　difficulty；　and　by　this　means　it　keeps　the　qualities　apart；　and　preserves　the　thing　in　the　sense　of
the　〃also〃。　Quite　rightly　consciousness　at　first　makes　itself　responsible　for　the　oneness〃　in　such　a
way　that　what　was　called　a　property　is　represented　as　being　〃free　matter〃　（materia　libera）。　（3）　In
this　way　the　thing　is　raised　to　the　level　of　a　true　also'　since　it　…thus　becomes　a　collection　of
component　elements　（materials　or　matters）；　and　instead　of　being　a　one〃　becomes　a　mere
enclosure；　a　circumscribing。　

If　we　look　back　on　what　consciousness　formerly　took　upon　itself；　and　now　takes　upon　itself；　what
it　previously　ascribed　to　the　thing；　and　now　ascribes　to　it；　we　see　that　consciousness　alternately
makes　itself；　as　well　as　the　thing；　into　both　a　pure　atomic　many…less　〃one〃；　and　an　〃also〃　resolved
into　independent　constituent　elements　（materials　or　matters）。　Consciousness　thus　finds　through　this
comparison　that　not　only　its　way　of　taking　the　truth　contains　the　diverse　moments　of　apprehension
and　return　upon　itself；　but　that　the　truth　itself；　the　thing；　manifests　itself　in　this　twofold　manner。　Here
we　find；　as　a　result　of　experience；　that　the　thing　exhibits　itself；　in　a　determinate　and　specific
manner；　to　the　consciousness　apprehending　it；　but　at　the　same　time　is　reflected　back　into　itself　out
of　that　manner　of　presenting　itself　to　consciousness；　in　other　words；　the　thing　contains　within　it
opposite　aspects　of　truth；　a　truth　whose　elements　are　in　antithesis　to　one　another。　

Consciousness；　then；　gets　away　also　from　this　second　form　of　perceptual　procedure；　that；　namely；
which　takes　the　thing　as　the　true　selfsame；　and　itself　as　the　reverse；　as　the　factor　that　leaves
sameness　behind　and　goes　back　into　self。　Its　object　is　now　the　entire　process　which　was
previously　shared　between　the　object　and　consciousness。　The　thing　is　a　〃one〃；　reflected　into　self；　it
is　for　itself；　but　it　is　also　for　an　other；　and；　further；　it　is　an　other　for　itself　as　it　is　for　another。　The
thing　is；　hence；　for　itself　and　also　for　another；　a　being　that　has　difference　of　a　twofold　kind。　But　it　is
also　〃one〃。　Its　being　〃one〃；　however；　contradicts　the　diversity　it　has。　Consciousness　would；
consequently；　have　again　to　make　itself　answerable　for　putting　the　diversity　into　the　〃one〃；　and
would　have　to　keep　this　apart　from　the　thing。　It　would　thus　be　compelled　to　say　that　the　thing
〃in…so…far　as〃　it　is　for　itself　is　not　for　another。　But　the　oneness　belongs　to　the　thing　itself；　too；　as
consciousness　has　found　out；　the　thing　is　essentially　reflected　into　self　The　〃also〃；　the　distinction　of
elements　indifferent　to　one　another；　falls　doubtless　within　the　thing　as　well　as　the　〃oneness〃；　but
since　both　are　different；　they　do　not　fall　within　the　same　thing；　but　in　different　things。　The
contradiction　which　is　found　in　the　case　of　the　objective　content　as　a　whole　is　assigned　to　and
shared　by　two　objects。　The　thing　is；　thus；　doubtless　as　it　stands　（an　und　für　sich）　selfsame；　but
this　unity　with　itself　is　disturbed　by　other　things。　In　this　way　the　unity　of　the　thing　is　preserved；　and；
at　the　same　time；　the　otherness　is　preserved　outside　the　thing；　as　well　as　outside　consciousness。　

Now；　although　the　contradiction　in　the　object　is　in　this　way　allotted　to　different　things；　yet　the
isolated　individual　thing　will　still　be　affected　with　distinction。　The　different　things　have　a　subsistence
on　their　own　account　（für　sich）；　and　the　conflict　between　them　takes　place　on　both　sides　in　such　a
way　that　each　is　not　different　from　itself；　but　only　from　the　other。　Each；　however；　is　thereby
characterized　as　a　something　distinctive；　and　contains　in　it　essential　distinction　from　the　others；　but
at　the　same　time　not　in　such　a　way　that　this　is　an　opposition　within　its　being；　on　the　contrary；　it　is
by　itself　a　simple　determinate　characteristic　which　constitutes　its　essential　character；　distinguishing　it
from　others。　As　a　matter　of　fact；　since　the　diversity　lies　in　it；　this　diversity　does　indeed　necessarily
assume　the　form　of　a　real　distinction　of　manifold　qualities　within　it。　But　because　the　determinate
characteristic　gives　the　essence　of　the　thing；　by　which　it　is　distinguished　from　others；　and　has　a
being　all　its　own；　this　further　manifold　constitution　is　something　indifferent。　The　thing　thus　no　doubt
contains　in　its　unity　the　qualifying　〃in…so…far〃　in　two　ways；　which　have；　however；　unequal
significance；　and　by　that　qualification　this　oppositeness　becomes　not　a　real　opposition　on　the　part
of　the　thing　itself；　but…so　far　as　the　thing　comes　into　a　condition　of　opposition　through　its　absolute
distinction　—　this　opposition　belongs　to　the　thing　with　reference　to　an　other　thing　lying　outside　it。
The　further　manifoldness　is　doubtless　necessarily　in　the　thing　too；　and　cannot　be　left　out；　but　it　is
unessential　to　the　thing。　

This　determinate　characteristic；　which　constitutes　the　essential　character　of　the　thing　and
distinguishes　it　from　all　others；　is　now　so　defined　that　thereby　the　thing；　stands　in　opposition　to
others；　but　must　therein　preserve　itself　for　itself　（für　sich）。　It　is；　however；　a　thing；　a　self…existent
〃one〃；　only　so　far　as　it　does　not　stand　in　relation　to　others。　For　in　this　relation；　the　connection　with
another　is　rather　the　point　emphasized；　and　connection　with　another　means　giving　up
self…existence；　means　ceasing　to　have　a　being　on　its　own　account。　It　is　precisely　through　the
absolute　character　and　its　opposition　that　the　thing　relates　itself　to　others；　and　is　essentially　this
process　of　relation；　and　only　this。　The　relation；　however；　is　the　negation　of　its　independence；　and
the　thing　collapses　through　its　own　essential　property。　

The　necessity　of　the　experience　which　consciousness　has　to　go　through　in　finding　that　the　thing　is
destroyed　just　by　the　very　characteristic　which　constitutes　its　essential　nature　and　its　distinctive
existence　on　its　own　account；　may；　as　regards　the　bare　principle　it　implies；　be　shortly　stated　thus。
The　thing　is　set　up　as　having　a　being　of　its　own；　as　existing　for　itself；　or　as　an　absolute　negation　of
all　otherness；　hence　it　is　absolute　negation　merely　relating　itself　to　itself。　But　this　kind　of　negation　is
the　cancelling　and　superseding　of　itself；　or　means　that　it　has　its　essential　reality　in　an　other。　

In　point　of　fact　the　determination　of　the　object；　as　it　（the　object）　has　turned　out；　contains　nothing
else。　It　aims　at　having　an　essential　property；　constituting　its　bare　existence　for　itself；　but　with　this
bare　self…existence　it　means　also　to　embrace　and　contain　diversity；　which　is　to　be　necessary；　but　is
at　the　same　time　not　to　constitute　its　essential　characteristic。　But　this　is　a　distinction　that　only　exists
in　words；　the　nonessential；　which　has　all　the　same　to　be　necessary；　cancels　its　own　meaning；　or　is
what　we　have　just　called　the　negoation　of　itself。　

With　this　the　last　qualifying　〃in…so…far〃；　which　separated　self…existence　and　existence　for　another；
drops　away　altogether。　The　object　is　really　in　one　and　the　same　respect　the　opposite　of　itself…for
itself　〃so　far　as〃　it　is　for　another；　and　for　another　〃so　far　as〃　it　is　for　itself。　It　is　for　itself；　reflected
into　self；　one；　but　all　this　is　asserted　along　with　its　opposite；　with　its　being　for　another；　and　for　that
reason　is　asserted　merely　to　be　superseded。　In　other　words；　this　existence　for　itself　is　as　much
unessential　as　that　which　alone　was　meant　to　be　unessential；　viz。　the　relation　to　another。　

　　3。　The　Transition　to　Unconditioned　Universality　and　the　sphere　of　Understanding

By　this　process　the　object　in　its　pure　characteristics；　in　those　features　which　were　to　constitute　its
essential　nature；　is　superseded；　just　as　the　object　in　its　sensible　mode　of　existence　became
transcended。　From　being　sensible　it　passed　into　being　a　universal；　but　this　universal；　because
derived　from　sense；　is　essentially　conditioned　by　it；　and　hence　is；　in　general；　not　a　genuine
self…identical　universality；　but　one　affected　with　an　opposition。　For　that　r