phenomenology of mind-第19节

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in　part　historical　in　character。　And　just　for　that　reason；　too；　it　is　not　in　the　least　refuted　if　anyone
assures　us　on　the　contrary　that　this　is　not　so；　that　the　process　instead　is　here　so　and　so；　if　ideas　we
are　all　used　to；　being　truths　accepted　or　settled　and　familiar　to　everyone；　are　brought　to　mind　and
recounted；　or；　again；　if　something　new　is　served　up　and　Guaranteed　as　coming　from　the　inner
sanctuaries　of　inspired　intuition。　

Such　a　view　is　bound　to　meet　with　opposition。　The　first　instinctive　reaction　on　the　part　of　knowing；
when　offered　something　that　was　unfamiliar；　is　usually　to　resist　it。　It　seeks　by　that　means　to　save
freedom　and　native　insight；　to　secure　its　own　inherent　authority　against　alien　authority　—　for　that　is
the　way　anything　apprehended　for　the　first　time　appears。　This　attitude　is　adopted；　too；　in　order　to
do　away　with　the　semblance　of　a　kind　of　disgrace　which　would　lie　in　the　fact　that　something　has
had　to　be　learnt。　In　like　manner；　again；　when　the　unfamiliar　or　unknown　is　received　with　applause；
the　reaction　is　in　the　same　way　an　exaltation　of　freedom　and　native　authority。　It　consists　in
something　analogous　to　ultra…revolutionary　declamation　and　action。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　15。　　The　demands　of　the　study　of　philosophy

Hence　the　important　thing　for　the　student　of　science　is　to　make　himself　undergo　the　strenuous　toil
of　conceptual　reflection；　of　thinking　in　the　form　of　the　notion。　This　demands　concentrated　attention
on　the　notion　as　such；　on　simple　and　ultimate　determinations　like　being…in…itself；　being…for…itself；
self…identity；　and　so　on；　for　these　are　elemental；　pure；　self　…determined　functions　of　a　kind　we
might　call　souls；　were　it　not　that　their　conceptual　nature　denotes　something　higher　than　that　term
contains。　The　interruption　by　conceptual　thought　of　the　habit　of　always　thinking　in　figurative　ideas
（Vorstellungen）　is　as　annoying　and　troublesome　to　this　way　of　thinking　as　to　that　process　of
formal　intelligence　which　in　its　reasoning　rambles　about　with　no　real　thoughts　to　reason　with。　The
former；　the　habit；　may　be　called　materialized　thinking；　a　fortuitous　mental　state；　one　that　is
absorbed　in　what　is　material；　and　hence　finds　it　very　distasteful　at　once　to　lift　its　self　clear　of　this
matter　and　be　with　itself　alone。　The　latter；　the　process　of　raisonnement；　is；　on　the　other　hand；
detachment　from　all　content；　and　conceited　superiority　to　it。　What　is　wanted　here　is　the　effort　and
struggle　to　give　up　this　kind　of　freedom；　and　instead　of　being　a　merely　arbitrary　principle　directing
the　content　anyhow；　this　freedom　should　sink　into　and　pervade　the　content；　should　let　it　be
directed　and　controlled　by　its　own　proper　nature；　i。e。　by　the　self　as　its　own　self。　and　should
observe　this　process　taking　place。　We　must　abstain　from　interrupting　the　immanent　rhythm　of　the
movement　of　conceptual　thought；　we　must　refrain　from　arbitrarily　interfering　with　it；　and
introducing　ideas　and　reflections　that　have　been　obtained　elsewhere。　Restraint　of　this　sort　is　itself
an　essential　condition　of　attending　to　and　getting　at　the　real　nature　of　the　notion。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　16。　　　Argumentative　thinking　in　its　negative　attitude　—　

There　are　two　aspects　in　the　case　of　that　ratiocinative　procedure　which　mark　its　contrast　from
conceptual　thinking　and　call　for　further　notice。　Raisonnement；　in　the　first　place；　adopts　a　negative
attitude　towards　the　content　apprehended；　knows　how　to　refute　it　and　reduce　it　to　nothingness。　To
see　what　the　content　is　not　is　merely　a　negative　process；　it　is　a　dead　halt；　which　does　not　of　itself
go　beyond　itself；　and　proceed　to　a　new　content；　it　has　to　get　hold　of　something　else　from
somewhere　or　other　in　order　to　have　once　more　a　content。　It　is　reflection　upon　and　into　the　empty
ego；　the　vanity　of　its　own　knowledge。　Conceit　of　this　kind　brings　out　not　only　that　this　content　is
vain　and　empty；　but　also　that　to　see　this　is　itself　fatuity　too：　for　it　is　negation　with　no　perception　of
the　positive　element　within　it。　In　that　this　reflection　does　not　even　have　its　own　negativity　as　its
content；　it　is　not　inside　actual　fact　at　all；　but　for　ever　away　outside　it。　On　that　account　it　imagines
that　by　asserting　mere　emptiness　it　is　going　much　farther　than　insight　that　embraces　and　reveals　a
wealth　of　content。　On　the　other　hand；　in　the　case　of　conceptual　thinking；　as　was　above　indicated；
the　negative　aspect　falls　within　the　content　itself；　and　is　the　positive　substance　of　that　content；　as
well　as　being　its　inherent　character　and　moving　principle　as　by　being　the　entirety　of　what　these　are。
Looked　at　as　a　result；　it　is　determinate　specific　negation；　the　negative　which　is　the　outcome　of　this
process；　and　consequently　is　a　positive　content　as　well。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　17。　　—　in　its　positive　attitude；　its　subject

In　view　of　the　fact　that　ratiocinative　thinking　has　a　content；　whether　of　images　or　thoughts　or　a
mixture　of　both；　there　is　another　side　to　its　process　which　makes　conceptual　comprehension
difficult　for　it。　The　peculiar　nature　of　this　aspect　is　closely　connected　with　the　essential　meaning　of
the　idea　above　described；　in　fact；　expresses　the　idea　in　the　way　this　appears　as　the　process　of
thinking　apprehension。　For　just　as　ratiocinative　thinking　in　its　negative　reference；　which　we　have
been　describing；　is　nothing　but　the　self　into　which　the　content　returns；　in　the　same　way；　on　the
other　hand；　in　its　positive　cognitive　process　the　self　is　an　ideally　presented　subject　to　which　the
content　is　related　as　an　accident　and　predicate。　This　subject　constitutes　the　basis　to　which　the
content　is　attached　and　on　which　the　process　moves　to　and　fro。　Conceptual　thinking　goes　on　in
quite　a　different　way。　Since　the　concept　or　notion　is　the　very　self　of　the　object；　manifesting　itself　as
the　development　of　the　object；　it　is　not　a　quiescent　subject；　passively　supporting　accidents：　it　is　a
self…determining　active　concept　which　takes　up　its　determinations　and　makes　them　its　own。　In　the
course　of　this　process　that　inert　passive　subject　really　disappears；　it　enters　into　the　different
constituents　and　pervades　the　content；　instead　of　remaining　in　inert　antithesis　to　determinateness　of
content；　it　constitutes；　in　fact；　that　very　specificity；　i。e。　the　content　as　differentiated　along　with　the
process　of　bringing　this　about。　Thus　the　solid　basis；　which　ratiocination　found　in　an　inert　subject；　is
shaken　to　its　foundations；　and　the　only　object　is　this　very　movement　of　the　subject。　The　subject
supplying　the　concrete　filling　to　its　own　content　ceases　to　be　something　transcending。　this　content；
and　cannot　have　further　predicates　or　accidents。　Conversely；　again；　the　scattered　diversity　of　the
content　is　brought　under　the　control　of　the　self；　and　so　bound　together；　the　content　is　not　a
universal　that　can　be　detached　from　the　subject；　and　adapted　to　several　indifferently。　Consequently
the　content　is　in　truth　no　longer　predicate　of　the　subject；　it　is　the　very　substance；　is　the　inmost
reality；　and　the　very　principle　of　what　is　being　considered。　Ideational　thinking　（vorstellen）；　since　its
nature　consists　in　dealing　with　accidents　or　predicates；　and　in　exercising　the　right　to　transcend　them
because　they　are　nothing　more　than　predicates　and　accidents　—　this　way　of　thinking　is　checked　in
its　course；　since　that　which　has　in　the　proposition　the　form　of　a　predicate　is　itself　the　substance　of
the　statement。　It　is　met　by　a　counter…thrust；　as　we　may　say。　Starting　from　the　subject；　as　if　this
were　a　permanent　base　on　which　to　proceed；　it　discovers；　by　the　predicate　being　in　reality　the
substance；　that　the　subject　has　passed　into　the　predicate；　and　has　thereby　ceased　to　be　subject：
and　since　in　this　way　what　seems　to　be　predicate　has　become　the　entire　mass　of　the　content；
whole　and　complete；　thinking　cannot　wander　and　ramble　about　at　will；　but　is　restrained　and
controlled　by　this　weight　of　content。　

Usually　the　subject　is　first　set　down　as　the　fixed　and　objective　self；　from　this　fixed　position　the
necessary　process　passes　on　to　the　multiplicity　of　determinations　or　predicates。　Here　the　knowing
ego　takes　the　place　of　that　subject　and　is　the　function　of　knitting　or　combining　the　predicates　one
with　another；　and　is　the　subject　holding　them　fast。　But　since　the　former　subject　enters　into　the
determinate　constituents　themselves；　and　is　their　very　life；　the　subject　in　the　second　case　—　viz。　the
knowing　subject…finds　that　the　former；　which　it　is　supposed　to　be　done　with　and　which　it　wants　to
transcend；　in　order　to　return　into　itself；　—　is　still　there　in　the　predicate：　and　instead　of　being　able　to
be　the　determining　agency　in　the　process　of　resolving　the　predicate…reflectively　deciding　whether
this　or　that　predicate　should　be　attached　to　the　former　subject　—　it　has　really　to　deal　with　the　self
of　the　content；　is　not　allowed　to　be　something　on　its　own　account　（für　sich）；　but　has　to　exist　along
with　this　content。　

What　has　been　said　can　be　expressed　in　a　formal　manner　by　saying　that　the　nature　of　judgment　or
the　proposition　in　general；　which　involves　the　distinction　of　subject　and　predicate；　is　subverted　and
destroyed　by　the　speculative　judgment；　and　the　identical　propositio