phenomenology of mind-第129节

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the　fact　of　judging　taken　for　the　actual　deed；　and　instead　of　proving　its　uprightness　and　honesty　by
acts　does　so　by　expressing　fine　sentiments。　It　is　thus　constituted　entirely　in　the　same　way　as　that
against　which。　the　reproach　is　made　of　putting　its　phrases　in　place　of　duty。　In　both　alike　the　aspect
of　reality　is　distinct　from　the　express　statements　—　in　the　one　owing　to　the　selfish　purpose　of　the
action；　in　the　other　through　failure　to　act　at　all；　although　the　necessity　of　acting　is　involved　in　the
very　speaking　of　duty；　for　duty　without　deeds　is　altogether　meaningless。

The　act　of　judging；　however；　has　also　to　be　looked　at　as　a　positive　act　of　thought　and　has　a
positive　content：　this　aspect　makes　the　contradiction　present　in　the　apprehending　consciousness；
and　its　identity　with　the　first　consciousness；　still　more　complete。　The　active　consciousness　declares
its　specific　deed　to　be　its　duty；　and　the　consciousness　that　passes　judgment　cannot　deny　this；　for
duty　as　such　is　form　void　of　all　content　and　capable　of　any。　In　other　words；　concrete　action；
inherently　implying　diversity　in　its　manysidedness；　involves　the　universal　aspect；　which　is　that　which
is　taken　as　duty；　just　as　much　as　the　particular；　which　constitutes　the　share　and　interest　the
individual　has　in　the　act。　Now　the　judging　consciousness　does　not　stop　at　the　former　aspect　of
duty　and　rest　content　with　the　knowledge　which　the　active　agent　has　of　this；　viz。　that　this　is　his
duty；　the　condition　and　the　status　of　his　reality。　It　holds　on　to　the　other　aspect；　diverts　the　act　into
the　inner　realm；　and　explains　the　act　from　selfish　motives　and　from　its　inner　intention；　an　intention
different　from　the　act　itself。　As　every　act　is　capable　of　treatment　in　respect　of　its　dutifulness；　so；
too；　each　can　be　considered　from　this　other　point　of　view　of　particularity；　for　as　an　act　it　is　the
reality　of　an　individual。

This　process　of　judging；　then；　takes　the　act　out　of　the　sphere　of　its　objective　existence；　and　turns　it
back　into　the　inner　subjective　sphere；　into　the　form　of　private　or　individual　particularity。　If　the　act
carries　glory　with　it；　then　the　inner　sphere　is　judged　as　love　of　fame。　If　it　is　altogether　conformity
with　the　position　of　the　individual；　without　going　beyond　this　position；　and　is　so　constituted　that　the
individuality　in　question　does　not　have　the　position　attached　to　it　as　an　external　feature；　but　through
itself　supplies　concrete　filling　to　this　universality；　and　by　that　very　process　shows　itself　to　be
capable　of　a　higher　station…then　the　inner　nature　of　the　act　is　judged　as　ambition；　and　so　on。　Since；
in　the　act　in　general；　the　individual　who　acts　comes　to　see　himself　in　objective　form；　or　gets　the
feeling　of　his　own　being　in　his　objective　existence　and　thus　attains　enjoyment；　the　judgment　on　the
act　finds　the　inner　nature　of　it　to　be　an　impulse　towards　personal　happiness；　even　though　this
happiness　were　to　consist　merely　in　inner　moral　vanity；　the　enjoyment　of　a　sense　of　personal
excellence；　and　in　the　foretaste　and　hope　of　a　happiness　to　come。

No　act　can　escape　being　judged　in　such　a　way；　for　〃duty　for　duty's　sake〃；　this　pure　purpose；　is
something　unreal。　What　reality　it　has　lies　in　the　deed　of　some　individuality；　and　the　action　thereby
has　in　it　the　aspect　of　particularity。　No　hero　is　a　hero　to　his　valet；　not；　however；　because　the　hero
is　not　a　hero；　but　because　the　valet　is　—　the　valet；　with　whom　the　hero　has　to　do；　not　as　a　hero；
but　as　a　man　who　eats；　drinks；　and　dresses；　who；　in　short；　appears　as　a　private　individual　with
certain　personal　wants　and　ideas　of　his　own。　In　the　same　way；　there　is　no　act　in　which　that　process
of　judgment　cannot　oppose　the　personal　aspect　of　the　individuality　to　the　universal　aspect　of　the
act；　and　play　the　part　of　the　〃moral〃　valet　towards　the　agent。（8）

The　consciousness；　that　so　passes　judgment；　is　in　consequence　itself　base　and　mean；　because　it
divides　the　act　up；　and　produces　and　holds　to　the　act's　self…discordance。　It　is；　furthermore；
hypocrisy；　because　it　gives　out　this　way　of　judging；　not　as　another　fashion　of　being　wicked；　but　as
the　correct　consciousness　of　the　act；　sets　itself　up；　in　its　unreality；　in　this　vanity　of　knowing　well　and
better；　far　above　the　deeds　it　decries；　and　wants　to　find　its　mere　words　without　deeds　taken　for　an
admirable　kind　of　reality。

On　this　account；　then；　putting　itself　on　a　level　with　the　agent　on　whom　it　passes　judgment；　it　is
recognized　by　the　latter　as　the　same　as　himself。　This　latter　does　not　merely　find　himself
apprehended　as　something　alien　to；　and　discordant　with；　that　other：　but　rather　finds　the　other　in　its
peculiar　constitutive　character　identical　with　himself。　Seeing　this　identity　and　giving　this　expression；
he　openly　confesses　himself　to　the　other；　and　expects　in　like　manner　that　the　other；　having　in　point
of　fact　put　itself　on　the　same　level；　will　respond　in　the　same　language；　will　therein　give　voice　to　this
identity；　and　that　thus　the　state　of　mutual　recognition　will　be　brought　about。　His　confession　is　not　an
attitude　of　abasement　or　humiliation　before　the　other；　is　not　throwing　himself　away。　For　to　give　the
matter　expression　in　this　way　has　not　the　one…sided　character　which　would　fix　and　establish　his
disparity　with　the　other：　on　the　contrary；　it　is　solely　because　of　seeing　the　identity　of　the　other　with
him　that　he　gives　himself　utterance。　In　making　his　confession　he　announces；　from　his　side；　their
common　identity；　and　does　so　for　the　reason　that　language　is　the　existence　of　spirit　as　an
immediate　self。　He　thus　expects　that　the　other　will　make　its　own　contribution　to　this　manner　of
existence。

But　the　admission　on　the　part　of　the　one　who　is　wicked；　〃I　am　so〃；　is　not　followed　by　a　reply
making　a　similar　confession。　This　was　not　what　that　way　of　judging　meant　at　all：　far　from　it！　It
repels　this　community　of　nature；　and　is　the　〃hardheartedness〃；　which　keeps　to　itself　and　rejects　all
continuity　with　the　other。　By　so　doing　the　scene　is　changed。　The　one　who　made　the　confession
sees　himself　thrust　off；　and　takes　the　other　to　be　in　the　wrong　when　he　refuses　to　let　his　own　inner
nature　go　forth　in　the　objective　shape　of　an　express　utterance；　when　he　contrasts　the　beauty　of　his
own　soul　with　the　wicked　individual；　and　opposes　to　the　confession　of　the　penitent　the　stiffnecked
attitude　of　the　self…consistent　equable　character；　and　the　rigid　silence　of　one　who　keeps　himself　to
himself　and　refuses　to　throw　himself　away　for　some　one　else。　Here　we　find　asserted　the　highest
pitch　of　revolt　to　which　a　spirit　certain　of　itself　can　reach。　For　it　beholds　itself；　qua　this　simple
self…knowledge；　in　another　conscious　being；　and　in　such　a　way　that　even　the　external　form　of　this
other　is　not　an　unessential　〃thing〃；　as　in　the　case　of　an　object　of　wealth；　but　thought；　knowledge
itself　is　what　is　held　opposed　to　it。　It　is　this　absolutely　fluid　continuity　of　pure　knowledge　which
refuses　to　establish　communication　with　an　other；　which　had；　ipso　facto；　by　making　its　confession；
renounced　separate　isolated　self…existence；　had　affirmed　its　particularity　to　be　cancelled；　and
thereby　established　itself　as　continuous　with　the　other；　i。e。　established　itself　as　universal。　The　other
however；　in　its　own　case　reserves　for　itself　its　uncommunicative；　isolated　independence：　in　the　case
of　the　individual　confessing；　it　reserves　for　him　the　very　same　independence；　though　the　latter　has
already　cast　that　away。　It　thereby　proves　itself　to　be　a　form　of　consciousness　which　is　forsaken　by
and　denies　the　very　nature　of　spirit；　for　it　does　not　understand　that　spirit；　in　the　absolute　certainty
of　itself；　is　master　and　lord　over　every　deed；　and　over　all　reality；　and　can　reject　and　cast　them　off
and　make　them　as　if　they　had　never　been。　At　the　same　time；　it　does　not　see　the　contradiction　it　is
committing　in　not　allowing　a　rejection；　which　has　been　made　in　express　language；　to　pass　for
genuine　rejection；　while　itself　has　the　certainty　of　its　own　spiritual　life；　not　in　a　concrete　real　act；　but
in　its　inner　nature；　and　finds　the　objective　existence　of　this　inner　being　in　the　language　of　its　own
judgment。　It　is　thus　its　own　self　which　checks　that　other's　return　from　the　act　to　the　spiritual
objectivity　of　language；　and　to　spiritual　identity；　and　by　its　harshness　produces　the　discordance
which　still　remains。

Now；　so　far　as　the　spirit　which　is　certain　of　itself；　in　the　form　of　a　〃beautiful　soul〃；　does　not　possess
the　strength　to　relinquish　the　self…absorbed　uncommunicative　knowledge　of　itself；　it　cannot　attain　to
any　identity　with　the　consciousness　that　is　repulsed；　and　so　cannot　succeed　in　seeing　the　unity　of　its
self　in　another　life；　cannot　reach　objective　existence。　The　identity　comes　about；　therefore；　merely　in
a　negative　way；　as　a　state　of　being　devoid　of　spiritual　character。　The　〃beautiful　soul〃；　then；　has　no
concrete　reality；　it　subsists　in　the　contradiction　between　its　pure　self　and　the　necessity　felt　by　this
self　to　externalize　itself　and　turn　into　something　actual；　it　exists　in　the　immediacy　of　this　rooted　and
fixed　opposition；　an　immediacy　which　alone　is　the　middle　term　reconciling　an　opposition　which　has
been　intensified　to　its　pu