phenomenology of mind-第125节

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acquainted　to　the　full　and　complete　extent　require　with　the　situation　in　which　its　action　takes　place；
and　knows　that　its　pretence　of　conscientiously　weighing　and　considering　all　the　circumstances　is
futile。　This　acquaintance　with　and　consideration　of　all　the　circumstances；　however；　are　not　entirely
absent：　but　they　are　merely　present　as　a　moment；　as　something　which　is　only　for　others：　and　the
conscientious　mind　holds　its　incomplete　knowledge　to　be　sufficient　and　complete；　because　it　is　its
own　knowledge。

In　a　similar　way　the　process　is　constituted　in　connexion　with　the　universality　of　the　essential
principle；　that　is；　with　the　characterization　of　the　content　as　determined　through　pure
consciousness。　Conscience；　when　it　goes　on　to　act；　takes　up　a　relation　to　the　various　sides　of　the
case。　The　case　breaks　up　into　separate　elements；　and　the　relation　of　pure　consciousness　towards　it
does　the　same：　whereby　the　multiplicity　characteristic　of　the　case　becomes　a　multiplicity　of　duties。
Conscience　knows　that　it　has　to　select　and　decide　amongst　them；　for　none　of　them　specifically；　in
its　content；　is　an　absolute　duty；　only　pure　duty　is　so。　But　this　abstract　entity　has；　in　its　realization；
come　to　denote　self…conscious　ego。　Spirit　certain　of　itself　is　at　rest　within　itself　in　the　form　of
conscience；　and　its　real　universality；　its　duty；　lies　in　its　pure　conviction　concerning　duty。　This　pure
conviction　as　such　is　as　empty　as　pure　duty；　pure　in　the　sense　that　nothing　within　it；　no　definite
content；　is　duty。　Action；　however；　has　to　take　place；　the　individual　must　determine　to　do　something
or　other；　and　spirit　which　is　certain　of　itself；　in　which　the　inherent　principle　has　attained　the
significance　of　self…conscious　ego；　knows　it　has　this　determination；　this　specific　content；　in　the
immediate　certainty　of　its　own　self。　This　certainty；　being　a　determination　and　a　content；　is　〃natural〃
consciousness；　i。e。　the　various　impulses　and　inclinations。

　　　　　（1）　Conscience　as　the　freedom　of　the　self　within　itself；　The　Reality　of　Duty：
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　conviction

Conscience　admits　no　content　as　absolute　for　it；　because　it　is　absolute　negativity　of　all　that　is
definite。　It　determines　from　itself　alone。　The　circle　of　the　self；　however；　within　which
determinateness　as　such　falls；　is　so…called　〃sensibility〃：　in　order　to　get　a　content　out　of　the
immediate　certainty　of　self　；　there　is　no　other　element　to　be　found　except　sensibility。

Everything　that　in　previous　modes　of　experience　was　presented　as　good　or　bad；　law　and　right；　is
something　other　than　immediate　certainty　of　self；　it　is　a　universal；　which　is　now　a　relative　entity；　an
existence…for…another。　Or；　looked　at　otherwise；　it　is　an　object　which；　while　connecting　and　relating
consciousness　with　itself；　comes　between　consciousness　and　its　own　propel　truth；　and　instead　of
that　object　being　the　immediacy　of　consciousness；　it　rather　cuts　consciousness　off　from　itself。

For　conscience；　however；　certainty　of　self　is　the　pure；　direct；　and　immediate　truth：　and　this　truth　is
thus　its　immediate　certainty　of　self　presented　as　content；　i。e。　its　truth　is　altogether　the　caprice　of　the
individual；　and　the　accidental　content　of　his　unconscious　natural　existence　＇his　sensibility＇。

This　content　at　the　same　time　passes　for　essential　moral　reality；　for　duty。　For　pure　duty；　as　was
found　when　testing　and　examining　laws；（3）　is　utterly　indifferent　to　every　content；　and　gets　along
with　any。　Here　it　has　at　the　same　time　the　essential　form　of　self…existence；　of　existing　on　its　own
account：　and　this　form　of　individual　conviction　is　nothing　else　than　the　sense　of　the　emptiness　Of
pure　duty；　and　the　consciousness　that　this　is　merely　a　moment；　that　its　substantiality　is　a　predicate
which　finds　its　subject　in　the　individual；　whose　caprice　gives　pure　duty　content；　can　connect　every
content　with　this　form；　and　attach　its　feeling　of　conscientiousness　to　any　content。

An　individual　increases　his　property　in　a　certain　way。　It　is　a　duty　that　each　should　see　to　the
maintenance　of　himself　and　family；　and　no　less　ensure　the　possibility　of　his　being　serviceable　to　his
neighbours　and　of　doing　good　to　those　standing　in　need。　The　individual　is　aware　that　this　is　a　duty；
for　this　content　is　directly　contained　in　the　certainty　he　has　of　himself。　He　perceives；　further；　that　he
fulfils　this　particular　duty　in　this　particular　case。　Other　people　possibly　consider　the　specific　way　he
adopts　as　fraud：　they　hold　by　other　sides　of　the　concrete　case　presented；　while　he　holds　firmly　to
this　particular　side　of　it　by　the　fact　of　his　being　conscious　that　the　increase　of　property　is　a　pure
and　absolute　duty。

In　the　same　way　there　is　fulfilled　by　the　individual；　as　a　duty；　what　other　people　call　violence　and
wrong…doing　—　the　duty　of　asserting　one's　independence　against　others：　and；　again；　the　duty　of
preserving　one's　life；　and　the　possibility　of　being　useful　to　one's　neighbours。　Others　call　this
cowardice；　but　what　they　call　courage　really　violates　both　these　duties。　But　cowardice　must　not　be
so　stupid　and　clumsy　as　not　to　know　that　the　maintenance　of　life　and　the　possibility　of　being　useful
to　others　are　duties　—　so　inept　as　not　to　be　convinced　of　the　dutifulness　of　its　action；　and　not　to
know　that　dutifulness　consists　in　knowledge。　Otherwise　it　would　commit　the　stupidity　of　being
immoral。　Since　morality　lies　in　the　consciousness　of　having　fulfilled　one's　duty；　this　will　not　be
lacking　when　the　action　is　what　is　called　cowardice　any　more　than　when　it　is　what　is　called
courage。　As　the　abstraction　called　〃duty〃　is　capable　of　every　content；　it　is　quite　equal　to　that　of
cowardice。　The　agent　knows　what　he　does　to　be　duty；　and　since　he　knows　this；　and　conviction　as
to　duty　is　just　dutifulness；　he　is　thus　recognized　and　acknowledged　by　others。　The　act　thereby
becomes　accepted　as　valid　and　has　actual　existence。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（1）　The　Universality　of　Conscience

It　is　of　no　avail　to　object　to　this　freedom　—　which　puts　any　and　every　kind　of　content　into　this
universal　inert　receptacle　of　pure　duty　and　pure　knowledge　—　by　asserting　that　another　content
ought　to　have　been　put　there。　For　whatever　the　content　be；　each　content　has　upon　it　the　stain　of
determinateness　from　which　pure　knowledge　is　free；　which　pure　knowledge　can　despise　just　as
readily　as　it　can　take　up　every　determinateness　in　turn。　Every　content；　through　its　being
determinate；　stands　on　the　same　footing　with　every　other；　even　though　it　seems　to　have　precisely
the　character　that　the　particularity　in　the　content　is　cancelled。　It　may　well　seem　—　since　in　concrete
cases　duty　breaks　regularly　into　opposition；　and；　by　doing　so；　sunders　the　opposites　individuality
and　universality　—　that　the　duty；　whose　content　is　the　universal　as　such；　contains　on　that　account；
ipso　facto；　the　nature　of　pure　duty；　and　that　thus　form　and　content　are　here　entirely　in　accord。　On
this　view；　it　might　seem　that；　e。g。　acting　for　the　universal　good；　for　what　is　the　best　for　all；　is　to　be
preferred　to　acting　for　what　is　the　best　for　the　individual。　But　this　universal　duty　is　precisely　what　is
present　as　self…contained　actual　substance；　in　the　form　of　＇established＇　law　and　right；　and　holds
good　independently　of　the　individual's　knowledge　and　conviction　as　well　as　of　his　immediate
interest。　It　is　thus　precisely　that　against　the　form　of　which　morality　as　a　whole　is　directed。　As
regards　its　content；　however；　this　too　is　determinate　in　character；　in　so　far　as　the　〃universally　best〃
is　opposed　to　the　〃individual　best〃。　Consequently；　its　law　is　one　from　which　conscience　knows
itself　to　be　absolutely　free；　and　it　gives　itself　the　absolute　privilege　to　add　and　pare；　to　neglect　as
well　as　fulfil　it。

Then；　again；　the　above　distinction　of　duty　towards　the　individual　and　duty　towards　the　universal　is
not　something　fixed　and　final；　when　we　look　at　the　nature　of　the　opposition　in　question。　On　the
contrary；　what　the　individual　does　for　himself　is　to　the　advantage　of　the　universal　as　well。　The　more
he　looks　after　his　own　good；　not　only　is　there　the　greater　possibility　of　his　usefulness　to　others：　his
very　reality　consists　merely　in　his　living　and　existing　in　connexion　with　others。　His　individual
enjoyment　means　ultimately　and　essentially　putting　what　is　his　own　at　the　disposal　of　others；　and
helping　them　to　secure　their　enjoyment。　In　fulfilling　duty　to　individuals；　and　hence　duty　to　self；　duty
to　the　general　thus　also　gets　fulfilled。　Weighing；　considering；　comparing　duties；　should　this　appear
here；　would　take　the　line　of　calculating　the　advantage　which　the　general　would　get　from　any　given
action。　But　there　can　be　no　such　process；　partly　because　morality　would　thereby　be　handed　over
to　the　inevitable　contingency　characteristic　of　mere　〃insight〃；　partly　because　it　is　precisely　the
nature　of　conscience　to　have　done　with　all　this　calculating　and　weighing　of　duties；　and　to　decide
directly　from　itself　without　any　such　reasons。

In　this　way；　then；　conscience　acts　and　maintains　itself　in　the　unity　of　its　essential　being　and　its
objective　existence　for　itself；　in　the　unity　of　pure　thought　and　individuality：　it　is　spirit　certain　of　itself；
wh