太子爷小说网 > 英语电子书 > phenomenology of mind >

第123节

phenomenology of mind-第123节

小说: phenomenology of mind 字数: 每页4000字

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页,按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页,按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部!
————未阅读完?加入书签已便下次继续阅读!



expression of hypocrisy。



                                



1。 Verstellung: It is not possible to bring out exactly by an English word the verbal play involved
in Hegel's interpretation of the state of mind here discussed。 Hegel has; in the course of his
analysis; used the meaning implied in the general term 〃stellen〃 to explain by contrast the specific
nuance of the purely moral attitude conveyed by the term verstellen。 

2。 An expression used by Kant of the 〃cosmological proof〃。 




c
                           Conscience:
                  The “Beautiful Soul”:
                       Evil and the Forgiveness of it 

The antinomy in the moral view of the world — viz。 that there is a moral consciousness and that
there is none; or that the validity; the bindingness of duty has its ground beyond consciousness;
and conversely only takes effect in consciousness — these contradictory elements had been
combined in the idea; in which the non…moral consciousness is to pass for moral; its contingent
knowledge and will to be accepted as fully sufficing; and happiness to be its lot as a matter of
grace。 Moral self consciousness took this self…contradictory idea not upon itself; but transferred it
to another being。 But this putting outside itself of what it must think as necessary is as much a
contradiction in form as the other was in content。 But that which appears as contradictory; and
that in the division and resolution of which lies the round of activity peculiar to the moral attitude;
are inherently the same: for pure duty qua pure knowledge is nothing else than the self of
consciousness; and the self of consciousness is existence and actuality; and; in the same way; what
is to be beyond actual consciousness is nothing else than pure thought; is; in fact; the self。 Because
this is so; self…consciousness; for us or per se; passes back into itself; and becomes aware that
that being is its self; in which the actual is at once pure knowledge and pure duty。 It takes itself to
be absolutely valid in its contingency; to be that which knows its immediate individual being as
pure knowledge and action; as the true objective reality and harmony。

This self of Conscience; the mode of spirit immediately certain of itself as absolute truth and
objective being; is the third type of spiritual self。 It is the outcome of the third sphere of the spiritual
world;(1) and may be shortly compared with the two former types of self。

The totality or actuality which is revealed as the truth of the ethical world; the world of the social
order; is the self of a Person 'the legal self': its existence lies in being recognized and
acknowledged。 As the person is the self devoid of substance; this its existence is abstract reality
too。 The person has a definite standing; and that directly and immediately: its self is the point in the
sphere of its existence which is immediately at rest。 That point is not torn away from its
universality; the two 'the particular focus and its universality' are therefore not in a relational
process with regard to one another: the universal is in it without distinction; and is neither the
content of the self; nor is the self filled by itself 。

The second self is the truth and outcome of the world of culture; is spirit that has recovered itself
after and through disruption; is absolute freedom。 In this self; the former immediate unity of
individual existence and universality breaks up into its component elements。 The universal; which
remains at the same time a purely spiritual entity; the state of recognition or universal will and
universal knowledge — the universal is object and content of the self; and its universal actuality。
But the universal has not there the form of existence detached from the self: in this mode of self it
therefore gets no filling; no positive content; no world。

Moral self…consciousness; indeed; lets its universal aspect get detached; so that this aspect
becomes a nature of its own; and at the same time it retains this universality within itself in a
superseded form。 But it is merely a game of dissembling; it constantly interchanges these two
characteristics。 In the form of Conscience; with its certainty of itself; it first finds the content to fill
the former emptiness of duty as well as the emptiness of right and the empty universal will。 And
because this certainty of self is at the same time immediacy; it finds in conscience definite
existence。

Having reached this level of its truth; moral self…consciousness then leaves; or rather supersedes;
this state of internal division and self…separation; whence arose 〃dissemblance〃 — the separation of
its inherent being from the self; of pure duty; qua pure purpose; from reality qua a nature and a
sensibility opposed to pure purpose。 It is; when thus returned into itself; concrete moral spirit;
which does not make for itself a bare abstract standard out of the consciousness of pure duty; a
standard to be set up against actual conscious life; on the contrary; pure duty; as also the sensuous
nature opposed to pure duty; are superseded moments。 This mode of spirit; in its immediate unity;
is a moral being making itself actual; and an act is immediately a concrete embodiment of morality。

Given a case of action; it is an objective reality for the knowing mind。 The latter; qua conscience;
knows it in a direct concrete manner; and at the same time it is merely as conscience knows it to
be。 When knowledge is something other than its object; it is contingent in character。 Spirit;
however; which is sure of its self; is no longer an accidental knowledge of that kind; is not a way
of producing inside its own being ideas from which reality is divorced。 On the contrary; since the
separation between what is essential and self has been given up; a case of moral action falls; just
as it is essentially; directly within immediate conscious certainty; the sensible 'feeling' form of
knowledge; and it is essentially only as it is in this form of knowledge。

Action; then; qua realization; is in this way the pure form of will — the bare conversion of reality in
the sense of a given case; into a reality that is enacted; the conversion of the bare state of objective
knowledge into one of knowledge about reality as something produced and brought about by
consciousness。 Just as sensuous certainty is directly taken up; or rather converted; into the
essential life and substance of spirit; this other transformation is also simple and unmediated; a
transition made through the pure conception without changing the content; the content being
conditioned by some interest on the part of the consciousness knowing it。

Further conscience does not break up the circumstances of the case into a variety of duties。 It
does not operate as the positive general medium; in which the manifold duties; each for itself;
would acquire immovable substantial existence。 If it did so; either no action could take place at
all; because each concrete case involves opposition in general; and; in the specific case of
morality; opposition of duties — and hence there would always be one side injured; one duty
violated; by the very nature of concrete action: or else; if action does take place; the violation of
one of the conflicting duties would be the actual result brought about。 Conscience is rather the
negative single unity; it is the absolute self; which does away with this variety of substantial moral
constituents。 It is simple action in accordance with duty; action which does not fulfil this or that
duty; but knows and does what is concretely right。 It is; therefore; in general; and for the first time
in moral experience; moral action as action; and into this the previous stage of mere consciousness
of morality without action has passed。

The concrete shape which the act takes may be analysed by a conscious process of distinction
into a variety of properties; i。e。 in this case into a variety of moral relationships; and these may
either be each expressly held to be absolute (as each must be if it is to be duty) or; again;
subjected to comparison and criticism。 In the simple moral action arising from conscience; duties
are so piled and commingled that the isolated independence of all these separate entities is
immediately destroyed; and the process of critically considering and worrying about what our duty
is《 finds no place at all in the unshaken certainty of conscience。

Just as little; again; do we find in conscience that fluctuating uncertainty of mind; which puts now
so…called 〃pure〃 morality away from itself; assigning it to some other holy being; and takes itself to
be unholy; and then again; on the other hand; puts this moral purity within itself; and places in that
other the connexion of the sensuous with the moral element。

It renounces all these semblances and dissemblances (Stellungen und Verstellungen)
characteristic of the moral point of view; when it gives up thinking that there is a contradiction
between duty and actual reality。 According to this latter state of mind; I act morally when I am
conscious of performing merely pure duty and nothing else but that: i。e。 in fact; when I do not a

返回目录 上一页 下一页 回到顶部 0 0

你可能喜欢的