phenomenology of mind-第120节

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is　the　pure　unadulterated　ultimate　element　（Ansich）；　and　morality　consists　merely　in　conformity　to
this　pure　principle　—　the　second　proposition　runs：　〃there　is　no　actual　existence　which　is　moral〃。

Since；　however；　in　the　third　place；　it　is　a　self；　it　is　inherently　the　unity　of　duty　and　actual　reality。　This
unity　thus　becomes　its　object；　as　completed　morality　—　but　as　something　beyond　its　actual　reality；
and　yet　a　〃beyond〃　which　still　ought　to　be　real。

In　this　final　goal　or　aim　of　the　synthetic　unity　of　the　two　first　propositions；　the　self…conscious
actuality；　as　well　as　duty；　is　only　affirmed　as　a　transcended　or　superseded　moment。　For　neither　of
them　is　alone；　neither　is　isolated；　on　the　contrary；　these　factors；　whose　essential　characteristic　lies
in　being　free　from　one　another；　are　thus　each　in　that　unity　no　longer　free　from　the　other；　each　is
transcended。　Hence；　as　regards　content；　they　become；　as　such；　object；　each　of　them　holds　good
for　the　other；　and；　as　regards　form；　they　become　object　in　suchwise　that　this　reciprocal
interchange　is；　at　the　same　time；　merely　pictured　—　a　mere　idea。　Or；　again；　the　actually　non…moral；
because　it　is；　at　the　same　time；　pure　thought　and　elevated　above　its　own　actual　reality；　is　in　idea
still　moral；　and　is　taken　to　be　entirely　valid。　In　this　way　the　first　proposition；　that　there　is　a　moral
self…consciousness；　is　reinstated；　but　bound　up　with　the　second　that　there　is　none；　that　is　to　say；
there　is　one；　but　merely　in　idea。　In　other　words；　there　is　indeed　none；　but　it　is　all　the　same　allowed
by　some　other　consciousness　to　pass　for　one。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　



1。　i。e。　there　is　not　the　opposition　of　an　object　to　subject　which　consciousness　requires。　




b
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Dissemblance　（1）

IN　the　moral　attitude　of　experience　we　see；　on　one　side；　consciousness　itself　produce　its　object　in
a　conscious　way。　We　find　that　neither　does　it　pick　up　the　object　as　something　external；　nor　does
the　object　come　before　it　in　an　unconscious　manner。　Rather；　consciousness　throughout　proceeds
on　an　explicit　ground；　and　from　this　establishes　the　objective　reality。　It　thus　knows　this　objective
reality　to　be　itself；　for　it　is　aware　of　itself　as　the　active　agent　producing　this　object。　It　seems；　in
consequence；　to　attain　here　its　peace　and　satisfaction；　for　this　can　only　be　found　where　it　does　not
need　to　go　any　more　beyond　its　object；　because　this　object　no　longer　goes　beyond　it。　On　the
other　side；　however；　it　really　puts　the　object　away　outside　itself；　as　something　beyond　itself。　But
this　latter　self…contained　entity　is　at　the　same　time　put　there　as　something　that　is　not；　free　from
self…consciousness；　but　really　there　on　behalf　of　and　by　means　of　it。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（1）　The　Contradictions　in　the　Moral　View　of　the　World

The　moral　attitude　is；　therefore；　in　fact　nothing　else　than　the　developed　expression　of　this
fundamental　contradiction　in　its　various　aspects。　It　isto　use　a　Kantian　phrase　which　is　here　most
appropriated　〃perfect　nest〃　of　thoughtless　contradictions。（2）　Consciousness；　in　developing　this
situation；　proceeds　by　fixing　definitely　one　moment；　passing　thence　immediately　over　to　another
and　doing　away　with　the　first。　But；　as　soon　as　it　has　now　set　up　this　second　moment；　it　also　〃shifts〃
（verstellt）　this　again；　and　really　makes　the　opposite　the　essential　element。　At　the　same　time；　it　is
conscious　of　its　contradiction　and　of　its　shuffling；　for　it　passes　from　one　moment；　immediately　in　its
relation　to　this　very　moment；　right　over　to　the　opposite。　Because　a　moment　has　for　it　no　reality　at
all；　it　affirms　that　very　moment　as　real：　or；　what　comes　to　the　same　thing；　in　order　to　assert　one
moment　as　per　se　existent；　it　asserts　the　opposite　as　the　per　se；　existent。　It　thereby　confesses　that；
as　a　matter　of　fact；　it　is　in　earnest　about　neither　of　them。　The　various　moments　of　this　vertiginous
fraudulent　process　we　must　look　at　more　closely。

Let　us；　to　begin　with；　agree　to　accept　the　assumption　that　there　is　an　actual　moral　consciousness；
because　the　assumption　is　made　directly　and　not　with　reference　to　something　preceding；　and　let　us
turn　to　the　harmony　of　morality　and　naturethe　first　postulate。　It　is　to　be　immanent；　not　explicitly
for　actual　conscious　life；　not　really　present；　the　present　is　rather　simply　the　contradiction　between
the　two。　In　the　present；　morality　is　taken　to　be　something　at　hand；　and　actual　reality　to　be　so
situated　or　〃placed〃　that　it　is　not　in　harmony　with　morality。　The　concrete　moral　consciousness；
however；　is　an　active　one；　that　is　precisely　what　constitutes　the　actuality　of　its　morality。　In　the　very
process　of　acting；　however；　that　〃Place〃　or　semblance　is　immediately　〃displaced〃；　is　dissembled；
for　action　is　nothing　else　than　the　actualization　of　the　inner　moral　purpose；　nothing　but　the
production　of　an　actuality　constituted　and　determined　by　the　purpose；　in　other　words；　the
production　of　the　harmony　of　moral　purpose　and　reality　itself。　At　the　same　time　the　performance　of
the　action　is　a　conscious　fact；　it　is　the　〃presence〃　of　this　unity　of　reality　and　purpose；　and　because
in　the　completed　act　consciousness　realizes　itself　as　a　given　individual　consciousness；　or　sees
existence　returned　into　itselfand　in　this　consists　the　nature　of　enjoymentthere　is；　eo　ipso；
contained　in　the　realization　of　moral　purpose　also　that　form　of　its　realization　which　is　called
enjoyment　and　happiness。

Action　thus；　as　a　fact；　fulfils　directly　what　it　was　assorted　could　not　take　place　at　all；　fulfils　what
was　to　be　merely　a　postulate；　was　to　lie　merely　〃beyond〃。　Consciousness；　therefore；　expresses
through　its　deed　that　it　is　not　in　earnest　in　making　the　postulate；　since　the　meaning　of　acting　is　really
that　it　makes　a　present　fact　of　what　was　not　to　be　in　the　present。　And；　since　the　harmony　is
postulated　for　the　sake　of　the　actionfor　what　is　to　become　actual　through　action　must　be　implicit；
otherwise　the　actuality　would　not　be　possiblethe　connexion　of　action　with　the　postulate　is　so
constituted　that；　for　the　sake　of　the　action；　i。e。　for　the　sake　of　the　actual　harmony　of　purpose
and　reality；　this　harmony　is　put　forward　as　not　actual；　as　far　away；　as　〃beyond〃。

In　that　action　takes　place；　the　want　of　adaptation　between　purpose　and　reality　is　thus　not　taken
seriously　at　all。　Action　itself；　on　the　other　hand；　does　seem　to　be　taken　seriously。　But；　as　a　matter
of　fact；　the　actual　deed　done　is　only　the　action　of　an　individual　consciousness；　and　so　is　itself
merely　something　individual；　and　the　result　contingent。　The　end　of　reason；　however；　being　the
all…comprehensive　universal　end；　is　nothing　short　of　the　entire　worlda　final　purpose　which　goes
far　beyond　the　content　of　this　individual　act；　and　therefore　is　to　be　placed　altogether　beyond
anything　actually　done。　Because　the　universal　best　ought　to　be　carried　out；　nothing　good　is　done。
In　point　of　fact；　however；　the　nothingness　of　actual　action　and　the　reality　of　the　entire　purpose
alone；　which　are　here　upheldthese　are　on　all　hands　again　〃shifted〃　or　dissembled。　The　moral　act
is　not　something　contingent　and　restricted；　its　essential　nature　lies　in　pure　duty。　This　pure　duty
constitutes　the　sole　entire　purpose；　and　the　act；　whatever　may　be　the　limitation　of　the　content；
being　the　actualization　of　that　purpose；　is　the　accomplishment　of　the　entire　absolute　purpose。　Or；　if
again　we　take　the　reality　in　the　sense　of　nature；　which　has　laws　of　its　own　and　stands　over　against
pure　duty；　and　take　it　in　such　a　way　that　duty　cannot　realize　its　law　within　nature；　then；　since　duty
as　such　is　the　essential　element；　we　are；　when　acting；　not　in　fact　concerned　about　the
accomplishment　of　pure　duty　which　is　the　whole　purpose；　for　the　accomplishment　would　then
rather　have　as　its　end　not　pure　duty；　but　the　opposite；　viz。　reality。　But　there　is　again　a　〃shifting〃
from　the　position　that　it　is　not　reality　with　which　we　have　to　do。　For　by　the　very　notion　of　moral
action；　pure　duty　is　essentially　an　active　consciousness。　Action　thus　ought　certainly　to　take　place；
absolute　duty　ought　to　be　expressed　in　the　whole　of　nature；　and　〃moral　law〃　to　become　〃natural
law〃。

If；　then；　we　allow　this　highest　good　to　stand　for　the　essentially　real；　consciousness　is　altogether　not
in　earnest　with　morality。　For；　in　this　highest　good；　nature　has　not　a　different　law　from　what　morality
has。　Moral　action　itself；　in　consequence；　drops；　for　action　takes　place　only　under　the　assumption
of　a　negative　element　which　is　to　be　cancelled　by　means　of　the　act。　But　if　nature　conforms　to　the
moral　law；　then　assuredly　this　moral　law　would　be　violated　by　acting；　by　cancelling　what　already
exists。

On　that　mode　of　interpretation；　then；　there　has　been　admitted　as　the　essential　situation　one　which
renders　moral　action　superfluous　and　in　which　moral　action　does　not　take　place　at　all。　Hence　the
postulate　of　the　harmony　between　morality　and　realitya　harmony　posited　by　the　very　notion　of
moral　action；　which　means　bringing　the　two　into　agreementfinds　on　this　view；　too；　an　expression
which　takes　the　form：〃because　moral　action　is　the　absolute　purpose；　the　absolute　purpose
isthat　moral　action　do　not　take　place　at　all〃。

If