phenomenology of mind-第119节

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on　as　having　a　substantial　existence　and　value。　Furthermore；　since　they　can　only　exist　in　a　moral
consciousness；　they　exist　at　the　same　time　in　another　consciousness　than　that　for　which　only　pure
duty　qua　pure　duty　is　sacred　and　substantial。

It　is　thus　postulated　that　there　is　another　consciousness　which　renders　them　sacred；　or　which
knows　them　as　duties　and　wills　them　so。　The　first　maintains　pure　duty　indifferent　towards　all
specific　content；　and　duty　consists　merely　in　being　thus　indifferent　towards　it。　The　other；　however；
contains　the　equally　essential　relation　to　the　process　of　action；　and　the　necessity；　therefore；　of
determinate　content：　since　duties　for　this　other　mean　determinate　duties；　the　content　is　thus；　for　it；
just　as　essential　as　the　form　in　virtue　of　which　the　content　is　a　duty　at　all。　This　consciousness　is；
consequently；　such　that　in　it　the　universal　and　the　particular　are；　through　and　through；　one；　its
essential　principle　is　thus　the　same　as　that　of　the　harmony　of　morality　and　happiness。　For　this
opposition　between　morality　and　happiness　expresses　in　like　manner　the　separation　of　the
self…identical　moral　consciousness　from　that　actuality　which；　qua　manifold　existence；　opposes　and
conflicts　with　the　simple　nature　of　duty。　While；　however；　the　first　postulate　expresses　merely　the
objective　existential　harmony　between　morality　and　nature；　because　nature　is　therein　the　negative
of　self…consciousness；　is　the　moment　of　existence；　this　inherent　harmony；　on　the　other　hand　is　now
affirmed　essentially　as　a　type　of　consciousness。　For　existence　now　appears　as　the　content　of　duty；
as　that　in　the　determinate　duty　which　gives　it　specific　determinateness。　The　immanent　harmony　is
thus　the　unity　of　elements　which；　qua　simple　ultimate　elements；　are　essentially　thought…created；　and
hence　cannot　exist　except　in　a　consciousness。　This　latter　becomes　now　a　master　and　ruler　of　the
world；　who　brings　about　the　harmony　of　morality　and　happiness；　and　at　the　same　time　sanctifies
duties　in　their　Multiplicity。　To　sanctify　these　duties　means　this　much；　that　the　consciousness　of　pure
duty　cannot　straight…way　and　directly　accept　the　determinate　or　specific　duty　as　sacred；　but
because　a　specific　duty；　owing　to　the　nature　of　concrete　action　which　is　something　specific　and
definite；　is　likewise　necessary；　its　necessity　falls　outside　that　consciousness　and　holds　inside
another　consciousness；　which　thus　mediates　or　connects　determinate　and　pure　duty；　and　is　the
reason　why　that　specific　duty　also　has　validity。

　　　　　　　　　　（2）　The　Divine　Lawgiver　and　the　Imperfect　Moral　Consciousness

In　the　concrete　act；　however；　consciousness　proceeds　to　work　as　this　particular　self；　as
completely　individual：　it　directs　its　activity　on　actual　reality　as　such；　and　takes　this　as　its　purpose；
for　it　wants　to　perform　something　definite。　〃Duty　in　general〃　thus　falls　outside　it　and　within　another
being；　which　is　a　consciousness　and　the　sacred　lawgiver　of　pure　duty。　The　consciousness　which
acts；　just　because　it　acts；　accepts　the　other　consciousness；　that　of　pure　duty；　and　admits　its　validity
immediately；　this　pure　duty　is　thus　a　content　of　another　consciousness；　and　is　only　indirectly　or　in　a
mediate　way　sacred　for　the　active　consciousness；　viz。　in　virtue　of　this　other　consciousness。

Because　it　is　established　in　this　manner　that　the　validity；　the　bindingness；　of　duty　as　something
wholly　and　absolutely　sacred；　falls　outside　the　actual　consciousness；　this　latter　thereby　stands
altogether　on　one　side　as　the　incomplete　moral　consciousness。　Just　as；　in　regard　to　its　knowledge；
it　is　aware　of　itself　as　that　whose　knowledge　and　conviction　are　incomplete　and　contingent；　in　the
same　way；　as　regards　its　willing；　it　feels　itself　to　be　that　whose　purposes　are　affected　with
sensibility。　On　account　of　its　〃unworthiness〃；　therefore；　it　cannot　look　on　happiness　as　something
necessary；　but　as　a　something　contingent；　and　can　only　expect　happiness　as　the　result　of　〃grace〃。

But　though　its　actuality　is　incomplete；　duty　is　still；　so　far　as　its　pure　will　and　knowledge　are
concerned；　held　to　be　the　essential　truth。　In　principle；　therefore；　so　far　as　the　notion　is　opposed　to
actual　reality；　in　other　words；　in　thought；　it　is　perfect。　The　absolute　Being　＇God＇　is；　however；　just
this　object　of　thought；　and　is　something　postulated　beyond　the　actual。　It　is　therefore　the　thought　in
which　the　morally　imperfect　knowledge　and　will　are　held　to　be　perfect；　and　the　Absolute；　since　it
takes　this　imperfection　to　have　full　weight；　distributes　happiness　according　to　〃worthiness〃；　i。e。
according　to　the　〃merit〃　ascribed　to　the　imperfect　consciousness。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（3）　The　Moral　World　as　a　Presented　Idea

This　completes　the　meaning　of　the　moral　attitude。　For　in　the　conception　of　moral
self…consciousness　the　two　aspects；　pure　duty　and　actual　reality；　are　affirmed　of　a　single　unity；　and
thereby　the　one；　like　the　other；　is　put　forward；　not　as　something　self…complete；　but　as　a　moment；
or　as　cancelled　and　transcended。　This　becomes　consciously　explicit　in　the　last　phase　of　the　moral
attitude　or　point　of　view。　Consciousness；　we　there　saw；　places　pure　duty　in　another　form　of　being
than　its　own　consciousness；　i。e。　it　regards　pure　duty　partly　as　something　ideally　presented；　partly
as　what　does　not　by　itself　hold　good　—　indeed；　the　non…moral　is　rather　what　is　held　to　be　perfect。
In　the　same　way　it　affirms　itself　to　be　that　whose　actuality；　not　being　in　conformity　with　duty；　is
transcended；　and；　qua　transcended；　or　in　the　idea　of　the　Absolute　＇God's　view＇；　no　longer
contradicts　morality。

For　the　moral　consciousness　itself；　however；　its　moral　attitude　does　not　mean　that　consciousness
therein　develops　its　own　proper　notion　and　makes　this　its　object。　It　has　no　consciousness　of　this
opposition　either　as　regards　the　form　or　the　content　thereof；　the　elements　composing　this
opposition　it　does　not　relate　and　compare　with　one　another；　but　goes　forward　on　its　own　course
of　development；　without　being　the　connecting　principle　of　those　moments。　For　it　is　only　aware　of
the　essence　pure　and　simple；　i。e。　the　object　so　far　as　this　is　duty；　so　far　as　this　is　an　abstract　object
of　its　pure　consciousness　—　in　other　words；　it　is　only　aware　of　this　object　as　pure　knowledge　or　as
itself。　Its　procedure　is　thus　merely　that　of　thinking；　not　conceiving；　is　by　way　of　thoughts　not
notions。　Consequently　it　does　not　yet　find　the　object　of　its　actual　consciousness　transparently　clear
to　itself；　it　is　not　the　absolute　notion；　which　alone　grasps　otherness　as　such；　its　absolute　opposite；
as　its　very　self。　Its　own　reality；　as　well　as　all　objective　reality；　no　doubt　is　held　to　be　something
unessential；　but　its　freedom　is　that　of　pure　thought；　in　opposition　to　which；　therefore；　nature　has
likewise　arisen　as　something　equally　free。　Because　both　are　found　in　like　manner　within　it…both　the
freedom　which　belongs　to　＇external＇　being　and　the　inclusion　of　this　existence　within　consciousness
—　its　object　comes　to　be　an　existing　object；　which　is　at　the　same　time　merely　a　thought…product。　In
the　last　phase　of　its　attitude　or　point　of　view；　the　content　is　essentially　so　affirmed　that　its　being　has
the　character　of　something　presented；　and　this　union　of　being　and　thinking　is　expressed　as　what　in
fact　it　is；　viz。…Imagining　（Vorstellen）。

When　we　look　at　the　moral　view　of　the　world　and　see　that　this　objective　condition　is　nothing　else
than　the　very　principle　or　notion　of　moral　self…consciousness　which　it　makes　objective　to　itself；
there　arises　through　this　consciousness　concerning　the　form　of　its　origin　another　mode　of　exhibiting
this　view　of　the　world。

The　first　stage；　which　forms　the　starting…point；　is　the　actual　moral　self…consciousness；　or　is　the　fact
that　there　is　such　a　self…consciousness　at　all。　For　the　notion　establishes　moral　self…consciousness　in
the　form　that；　for　it；　all　reality　in　general　has　essential　being　only　so　far　as　such　reality　is　in
conformity　with　duty；　and　that　notion　establishes　this　essential　element　as　knowledge；　i。e。　in
immediate　unity　with　the　actual　self。　This　unity　is　thus　itself　actual；　is　a　moral　actual　consciousness。
The　latter；　now；　qua　consciousness；　pictures　its　content　to　itself　as　an　object；　viz。　as　the　final
purpose　of　the　world；　as　the　harmony　of　morality　with　all　reality。　Since；　however；　it　pictures　this
unity　as　object　and　is　not　yet　the　complete　notion；　which　has　mastery　over　the　object　as　such；　this
unity　is　taken　to　be　something　negative　of　self…consciousness；　i。e。　the　unity　falls　outside　it；　as
something　beyond　its　actual　reality；　but　at　the　same　time　of　such　a　nature　as　to　be　also　existent；
though　merely　thought　of。

This　self…consciousness；　which；　qua　self…consciousness；　is　something　other　than　the　object；　thus
finds　itself　left　with　the　want　of　harmony　between　the　consciousness　of　duty　and　actual　reality；　and
indeed　its　own　reality。　The　proposition　consequently　now　runs　thus：　〃there　is　no　morally　complete
actual　self…consciousness〃；　and；　since　what　is　moral　only　is　at　all　so　far　as　it　is　complete；　—　for　duty
is　the　pure　unadulterated　ultimate　element　（Ansich）；　and　morality　consists　merely　in　conformity　to
this　pure　princ