phenomenology of mind-第118节

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moment　is　that　of　enjoyment；　which　thus　lies　in　the　very　principle　of　morality；　not　indeed　of
morality　immediately　in　the　sense　of　a　frame　of　mind；　but　in　the　principle　of　the　actualization　of
morality。　Owing　to　this；　however；　enjoyment　is　also　involved　in　morality；　as　a　mood；　for　morality
seeks；　not　to　remain　a　frame　of　mind　as　opposed　to　action；　but　to　act　or　realize　itself。　Thus　the
purpose；　expressed　as　a　whole　along　with　the　consciousness　of　its　elements　or　moments；　is　that
duty　fulfilled　shall　be　both　a　purely　moral　act　and　a　realized　individuality；　and　that　nature；　the
aspect　of　individuality　in　contrast　with　abstract　purpose；　shall　be　one　with　this　purpose。

While　experience　must　necessarily　bring　to　light　the　disharmony　between　the　two　aspects；　seeing
that　nature　is　detached　and　free　nevertheless　duty　is　alone　the　essential　fact　and　nature　by　contrast
is　devoid　of　self…hood。　That　purpose　in　its　entirety；　which　the　harmony　of　the　two　constitutes；
contains　within　it　actuality　itself。　It　is；　at　the　same　time；　the　thought　of　actuality。　The　harmony　of
morality　and　nature；　or…seeing　that　nature　is　taken　account　of　merely　so　far　as　consciousness　finds
out　nature's　unity　with　it　—　the　harmony　of　morality　and　happiness；　is　thought　of　as　necessarily
existing；　it　is　postulated。　For　to　postulate　or　demand　means　that　something　is　thought　as　being
which　is　not　yet　actual　—　a　necessity　affecting；　not　the　conception　qua　conception；　but　existence。
But　necessity　is　at　the　same　time　essentially　relation　through　the　conception。　The　postulated
existence　thus　is　not　something　that　concerns　the　imagination　of　some　chance　individual
consciousness；　but　is　implied　in　the　very　notion　of　morality　itself；　whose　true　content　is　the　unity　of
pure　with　individual　consciousness。　It　falls　to　the　individual　consciousness　to　see　that　this　unity　is；
for　it；　an　actuality：　—　which　means　happiness　as　regards　the　content　of　the　purpose；　and　existence
in　general　as　regards　its　form。　The　existence　thus　demanded…the　unity　of　both　—　is　therefore　not　a
wish；　nor；　looked　at　qua　purpose；　is　it　of　such　a　kind　as　to　be　still　uncertain　of　attainment；　the
purpose　is　rather　a　demand　of　reason；　or　an　immediate　certainty　and　presupposition　of　reason。

The　first　experience　above　referred　to　and　this　postulate　are　not　the　only　experience　and　postulate；
a　whole　round　of　postulates　comes　to　light。　For　nature　is　not　merely　this　completely　free　external
mode　in　which；　as　a　bare　pure　object；　consciousness　has　to　realize　its　purpose。　Consciousness　is
per　se　essentially　something　for　which　this　other　detached　reality　exists；　i。e。　it　is　itself　something
contingent　and　natural。　This　nature；　which　is　properly　its　own；　is　sensibility；　which；　taking　the　form
of　volition；　in　the　shape　of　Impulses　and　Inclinations；　has　by　itself　a　determinate　essential　being　of
its　own；　i。e。　has　specific　single　purposes；　and　thus　is　opposed　to　pure　will　with　its　pure　purpose。　In
contrast　with　this　opposition；　however；　pure　consciousness　rather　takes　the　relation　of　sensibility　to
it；　the　absolute　unity　of　sensibility　with　it；　to　be　the　essential　fact。　Both　of　these；　pure　thought　and
sensibility；　are　essentially　and　inherently　one　consciousness；　and　pure　thought　is　just　that　for　which
and　in　which　this　pure　unity　exists；　but　for　it　qua　consciousness　the　opposition　between　itself　and
its　impulses　holds。　In　this　conflict　between　reason　and　sensibility；　the　essential　thing　for　reason　is
that　the　conflict　should　be　resolved；　and　that　the　unity　of　both　should　come　out　as　a　result：　not　the
original　unity　which　consisted　in　both　the　opposites　being　in　one　individual；　but　a　unity　which　arises
out　of　the　known　opposition　of　the　two。　So　attained；　such　a　unity　is　then　actual　morality；　for　in　it　is
contained　the　opposition　through　which　the　self　is　a　consciousness；　or　first　becomes　concrete　and
in　actual　fact　self；　and　at　the　same　time　universal。　In　other　words；　we　find　there　expressed　that
process　of　mediation　which；　as　we　see；　is　essential　to　morality。

Since；　of　the　two　factors　in　opposition；　sensibility　is　otherness　out　and　out；　is　the　negative；　while；
on　the　other　hand；　pure　thought　of　duty　is　the　ultimate　essence　which　cannot　possibly　be
surrendered　in　any　respect；　it　seems　as　if　the　unity　produced　can　be　brought　about　only　by　doing
away　with　sensibility。　But　since　sensibility　is　itself　a　moment　of　this　process　of　producing　the　unity；
is　the　moment　of　actuality；　we　have；　in　the　first　instance；　to　be　content　to　express　the　unity　in　this
form　—　sensibility　should　be　in　conformity　with　morality。

This　unity　is　likewise　a　postulated　existence；　it　is　not　there　as　a　fact；　for　what　is　there　is
consciousness；　or　the　opposition　of　sensibility　and　pure　consciousness。　All　the　same；　the　unity　is
not　a　something　per　se　like　the　first　postulate；　in　which　free　external　nature　constitutes　an　aspect
and　the　harmony　of　nature　with　moral　consciousness　in　consequence　falls　outside　the　latter。
Rather；　nature　is　here　that　which　lies　within　consciousness；　and　we　have　here　to　deal　with　morality
（Moralit？t）　as　such；　with　a　harmony　which　is　the　active　self's　very　own。　Consciousness　has；
therefore；　of　itself　to　bring　about　this　harmonious　unity；　and　〃to　be　always　making　progress　in
morality〃。　The　completion　of　this　result；　however；　has　to　be　pushed　away　into　the　remote　infinite；
because　if　it　actually　entered　the　life　of　consciousness　as　an　actual　fact；　the　moral　consciousness
would　be　done　away　with。　For　morality　is　only　moral　consciousness　qua　negative　force；　sensibility
has　merely　a　negative　significance　for　the　consciousness　of　pure　duty；　it　is　something　merely　〃not　in
conformity　with〃　duty。　By　attaining　that　harmony；　however；　morality　qua　consciousness；　i。e。　its
actuality；　passes　away；　just　as　in　the　moral　consciousness　or　actuality　its　harmony　vanishes。　The
completion　is；　therefore；　not　to　be　reached　as　an　actual　fact；　it　is　to　be　thought　of　merely　as　an
absolute　task　or　problem；　i。e。　one　which　remains　a　problem　pure　and　simple。　Nevertheless；　its
content　has　to　be　thought　as　something　which　unquestionably　has　to　be；　and　must　not　remain　a
problem：　whether　we　imagine　the　moral　consciousness　quite　cancelled　in　the　attainment　of　this
goal；　or　riot。　Which　of　these　exactly　is　the　case；　can　no　longer　be　clearly　distinguished　in　the　dim
distance　of　infinitude；　to　which　the　attainment　of　the　end　has　to　be　postponed；　just　because　we
cannot　decide　the　point。　We　shall　be；　strictly　speaking；　bound　to　say　that　a　definite　idea　on　the
matter　ought　to　be　of　no　interest　and　ought　not　to　be　sought　for；　because　this　leads　to
contradictions　—　the　contradiction　involved　in　an　undertaking　that　at　once　ought　to　remain　an
undertaking　and　yet　ought　to　be　carried　out；　and　the　conttradiction　involved　in　the　morality　which
is　to　be　no　longer　consciousness；　i。e。　no　longer　actual。　By　adopting　the　view；　however；　that
morality　when　completed　would　contain　a　contradiction；　the　sacredness　of　moral　truth　would　be
seriously　affected；　and　the　unconditional　duty　would　appear　something　unreal。

The　first　postulate　was　the　harmony　of　morality　and　objective　nature…the　final　purpose　of　the
world：　the　other　was　the　harmony　of　morality　and　will　in　its　sensuous　form；　in　the　form　if　impulse；
etc。…the　final　purpose　of　self…consciousness　as　such。　The　former　is　the　harmony　in　the　form　of
implicit　immanent　existence；　the　latter；　the　harmony　in　the　form　of　explicit　self…existence。　That；
however；　which　connects　these　two　extreme　final　purposes　which　are　thought；　and　operates　as
their　mediating　ground；　is　the　process　of　concrete　action　itself。　They　are　harmonies　whose
moments　have　not　yet　become　definitely　objective　in　their　abstract　distinctiveness　from　each　other：
this　takes　place　in　concrete　actuality；　in　which　the　aspects　appear　in　consciousness　proper；　each　as
the　other　of　the　other。　The　postulates　arising　by　this　means　contain　harmonies　which　are　now　both
immanent　and　self…existent；　whereas　formerly　they　were　postulated　merely　separately；　the　one
being　the　immanent　harmony；　the　other　self…existent。

The　moral　consciousness；　qua　simple　knowledge　and　willing　of　pure　duty；　is　brought；　by　the
process　of　acting；　into　relation　with　an　object　opposed　to　that　abstract　simplicity；　into　relation　with
the　manifold　actuality　which　various　cases　present；　and　thereby　assumes　a　moral　attitude　varied
and　manifold　in　character。　Hence　arise；　on　the　side　of　content；　the　plurality　of　laws　generally；　and；
on　the　side　of　form；　the　contradictory　powers　of　intelligent　knowing　consciousness　and　of　a　being
devoid　of　consciousness。

To　begin　with；　as　regards　the　plurality　of　duties；　it　is　merely　the　aspect　of　pure　or　bare　duty　in　them
which　the　moral　consciousness　in　general　recognizes　as　having　validity：　the　many　duties　qua　many
are　determinate　and；　therefore；　are　not；　as　such；　anything　sacred　for　the　moral　consciousness。　At
the　same　time；　however；　being　necessary；　in　virtue　of　the　notion　of　action　which　implicates　a
manifold　actuality；　and　hence　manifold　types　of　moral　attitude；　those　many　duties　must　be　looked
on　as　having　a　substantial　existence　and　value。　Furthermore；　since　they　can　only　exist　in　a　moral