the critique of pure reason-第53节

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produce　the　conception　of　it；　for　example…　〃With　a　given　line；　to

describe　a　circle　upon　a　plane；　from　a　given　point〃；　and　such　a

proposition　does　not　admit　of　proof；　because　the　procedure；　which　it

requires；　is　exactly　that　by　which　alone　it　is　possible　to　generate

the　conception　of　such　a　figure。　With　the　same　right；　accordingly；　can

we　postulate　the　principles　of　modality；　because　they　do　not

augment*　the　conception　of　a　thing　but　merely　indicate　the　manner　in

which　it　is　connected　with　the　faculty　of　cognition。



　　*When　I　think　the　reality　of　a　thing；　I　do　really　think　more　than

the　possibility；　but　not　in　the　thing；　for　that　can　never　contain　more

in　reality　than　was　contained　in　its　complete　possibility。　But　while

the　notion　of　possibility　is　merely　the　notion　of　a　position　of

thing　in　relation　to　the　understanding　（its　empirical　use）；　reality　is

the　conjunction　of　the　thing　with　perception。



　　　　　　　　　　　GENERAL　REMARK　ON　THE　SYSTEM　OF　PRINCIPLES。



　　It　is　very　remarkable　that　we　cannot　perceive　the　possibility　of　a

thing　from　the　category　alone；　but　must　always　have　an　intuition；　by

which　to　make　evident　the　objective　reality　of　the　pure　conception

of　the　understanding。　Take；　for　example；　the　categories　of　relation。

How　（1）　a　thing　can　exist　only　as　a　subject；　and　not　as　a　mere

determination　of　other　things；　that　is；　can　be　substance；　or　how

（2）；　because　something　exists；　some　other　thing　must　exist；

consequently　how　a　thing　can　be　a　cause；　or　how　（3）；　when　several

things　exist；　from　the　fact　that　one　of　these　things　exists；　some

consequence　to　the　others　follows；　and　reciprocally；　and　in　this　way　a

community　of　substances　can　be　possible…　are　questions　whose

solution　cannot　be　obtained　from　mere　conceptions。　The　very　same　is

the　case　with　the　other　categories；　for　example；　how　a　thing　can　be　of

the　same　sort　with　many　others；　that　is；　can　be　a　quantity；　and　so　on。

So　long　as　we　have　not　intuition　we　cannot　know　whether　we　do　really

think　an　object　by　the　categories；　and　where　an　object　can　anywhere　be

found　to　cohere　with　them；　and　thus　the　truth　is　established；　that　the

categories　are　not　in　themselves　cognitions；　but　mere　forms　of　thought

for　the　construction　of　cognitions　from　given　intuitions。　For　the　same

reason　is　it　true　that　from　categories　alone　no　synthetical

proposition　can　be　made。　For　example：　〃In　every　existence　there　is

substance；〃　that　is；　something　that　can　exist　only　as　a　subject　and

not　as　mere　predicate；　or；　〃Everything　is　a　quantity〃…　to　construct

propositions　such　as　these；　we　require　something　to　enable　us　to　go

out　beyond　the　given　conception　and　connect　another　with　it。　For　the

same　reason　the　attempt　to　prove　a　synthetical　proposition　by　means　of

mere　conceptions；　for　example：　〃Everything　that　exists　contingently

has　a　cause；〃　has　never　succeeded。　We　could　never　get　further　than

proving　that；　without　this　relation　to　conceptions；　we　could　not

conceive　the　existence　of　the　contingent；　that　is；　could　not　a

priori　through　the　understanding　cognize　the　existence　of　such　a

thing；　but　it　does　not　hence　follow　that　this　is　also　the　condition　of

the　possibility　of　the　thing　itself　that　is　said　to　be　contingent。　If；

accordingly；　we　look　back　to　our　proof　of　the　principle　of

causality；　we　shall　find　that　we　were　able　to　prove　it　as　valid　only

of　objects　of　possible　experience；　and；　indeed；　only　as　itself　the

principle　of　the　possibility　of　experience；　Consequently　of　the

cognition　of　an　object　given　in　empirical　intuition；　and　not　from　mere

conceptions。　That；　however；　the　proposition：　〃Everything　that　is

contingent　must　have　a　cause；〃　is　evident　to　every　one　merely　from

conceptions；　is　not　to　be　denied。　But　in　this　case　the　conception　of

the　contingent　is　cogitated　as　involving　not　the　category　of

modality　（as　that　the　non…existence　of　which　can　be　conceive　but

that　of　relation　（as　that　which　can　exist　only　as　the　consequence　of

something　else）；　and　so　it　is　really　an　identical　proposition：　〃That

which　can　exist　only　as　a　consequence；　has　a　cause。〃　In　fact；　when

we　have　to　give　examples　of　contingent　existence；　we　always　refer　to

changes；　and　not　merely　to　the　possibility　of　conceiving　the

opposite。*　But　change　is　an　event；　which；　as　such；　is　possible　only

through　a　cause；　and　considered　per　se　its　non…existence　is

therefore　possible；　and　we　become　cognizant　of　its　contingency　from

the　fact　that　it　can　exist　only　as　the　effect　of　a　cause。　Hence；　if

a　thing　is　assumed　to　be　contingent；　it　is　an　analytical　proposition

to　say；　it　has　a　cause。



　　*We　can　easily　conceive　the　non…existence　of　matter；　but　the

ancients　did　not　thence　infer　its　contingency。　But　even　the

alternation　of　the　existence　and　non…existence　of　a　given　state　in　a

thing；　in　which　all　change　consists；　by　no　means　proves　the

contingency　of　that　state…　the　ground　of　proof　being　the　reality　of

its　opposite。　For　example；　a　body　is　in　a　state　of　rest　after

motion；　but　we　cannot　infer　the　contingency　of　the　motion　from　the

fact　that　the　former　is　the　opposite　of　the　latter。　For　this

opposite　is　merely　a　logical　and　not　a　real　opposite　to　the　other。

If　we　wish　to　demonstrate　the　contingency　of　the　motion；　what　we　ought

to　prove　is　that；　instead　of　the　motion　which　took　place　in　the

preceding　point　of　time；　it　was　possible　for　the　body　to　have　been

then　in　rest；　not；　that　it　is　afterwards　in　rest；　for　in　this　case；

both　opposites　are　perfectly　consistent　with　each　other。



　　But　it　is　still　more　remarkable　that；　to　understand　the

possibility　of　things　according　to　the　categories　and　thus　to

demonstrate　the　objective　reality　of　the　latter；　we　require　not　merely

intuitions；　but　external　intuitions。　If；　for　example；　we　take　the　pure

conceptions　of　relation；　we　find　that　（1）　for　the　purpose　of

presenting　to　the　conception　of　substance　something　permanent　in

intuition　corresponding　thereto　and　thus　of　demonstrating　the

objective　reality　of　this　conception；　we　require　an　intuition　（of

matter）　in　space；　because　space　alone　is　permanent　and　determines

things　as　such；　while　time；　and　with　it　all　that　is　in　the　internal

sense；　is　in　a　state　of　continual　flow；　（2）　in　order　to　represent

change　as　the　intuition　corresponding　to　the　conception　of

causality；　we　require　the　representation　of　motion　as　change　in　space；

in　fact；　it　is　through　it　alone　that　changes；　the　possibility　of　which

no　pure　understanding　can　perceive；　are　capable　of　being　intuited。

Change　is　the　connection　of　determinations　contradictorily　opposed

to　each　other　in　the　existence　of　one　and　the　same　thing。　Now；　how

it　is　possible　that　out　of　a　given　state　one　quite　opposite　to　it　in

the　same　thing　should　follow；　reason　without　an　example　can　not　only

not　conceive；　but　cannot　even　make　intelligible　without　intuition；　and

this　intuition　is　the　motion　of　a　point　in　space；　the　existence　of

which　in　different　spaces　（as　a　consequence　of　opposite

determinations）　alone　makes　the　intuition　of　change　possible。　For；

in　order　to　make　even　internal　change　cognitable；　we　require　to

represent　time；　as　the　form　of　the　internal　sense；　figuratively　by　a

line；　and　the　internal　change　by　the　drawing　of　that　line　（motion）；

and　consequently　are　obliged　to　employ　external　intuition　to　be　able

to　represent　the　successive　existence　of　ourselves　in　different

states。　The　proper　ground　of　this　fact　is　that　all　change　to　be

perceived　as　change　presupposes　something　permanent　in　intuition；

while　in　the　internal　sense　no　permanent　intuition　is　to　be　found。

Lastly；　the　objective　possibility　of　the　category　of　community

cannot　be　conceived　by　mere　reason；　and　consequently　its　objective

reality　cannot　be　demonstrated　without　an　intuition；　and　that　external

in　space。　For　how　can　we　conceive　the　possibility　of　community；　that

is；　when　several　substances　exist；　that　some　effect　on　the　existence

of　the　one　follows　from　the　existence　of　the　other；　and

reciprocally；　and　therefore　that；　because　something　exists　in　the

latter；　something　else　must　exist　in　the　former；　which　could　not　be

understood　from　its　own　existence　alone？　For　this　is　the　very

essence　of　community…　which　is　inconceivable　as　a　property　of　things

which　are　perfectly　isolated。　Hence；　Leibnitz；　in　attributing　to　the

substances　of　the　world…　as　cogitated　by　the　understanding　alone…　a

community；　required　the　mediating　aid　of　a　divinity；　for；　from　their

existence；　such　a　property　seemed　to　him　with　justice　inconceivable。

But　we　can　very　easily　conceive　the　possibility　of　community　（of

substances　as　phenomena）　if　we　represent　them　to　ourselves　as　in

space；　consequently　in　external　intuition。　For　external　intuition

contains　in　itself　a　priori　formal　external　relations；　as　the

conditions　of　the　possibility　of　the　real　relations　of　action　and

reaction；　and　therefore　of　the　possibility　of　community。　With　the　same

ease　can　it　be　demonstrated；　that　the　possibility　of　things　as