the critique of pure reason-第50节

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influence　of　this　postulate　of　possibility。　When　I　represent　to　myself

a　thing　that　is　permanent；　so　that　everything　in　it　which　changes

belongs　merely　to　its　state　or　condition；　from　such　a　conception　alone

I　never　can　cognize　that　such　a　thing　is　possible。　Or；　if　I

represent　to　myself　something　which　is　so　constituted　that；　when　it　is

posited；　something　else　follows　always　and　infallibly；　my　thought

contains　no　self…contradiction；　but　whether　such　a　property　as

causality　is　to　be　found　in　any　possible　thing；　my　thought　alone

affords　no　means　of　judging。　Finally；　I　can　represent　to　myself

different　things　（substances）　which　are　so　constituted　that　the

state　or　condition　of　one　causes　a　change　in　the　state　of　the　other；

and　reciprocally；　but　whether　such　a　relation　is　a　property　of

things　cannot　be　perceived　from　these　conceptions；　which　contain　a

merely　arbitrary　synthesis。　Only　from　the　fact；　therefore；　that

these　conceptions　express　a　priori　the　relations　of　perceptions　in

every　experience；　do　we　know　that　they　possess　objective　reality；　that

is；　transcendental　truth；　and　that　independent　of　experience；　though

not　independent　of　all　relation　to　form　of　an　experience　in　general

and　its　synthetical　unity；　in　which　alone　objects　can　be　empirically

cognized。

　　But　when　we　fashion　to　ourselves　new　conceptions　of　substances；

forces；　action；　and　reaction；　from　the　material　presented　to　us　by

perception；　without　following　the　example　of　experience　in　their

connection；　we　create　mere　chimeras；　of　the　possibility　of　which　we

cannot　discover　any　criterion；　because　we　have　not　taken　experience

for　our　instructress；　though　we　have　borrowed　the　conceptions　from

her。　Such　fictitious　conceptions　derive　their　character　of　possibility

not；　like　the　categories；　a　priori；　as　conceptions　on　which　all

experience　depends；　but　only；　a　posteriori；　as　conceptions　given　by

means　of　experience　itself；　and　their　possibility　must　either　be

cognized　a　posteriori　and　empirically；　or　it　cannot　be　cognized　at

all。　A　substance　which　is　permanently　present　in　space；　yet　without

filling　it　（like　that　tertium　quid　between　matter　and　the　thinking

subject　which　some　have　tried　to　introduce　into　metaphysics）；　or　a

peculiar　fundamental　power　of　the　mind　of　intuiting　the　future　by

anticipation　（instead　of　merely　inferring　from　past　and　present

events）；　or；　finally；　a　power　of　the　mind　to　place　itself　in　community

of　thought　with　other　men；　however　distant　they　may　be…　these　are

conceptions　the　possibility　of　which　has　no　ground　to　rest　upon。　For

they　are　not　based　upon　experience　and　its　known　laws；　and；　without

experience；　they　are　a　merely　arbitrary　conjunction　of　thoughts；

which；　though　containing　no　internal　contradiction；　has　no　claim　to

objective　reality；　neither；　consequently；　to　the　possibility　of　such

an　object　as　is　thought　in　these　conceptions。　As　far　as　concerns

reality；　it　is　self…evident　that　we　cannot　cogitate　such　a　possibility

in　concreto　without　the　aid　of　experience；　because　reality　is

concerned　only　with　sensation；　as　the　matter　of　experience；　and　not

with　the　form　of　thought；　with　which　we　can　no　doubt　indulge　in

shaping　fancies。

　　But　I　pass　by　everything　which　derives　its　possibility　from

reality　in　experience；　and　I　purpose　treating　here　merely　of　the

possibility　of　things　by　means　of　a　priori　conceptions。　I　maintain；

then；　that　the　possibility　of　things　is　not　derived　from　such

conceptions　per　se；　but　only　when　considered　as　formal　and　objective

conditions　of　an　experience　in　general。

　　It　seems；　indeed；　as　if　the　possibility　of　a　triangle　could　be

cognized　from　the　conception　of　it　alone　（which　is　certainly

independent　of　experience）；　for　we　can　certainly　give　to　the

conception　a　corresponding　object　completely　a　priori；　that　is　to　say；

we　can　construct　it。　But　as　a　triangle　is　only　the　form　of　an

object；　it　must　remain　a　mere　product　of　the　imagination；　and　the

possibility　of　the　existence　of　an　object　corresponding　to　it　must

remain　doubtful；　unless　we　can　discover　some　other　ground；　unless　we

know　that　the　figure　can　be　cogitated　under　the　conditions　upon

which　all　objects　of　experience　rest。　Now；　the　facts　that　space　is　a

formal　condition　a　priori　of　external　experience；　that　the　formative

synthesis；　by　which　we　construct　a　triangle　in　imagination；　is　the

very　same　as　that　we　employ　in　the　apprehension　of　a　phenomenon　for

the　purpose　of　making　an　empirical　conception　of　it；　are　what　alone

connect　the　notion　of　the　possibility　of　such　a　thing；　with　the

conception　of　it。　In　the　same　manner；　the　possibility　of　continuous

quantities；　indeed　of　quantities　in　general；　for　the　conceptions　of

them　are　without　exception　synthetical；　is　never　evident　from　the

conceptions　in　themselves；　but　only　when　they　are　considered　as　the

formal　conditions　of　the　determination　of　objects　in　experience。　And

where；　indeed；　should　we　look　for　objects　to　correspond　to　our

conceptions；　if　not　in　experience；　by　which　alone　objects　are

presented　to　us？　It　is；　however；　true　that　without　antecedent

experience　we　can　cognize　and　characterize　the　possibility　of

things；　relatively　to　the　formal　conditions；　under　which　something

is　determined　in　experience　as　an　object；　consequently；　completely　a

priori。　But　still　this　is　possible　only　in　relation　to　experience

and　within　its　limits。

　　The　postulate　concerning　the　cognition　of　the　reality　of　things

requires　perception；　consequently　conscious　sensation；　not　indeed

immediately；　that　is；　of　the　object　itself；　whose　existence　is　to　be

cognized；　but　still　that　the　object　have　some　connection　with　a　real

perception；　in　accordance　with　the　analogies　of　experience；　which

exhibit　all　kinds　of　real　connection　in　experience。

　　From　the　mere　conception　of　a　thing　it　is　impossible　to　conclude　its

existence。　For；　let　the　conception　be　ever　so　complete；　and　containing

a　statement　of　all　the　determinations　of　the　thing；　the　existence　of

it　has　nothing　to　do　with　all　this；　but　only　with　thew　question

whether　such　a　thing　is　given；　so　that　the　perception　of　it　can　in

every　case　precede　the　conception。　For　the　fact　that　the　conception　of

it　precedes　the　perception；　merely　indicates　the　possibility　of　its

existence；　it　is　perception　which　presents　matter　to　the　conception；

that　is　the　sole　criterion　of　reality。　Prior　to　the　perception　of

the　thing；　however；　and　therefore　comparatively　a　priori；　we　are

able　to　cognize　its　existence；　provided　it　stands　in　connection　with

some　perceptions　according　to　the　principles　of　the　empirical

conjunction　of　these；　that　is；　in　conformity　with　the　analogies　of

perception。　For；　in　this　case；　the　existence　of　the　supposed　thing

is　connected　with　our　perception　in　a　possible　experience；　and　we

are　able；　with　the　guidance　of　these　analogies；　to　reason　in　the

series　of　possible　perceptions　from　a　thing　which　we　do　really

perceive　to　the　thing　we　do　not　perceive。　Thus；　we　cognize　the

existence　of　a　magnetic　matter　penetrating　all　bodies　from　the

perception　of　the　attraction　of　the　steel…filings　by　the　magnet；

although　the　constitution　of　our　organs　renders　an　immediate

perception　of　this　matter　impossible　for　us。　For；　according　to　the

laws　of　sensibility　and　the　connected　context　of　our　perceptions；　we

should　in　an　experience　come　also　on　an　immediate　empirical

intuition　of　this　matter；　if　our　senses　were　more　acute…　but　this

obtuseness　has　no　influence　upon　and　cannot　alter　the　form　of　possible

experience　in　general。　Our　knowledge　of　the　existence　of　things

reaches　as　far　as　our　perceptions；　and　what　may　be　inferred　from

them　according　to　empirical　laws；　extend。　If　we　do　not　set　out　from

experience；　or　do　not　proceed　according　to　the　laws　of　the　empirical

connection　of　phenomena；　our　pretensions　to　discover　the　existence

of　a　thing　which　we　do　not　immediately　perceive　are　vain。　Idealism；

however；　brings　forward　powerful　objections　to　these　rules　for　proving

existence　mediately。　This　is；　therefore；　the　proper　place　for　its

refutation。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　REFUTATION　OF　IDEALISM。



　　Idealism…　I　mean　material　idealism…　is　the　theory　which　declares　the

existence　of　objects　in　space　without　us　to　be　either　（）　doubtful

and　indemonstrable；　or　（2）　false　and　impossible。　The　first　is　the

problematical　idealism　of　Descartes；　who　admits　the　undoubted

certainty　of　only　one　empirical　assertion　（assertio）；　to　wit；　〃I

am。〃　The　second　is　the　dogmatical　idealism　of　Berkeley；　who

maintains　that　space；　together　with　all　the　objects　of　which　it　is　the

inseparable　condition；　is　a　thing　which　is　in　itself　impossible；　and

that　consequently　the　objects　in　space　are　mere　products　of　the

imagination。　The　dogmatical　theory　of　idealism　is　unavoidable；　if　we

regard　space　as　a　property　of　things　in　themselves；　for　in　that　case

it　is；　with　all　to　which　it　serves　as　condition；　a　nonentity。　But

the　foundation　for　this　kind　of　idealism　we　have　alrea