the critique of pure reason-第45节

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vessel　should　be　perceived　first　below　and　afterwards　higher　up　the

stream。　Here；　therefore；　the　order　in　the　sequence　of　perceptions　in

apprehension　is　determined；　and　by　this　order　apprehension　is

regulated。　In　the　former　example；　my　perceptions　in　the　apprehension

of　a　house　might　begin　at　the　roof　and　end　at　the　foundation；　or

vice　versa；　or　I　might　apprehend　the　manifold　in　this　empirical

intuition；　by　going　from　left　to　right；　and　from　right　to　left。

Accordingly；　in　the　series　of　these　perceptions；　there　was　no

determined　order；　which　necessitated　my　beginning　at　a　certain

point；　in　order　empirically　to　connect　the　manifold。　But　this　rule

is　always　to　be　met　with　in　the　perception　of　that　which　happens；

and　it　makes　the　order　of　the　successive　perceptions　in　the

apprehension　of　such　a　phenomenon　necessary。

　　I　must；　therefore；　in　the　present　case；　deduce　the　subjective

sequence　of　apprehension　from　the　objective　sequence　of　phenomena；　for

otherwise　the　former　is　quite　undetermined；　and　one　phenomenon　is

not　distinguishable　from　another。　The　former　alone　proves　nothing　as

to　the　connection　of　the　manifold　in　an　object；　for　it　is　quite

arbitrary。　The　latter　must　consist　in　the　order　of　the　manifold　in　a

phenomenon；　according　to　which　order　the　apprehension　of　one　thing

（that　which　happens）　follows　that　of　another　thing　（which　precedes）；

in　conformity　with　a　rule。　In　this　way　alone　can　I　be　authorized　to

say　of　the　phenomenon　itself；　and　not　merely　of　my　own　apprehension；

that　a　certain　order　or　sequence　is　to　be　found　therein。　That　is；　in

other　words；　I　cannot　arrange　my　apprehension　otherwise　than　in　this

order。

　　In　conformity　with　this　rule；　then；　it　is　necessary　that　in　that

which　antecedes　an　event　there　be　found　the　condition　of　a　rule；

according　to　which　in　this　event　follows　always　and　necessarily；　but　I

cannot　reverse　this　and　go　back　from　the　event；　and　determine　（by

apprehension）　that　which　antecedes　it。　For　no　phenomenon　goes　back

from　the　succeeding　point　of　time　to　the　preceding　point；　although

it　does　certainly　relate　to　a　preceding　point　of　time；　from　a　given

time；　on　the　other　hand；　there　is　always　a　necessary　progression　to

the　determined　succeeding　time。　Therefore；　because　there　certainly

is　something　that　follows；　I　must　of　necessity　connect　it　with

something　else；　which　antecedes；　and　upon　which　it　follows；　in

conformity　with　a　rule；　that　is　necessarily；　so　that　the　event；　as

conditioned；　affords　certain　indication　of　a　condition；　and　this

condition　determines　the　event。

　　Let　us　suppose　that　nothing　precedes　an　event；　upon　which　this　event

must　follow　in　conformity　with　a　rule。　All　sequence　of　perception

would　then　exist　only　in　apprehension；　that　is　to　say；　would　be　merely

subjective；　and　it　could　not　thereby　be　objectively　determined　what

thing　ought　to　precede；　and　what　ought　to　follow　in　perception。　In

such　a　case；　we　should　have　nothing　but　a　play　of　representations；

which　would　possess　no　application　to　any　object。　That　is　to　say；　it

would　not　be　possible　through　perception　to　distinguish　one　phenomenon

from　another；　as　regards　relations　of　time；　because　the　succession

in　the　act　of　apprehension　would　always　be　of　the　same　sort；　and

therefore　there　would　be　nothing　in　the　phenomenon　to　determine　the

succession；　and　to　render　a　certain　sequence　objectively　necessary。

And；　in　this　case；　I　cannot　say　that　two　states　in　a　phenomenon　follow

one　upon　the　other；　but　only　that　one　apprehension　follows　upon

another。　But　this　is　merely　subjective；　and　does　not　determine　an

object；　and　consequently　cannot　be　held　to　be　cognition　of　an

object…　not　even　in　the　phenomenal　world。

　　Accordingly；　when　we　know　in　experience　that　something　happens；　we

always　presuppose　that　something　precedes；　whereupon　it　follows　in

conformity　with　a　rule。　For　otherwise　I　could　not　say　of　the　object

that　it　follows；　because　the　mere　succession　in　my　apprehension；　if　it

be　not　determined　by　a　rule　in　relation　to　something　preceding；　does

not　authorize　succession　in　the　object。　Only；　therefore；　in

reference　to　a　rule；　according　to　which　phenomena　are　determined　in

their　sequence；　that　is；　as　they　happen；　by　the　preceding　state；　can　I

make　my　subjective　synthesis　（of　apprehension）　objective；　and　it　is

only　under　this　presupposition　that　even　the　experience　of　an　event　is

possible。

　　No　doubt　it　appears　as　if　this　were　in　thorough　contradiction　to　all

the　notions　which　people　have　hitherto　entertained　in　regard　to　the

procedure　of　the　human　understanding。　According　to　these　opinions；

it　is　by　means　of　the　perception　and　comparison　of　similar

consequences　following　upon　certain　antecedent　phenomena　that　the

understanding　is　led　to　the　discovery　of　a　rule；　according　to　which

certain　events　always　follow　certain　phenomena；　and　it　is　only　by　this

process　that　we　attain　to　the　conception　of　cause。　Upon　such　a

basis；　it　is　clear　that　this　conception　must　be　merely　empirical；

and　the　rule　which　it　furnishes　us　with…　〃Everything　that　happens　must

have　a　cause〃…　would　be　just　as　contingent　as　experience　itself。　The

universality　and　necessity　of　the　rule　or　law　would　be　perfectly

spurious　attributes　of　it。　Indeed；　it　could　not　possess　universal

validity；　inasmuch　as　it　would　not　in　this　case　be　a　priori；　but

founded　on　deduction。　But　the　same　is　the　case　with　this　law　as　with

other　pure　a　priori　representations　（e。g。；　space　and　time）；　which　we

can　draw　in　perfect　clearness　and　completeness　from　experience；　only

because　we　had　already　placed　them　therein；　and　by　that　means；　and

by　that　alone；　had　rendered　experience　possible。　Indeed；　the　logical

clearness　of　this　representation　of　a　rule；　determining　the　series

of　events；　is　possible　only　when　we　have　made　use　thereof　in

experience。　Nevertheless；　the　recognition　of　this　rule；　as　a　condition

of　the　synthetical　unity　of　phenomena　in　time；　was　the　ground　of

experience　itself　and　consequently　preceded　it　a　priori。

　　It　is　now　our　duty　to　show　by　an　example　that　we　never；　even　in

experience；　attribute　to　an　object　the　notion　of　succession　or

effect　（of　an　event…　that　is；　the　happening　of　something　that　did

not　exist　before）；　and　distinguish　it　from　the　subjective　succession

of　apprehension；　unless　when　a　rule　lies　at　the　foundation；　which

compels　us　to　observe　this　order　of　perception　in　preference　to　any

other；　and　that；　indeed；　it　is　this　necessity　which　first　renders

possible　the　representation　of　a　succession　in　the　object。

　　We　have　representations　within　us；　of　which　also　we　can　be

conscious。　But；　however　widely　extended；　however　accurate　and

thoroughgoing　this　consciousness　may　be；　these　representations　are

still　nothing　more　than　representations；　that　is；　internal

determinations　of　the　mind　in　this　or　that　relation　of　time。　Now　how

happens　it　that　to　these　representations　we　should　set　an　object；　or

that；　in　addition　to　their　subjective　reality；　as　modifications；　we

should　still　further　attribute　to　them　a　certain　unknown　objective

reality？　It　is　clear　that　objective　significancy　cannot　consist　in　a

relation　to　another　representation　（of　that　which　we　desire　to　term

object）；　for　in　that　case　the　question　again　arises：　〃How　does　this

other　representation　go　out　of　itself；　and　obtain　objective

significancy　over　and　above　the　subjective；　which　is　proper　to　it；

as　a　determination　of　a　state　of　mind？〃　If　we　try　to　discover　what

sort　of　new　property　the　relation　to　an　object　gives　to　our　subjective

representations；　and　what　new　importance　they　thereby　receive；　we

shall　find　that　this　relation　has　no　other　effect　than　that　of

rendering　necessary　the　connection　of　our　representations　in　a　certain

manner；　and　of　subjecting　them　to　a　rule；　and　that　conversely；　it　is

only　because　a　certain　order　is　necessary　in　the　relations　of　time

of　our　representations；　that　objective　significancy　is　ascribed　to

them。

　　In　the　synthesis　of　phenomena；　the　manifold　of　our　representations

is　always　successive。　Now　hereby　is　not　represented　an　object；　for

by　means　of　this　succession；　which　is　common　to　all　apprehension；　no

one　thing　is　distinguished　from　another。　But　so　soon　as　I　perceive

or　assume　that　in　this　succession　there　is　a　relation　to　a　state

antecedent；　from　which　the　representation　follows　in　accordance　with　a

rule；　so　soon　do　I　represent　something　as　an　event；　or　as　a　thing　that

happens；　in　other　words；　I　cognize　an　object　to　which　I　must　assign

a　certain　determinate　position　in　time；　which　cannot　be　altered；

because　of　the　preceding　state　in　the　object。　When；　therefore；　I

perceive　that　something　happens；　there　is　contained　in　this

representation；　in　the　first　place；　the　fact；　that　something

antecedes；　because；　it。　is　only　in　relation　to　this　that　the

phenomenon　obtains　its　proper　relation　of　time；　in　other　words；　exists

after　an　antecedent　time；　in　which　it　did　not　exist。　But　it　can

receive　its　determined　place　i