the critique of pure reason-第34节

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　　It　is　quite　possible　that　someone　may　propose　a　species　of

preformation…system　of　pure　reason…　a　middle　way　between　the　two…　to

wit；　that　the　categories　are　neither　innate　and　first　a　priori

principles　of　cognition；　nor　derived　from　experience；　but　are　merely

subjective　aptitudes　for　thought　implanted　in　us　contemporaneously

with　our　existence；　which　were　so　ordered　and　disposed　by　our　Creator；

that　their　exercise　perfectly　harmonizes　with　the　laws　of　nature　which

regulate　experience。　Now；　not　to　mention　that　with　such　an

hypothesis　it　is　impossible　to　say　at　what　point　we　must　stop　in　the

employment　of　predetermined　aptitudes；　the　fact　that　the　categories

would　in　this　case　entirely　lose　that　character　of　necessity　which

is　essentially　involved　in　the　very　conception　of　them；　is　a

conclusive　objection　to　it。　The　conception　of　cause；　for　example；

which　expresses　the　necessity　of　an　effect　under　a　presupposed

condition；　would　be　false；　if　it　rested　only　upon　such　an　arbitrary

subjective　necessity　of　uniting　certain　empirical　representations

according　to　such　a　rule　of　relation。　I　could　not　then　say…　〃The

effect　is　connected　with　its　cause　in　the　object　（that　is；

necessarily）；〃　but　only；　〃I　am　so　constituted　that　I　can　think　this

representation　as　so　connected；　and　not　otherwise。〃　Now　this　is　just

what　the　sceptic　wants。　For　in　this　case；　all　our　knowledge；　depending

on　the　supposed　objective　validity　of　our　judgement；　is　nothing　but

mere　illusion；　nor　would　there　be　wanting　people　who　would　deny　any

such　subjective　necessity　in　respect　to　themselves；　though　they　must

feel　it。　At　all　events；　we　could　not　dispute　with　any　one　on　that

which　merely　depends　on　the　manner　in　which　his　subject　is　organized。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　Short　view　of　the　above　Deduction。



　　The　foregoing　deduction　is　an　exposition　of　the　pure　conceptions

of　the　understanding　（and　with　them　of　all　theoretical　a　priori

cognition）；　as　principles　of　the　possibility　of　experience；　but　of

experience　as　the　determination　of　all　phenomena　in　space　and　time

in　general…　of　experience；　finally；　from　the　principle　of　the　original

synthetical　unity　of　apperception；　as　the　form　of　the　understanding　in

relation　to　time　and　space　as　original　forms　of　sensibility。



　　I　consider　the　division　by　paragraphs　to　be　necessary　only　up　to

this　point；　because　we　had　to　treat　of　the　elementary　conceptions。

As　we　now　proceed　to　the　exposition　of　the　employment　of　these；　I

shall　not　designate　the　chapters　in　this　manner　any　further。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　BOOK　II。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Analytic　of　Principles。



　　General　logic　is　constructed　upon　a　plan　which　coincides　exactly

with　the　division　of　the　higher　faculties　of　cognition。　These　are；

understanding；　judgement；　and　reason。　This　science；　accordingly；

treats　in　its　analytic　of　conceptions；　judgements；　and　conclusions

in　exact　correspondence　with　the　functions　and　order　of　those　mental

powers　which　we　include　generally　under　the　generic　denomination　of

understanding。

　　As　this　merely　formal　logic　makes　abstraction　of　all　content　of

cognition；　whether　pure　or　empirical；　and　occupies　itself　with　the

mere　form　of　thought　（discursive　cognition）；　it　must　contain　in　its

analytic　a　canon　for　reason。　For　the　form　of　reason　has　its　law；

which；　without　taking　into　consideration　the　particular　nature　of

the　cognition　about　which　it　is　employed；　can　be　discovered　a

priori；　by　the　simple　analysis　of　the　action　of　reason　into　its

momenta。

　　Transcendental　logic；　limited　as　it　is　to　a　determinate　content；

that　of　pure　a　priori　cognitions；　to　wit；　cannot　imitate　general　logic

in　this　division。　For　it　is　evident　that　the　transcendental　employment

of　reason　is　not　objectively　valid；　and　therefore　does　not　belong　to

the　logic　of　truth　（that　is；　to　analytic）；　but　as　a　logic　of　illusion；

occupies　a　particular　department　in　the　scholastic　system　under　the

name　of　transcendental　dialectic。

　　Understanding　and　judgement　accordingly　possess　in　transcendental

logic　a　canon　of　objectively　valid；　and　therefore　true　exercise；　and

are　comprehended　in　the　analytical　department　of　that　logic。　But

reason；　in　her　endeavours　to　arrive　by　a　priori　means　at　some　true

statement　concerning　objects　and　to　extend　cognition　beyond　the　bounds

of　possible　experience；　is　altogether　dialectic；　and　her　illusory

assertions　cannot　be　constructed　into　a　canon　such　as　an　analytic

ought　to　contain。

　　Accordingly；　the　analytic　of　principles　will　be　merely　a　canon　for

the　faculty　of　judgement；　for　the　instruction　of　this　faculty　in　its

application　to　phenomena　of　the　pure　conceptions　of　the　understanding；

which　contain　the　necessary　condition　for　the　establishment　of　a

priori　laws。　On　this　account；　although　the　subject　of　the　following

chapters　is　the　especial　principles　of　understanding；　I　shall　make　use

of　the　term　Doctrine　of　the　faculty　of　judgement；　in　order　to　define

more　particularly　my　present　purpose。



　　INTRODUCTION。　Of　the　Transcendental　Faculty　of　judgement　in　General。



　　If　understanding　in　general　be　defined　as　the　faculty　of　laws　or

rules；　the　faculty　of　judgement　may　be　termed　the　faculty　of

subsumption　under　these　rules；　that　is；　of　distinguishing　whether　this

or　that　does　or　does　not　stand　under　a　given　rule　（casus　datae　legis）。

General　logic　contains　no　directions　or　precepts　for　the　faculty　of

judgement；　nor　can　it　contain　any　such。　For　as　it　makes　abstraction　of

all　content　of　cognition；　no　duty　is　left　for　it；　except　that　of

exposing　analytically　the　mere　form　of　cognition　in　conceptions；

judgements；　and　conclusions；　and　of　thereby　establishing　formal

rules　for　all　exercise　of　the　understanding。　Now　if　this　logic

wished　to　give　some　general　direction　how　we　should　subsume　under

these　rules；　that　is；　how　we　should　distinguish　whether　this　or　that

did　or　did　not　stand　under　them；　this　again　could　not　be　done

otherwise　than　by　means　of　a　rule。　But　this　rule；　precisely　because　it

is　a　rule；　requires　for　itself　direction　from　the　faculty　of

judgement。　Thus；　it　is　evident　that　the　understanding　is　capable　of

being　instructed　by　rules；　but　that　the　judgement　is　a　peculiar

talent；　which　does　not；　and　cannot　require　tuition；　but　only　exercise。

This　faculty　is　therefore　the　specific　quality　of　the　so…called　mother

wit；　the　want　of　which　no　scholastic　discipline　can　compensate。

　　For　although　education　may　furnish；　and；　as　it　were；　engraft　upon

a　limited　understanding　rules　borrowed　from　other　minds；　yet　the　power

of　employing　these　rules　correctly　must　belong　to　the　pupil　himself；

and　no　rule　which　we　can　prescribe　to　him　with　this　purpose　is；　in　the

absence　or　deficiency　of　this　gift　of　nature；　secure　from　misuse。*　A

physician　therefore；　a　judge　or　a　statesman；　may　have　in　his　head　many

admirable　pathological；　juridical；　or　political　rules；　in　a　degree

that　may　enable　him　to　be　a　profound　teacher　in　his　particular

science；　and　yet　in　the　application　of　these　rules　he　may　very

possibly　blunder…　either　because　he　is　wanting　in　natural　judgement

（though　not　in　understanding）　and；　whilst　he　can　comprehend　the

general　in　abstracto；　cannot　distinguish　whether　a　particular　case

in　concreto　ought　to　rank　under　the　former；　or　because　his　faculty

of　judgement　bas　not　been　sufficiently　exercised　by　examples　and

real　practice。　Indeed；　the　grand　and　only　use　of　examples；　is　to

sharpen　the　judgement。　For　as　regards　the　correctness　and　precision　of

the　insight　of　the　understanding；　examples　are　commonly　injurious

rather　than　otherwise；　because；　as　casus　in　terminis　they　seldom

adequately　fulfil　the　conditions　of　the　rule。　Besides；　they　often

weaken　the　power　of　our　understanding　to　apprehend　rules　or　laws　in

their　universality；　independently　of　particular　circumstances　of

experience；　and　hence；　accustom　us　to　employ　them　more　as　formulae

than　as　principles。　Examples　are　thus　the　go…cart　of　the　judgement；

which　he　who　is　naturally　deficient　in　that　faculty　cannot　afford　to

dispense　with。



　　*Deficiency　in　judgement　is　properly　that　which　is　called　stupidity；

and　for　such　a　failing　we　know　no　remedy。　A　dull　or　narrow…minded

person；　to　whom　nothing　is　wanting　but　a　proper　degree　of

understanding；　may　be　improved　by　tuition；　even　so　far　as　to　deserve

the　epithet　of　learned。　But　as　such　persons　frequently　labour　under

a　deficiency　in　the　faculty　of　judgement；　it　is　not　uncommon　to　find

men　extremely　learned　who　in　the　application　of　their　science　betray　a

lamentable　degree　this　irremediable　want。



　　But　although　general　logic　cannot　give　directions　to　the　faculty

of　judgement；　the　case　is　very　different　as　regards　transcendental

logic；　insomuch　that　it　appears　to　be　the　especial　duty　of　the

latter　to　secure　and　direct；　by　means　of　determinate　rules；　the

faculty　of　judgement　in　the　employment　of　the　pure　understanding。　For；

as　a　doctrine；　that　is；　as　an　endeavour　to　enlarge　the　spher