the critique of pure reason-第136节

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smallest　use　in　the　sphere　of　concrete　or　physical　investigation。　We

may　find　out　that　the　will　is　free；　but　this　knowledge　only　relates　to

the　intelligible　cause　of　our　volition。　As　regards　the　phenomena　or

expressions　of　this　will；　that　is；　our　actions；　we　are　bound；　in

obedience　to　an　inviolable　maxim；　without　which　reason　cannot　be

employed　in　the　sphere　of　experience；　to　explain　these　in　the　same　way

as　we　explain　all　the　other　phenomena　of　nature；　that　is　to　say；

according　to　its　unchangeable　laws。　We　may　have　discovered　the

spirituality　and　immortality　of　the　soul；　but　we　cannot　employ　this

knowledge　to　explain　the　phenomena　of　this　life；　nor　the　peculiar

nature　of　the　future；　because　our　conception　of　an　incorporeal

nature　is　purely　negative　and　does　not　add　anything　to　our

knowledge；　and　the　only　inferences　to　be　drawn　from　it　are　purely

fictitious。　If；　again；　we　prove　the　existence　of　a　supreme

intelligence；　we　should　be　able　from　it　to　make　the　conformity　to　aims

existing　in　the　arrangement　of　the　world　comprehensible；　but　we　should

not　be　justified　in　deducing　from　it　any　particular　arrangement　or

disposition；　or　inferring　any　where　it　is　not　perceived。　For　it　is　a

necessary　rule　of　the　speculative　use　of　reason　that　we　must　not

overlook　natural　causes；　or　refuse　to　listen　to　the　teaching　of

experience；　for　the　sake　of　deducing　what　we　know　and　perceive　from

something　that　transcends　all　our　knowledge。　In　one　word；　these

three　propositions　are；　for　the　speculative　reason；　always

transcendent；　and　cannot　be　employed　as　immanent　principles　in

relation　to　the　objects　of　experience；　they　are；　consequently；　of　no

use　to　us　in　this　sphere；　being　but　the　valueless　results　of　the

severe　but　unprofitable　efforts　of　reason。

　　If；　then；　the　actual　cognition　of　these　three　cardinal

propositions　is　perfectly　useless；　while　Reason　uses　her　utmost

endeavours　to　induce　us　to　admit　them；　it　is　plain　that　their　real

value　and　importance　relate　to　our　practical；　and　not　to　our

speculative　interest。

　　I　term　all　that　is　possible　through　free　will；　practical。　But　if　the

conditions　of　the　exercise　of　free　volition　are　empirical；　reason

can　have　only　a　regulative；　and　not　a　constitutive；　influence　upon　it；

and　is　serviceable　merely　for　the　introduction　of　unity　into　its

empirical　laws。　In　the　moral　philosophy　of　prudence；　for　example；

the　sole　business　of　reason　is　to　bring　about　a　union　of　all　the　ends；

which　are　aimed　at　by　our　inclinations；　into　one　ultimate　end…　that　of

happiness…　and　to　show　the　agreement　which　should　exist　among　the

means　of　attaining　that　end。　In　this　sphere；　accordingly；　reason

cannot　present　to　us　any　other　than　pragmatical　laws　of　free　action；

for　our　guidance　towards　the　aims　set　up　by　the　senses；　and　is

incompetent　to　give　us　laws　which　are　pure　and　determined　completely　a

priori。　On　the　other　hand；　pure　practical　laws；　the　ends　of　which　have

been　given　by　reason　entirely　a　priori；　and　which　are　not

empirically　conditioned；　but　are；　on　the　contrary；　absolutely

imperative　in　their　nature；　would　be　products　of　pure　reason。　Such　are

the　moral　laws；　and　these　alone　belong　to　the　sphere　of　the

practical　exercise　of　reason；　and　admit　of　a　canon。

　　All　the　powers　of　reason；　in　the　sphere　of　what　may　be　termed　pure

philosophy；　are；　in　fact；　directed　to　the　three　above…mentioned

problems　alone。　These　again　have　a　still　higher　end…　the　answer　to　the

question；　what　we　ought　to　do；　if　the　will　is　free；　if　there　is　a

God　and　a　future　world。　Now；　as　this　problem　relates　to　our　in

reference　to　the　highest　aim　of　humanity；　it　is　evident　that　the

ultimate　intention　of　nature；　in　the　constitution　of　our　reason；　has

been　directed　to　the　moral　alone。

　　We　must　take　care；　however；　in　turning　our　attention　to　an　object

which　is　foreign*　to　the　sphere　of　transcendental　philosophy；　not　to

injure　the　unity　of　our　system　by　digressions；　nor；　on　the　other　hand；

to　fail　in　clearness；　by　saying　too　little　on　the　new　subject　of

discussion。　I　hope　to　avoid　both　extremes；　by　keeping　as　close　as

possible　to　the　transcendental；　and　excluding　all　psychological；

that　is；　empirical；　elements。



　　*All　practical　conceptions　relate　to　objects　of　pleasure　and　pain；

and　consequently…　in　an　indirect　manner；　at　least…　to　objects　of

feeling。　But　as　feeling　is　not　a　faculty　of　representation；　but　lies

out　of　the　sphere　of　our　powers　of　cognition；　the　elements　of　our

judgements；　in　so　far　as　they　relate　to　pleasure　or　pain；　that　is；　the

elements　of　our　practical　judgements；　do　not　belong　to

transcendental　philosophy；　which　has　to　do　with　pure　a　priori

cognitions　alone。



　　I　have　to　remark；　in　the　first　place；　that　at　present　I　treat　of　the

conception　of　freedom　in　the　practical　sense　only；　and　set　aside　the

corresponding　transcendental　conception；　which　cannot　be　employed　as　a

ground　of　explanation　in　the　phenomenal　world；　but　is　itself　a　problem

for　pure　reason。　A　will　is　purely　animal　（arbitrium　brutum）　when　it　is

determined　by　sensuous　impulses　or　instincts　only；　that　is；　when　it　is

determined　in　a　pathological　manner。　A　will；　which　can　be　determined

independently　of　sensuous　impulses；　consequently　by　motives

presented　by　reason　alone；　is　called　a　free　will　（arbitrium

liberum）；　and　everything　which　is　connected　with　this　free　will；

either　as　principle　or　consequence；　is　termed　practical。　The　existence

of　practical　freedom　can　be　proved　from　experience　alone。　For　the

human　will　is　not　determined　by　that　alone　which　immediately　affects

the　senses；　on　the　contrary；　we　have　the　power；　by　calling　up　the

notion　of　what　is　useful　or　hurtful　in　a　more　distant　relation；　of

overcoming　the　immediate　impressions　on　our　sensuous　faculty　of

desire。　But　these　considerations　of　what　is　desirable　in　relation　to

our　whole　state；　that　is；　is　in　the　end　good　and　useful；　are　based

entirely　upon　reason。　This　faculty；　accordingly；　enounces　laws；

which　are　imperative　or　objective　laws　of　freedom　and　which　tell　us

what　ought　to　take　place；　thus　distinguishing　themselves　from　the　laws

of　nature；　which　relate　to　that　which　does　take　place。　The　laws　of

freedom　or　of　free　will　are　hence　termed　practical　laws。

　　Whether　reason　is　not　itself；　in　the　actual　delivery　of　these

laws；　determined　in　its　turn　by　other　influences；　and　whether　the

action　which；　in　relation　to　sensuous　impulses；　we　call　free；　may　not；

in　relation　to　higher　and　more　remote　operative　causes；　really　form

a　part　of　nature…　these　are　questions　which　do　not　here　concern　us。

They　are　purely　speculative　questions；　and　all　we　have　to　do；　in　the

practical　sphere；　is　to　inquire　into　the　rule　of　conduct　which

reason　has　to　present。　Experience　demonstrates　to　us　the　existence

of　practical　freedom　as　one　of　the　causes　which　exist　in　nature；

that　is；　it　shows　the　causal　power　of　reason　in　the　determination　of

the　will。　The　idea　of　transcendental　freedom；　on　the　contrary；

requires　that　reason…　in　relation　to　its　causal　power　of　commencing

a　series　of　phenomena…　should　be　independent　of　all　sensuous

determining　causes；　and　thus　it　seems　to　be　in　opposition　to　the　law

of　nature　and　to　all　possible　experience。　It　therefore　remains　a

problem　for　the　human　mind。　But　this　problem　does　not　concern　reason

in　its　practical　use；　and　we　have；　therefore；　in　a　canon　of　pure

reason；　to　do　with　only　two　questions；　which　relate　to　the　practical

interest　of　pure　reason：　Is　there　a　God？　and；　Is　there　a　future

life？　The　question　of　transcendental　freedom　is　purely　speculative；

and　we　may　therefore　set　it　entirely　aside　when　we　come　to　treat　of

practical　reason。　Besides；　we　have　already　discussed　this　subject　in

the　antinomy　of　pure　reason。



　　　SECTION　II。　Of　the　Ideal　of　the　Summum　Bonum　as　a　Determining

　　　　　　　　　　　Ground　of　the　Ultimate　End　of　Pure　Reason。



　　Reason　conducted　us；　in　its　speculative　use；　through　the　field　of

experience　and；　as　it　can　never　find　complete　satisfaction　in　that

sphere；　from　thence　to　speculative　ideas…　which；　however；　in　the　end

brought　us　back　again　to　experience；　and　thus　fulfilled　the　purpose　of

reason；　in　a　manner　which；　though　useful；　was　not　at　all　in　accordance

with　our　expectations。　It　now　remains　for　us　to　consider　whether

pure　reason　can　be　employed　in　a　practical　sphere；　and　whether　it　will

here　conduct　us　to　those　ideas　which　attain　the　highest　ends　of　pure

reason；　as　we　have　just　stated　them。　We　shall　thus　ascertain

whether；　from　the　point　of　view　of　its　practical　interest；　reason

may　not　be　able　to　supply　us　with　that　which；　on　the　speculative　side；

it　wholly　denies　us。

　　The　whole　interest　of　reason；　speculative　as　well　as　practical；　is

centred　in　the　three　following　questions：



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　1。　WHAT　CAN　I　KNOW？

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　2。　WHAT　OUGHT　I　TO　DO？

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　3。　WHAT　MAY　I　HOPE？



　　The　first　question　is　purely　speculative。　We　have；　as　I　flatter

myself；　exhausted　all　the　replie