the critique of pure reason-第135节

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！



conditions　of　thought；　and　not　the　objective　cognition；　or　it　may

happen　that　both　propositions　contradict　each　other　only　under　a

subjective　condition；　which　is　incorrectly　considered　to　be　objective；

and；　as　the　condition　is　itself　false；　both　propositions　may　be　false；

and　it　will；　consequently；　be　impossible　to　conclude　the　truth　of

the　one　from　the　falseness　of　the　other。

　　In　mathematics　such　subreptions　are　impossible；　and　it　is　in　this

science；　accordingly；　that　the　indirect　mode　of　proof　has　its　true

place。　In　the　science　of　nature；　where　all　assertion　is　based　upon

empirical　intuition；　such　subreptions　may　be　guarded　against　by　the

repeated　comparison　of　observations；　but　this　mode　of　proof　is　of

little　value　in　this　sphere　of　knowledge。　But　the　transcendental

efforts　of　pure　reason　are　all　made　in　the　sphere　of　the　subjective；

which　is　the　real　medium　of　all　dialectical　illusion；　and　thus

reason　endeavours；　in　its　premisses；　to　impose　upon　us　subjective

representations　for　objective　cognitions。　In　the　transcendental　sphere

of　pure　reason；　then；　and　in　the　case　of　synthetical　propositions；

it　is　inadmissible　to　support　a　statement　by　disproving　the

counter…statement。　For　only　two　cases　are　possible；　either；　the

counter…statement　is　nothing　but　the　enouncement　of　the

inconsistency　of　the　opposite　opinion　with　the　subjective　conditions

of　reason；　which　does　not　affect　the　real　case　（for　example；　we　cannot

comprehend　the　unconditioned　necessity　of　the　existence　of　a　being；

and　hence　every　speculative　proof　of　the　existence　of　such　a　being

must　be　opposed　on　subjective　grounds；　while　the　possibility　of　this

being　in　itself　cannot　with　justice　be　denied）；　or；　both　propositions；

being　dialectical　in　their　nature；　are　based　upon　an　impossible

conception。　In　this　latter　case　the　rule　applies：　non　entis　nulla　sunt

predicata；　that　is　to　say；　what　we　affirm　and　what　we　deny；　respecting

such　an　object；　are　equally　untrue；　and　the　apagogic　mode　of

arriving　at　the　truth　is　in　this　case　impossible。　If；　for　example；

we　presuppose　that　the　world　of　sense　is　given　in　itself　in　its

totality；　it　is　false；　either　that　it　is　infinite；　or　that　it　is

finite　and　limited　in　space。　Both　are　false；　because　the　hypothesis　is

false。　For　the　notion　of　phenomena　（as　mere　representations）　which　are

given　in　themselves　（as　objects）　is　self…contradictory；　and　the

infinitude　of　this　imaginary　whole　would；　indeed；　be　unconditioned；

but　would　be　inconsistent　（as　everything　in　the　phenomenal　world　is

conditioned）　with　the　unconditioned　determination　and　finitude　of

quantities　which　is　presupposed　in　our　conception。

　　The　apagogic　mode　of　proof　is　the　true　source　of　those　illusions

which　have　always　had　so　strong　an　attraction　for　the　admirers　of

dogmatical　philosophy。　It　may　be　compared　to　a　champion　who

maintains　the　honour　and　claims　of　the　party　he　has　adopted　by

offering　battle　to　all　who　doubt　the　validity　of　these　claims　and

the　purity　of　that　honour；　while　nothing　can　be　proved　in　this　way；

except　the　respective　strength　of　the　combatants；　and　the　advantage；

in　this　respect；　is　always　on　the　side　of　the　attacking　party。

Spectators；　observing　that　each　party　is　alternately　conqueror　and

conquered；　are　led　to　regard　the　subject　of　dispute　as　beyond　the

power　of　man　to　decide　upon。　But　such　an　opinion　cannot　be

justified；　and　it　is　sufficient　to　apply　to　these　reasoners　the

remark：



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Non　defensoribus　istis

　　　　　　　　Tempus　eget。



　　Each　must　try　to　establish　his　assertions　by　a　transcendental

deduction　of　the　grounds　of　proof　employed　in　his　argument；　and　thus

enable　us　to　see　in　what　way　the　claims　of　reason　may　be　supported。　If

an　opponent　bases　his　assertions　upon　subjective　grounds；　he　may　be

refuted　with　ease；　not；　however　to　the　advantage　of　the　dogmatist；　who

likewise　depends　upon　subjective　sources　of　cognition　and　is　in　like

manner　driven　into　a　corner　by　his　opponent。　But；　if　parties　employ

the　direct　method　of　procedure；　they　will　soon　discover　the

difficulty；　nay；　the　impossibility　of　proving　their　assertions；　and

will　be　forced　to　appeal　to　prescription　and　precedence；　or　they　will；

by　the　help　of　criticism；　discover　with　ease　the　dogmatical

illusions　by　which　they　had　been　mocked；　and　compel　reason　to　renounce

its　exaggerated　pretensions　to　speculative　insight　and　to　confine

itself　within　the　limits　of　its　proper　sphere…　that　of　practical

principles。

　　　　　　　　　　　　CHAPTER　II。　The　Canon　of　Pure　Reason。



　　It　is　a　humiliating　consideration　for　human　reason　that　it　is

incompetent　to　discover　truth　by　means　of　pure　speculation；　but；　on

the　contrary；　stands　in　need　of　discipline　to　check　its　deviations

from　the　straight　path　and　to　expose　the　illusions　which　it

originates。　But；　on　the　other　hand；　this　consideration　ought　to

elevate　and　to　give　it　confidence；　for　this　discipline　is　exercised　by

itself　alone；　and　it　is　subject　to　the　censure　of　no　other　power。

The　bounds；　moreover；　which　it　is　forced　to　set　to　its　speculative

exercise；　form　likewise　a　check　upon　the　fallacious　pretensions　of

opponents；　and　thus　what　remains　of　its　possessions；　after　these

exaggerated　claims　have　been　disallowed；　is　secure　from　attack　or

usurpation。　The　greatest；　and　perhaps　the　only；　use　of　all

philosophy　of　pure　reason　is；　accordingly；　of　a　purely　negative

character。　It　is　not　an　organon　for　the　extension；　but　a　discipline

for　the　determination；　of　the　limits　of　its　exercise；　and　without

laying　claim　to　the　discovery　of　new　truth；　it　has　the　modest　merit　of

guarding　against　error。

　　At　the　same　time；　there　must　be　some　source　of　positive　cognitions

which　belong　to　the　domain　of　pure　reason　and　which　become　the

causes　of　error　only　from　our　mistaking　their　true　character；　while

they　form　the　goal　towards　which　reason　continually　strives。　How

else　can　we　account　for　the　inextinguishable　desire　in　the　human

mind　to　find　a　firm　footing　in　some　region　beyond　the　limits　of　the

world　of　experience？　It　hopes　to　attain　to　the　possession　of　a

knowledge　in　which　it　has　the　deepest　interest。　It　enters　upon　the

path　of　pure　speculation；　but　in　vain。　We　have　some　reason；　however；

to　expect　that；　in　the　only　other　way　that　lies　open　to　it…　the　path

of　practical　reason…　it　may　meet　with　better　success。

　　I　understand　by　a　canon　a　list　of　the　a　priori　principles　of　the

proper　employment　of　certain　faculties　of　cognition。　Thus　general

logic；　in　its　analytical　department；　is　a　formal　canon　for　the

faculties　of　understanding　and　reason。　In　the　same　way；　Transcendental

Analytic　was　seen　to　be　a　canon　of　the　pure　understanding；　for　it

alone　is　competent　to　enounce　true　a　priori　synthetical　cognitions。

But；　when　no　proper　employment　of　a　faculty　of　cognition　is

possible；　no　canon　can　exist。　But　the　synthetical　cognition　of　pure

speculative　reason　is；　as　has　been　shown；　completely　impossible。　There

cannot；　therefore；　exist　any　canon　for　the　speculative　exercise　of

this　faculty…　for　its　speculative　exercise　is　entirely　dialectical；

and；　consequently；　transcendental　logic；　in　this　respect；　is　merely

a　discipline；　and　not　a　canon。　If；　then；　there　is　any　proper　mode　of

employing　the　faculty　of　pure　reason…　in　which　case　there　must　be　a

canon　for　this　faculty…　this　canon　will　relate；　not　to　the

speculative；　but　to　the　practical　use　of　reason。　This　canon　we　now

proceed　to　investigate。



　　　　SECTION　I。　Of　the　Ultimate　End　of　the　Pure　Use　of　Reason。



　　There　exists　in　the　faculty　of　reason　a　natural　desire　to　venture

beyond　the　field　of　experience；　to　attempt　to　reach　the　utmost

bounds　of　all　cognition　by　the　help　of　ideas　alone；　and　not　to　rest

satisfied　until　it　has　fulfilled　its　course　and　raised　the　sum　of

its　cognitions　into　a　self…subsistent　systematic　whole。　Is　the

motive　for　this　endeavour　to　be　found　in　its　speculative；　or　in　its

practical　interests　alone？

　　Setting　aside；　at　present；　the　results　of　the　labours　of　pure　reason

in　its　speculative　exercise；　I　shall　merely　inquire　regarding　the

problems　the　solution　of　which　forms　its　ultimate　aim；　whether　reached

or　not；　and　in　relation　to　which　all　other　aims　are　but　partial　and

intermediate。　These　highest　aims　must；　from　the　nature　of　reason；

possess　complete　unity；　otherwise　the　highest　interest　of　humanity

could　not　be　successfully　promoted。

　　The　transcendental　speculation　of　reason　relates　to　three　things：

the　freedom　of　the　will；　the　immortality　of　the　soul；　and　the

existence　of　God。　The　speculative　interest　which　reason　has　in　those

questions　is　very　small；　and；　for　its　sake　alone；　we　should　not

undertake　the　labour　of　transcendental　investigation…　a　labour　full　of

toil　and　ceaseless　struggle。　We　should　be　loth　to　undertake　this

labour；　because　the　discoveries　we　might　make　would　not　be　of　the

smallest　use　in　the　sphere　of　concrete　or　physical　investigation。　We

may　find　out　that　the　will　is　free；　but　t