the critique of pure reason-第13节

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origin）；　at　the　foundation　of　its　precepts；　yet　still　into　the

conception　of　duty…　as　an　obstacle　to　be　overcome；　or　as　an　incitement

which　should　not　be　made　into　a　motive…　these　empirical　conceptions

must　necessarily　enter；　in　the　construction　of　a　system　of　pure

morality。　Transcendental　philosophy　is　consequently　a　philosophy　of

the　pure　and　merely　speculative　reason。　For　all　that　is　practical；

so　far　as　it　contains　motives；　relates　to　feelings；　and　these　belong

to　empirical　sources　of　cognition。

　　If　we　wish　to　divide　this　science　from　the　universal　point　of　view

of　a　science　in　general；　it　ought　to　comprehend；　first；　a　Doctrine

of　the　Elements；　and；　secondly；　a　Doctrine　of　the　Method　of　pure

reason。　Each　of　these　main　divisions　will　have　its　subdivisions；　the

separate　reasons　for　which　we　cannot　here　particularize。　Only　so

much　seems　necessary；　by　way　of　introduction　of　premonition；　that

there　are　two　sources　of　human　knowledge　（which　probably　spring　from　a

common；　but　to　us　unknown　root）；　namely；　sense　and　understanding。　By

the　former；　objects　are　given　to　us；　by　the　latter；　thought。　So　far　as

the　faculty　of　sense　may　contain　representations　a　priori；　which

form　the　conditions　under　which　objects　are　given；　in　so　far　it

belongs　to　transcendental　philosophy。　The　transcendental　doctrine　of

sense　must　form　the　first　part　of　our　science　of　elements；　because　the

conditions　under　which　alone　the　objects　of　human　knowledge　are

given　must　precede　those　under　which　they　are　thought。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　I。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　TRANSCENDENTAL　DOCTRINE　OF　ELEMENTS。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　FIRST　PART。　TRANSCENDENTAL　AESTHETIC。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　SS　I。　Introductory。



　　In　whatsoever　mode；　or　by　whatsoever　means；　our　knowledge　may　relate

to　objects；　it　is　at　least　quite　clear　that　the　only　manner　in　which

it　immediately　relates　to　them　is　by　means　of　an　intuition。　To　this　as

the　indispensable　groundwork；　all　thought　points。　But　an　intuition　can

take　place　only　in　so　far　as　the　object　is　given　to　us。　This；　again；

is　only　possible；　to　man　at　least；　on　condition　that　the　object　affect

the　mind　in　a　certain　manner。　The　capacity　for　receiving

representations　（receptivity）　through　the　mode　in　which　we　are

affected　by　objects；　objects；　is　called　sensibility。　By　means　of

sensibility；　therefore；　objects　are　given　to　us；　and　it　alone

furnishes　us　with　intuitions；　by　the　understanding　they　are　thought；

and　from　it　arise　conceptions。　But　an　thought　must　directly；　or

indirectly；　by　means　of　certain　signs；　relate　ultimately　to

intuitions；　consequently；　with　us；　to　sensibility；　because　in　no　other

way　can　an　object　be　given　to　us。

　　The　effect　of　an　object　upon　the　faculty　of　representation；　so　far

as　we　are　affected　by　the　said　object；　is　sensation。　That　sort　of

intuition　which　relates　to　an　object　by　means　of　sensation　is　called

an　empirical　intuition。　The　undetermined　object　of　an　empirical

intuition　is　called　phenomenon。　That　which　in　the　phenomenon

corresponds　to　the　sensation；　I　term　its　matter；　but　that　which

effects　that　the　content　of　the　phenomenon　can　be　arranged　under

certain　relations；　I　call　its　form。　But　that　in　which　our　sensations

are　merely　arranged；　and　by　which　they　are　susceptible　of　assuming　a

certain　form；　cannot　be　itself　sensation。　It　is；　then；　the　matter　of

all　phenomena　that　is　given　to　us　a　posteriori；　the　form　must　lie

ready　a　priori　for　them　in　the　mind；　and　consequently　can　be

regarded　separately　from　all　sensation。

　　I　call　all　representations　pure；　in　the　transcendental　meaning　of

the　word；　wherein　nothing　is　met　with　that　belongs　to　sensation。　And

accordingly　we　find　existing　in　the　mind　a　priori；　the　pure　form　of

sensuous　intuitions　in　general；　in　which　all　the　manifold　content　of

the　phenomenal　world　is　arranged　and　viewed　under　certain　relations。

This　pure　form　of　sensibility　I　shall　call　pure　intuition。　Thus；　if

I　take　away　from　our　representation　of　a　body　all　that　the

understanding　thinks　as　belonging　to　it；　as　substance；　force；

divisibility；　etc。；　and　also　whatever　belongs　to　sensation；　as

impenetrability；　hardness；　colour；　etc。；　yet　there　is　still

something　left　us　from　this　empirical　intuition；　namely；　extension　and

shape。　These　belong　to　pure　intuition；　which　exists　a　priori　in　the

mind；　as　a　mere　form　of　sensibility；　and　without　any　real　object　of

the　senses　or　any　sensation。

　　The　science　of　all　the　principles　of　sensibility　a　priori；　I　call

transcendental　aesthetic。*　There　must；　then；　be　such　a　science　forming

the　first　part　of　the　transcendental　doctrine　of　elements；　in

contradistinction　to　that　part　which　contains　the　principles　of　pure

thought；　and　which　is　called　transcendental　logic。



　　*The　Germans　are　the　only　people　who　at　present　use　this　word　to

indicate　what　others　call　the　critique　of　taste。　At　the　foundation

of　this　term　lies　the　disappointed　hope；　which　the　eminent　analyst；

Baumgarten；　conceived；　of　subjecting　the　criticism　of　the　beautiful　to

principles　of　reason；　and　so　of　elevating　its　rules　into　a　science。

But　his　endeavours　were　vain。　For　the　said　rules　or　criteria　are；　in

respect　to　their　chief　sources；　merely　empirical；　consequently　never

can　serve　as　determinate　laws　a　priori；　by　which　our　judgement　in

matters　of　taste　is　to　be　directed。　It　is　rather　our　judgement　which

forms　the　proper　test　as　to　the　correctness　of　the　principles。　On　this

account　it　is　advisable　to　give　up　the　use　of　the　term　as

designating　the　critique　of　taste；　and　to　apply　it　solely　to　that

doctrine；　which　is　true　science…　the　science　of　the　laws　of

sensibility…　and　thus　come　nearer　to　the　language　and　the　sense　of　the

ancients　in　their　well…known　division　of　the　objects　of　cognition　into

aiotheta　kai　noeta；　or　to　share　it　with　speculative　philosophy；　and

employ　it　partly　in　a　transcendental；　partly　in　a　psychological

signification。



　　In　the　science　of　transcendental　aesthetic　accordingly；　we　shall

first　isolate　sensibility　or　the　sensuous　faculty；　by　separating

from　it　all　that　is　annexed　to　its　perceptions　by　the　conceptions　of

understanding；　so　that　nothing　be　left　but　empirical　intuition。　In　the

next　place　we　shall　take　away　from　this　intuition　all　that　belongs

to　sensation；　so　that　nothing　may　remain　but　pure　intuition；　and　the

mere　form　of　phenomena；　which　is　all　that　the　sensibility　can　afford　a

priori。　From　this　investigation　it　will　be　found　that　there　are　two

pure　forms　of　sensuous　intuition；　as　principles　of　knowledge　a　priori；

namely；　space　and　time。　To　the　consideration　of　these　we　shall　now

proceed。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　SECTION　I。　Of　Space。



　　　　　SS　2。　Metaphysical　Exposition　of　this　Conception。



　　By　means　of　the　external　sense　（a　property　of　the　mind）；　we

represent　to　ourselves　objects　as　without　us；　and　these　all　in

space。　Herein　alone　are　their　shape；　dimensions；　and　relations　to　each

other　determined　or　determinable。　The　internal　sense；　by　means　of

which　the　mind　contemplates　itself　or　its　internal　state；　gives；

indeed；　no　intuition　of　the　soul　as　an　object；　yet　there　is

nevertheless　a　determinate　form；　under　which　alone　the　contemplation

of　our　internal　state　is　possible；　so　that　all　which　relates　to　the

inward　determinations　of　the　mind　is　represented　in　relations　of　time。

Of　time　we　cannot　have　any　external　intuition；　any　more　than　we　can

have　an　internal　intuition　of　space。　What　then　are　time　and　space？　Are

they　real　existences？　Or；　are　they　merely　relations　or

determinations　of　things；　such；　however；　as　would　equally　belong　to

these　things　in　themselves；　though　they　should　never　become　objects　of

intuition；　or；　are　they　such　as　belong　only　to　the　form　of

intuition；　and　consequently　to　the　subjective　constitution　of　the

mind；　without　which　these　predicates　of　time　and　space　could　not　be

attached　to　any　object？　In　order　to　become　informed　on　these　points；

we　shall　first　give　an　exposition　of　the　conception　of　space。　By

exposition；　I　mean　the　clear；　though　not　detailed；　representation　of

that　which　belongs　to　a　conception；　and　an　exposition　is

metaphysical　when　it　contains　that　which　represents　the　conception

as　given　a　priori。

　　1。　Space　is　not　a　conception　which　has　been　derived　from　outward

experiences。　For；　in　order　that　certain　sensations　may　relate　to

something　without　me　（that　is；　to　something　which　occupies　a　different

part　of　space　from　that　in　which　I　am）；　in　like　manner；　in　order

that　I　may　represent　them　not　merely　as　without；　of；　and　near　to

each　other；　but　also　in　separate　places；　the　representation　of　space

must　already　exist　as　a　foundation。　Consequently；　the　representation

of　space　cannot　be　borrowed　from　the　relations　of　external　phenomena

through　experience；　but；　on　the　contrary；　this　external　experience

is　itself　only　possible　through　the　said　antecedent　representation。

　　2。　Space　then　is　a　necessary　representation　a　priori；　which　serves

for　the　fo