the critique of pure reason-第105节
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possible perception has been added to the experience of the mind。
But if we cogitate existence by the pure category alone; it is not
to be wondered at; that we should find ourselves unable to present any
criterion sufficient to distinguish it from mere possibility。
Whatever be the content of our conception of an object; it is
necessary to go beyond it; if we wish to predicate existence of the
object。 In the case of sensuous objects; this is attained by their
connection according to empirical laws with some one of my
perceptions; but there is no means of cognizing the existence of
objects of pure thought; because it must be cognized completely a
priori。 But all our knowledge of existence (be it immediately by
perception; or by inferences connecting some object with a perception)
belongs entirely to the sphere of experience… which is in perfect
unity with itself; and although an existence out of this sphere cannot
be absolutely declared to be impossible; it is a hypothesis the
truth of which we have no means of ascertaining。
The notion of a Supreme Being is in many respects a highly useful
idea; but for the very reason that it is an idea; it is incapable of
enlarging our cognition with regard to the existence of things。 It
is not even sufficient to instruct us as to the possibility of a being
which we do not know to exist。 The analytical criterion of
possibility; which consists in the absence of contradiction in
propositions; cannot be denied it。 But the connection of real
properties in a thing is a synthesis of the possibility of which an
a priori judgement cannot be formed; because these realities are not
presented to us specifically; and even if this were to happen; a
judgement would still be impossible; because the criterion of the
possibility of synthetical cognitions must be sought for in the
world of experience; to which the object of an idea cannot belong。 And
thus the celebrated Leibnitz has utterly failed in his attempt to
establish upon a priori grounds the possibility of this sublime
ideal being。
The celebrated ontological or Cartesian argument for the existence
of a Supreme Being is therefore insufficient; and we may as well
hope to increase our stock of knowledge by the aid of mere ideas; as
the merchant to augment his wealth by the addition of noughts to his
cash account。
SECTION V。 Of the Impossibility of a Cosmological Proof
of the Existence of God。
It was by no means a natural course of proceeding; but; on the
contrary; an invention entirely due to the subtlety of the schools; to
attempt to draw from a mere idea a proof of the existence of an object
corresponding to it。 Such a course would never have been pursued; were
it not for that need of reason which requires it to suppose the
existence of a necessary being as a basis for the empirical regress;
and that; as this necessity must be unconditioned and a priori; reason
is bound to discover a conception which shall satisfy; if possible;
this requirement; and enable us to attain to the a priori cognition of
such a being。 This conception was thought to be found in the idea of
an ens realissimum; and thus this idea was employed for the attainment
of a better defined knowledge of a necessary being; of the existence
of which we were convinced; or persuaded; on other grounds。 Thus
reason was seduced from her natural courage; and; instead of
concluding with the conception of an ens realissimum; an attempt was
made to begin with it; for the purpose of inferring from it that
idea of a necessary existence which it was in fact called in to
complete。 Thus arose that unfortunate ontological argument; which
neither satisfies the healthy common sense of humanity; nor sustains
the scientific examination of the philosopher。
The cosmological proof; which we are about to examine; retains the
connection between absolute necessity and the highest reality; but;
instead of reasoning from this highest reality to a necessary
existence; like the preceding argument; it concludes from the given。
unconditioned necessity of some being its unlimited reality。 The track
it pursues; whether rational or sophistical; is at least natural;
and not only goes far to persuade the common understanding; but
shows itself deserving of respect from the speculative intellect;
while it contains; at the same time; the outlines of all the arguments
employed in natural theology… arguments which always have been; and
still will be; in use and authority。 These; however adorned; and hid
under whatever embellishments of rhetoric and sentiment; are at bottom
identical with the arguments we are at present to discuss。 This proof;
termed by Leibnitz the argumentum a contingentia mundi; I shall now
lay before the reader; and subject to a strict examination。
It is framed in the following manner: If something exists; an
absolutely necessary being must likewise exist。 Now I; at least;
exist。 Consequently; there exists an absolutely necessary being。 The
minor contains an experience; the major reasons from a general
experience to the existence of a necessary being。* Thus this
argument really begins at experience; and is not completely a
priori; or ontological。 The object of all possible experience being
the world; it is called the cosmological proof。 It contains no
reference to any peculiar property of sensuous objects; by which
this world of sense might be distinguished from other possible worlds;
and in this respect it differs from the physico…theological proof;
which is based upon the consideration of the peculiar constitution
of our sensuous world。
*This inference is too well known to require more detailed
discussion。 It is based upon the spurious transcendental law of
causality; that everything which is contingent has a cause; which;
if itself contingent; must also have a cause; and so on; till the
series of subordinated causes must end with an absolutely necessary
cause; without which it would not possess completeness。
The proof proceeds thus: A necessary being can be determined only in
one way; that is; it can be determined by only one of all possible
opposed predicates; consequently; it must be completely determined
in and by its conception。 But there is only a single conception of a
thing possible; which completely determines the thing a priori: that
is; the conception of the ens realissimum。 It follows that the
conception of the ens realissimum is the only conception by and in
which we can cogitate a necessary being。 Consequently; a Supreme Being
necessarily exists。
In this cosmological argument are assembled so many sophistical
propositions that speculative reason seems to have exerted in it all
her dialectical skill to produce a transcendental illusion of the most
extreme character。 We shall postpone an investigation of this argument
for the present; and confine ourselves to exposing the stratagem by
which it imposes upon us an old argument in a new dress; and appeals
to the agreement of two witnesses; the one with the credentials of
pure reason; and the other with those of empiricism; while; in fact;
it is only the former who has changed his dress and voice; for the
purpose of passing himself off for an additional witness。 That it
may possess a secure foundation; it bases its conclusions upon
experience; and thus appears to be completely distinct from the
ontological argument; which places its confidence entirely in pure a
priori conceptions。 But this experience merely aids reason in making
one step… to the existence of a necessary being。 What the properties
of this being are cannot be learned from experience; and therefore
reason abandons it altogether; and pursues its inquiries in the sphere
of pure conception; for the purpose of discovering what the properties
of an absolutely necessary being ought to be; that is; what among
all possible things contain the conditions (requisita) of absolute
necessity。 Reason believes that it has discovered these requisites
in the conception of an ens realissimum… and in it alone; and hence
concludes: The ens realissimum is an absolutely necessary being。 But
it is evident that reason has here presupposed that the conception
of an ens realissimum is perfectly adequate to the conception of a
being of absolute necessity; that is; that we may infer the
existence of the latter from that of the former… a proposition which
formed the basis of the ontological argument; and which is now
employed in the support of the cosmological argument; contrary to
the wish and professions of its inventors。 For the existence of an
absolutely necessary being is given in conceptions alone。 But if I
say: 〃The conception of the ens realissimum is a conception of this
kind; and in fact the only conception which is adequate to our idea of
a necessary being;〃 I am obliged to admit; that the latter may be
inferred from the former。 Thus it is properly the ontolog