the critique of pure reason-第104节

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itself　with　all　its　predicates；　how　then　can　there　be　any　room　for

contradiction？　Externally；　there　is　nothing　to　give　rise　to　a

contradiction；　for　a　thing　cannot　be　necessary　externally；　nor

internally；　for；　by　the　annihilation　or　suppression　of　the　thing

itself；　its　internal　properties　are　also　annihilated。　God　is

omnipotent…　that　is　a　necessary　judgement。　His　omnipotence　cannot　be

denied；　if　the　existence　of　a　Deity　is　posited…　the　existence；　that

is；　of　an　infinite　being；　the　two　conceptions　being　identical。　But

when　you　say；　God　does　not　exist；　neither　omnipotence　nor　any　other

predicate　is　affirmed；　they　must　all　disappear　with　the　subject；　and

in　this　judgement　there　cannot　exist　the　least　self…contradiction。

　　You　have　thus　seen　that　when　the　predicate　of　a　judgement　is

annihilated　in　thought　along　with　the　subject；　no　internal

contradiction　can　arise；　be　the　predicate　what　it　may。　There　is　no

possibility　of　evading　the　conclusion…　you　find　yourselves　compelled

to　declare：　There　are　certain　subjects　which　cannot　be　annihilated

in　thought。　But　this　is　nothing　more　than　saying：　There　exist　subjects

which　are　absolutely　necessary…　the　very　hypothesis　which　you　are

called　upon　to　establish。　For　I　find　myself　unable　to　form　the

slightest　conception　of　a　thing　which　when　annihilated　in　thought　with

all　its　predicates；　leaves　behind　a　contradiction；　and　contradiction

is　the　only　criterion　of　impossibility　in　the　sphere　of　pure　a

priori　conceptions。

　　Against　these　general　considerations；　the　justice　of　which　no　one

can　dispute；　one　argument　is　adduced；　which　is　regarded　as

furnishing　a　satisfactory　demonstration　from　the　fact。　It　is

affirmed　that　there　is　one　and　only　one　conception；　in　which　the

non…being　or　annihilation　of　the　object　is　self…contradictory；　and

this　is　the　conception　of　an　ens　realissimum。　It　possesses；　you　say；

all　reality；　and　you　feel　yourselves　justified　in　admitting　the

possibility　of　such　a　being。　（This　I　am　willing　to　grant　for　the

present；　although　the　existence　of　a　conception　which　is　not

self…contradictory　is　far　from　being　sufficient　to　prove　the

possibility　of　an　object。）*　Now　the　notion　of　all　reality　embraces

in　it　that　of　existence；　the　notion　of　existence　lies；　therefore；　in

the　conception　of　this　possible　thing。　If　this　thing　is　annihilated　in

thought；　the　internal　possibility　of　the　thing　is　also　annihilated；

which　is　self…contradictory。



　　*A　conception　is　always　possible；　if　it　is　not　self…contradictory。

This　is　the　logical　criterion　of　possibility；　distinguishing　the

object　of　such　a　conception　from　the　nihil　negativum。　But　it　may　be；

notwithstanding；　an　empty　conception；　unless　the　objective　reality

of　this　synthesis；　but　which　it　is　generated；　is　demonstrated；　and　a

proof　of　this　kind　must　be　based　upon　principles　of　possible

experience；　and　not　upon　the　principle　of　analysis　or　contradiction。

This　remark　may　be　serviceable　as　a　warning　against　concluding；　from

the　possibility　of　a　conception…　which　is　logical…　the　possibility

of　a　thing…　which　is　real。



　　I　answer：　It　is　absurd　to　introduce…　under　whatever　term

disguised…　into　the　conception　of　a　thing；　which　is　to　be　cogitated

solely　in　reference　to　its　possibility；　the　conception　of　its

existence。　If　this　is　admitted；　you　will　have　apparently　gained　the

day；　but　in　reality　have　enounced　nothing　but　a　mere　tautology。　I　ask；

is　the　proposition；　this　or　that　thing　（which　I　am　admitting　to　be

possible）　exists；　an　analytical　or　a　synthetical　proposition？　If　the

former；　there　is　no　addition　made　to　the　subject　of　your　thought　by

the　affirmation　of　its　existence；　but　then　the　conception　in　your

minds　is　identical　with　the　thing　itself；　or　you　have　supposed　the

existence　of　a　thing　to　be　possible；　and　then　inferred　its　existence

from　its　internal　possibility…　which　is　but　a　miserable　tautology。　The

word　reality　in　the　conception　of　the　thing；　and　the　word　existence　in

the　conception　of　the　predicate；　will　not　help　you　out　of　the

difficulty。　For；　supposing　you　were　to　term　all　positing　of　a　thing

reality；　you　have　thereby　posited　the　thing　with　all　its　predicates　in

the　conception　of　the　subject　and　assumed　its　actual　existence；　and

this　you　merely　repeat　in　the　predicate。　But　if　you　confess；　as

every　reasonable　person　must；　that　every　existential　proposition　is

synthetical；　how　can　it　be　maintained　that　the　predicate　of

existence　cannot　be　denied　without　contradiction？…　a　property　which　is

the　characteristic　of　analytical　propositions；　alone。

　　I　should　have　a　reasonable　hope　of　putting　an　end　for　ever　to　this

sophistical　mode　of　argumentation；　by　a　strict　definition　of　the

conception　of　existence；　did　not　my　own　experience　teach　me　that　the

illusion　arising　from　our　confounding　a　logical　with　a　real

predicate　（a　predicate　which　aids　in　the　determination　of　a　thing）

resists　almost　all　the　endeavours　of　explanation　and　illustration。　A

logical　predicate　may　be　what　you　please；　even　the　subject　may　be

predicated　of　itself；　for　logic　pays　no　regard　to　the　content　of　a

judgement。　But　the　determination　of　a　conception　is　a　predicate；　which

adds　to　and　enlarges　the　conception。　It　must　not；　therefore；　be

contained　in　the　conception。

　　Being　is　evidently　not　a　real　predicate；　that　is；　a　conception　of

something　which　is　added　to　the　conception　of　some　other　thing。　It

is　merely　the　positing　of　a　thing；　or　of　certain　determinations　in　it。

Logically；　it　is　merely　the　copula　of　a　judgement。　The　proposition；

God　is　omnipotent；　contains　two　conceptions；　which　have　a　certain

object　or　content；　the　word　is；　is　no　additional　predicate…　it

merely　indicates　the　relation　of　the　predicate　to　the　subject。　Now；　if

I　take　the　subject　（God）　with　all　its　predicates　（omnipotence　being

one）；　and　say：　God　is；　or；　There　is　a　God；　I　add　no　new　predicate　to

the　conception　of　God；　I　merely　posit　or　affirm　the　existence　of　the

subject　with　all　its　predicates…　I　posit　the　object　in　relation　to

my　conception。　The　content　of　both　is　the　same；　and　there　is　no

addition　made　to　the　conception；　which　expresses　merely　the

possibility　of　the　object；　by　my　cogitating　the　object…　in　the

expression；　it　is…　as　absolutely　given　or　existing。　Thus　the　real

contains　no　more　than　the　possible。　A　hundred　real　dollars　contain

no　more　than　a　hundred　possible　dollars。　For；　as　the　latter　indicate

the　conception；　and　the　former　the　object；　on　the　supposition　that　the

content　of　the　former　was　greater　than　that　of　the　latter；　my

conception　would　not　be　an　expression　of　the　whole　object；　and　would

consequently　be　an　inadequate　conception　of　it。　But　in　reckoning　my

wealth　there　may　be　said　to　be　more　in　a　hundred　real　dollars　than

in　a　hundred　possible　dollars…　that　is；　in　the　mere　conception　of

them。　For　the　real　object…　the　dollars…　is　not　analytically

contained　in　my　conception；　but　forms　a　synthetical　addition　to　my

conception　（which　is　merely　a　determination　of　my　mental　state）；

although　this　objective　reality…　this　existence…　apart　from　my

conceptions；　does　not　in　the　least　degree　increase　the　aforesaid

hundred　dollars。

　　By　whatever　and　by　whatever　number　of　predicates…　even　to　the

complete　determination　of　it…　I　may　cogitate　a　thing；　I　do　not　in

the　least　augment　the　object　of　my　conception　by　the　addition　of　the

statement：　This　thing　exists。　Otherwise；　not　exactly　the　same；　but

something　more　than　what　was　cogitated　in　my　conception；　would

exist；　and　I　could　not　affirm　that　the　exact　object　of　my　conception

had　real　existence。　If　I　cogitate　a　thing　as　containing　all　modes　of

reality　except　one；　the　mode　of　reality　which　is　absent　is　not　added

to　the　conception　of　the　thing　by　the　affirmation　that　the　thing

exists；　on　the　contrary；　the　thing　exists…　if　it　exist　at　all…　with

the　same　defect　as　that　cogitated　in　its　conception；　otherwise　not

that　which　was　cogitated；　but　something　different；　exists。　Now；　if　I

cogitate　a　being　as　the　highest　reality；　without　defect　or

imperfection；　the　question　still　remains…　whether　this　being　exists　or

not？　For；　although　no　element　is　wanting　in　the　possible　real

content　of　my　conception；　there　is　a　defect　in　its　relation　to　my

mental　state；　that　is；　I　am　ignorant　whether　the　cognition　of　the

object　indicated　by　the　conception　is　possible　a　posteriori。　And

here　the　cause　of　the　present　difficulty　becomes　apparent。　If　the

question　regarded　an　object　of　sense　merely；　it　would　be　impossible

for　me　to　confound　the　conception　with　the　existence　of　a　thing。　For

the　conception　merely　enables　me　to　cogitate　an　object　as　according

with　the　general　conditions　of　experience；　while　the　existence　of

the　object　permits　me　to　cogitate　it　as　contained　in　the　sphere　of

actual　experience。　At　the　same　time；　this　connection　with　the　world　of

experience　does　not　in　the　least　augment　the　conception；　although　a

possible　perception　has　been　added　to　the　experience　of　the　mind。

But　if　w