the army of the cumberland-第42节

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s　it　appeared　doubtful　if　the　left　had　been　able　to　maintain　its　position。　　He　then　concluded　to　go　to　Rossville　and　there　determine　whether　to　join　Thomas　on　the　battlefield　or　whether　his　duty　called　him　to　Chattanooga；　to　prepare　for　his　broken　army　if　his　worst　fears　should　be　realized。　　On　reaching　Rossville　it　was　determined　that　Garfield　should　go　to　the　front　to　Thomas　and　report；　and　that　Rosecrans　should　go　to　Chattanooga　and　make　the　necessary　dispositions　for　the　troops　as　they　came　back　in　rout。

Rosecrans　on　arriving　at　Chattanooga　at　once　sent　out　orders　to　Thomas　to　assume　command　of　all　the　troops　at　the　front；　and　with　Crittenden　and　McCook　to　take　a　strong　position　and　assume　a　threatening　attitude　at　Rossville；　where　ammunition　and　rations　would　be　sent　to　meet　him。　　Thomas　determined　to　hold　his　position　until　nightfall；　if　possible；　before　withdrawing。　　He　then　distributed　ammunition　to　the　commands　and　ordered　the　division　commanders　to　hold　themselves　in　readiness　to　fall　back　as　soon　as　ordered。　Reynolds　at　half…past　five　was　notified　to　commence　the　movement。　Leaving　the　position　he　had　held　near　Wood；　Thomas　started　to　meet　Reynolds　and　show　him　the　position　he　wanted　him　to　occupy；　forming　the　line　covering　the　retirement　of　the　troops　on　the　La　Fayette　road　on　the　left。　　Just　before　meeting　Reynolds；　Thomas　was　informed　of　a　large　rebel　force　in　the　woods　ahead　of　him；　drawn　up　in　line　and　advancing　toward　him。　　This　was　Liddell's　division　on　the　extreme　rebel　right；　under　orders　from　Bragg；　moving　to　a　third　attack　on　Thomas's　left。　　Reynolds　arriving　at　this　time；　Thomas　ordered　him　to　at　once　change　the　head　of　the　column　to　the　left；　form　lines　perpendicular　to　the　road　and　to　charge　the　enemy　then　in　his　immediate　front；　while　the　artillery　opened　a　converging　fire　from　the　right　and　left。　　Turchin　charged　with　his　brigade　upon　the　rebel　force　and　drove　them　in　complete　rout　far　beyond　Baird's　left。　Robinson's　commandKing's　brigadeclosely　supporting　Turchin；　was　posted　on　the　road　leading　through　the　ridge　to　hold　the　ground；　while　the　troops　on　our　right　and　left　retired。

Shortly　after　this　Willich　with　his　brigade　was　placed　in　position　on　commanding　ground　to　the　right　of　the　ridge　road；　and　assisted　in　covering　the　withdrawal　of　our　troops。　　Turchin's　brigade；　having　cleared　the　front；　returned　and　took　position　on　this　road　with　Robinson　and　Willich。

Thomas　having　made　this　disposition　of　the　troops；　ordered　Wood；　Brannan；　and　Granger；　to　fall　back　from　their　positions。　　These　troops　were　not　molested；　but　Baird　and　Johnson　as　they　were　retiring　were　attacked。　　By　the　exercise　of　care　and　foresight　they　retired　without　confusion　and　with　but　slight　loss。　　This　attack　was　led　by　L。　E。　Polk's　brigade；　but　the　rebel　lines　had　become　so　changed　that　they　formed　an　acute　angle　and　their　troops　were　firing　into　each　other　in　the　dark。　　So　quietly　was　the　army　withdrawn　that　it　was　not　until　after　sunrise　on　the　21st　that　Bragg　discovered　that　Thomas　had　retired。　　Having　effected　the　withdrawal　of　his　troops；　General　Thomas；　accompanied　by　Granger　and　Garfield；　proceeded　to　Rossville　and　placed　the　command　in　position　at　that　place；　ordering　one　brigade　of　Negley's　division　to　hold　the　gap　on　the　Ringgold　road　with　the　other　two　brigades　posted　on　the　top　of　the　ridge　to　the　right；　joining　on　the　brigades　in　the　road；　with　Dan　McCook's　brigade　in　reserve。　　On　the　right　of　Negley　Reynold's　division　took　position；　reaching　to　the　Dry　Valley　road；　with　Brannan's　division　as　a　reserve　in　rear　of　Reynolds's　right。　　On　the　right　of　the　Dry　Valley　road；　extending　to　the　west；　McCook's　corps　was　placed；　his　right　extending　to　Chattanooga　Creek。　　Upon　the　high　ground　to　the　left　of　the　Ringgold　road　the　entire　of　Crittenden's　corps　was　placed。　　As　a　reserve　Steedman's　division　of　Granger's　corps　was　posted　on　his　left；　while　Baird's　division　was　also　in　reserve　and　in　support　of　the　brigade　of　Negley's　division　holding　the　gap。　Thrown　out　on　the　Ringgold　road；　a　mile　and　a　half　in　advance　of　the　gap；　Minty's　brigade　of　cavalry　held　the　road　at　that　point　during　the　night。　　Here　the　weary　troops　rested　undisturbed　the　night　after　the　heavy　fighting　and　nothing　was　seen　of　the　enemy　until　about　nine　o'clock　of　the　21st；　when　their　advance　appeared　in　heavy　force　of　infantry　and　cavalry　on　Minty's　front。　　Thomas；　withdrawing　Minty　through　the　gap；　posted　his　command　on　our　left　flank　and　directed　him　to　throw　out　strong　reconnoitering　parties　across　the　ridge；　watching　the　enemy's　movements　on　our　left　and　front。　　There　was　no　object　in　attempting　to　hold　the　position　at　Rossville　Gap；　beyond　the　gaining　of　a　day　to　select　the　final　position　for　the　troops　at　Chattanooga　on　their　retirement　to　that　place；　the　location　of　the　lines；　and　the　preparation　for　throwing　up　earthworks。　　This　was　all　accomplished　on　the　21st　and　preparations　made　to　fall　back。　　All　wagons；　ambulances；　and　surplus　artillery…carriages　were　sent　to　the　rear　before　night　and　the　troops　were　held　in　readiness　to　move　at　a　moment's　notice。　　The　orders　to　withdraw　reached　Thomas　about　six　o'clock　P。M。；　and　the　movement　commenced　about　nine　P。M。

Brannan's　division　was　posted　at　six　P。M。　on　the　road　about　half　way　from　Rossville　to　Chattanooga；　covering　the　movement。　　Orders　were　sent　by　Thomas　for　each　division　commander　to　throw　out　a　strong　skirmish　line；　to　be　withdrawn　at　daylight；　concealing　the　movement　to　the　rear。　　This　line　was　to　be　supported　by　Baird's　division　and　Minty's　brigade　of　cavalry；　which　was　to　retire　after　the　skirmishers　were　withdrawn。　　During　the　night　the　movement　was　completed　without　the　loss　of　a　single　man；　and　at　seven　o'clock　on　the　morning　of　the　22d；　the　Army　of　the　Cumberland；　again　united；　was　in　position；　holding　the　coveted　prize；　still　strong　enough　to　prevent　the　enemy　from　attempting　further　to　dispute　our　possession　of　the　town。　　The　temporary　works　were　strengthened　from　day　to　day　until　all　apprehension　of　an　attack　from　the　enemy　on　the　front　was　at　an　end。

Taking　all　the　surroundings　into　consideration；　the　campaign　from　the　western　slopes　of　the　Cumberland　Mountains；　ending　in　the　battle　of　Chickamauga；　was　the　most　brilliant　one　of　the　war；　made　as　it　was；　in　the　face　of　the　strong　column　of　the　enemy；　whose　business　it　was　to　watch　every　movement；　and　as　far　as　possible　to　retard　and　cripple　the　advance。　　Rosecrans；　with　his　masterly　manevering；　in　every　instance　deceived　his　opponent　down　to　the　withdrawal　of　Bragg　from　Chattanooga。　　While　recognizing　the　genius　of　the　military　leader　who　could　plan　the　campaign　that　was　made　from　the　time　of　the　crossing　of　the　Cumberland　Mountains；　Bragg　regarded　the　obstacles　to　be　overcome　on　such　a　campaign　so　stupendous　that　he　was　incredulous　that　any　movement　south　of　the　Tennessee　was　contemplated　by　the　Federal　leader。　　Every　preparation　was　made　by　Bragg　to　meet　the　crossing　of　our　army　over　the　Tennessee　north　of　Chattanooga　on　the　advance　of　Crittenden；　he　threw　open　the　gateway　for　Rosecrans's　advance。　　When　the　full　scope　of　the　movement　dawned　upon　him；　Bragg　abandoned　Chattanooga　and　gathered　his　troops　wherever　he　could　reach　them　from　all　quarters　to　concentrate　for　the　destruction　of　our　army。　　Bragg　never　intended　his　withdrawal　from　Chattanooga　to　be　permanent；　all　the　indications　he　left　behind　him　pointed　that　way。　　None　of　the　bridges　were　destroyed　as　he　retired。　　All　storehouses；　hospitals；　and　other　buildings　used　by　his　army　were　left　standing；　and　Rosecrans's　mistake　was　in　construing　Bragg's　withdrawal　to　be　a　demoralized　retreat　and　in　ordering　his　army　to　pursue　before　this　was　definitely　determined。　　However；　all　advices　that　Rosecrans　had　were　to　the　effect　that　the　rebels　were　in　hasty　flight　and　would　not　stop　anywhere　north　of　Dalton；　and　that　their　probable　destination　was　Rome。　　This　information　was　sent　to　him　from　Washington；　and　Bragg　aided　in　confirming　this　belief　by　sending　numbers　of　his　soldiers　as　〃deserters〃　into　the　Federal　lines　with　the　same　report。

As　late　as　the　11th；　Halleck　telegraphed　Rosecrans　that　after　he　occupied　〃the　mountain　passes　to　the　west　of　Dalton〃　it　would　be　determined　what　his　future　movements　would　be；　and　on　the　13th；　Halleck　telegraphed　Rosecrans　that　if　Bragg　should　go　to　Alabama　he　must　not　be　allowed　to　re…enter　Middle　Tennessee。　　On　the　13th；　Foster；　at　Fortress　Monroe；　telegraphed　Halleck　that　trains　of　cars　had　been　running　day　and　night　southward　for　the　past　thirty…six　hours。　　On　the　following　day　Foster　sent　Halleck　another　despatch；　that　Longstreet's　corps　was　reported　going　south；　which　Meade　on　the　same　day　confirmed。　　Then　Halleck　sent　urgent　messages　to　Hurlbut　and　Burnside　to　move　to　Rosecrans's　support。　　But　it　was　too　late。　These　commands　were　many　days'　marches　away；　and　at　that　moment　the　Army　of　the　Cumberland　was　engaged　in　the　earlier　movements　of　the　life　and　death　struggle　it　was　peremptorily　ordered　by　Halleck　to　encounter　alone　with　its　old　enemy；　under　Bragg；　heavily　re…enforced；　while　large　numbers　of　Federal　troops　which　might　have　been　within　helping　distance；　had　orders　been　given　in　due　season；　as　asked　for　by　Rosecrans；　remained　inactive。

It