the army of the cumberland-第36节

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he　regiment　entered　the　town　as　the　rear　of　the　enemy's　column　was　leaving　the　place。　　The　next　day　the　four　divisions　of　the　Fourteenth　Corps　were　in　supporting　distance　of　each　other；　with　Negley　still　in　front　of　Dug　Gap；　the　enemy　holding　the　east　entrance　with　a　heavy　force；　and　the　Gap　full　of　obstructions。　Negley　discovered　early　on　the　following　day　that　his　situation　was　critical；　and　that　he　was　in　danger　of　losing　his　train。　　He　determined　to　fall　back　to　a　strong　position　in　front　of　Stevens's　Gap；　which　movement　he　proceeded　to　execute；　and　succeeded　in　the　face　of　the　enemy　by　his　energy　and　skill；　with　the　prompt　co…operation　of　Baird；　in　securing　his　position　in　front　of　the　gap　without　the　loss　of　a　single　wagon。　　The　next　day　the　location　of　Bragg's　army　at　La　Fayette　with　Johnston's　reinforcements　was　fully　determined；　and　Thomas's　corps　now　awaited　the　movements　of　the　other　troops　with　reference　to　the　concentration　of　the　army。

In　the　meantime　Davis's　and　Johnson's　divisions　of　McCook's　corps；　crossing　the　river　at　Caperton's　Ferry；　moved　over　Sand　Mountain　into　Will's　Valley；　and　thenceDavis　being　in　the　advancemoved　into　and　seized　Winston's　Gap；　some　twenty…five　miles　from　Caperton's　Ferry；　and　about　forty…two　from　Chattanooga。　　Sheridan's　division　crossed　the　river　at　the　railroad　bridge；　moved　through　Trenton；　and　on　the　6th　encamped　twelve　miles　from　Winston's　Gap。　　McCook　sent　several　detachments　on　the　8th　and　9th　to　different　points；　reconnoitering　the　enemy。　　One　went　to　Alpine　and　two　into　Broomtown　Valley；　but　nothing　was　discovered　of　Bragg's　whereabouts。　　On　the　evening　of　the　9th　Rosecrans　sent　orders　to　McCook；　stating　that　the　enemy　had　evacuated　Chattanooga　and　were　retreating　southward；　and　directing　him　to　move　rapidly　upon　Alpine　and　Summerville　in　pursuit；　to　intercept　his　line　of　retreat；　and　to　attack　on　his　flank。　　The　day　following　McCook　reached　Alpine；　where　he　discovered　the　situation。　　The　enemy　had　not　retreated　very　far　from　Chattanooga；　the　exact　location　as　yet　unknown。　　McCook　learned　that　he　could　not　communicate　with　Thomas；　as　his　couriers　could　not　pass　through　the　valley；　occupied　as　it　was　by　the　enemy　in　force；　and　that　his　corps　was　entirely　isolated　at　Alpine。　　That；　had　he　gone　to　Summerville；　he　would　have　been　exposed　to　an　attack　from　the　entire　rebel　army；　which　his　reconnoissance　later　determined　was　concentrated　in　force　near　La　Fayette。　　On　the　following　day　McCook　remained　in　camp　waiting　for　Thomas　to　move　up　on　him。　　He；　however；　sent　his　wagon…train　back　to　the　summit　of　Lookout　Mountain。　　On　the　12th　McCook　waited　in　camp　for　reports　from　the　cavalry　as　to　the　position　and　movements　of　the　enemy。

Crittenden's　corps　had　during　the　time　moved　down　the　Sequatchie　Valley；　in　readiness　for　an　active　campaign。　　He　then　crossed　the　river　at　Bridgeport；　Shell　Mound；　and　Battle　Creek；　and　on　September　4th　his　entire　corps　was　across　the　river。　　He　was　ordered　to　move　up　the　valley　of　Running　Water　Creek　and　Whiteside；　leaving　one　division　on　the　line　of　the　Nashville　and　Chattanooga　Railroad；　and　to　push　forward　as　near　as　possible　to　Chattanooga；　threatening　the　enemy　in　that　direction。　　At　6　A。M。　on　the　9th　Crittenden　was　informed　by　a　despatch　from　Rosecrans　that　Chattanooga　had　been　abandoned　by　the　enemy；　and　that　he　was　to　push　forward　at　once　with　five　day's　rations　and　make　a　vigorous　pursuit。　　During　the　morning　Crittenden　with　Wood's　division　occupied　the　town；　and　Wood　was　placed　in　command。　　Palmer's　and　Van　Cleve's　were　turned　off　south　after　they　passed　the　spur　of　Lookout　Mountain；　and　encamped　at　Rossville；　five　miles　south　of　Chattanooga。　　In　the　afternoon　of　the　same　day　Crittenden　was　ordered　to　leave　a　brigade　at　Chattanooga；　and　with　the　balance　of　his　command　to　pursue　the　enemy　with　the　utmost　vigor；　the　line　of　march　to　be　through　Ringgold　and　on　to　Dalton。　　The　next　day　Crittenden　left　Wagnerwho　had　crossed　the　river　from　the　front　of　the　town　during　the　nightin　command；　and　ordered　forward　Palmer's；　Van　Cleve's；　and　the　two　brigades　of　Wood's　division　in　pursuit；　marching　on　the　Rossville　and　Riggold　road。　　During　the　afternoon　Palmer　reported　the　enemy's　cavalry　strong　on　his　front；　that　he　had　only　been　able　to　march　six　miles；　had　encamped　at　Chickamauga　Creek；　and　that　his　advance　had　been　checked　by　a　charge　of　the　rebel　cavalry。　　That　night　Crittenden　received　several　reports　from　his　front　that　the　enemy　was　in　force　near　La　Fayette；　and　threatening　to　retake　Chattanooga。

During　the　11th；　Wood；　with　his　two　brigades；　was　on　a　reconnoissance　at　Gordon's　Mills；　and　Crittenden　was　ordered　to　occupy　Ringgold　and　report。　　These　movements　determined　to　Rosecrans's　satisfaction　the　position　of　the　enemy　in　force　in　the　vicinity　of　La　Fayette。　He　immediately　ordered　Crittenden　to　close　his　entire　command　upon　Wood；　crossing　as　quickly　as　possible　to　the　Rossville　and　La　Fayette　road；　to　some　point　near　Lee　and　Gordon's　Mills。　　Early　on　the　morning　of　the　12th；　Wilder　was　ordered　back　to　Ringgold　and　directed　to　follow　on　the　line　of　march　of　the　infantry；　covering　the　left　flank。　　Crittenden　succeeded　during　the　day　in　effecting　a　concentration　of　his　command　at　Lee　and　Gordon's　Mills；　which　point　Wilder's　brigade　reached　after　a　severe　skirmish　during　the　day　near　Leet's　tanyard；　where　he　lost　thirty　men　killed　and　wounded。　With　the　knowledge　that　Bragg　was　concentrating　his　forces　awaiting　reinforcements　behind　Pigeon　Mountain；　in　the　vicinity　of　La　Fayette；　and　that　his　own　army　was　scattered　a　distance　of　thirty　miles　from　flank　to　flankfrom　Lee　and　Gordon's　Mills　to　AlpineRosecrans　felt　that　it　was　a　matter　of　life　and　death　to　effect　the　concentration　of　his　army　in　the　shortest　possible　space　of　time。

During　these　movements　of　the　army　under　Rosecrans；　what　was　Bragg　doing？　　On　August　20th；　the　movement　of　our　army　over　the　Cumberland　Mountains　was　reported　to　Bragg；　and　he　then　knew　that　he　might　look　for　an　immediate　advance。　　The　movement　of　our　army　across　the　Tennessee　was　also　reported　to　Bragg　by　his　scouts；　but　was　regarded　by　him　as　incredible。　　These　reports　were　soon　after　confirmed　by　the　news　that　our　cavalry　had　occupied　Trenton　and　had　advanced　up　the　Will's　Valley　Railroad　as　far　as　Wauhatchie；　within　seven　miles　of　Chattanooga；　as　a　covering　force　under　which　Rosecrans's　columns　of　infantry　were　advancing。　　Our　army　was　now　as　near　the　line　of　communication　of　the　rebel　army；　as　the　latter　was　to　the　line　to　Nashville；　and　with　less　risk　in　its　advance　movements　should　Bragg　commence　operations　to　the　north。　　Bringing　his　cavalry　forward　at　once；　Bragg　soon　ascertained　that　the　general　movement　of　our　army　was　toward　his　left　and　rear　in　the　direction　of　Dalton　and　Rome；　keeping　Lookout　Mountain　between　the　armies。　　He　then　determined　to　meet　our　army　as　its　columns　debouched　from　the　defiles　of　the　mountains。　　To　hold　Chattanooga　would　require　at　least　two　strong　divisions；　and　he　felt　that　his　force　would　not　permit　this　and　make　a　successful　attack　also。　　Bragg　put　his　army　in　motion　on　September　7th　and　8th；　and　took　up　position　from　Lee　and　Gordon's　Mills　to　La　Fayette；　on　the　road　running　south　from　Chattanooga；　with　the　front　to　the　east　side　of　Lookout　Mountain；　and　on　the　east　bank　of　Chickamauga　Creek；　establishing　his　headquarters　at　the　former　place。

The　positions　of　our　detached　corps　was　fully　known　to　Bragg　on　the　8th。　　Learning　of　Negley's　movement　of　the　9th　into　McLemore's　cove；　Bragg　rightly　interpreted　it　to　mean　that　a　hurried　pursuit　was　being　made　after　his　force；　under　the　idea　that　he　was　in　full　retreat。　　With　his　own　force　concentrated　in　front　of　the　centre；　Bragg　at　once　saw　how　Rosecrans　had　exposed　the　corps　of　his　army　to　be　attacked　and　defeated　in　detail；　and　that　evening　he　gave　order　to　Hindman　to　prepare　his　division　to　move　against　Negley；　and　ordered　Hill　to　send　or　take　Cleburne's　division；　join　Hindman；　and　immediately　move　upon　Negley。　　On　receipt　of　these　orders；　Hill　replied　that　his　part　of　the　movement　was　impracticable；　as　Cleburne　was　sick；　and　that　both　gapsDug　and　Catlett'shad　been　closed　by　felling　timber　which　would　require　twenty…four　hours　to　remove。　　Hindman　having　marched　during　the　night　of　the　9th　some　ten　miles；　was　now　in　position；　some　three　miles　from　Negley　in　the　cove。　　Bragg　not　wishing　to　lose　so　favorable　an　opportunity　of　striking　his　opponent's　force；　ordered　Buckner　with　his　command　to　move　from　Anderson　and　join　Hindman　in　the　cove；　which　he　did　during　the　afternoon　of　the　10th。　　After　these　commands　had　united；　the　commanders　held　a　consultation　and　determined　that　a　change　in　the　plan　of　operations　should　be　made。　　Bragg　having　removed　his　headquarters　to　La　Fayette；　〃so　as　to　secure　more　prompt　and　decided　action　in　the　movements　ordered　against　the　enemy's　centre；〃　now　directed　Polk　to　send　his　remaining　division　to　support　Hindman　during　the　operations　in　the　cove。　　Despatching　an　officer　to　Bragg　with　a　report　as　to　this　change　of　plans；　Hindman　and　Cleburne　waited　his　return。　　Bragg　refused　to　make　any　change；　and　sent　a　verbal　order　to　Hindman　to　proceed　at　once　to　carry　out　his　previous　instruction。　　Bragg　at　the　same　time　sent