the army of the cumberland-第27节

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


s　where　breakfast　was　being　prepared。　　He　was　right　as　to　this　fact；　but　wrong　about　his　deduction。　　Willich's　brigade　was　the　only　one　that　was　not　through　the　morning　meal；　and　this　was　by　reason　of　his　troops　being　under　arms　for　nearly　two　hours　prior　to　this　time；　after　which　Willich　gave　them　orders　to　prepare　their　meal。　　Kirk's　brigade　had　been　under　arms　since　five　o'clock　in　the　morning；　ready　for　action　an　hour　before　the　battle　commenced；　and　in　Post's　brigade　the　men　were　in　order　of　battle　for　an　hour　before　the　first　dawn　of　light。　　The　front　of　all　these　brigades　was　covered　with　heavy　picket　lines　well　thrown　out。　　General　Sill　reported　to　General　Sheridan　at　two　o'clock　in　the　morning；　〃great　activity　on　the　part　of　the　enemy　immediately　in　his　front；　with　movements　of　troops　to　their　left；〃　and　from　four　o'clock　in　the　morning　until　seven；　Sheridan's　troops　were　standing　under　arms；　and　the　cannoneeers　were　at　their　places。

It　is　difficult　to　determine　which　to　admire　more；　the　heavy；　quick；　decided　onset　of　the　rebels；　as　with　ranks　well　closed　up；　without　music；　and　almost　noiselessly；　they　moved　in　the　gray　light　of　the　early　December　morning；　out　of　the　cedars；　across　the　open　fields；　hurling　the　full　weight　of　their　advancing　columns　upon　our　right；　with　all　the　dash　of　Southern　troops；　sweeping　on　with　rapid　stride；　and　wild　yells　of　triumph；　to　what　appeared　to　them　an　easy　final　victory；　or；　later　in　the　afternoon；　when　our　troops　that　had　been　driven　from　the　field　early　in　the　morning；　were　reformed　under　the　eye　of　the　commanding　general；　met　and　threw　back　from　the　point　of　the　bayonet；　and　from　the　cannon　mouth；　the　charge　after　charge　of　the　same　victorious　troops　of　the　earlier　portion　of　the　day。　　One　was　like　the　resistless　sweep　of　a　whirlwind　in　its　onward　course　of　destruction；　the　other　the　grand　sturdy　resistance　of　the　rocky　coast；　which　the　waves　only　rush　upon　to　be　dashed　to　pieces。　　In　each　of　these；　the　two　armies　displayed　their　distinctive　feature　to　the　best。　　Under　Thomas；　the　Centre　of　the　army　evinced；　in　a　marked　degree；　the　staying　qualities　of　that　commander；　which　afterward　were　shown　so　conspicuously　at　Chickamauga。





Chapter　IX。




In　Murfreesboro。

During　the　first　six　months　of　1863；　the　military　operations　of　the　Army　of　the　Cumberland　were　of　a　minor　character。　　The　exhaustion　attending　the　severe　fighting　of　the　last　week　of　the　previous　year；　kept　that　army　in　camp　for　some　time　to　restore　the　losses　of　arms　and　material；　to　reclothe　the　army；　to　recruit　the　strength　of　the　troops；　to　forward　the　needed　supplies；　and　to　build　the　necessary　works　to　fortify　Murfreesboro　as　a　new　base。　　The　rebuilding　of　the　Muldraughs　Hills'　trestleworks；　and　the　heavy　repairs　elsewhere　needed　on　the　railroad　north　of　Nashville；　together　with　having　the　road　from　Nashville　to　Murfreesboro　placed　in　proper　order；　all　required　time　and　were　necessary　to　be　done；　to　supply　the　wants　of　the　army　in　the　immediate　present。　　But　the　future　was　what　demanded　the　greatest　thought　and　most　careful　planning。　　The　problem　that　gave　Buell　the　greatest　trouble　to　solvethe　protection　of　his　lines　of　communication　and　supplieswas　now　forced　upon　Rosecrans。　　The　enemy　with　more　than　one…half　of　his　cavalry　force　absent　during　the　battle　of　Stone's　River；　under　Morgan　in　Kentucky　and　Forrest　in　West　Tennessee；　outnumbered　that　arm　of　the　service　of　the　Army　of　the　Cumberland　during　the　battle　almost　two　to　one。　　These　troopers　were　nearly　all　old　veterans；　accustomed　to　the　severest　hardships　of　service；　and　it　was　wonderful　the　rapidity　with　which　they　got　over　ground　and　the　amount　of　fatigue　they　could　undergo。　　To　afford　perfect　protection　to　his　line　supplying　the　army　from　its　base　at　Louisville；　as　against　these　raiding　bands；　if　infantry　was　to　be　employed；　Rosecrans's　entire　force　was　needed；　posted　by　brigades　at　the　vulnerable　points。　To　make　an　advance　and　thus　lengthen　his　lines；　simply　increased　the　present　difficulties。　　Without　making　the　necessary　preparation　to　protect　his　line　of　supplies；　Rosecrans　would　hamper　his　forward　movement　and　retard　and　cripple　his　advance　when　commenced。　　The　only　proper　force　to　meet　the　enemy's　troopers　was　cavalry。　　In　the　early　days　of　the　Army　of　the　Ohio；　under　Buell；　a　number　of　unsuccessful　attempts　were　made　to　chase　and　fight　cavalry　with　infantry；　and　in　every　instance　the　effort　was　crowned　with　failure；　the　only　result　being　the　discomfort　and　complete　exhaustion　of　the　marching　troops。

The　repair　of　the　most　complete　wrecking　the　Louisville　road　ever　suffered；　demanded　Rosecrans's　attention　the　first　thing　after　the　Battle　of　Stone's　River。　　When　the　army　left　Nashville；　on　the　advance　to　meet　Bragg；　the　supplies　in　that　city　were　very　limited。　With　the　disabling　of　the　road　it　was　impossible　at　that　time　to　forward　sufficient　supplies　to　meet　the　wants　of　the　command；　and　for　the　first　few　weeks　while　the　army　remained　at　Murfreesboro　the　troops　were　on　half　rations；　and　many　of　the　articles　constituting　the　〃ration〃　entirely　dispensed　with；　leaving　but　three　or　four　on　the　list。　　The　surrounding　country　for　miles　was　scoured　for　forage　and　provisions。　　Everything　of　that　kind　was　gathered　in　by　raiding　parties；　not　leaving　sufficient　for　the　actual　necessities　of　the　inhabitants。　　To　such　an　extent　did　this　go；　that　to　the　officers　with　means　to　purchase　such　provisions　as　were　to　be　had；　potatoes　and　onions　became　luxuries。　　The　whole　army　was　threatened　with　scurvy。

The　number　and　extent　of　these　raids；　and　the　damage　sustained　by　the　Louisville　and　Nashville　Railroad　during　the　year　from　July　1；　1862；　is　concisely　set　forth　in　the　report　of　the　superintendent　of　that　road。　　His　report　shows　that　during　this　time　〃the　road　has　been　operated　for　its　entire　length　only　seven　months　and　twelve　days；〃　〃all　the　bridges　and　trestleworks　on　the　main　stem　and　branches；　with　the　exception　of　the　bridge　over　Barren　River　and　four　small　bridges；　were　destroyed　and　rebuilt　during　the　year。　Some　of　the　structures　were　destroyed　twice　and　some　three　times。　In　addition　to　this；　most　of　the　water　stations；　several　depots；　and　a　large　number　of　cars　were　burnt；　a　number　of　engines　badly　damaged；　and　a　tunnel　in　Tennessee　nearly　filled　up　for　a　distance　of　eight　hundred　feet。〃

By　reason　of　this　condition　of　things；　Rosecrans　determined　to　increase　the　cavalry　arm　of　his　army；　so　that　he　could　meet　the　ten　or　twelve　thousand　cavalry　of　the　enemy　in　their　detached　raids　on　more　of　an　equal　footing。　　From　the　commencement　of　operations　in　Tennessee　under　Buell；　the　enemy's　cavalry　had　been　steadily　increasing　in　numbers　and　in　efficiency；　until　at　this　time　it　was　a　greater　problem　how　to　meet　this　arm　of　the　enemy's　force　than　his　infantry。　　Rosecrans　made　repeated　urgent　applications　to　the　department　at　Washington　for　additional　cavalry；　for　horses　and　improved　arms　for　those　already　under　his　command。　　He　detailed　infantry　to　be　mounted　and　armed　as　cavalry；　organizing　a　brigade　of　〃mounted　infantry〃　under　Colonel　John　T。　Wilder。

On　Bragg's　retreating　from　Murfreesboro；　he　took　position　with　a　portion　of　his　army　and　established　his　headquarters　at　Shelbyville。　He　then　ordered　part　of　his　command　to　move　to　Tullahoma；　and　there　intrench；　throwing　up　extensive　earthworks　and　fortifications。　Later；　he　placed　his　troops　in　winter　quarters。　　In　addition　to　the　cavalry　that　had　formerly　been　under　Bragg；　Van　Dorn　in　February　reported　to　him　with　his　command　of　three　brigades　of　cavalry；　about　five　thousand　effective　troops。　　Bragg　placed　Van　Dorn　and　Wheeler　to　protect　the　front　and　flanks　of　his　army；　assigning　the　former　to　the　left；　with　his　headquarters　at　Columbia；　and　directing　the　latter　to　take　position　on　the　right；　constituted　each　command　a　corps。　　To　Wheeler's　command　he　assigned　Morgan's；　Wharton's；　and　Martin's　divisions。　　Forrest's　command　was　assigned　to　Van　Dorn。　Some　important　events　took　place　during　the　first　six　months　of　1863；　that　had　a　bearing　on　the　fortunes　of　the　Army　of　the　Cumberland。

On　January　9th；　in　recognition　of　the　services　of　that　army；　by　General　Order　No。　9　of　the　War　Department；　that　command　was　reorganized；　and　the　Centre；　Right；　and　Left　were　constituted　corps　d'armee；　with　the　designation　of　Fourteenth；　Twentieth；　and　Twenty…first　Corps；　under　the　same　commanders；　who　were　thus　advanced　to　this　higher　command。　　During　this　month；　Steedman；　in　command　of　Fry's　old　division；　was　ordered　from　Gallatin　to　the　front；　and　posted　at　Triune　and　La　Vergne。　　Reynold's　division　was　ordered　from　Gallatin　to　Murfreesboro。　　A　slight　change　was　also　made　in　the　boundaries　of　the　Department。　　On　the　25th；　by　order　of　the　War　Department；　the　commands　of　Fort　Henry　and　Fort　Donelson　were　transferred　from　the　department　under　Grant；　to　that　under　Rosecrans；　and　later　Fort　Heiman。　　To　Rosecrans　was　then　committed　the　care　and　control　of　the　Cumberland　River；　his　second　and　secondary　line　of　communication　and　supplies　connecting　his　two　principal　depots。

On　January　26th；　Bragg　ordered　Wheeler　on　an　expedition　to　capture　Fort　Donelson。　　Wheeler　directed　Forrest　to　move　his　brigade　with　four　guns　on　the　river