the army of the cumberland-第20节

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


gg's　first　disposition　of　his　troops　for　battle。　　On　Monday；　the　29th；　no　change　of　importance　was　made；　the　troops　remaining　in　line　of　battle。　　In　the　evening；　when　Harker's　brigade　crossed　the　river；　Bragg　thought　this　was　a　movement　to　occupy　a　hill　situated　about　six　hundred　yards　in　front　of　Hanson's　centre。　　This　commanded　the　ground　sloping　to　the　river　south　and　west；　and　from　it　the　right　of　Withers's　division　across　the　river　could　be　enfiladed。　　Hanson's　brigade　was　sent　out；　and；　on　Harker's　return；　the　hill　was　occupied　by　the　batteries　of　the　enemy。　　On　Monday　Bragg；　finding　that　Rosecrans　was　extending　his　line　on　his　right；as　Bragg　supposed　to　operate　on　that　flankthrew　his　reserve　division　under　McCown　on　Withers's　left。　　Hardee　was　ordered　to　take　command　of　McCown's　division；　and　to　move　Cleburne　from　the　second　line　in　the　rear　of　Breckinridge；　and　place　him　on　the　left　as　support　to　McCown。　　Cleburne　was　brought　forward　and　placed　five　hundred　yards　in　rear　of　the　latter。　　Bragg's　main　line　of　battle　was　in　the　edge　of　the　woods；　with　open　ground　to　the　front。　　His　troops　were　formed　in　two　lines；　the　first　line　protected　by　intrenchments；　and　his　second　line　formed　some　six　hundred　yards　to　the　rear。　　He　awaited　the　attack　of　Rosecrans　on　the　30th；　and　not　receiving　it；　on　Tuesday　made　his　arrangements　for　an　advance　and　attack　in　force　on　the　morning　of　the　31st。　　His　troops　remained　in　line　of　battle；　ready　to　move　with　the　early　dawn　of　the　coming　day。　　The　two　armies　were　now　arrayed　only　some　five　hundred　yards　apart；　facing　each　other；　and　eager　for　the　conflict　of　the　morrow。

At　nine　o'clock　on　the　evening　of　the　30th；　the　corps　commanders　met　at　Rosecrans's　headquarters；　in　the　cedars　near　the　Murfreesboro　pike；　to　receive　their　final　instructions　and　to　learn　the　details　of　the　plan　of　battle　for　the　next　day。　　McCook　was　directed　with　his　three　divisions　to　occupy　the　most　advantageous　position；　refusing　his　right　as　much　as　practicable　and　necessary　to　secure　it；　to　await　the　attack　of　the　enemy；　and　in　the　event　of　that　not　being　made；　to　himself　engage　and　hold　the　force　on　his　front；　Johnson's　division　held　the　extreme　right　of　his　line；　on　Johnson's　left　was　Davis's　division；　and　on　Davis's　left　Sheridan's　was　posted。　　Thomas　was　instructed　to　open　with　skirmishing　and　engage　the　enemy's　centre　with　Negley's　division　of　his　command　and　Palmer's　of　Crittenden's　corps；　Negley's　right　resting　on　Sheridan's　left；　and　Palmer's　right　on　the　left　of　Negley；　Rousseau　being　in　reserve。　Crittenden　was　ordered　to　move　Van　Cleve's　division　across　the　river　at　the　lower　ford；　covered　and　supported　by　the　pioneer　brigade　and　at　once　advance　on　Breckinridge。　　Wood's　division　was　to　followcrossing　at　the　upper　ford　and　joining　Van　Cleve's　rightwhen　they　were　to　press　everything　before　them　into　Murfreesboro。　　This　gave　a　strong　attack　from　two　divisions　of　Federal　troops　on　the　one　of　Breckinridge's；　which　was　known　to　be　the　only　one　of　the　enemy's　on　the　east　of　the　river。　　As　soon　as　Breckinridge　had　been　dislodged　from　his　position；　the　artillery　of　Wood's　division　was　to　take　position　on　the　heights　east　of　the　river　and　open　fire　on　the　enemy's　lines　on　the　other　side；　which　could　here　be　seen　in　reverse；　and　dislodge　them；　when　Palmer　was　to　drive　them　southward　across　the　river　or　through　the　wood。　　Sustained　by　the　advance　of　the　Centre　under　Thomas　crushing　their　right；　Crittenden　was　to　keep　advancing；　take　Murfreesboro；　move　rapidly　westward　on　the　Franklin　pike；　get　on　their　flank　and　rear　and　drive　them　into　the　country　toward　Salem；　with　the　prospect　of　cutting　off　their　retreat　and　probably　destroying　their　army。　　Rosecrans　called　the　attention　of　the　corps　commanders　to　the　fact　that　this　combination；　which　gave　to　him　such　a　superiority　on　the　left；　depended　for　its　success　upon　McCook's　maintaining　his　position　on　the　right　for　at　least　three　hours；　and　if　compelled　to　fall　back　that　he　should　do　so　in　the　same　manner　he　had　advanced　the　day　before；　slowly　and　steadily；　refusing　his　right。　　McCook　was　asked　if　he　could　hold　his　position　for　three　hours；　and　replied　that　he　thought　he　could。　The　importance　of　doing　so　was　again　impressed　upon　him；　and　the　officers　then　separated。

As　will　be　seen；　the　plan　of　battle　as　formed　by　Rosecrans　contemplated　a　feint　attack　by　his　right；　which　in　the　event　of　a　repulse　was　to　fall　back　slowly；　contesting　the　ground　stubbornly；　while　the　main　attack　was　to　be　made　by　the　forces　on　the　left；　followed　up　the　advance　of　the　centre；　the　right　to　be　temporarily　sacrificed　for　the　success　of　the　general　plan。　　Rosecrans　knew　that　Bragg　had　weakened　his　right　to　support　his　left；　looking　to　offensive　movements　on　his　part；　and　that　the　vital　point　in　his　own　plan　was　the　ability　of　McCook　to　hold　the　enemy　in　check　on　his　front。

During　the　30th；　Bragg　formed　his　plan　of　battle；　which；　singular　as　it　appears；　was　the　exact　counterpart　of　that　of　the　Federal　commander。　　Hardee　on　the　left；　with　McCown's　and　Cleburne's　divisions；　was　to　advance　against　the　Federal　right；　which　being　forced　back；　Polk　and　Withers's　and　Cheatham's　divisions　were　then　to　push　the　centre。　　The　movement　made　by　a　steady　wheel　to　the　right　on　the　right　of　Polk's　command　as　a　pivot。　　Bragg's　plan　was　to　drive　our　right　and　centre　back　against　our　left　on　Stone's　River；　seize　our　line　of　communication　with　Nashville；　thus　cutting　us　off　from　our　base　of　operations　and　supplies；　and　ultimately　securing　the　objective　of　his　campaign；　Nashville。　　Bragg's　plan　was　equally　as　bold　as　that　of　his　opponentwhose　command　was　slightly　inferior　in　strength　to　the　rebel　forceand　the　success　of　either　depended　very　largely　on　the　degree　of　diligence　in　opening　the　engagement。　　Rosecrans's　orders　were　for　the　troops　to　breakfast　before　daylight　and　attack　at　seven　o'clock。　　Bragg　issued　orders　to　attack　at　daylight。





Chapter　VIII。




The　Battle　of　Stone's　River。

With　early　light；　on　the　morning　of　the　31st；　the　movement　in　each　army　began。　　Rosecrans　had　established　his　headquarters　in　the　rear　of　the　left；　in　order　to　direct　in　person　the　forward　movement　of　that　portion　of　his　army　which　was　to　cross　Stone's　River；　sweep　all　resistance　before　it；　and　swing　into　Murfreesboro。　　The　command　was　given；　and　at　once　Van　Cleve　advanced　two　brigades；　making　the　crossing　of　the　river　at　the　lower　ford　without　opposition。　　Wood's　division　had　reached　the　river　bank　prepared　to　make　the　crossing　and　support　Van　Cleve。　　Everything　on　the　left　appeared　to　be　working　satisfactorily；　when　the　opening　sounds　of　the　enemy's　attack　on　the　right　reached　the　left。　　This　was　as　intended；　and　went　to　show　that　if　Bragg's　left　was　fully　occupied　he　then　could　give　the　less　attention　to　his　right；　engaged　by　our　army。　　with　high　hopes　the　troops　then　pressing　forward　continued　to　cross　the　river。　　Within　an　hour　after　the　opening　of　the　battle；　one　of　McCook's　staff　officers　reported　to　Rosecrans　that　the　Right　Wing　was　heavily　pressed　and　needed　assistance。　　Rosecrans　was　not　told　of　the　rout　of　Johnson's　division；　nor　of　the　rapid　withdrawal　of　Davis；　made　necessary　thereby。　　Rosecrans；　sending　word　to　McCook　to　make　a　stubborn　fight；　continued　his　own　offensive　movement。　　Everything　was　working　well　as　far　as　he　knew。　　His　strong　force　on　the　left　was　not　yet　engaged。　　This　he　could　hurl　at　the　enemy's　line　of　communications　and　strike　on　the　flank　of　Bragg's　army　that　was　flanking　him。　　Soon　after　another　staff　officer　from　McCook　arrived　and　reported　that　the　entire　Right　Wing　was　being　driven；　a　fact　that　manifested　itself　by　the　troops　from　the　broken　divisions　pouring　forth　from　the　cedars　in　alarming　numbers；　and　by　the　rapid　movement　of　the　noise　of　the　battle　to　the　north。　　Then　Rosecrans　saw　the　necessity　of　abandoning　his　own　movement；　of　recalling　the　left；　and　of　proceeding　at　once　to　the　right　to　save　what　was　left　of　that　corps　as　speedily　as　possible。　　He　ordered　back　his　left　from　across　the　river；　and　calling　on　his　staff　to　mount；　rode　full　gallop　over　to　the　right　to　reform　that　command　on　a　new　line　and　save　his　army。　　Now　that　he　was　on　the　defensive；　after　McCook's　disaster；　it　was　impossible　to　carry　out　his　original　plan　of　battle。

On　the　30th；　McCown　in　posting　his　division　placed　Ector's　and　Rains's　brigades　in　the　first　line；　and　McNair's　brigade　in　the　second。　　Hardee　ordered　McCown　at　once　to　change　this　so　as　to　bring　McNair　on　the　front　line。　　This　order　was　not　obeyed　until　the　morning　of　the　31st；　when　the　movement　was　made；　causing；　however；　some　delay　in　the　advance　of　Hardee's　command　on　our　right。　　At　half　past　six　o'clock；　McCown's　division　in　the　front　line　with　Cleburne's　division　in　the　second　swinging　around　by　a　continuous　change　of　direction　to　the　right；　advanced　on　to　the　right　of　McCook。　McCown　did　not　properly　execute　the　movement　as　intended；　and　was　carried　so　far　west　as　to　leave　a　gap　in　the　rebel　front　between　Withers's　left　and　McCown's　right。　　Into　this　gap　Cleburne　immediately　threw　his　division；　and　advanced；　filling　the　interval　in　the　front　line　between　McCown　and　Polk。　　This　gave　Hardee　double　the　length　of　front　originally　contemplated