笛卡尔+第一哲学沉思录+英文版-第6节

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


that　which　can　be　defined　by　a　certain　figure：　　something
which　can　be　confined　in　a　certain　place；　and　which　can　fill　a
given　space　in　such　a　way　that　every　other　body　will　be
excluded　from　it；　which　can　be　perceived　either　by　tough；　or
by　sight；　or　by　hearing；　or　by　taste；　or　by　smell：　　which　can
be　moved　in　many　ways　not；　in　truth；　by　itself；　but　by
something　which　is　foreign　to　it；　by　which　it　is　touched　＇and
from　which　it　receives　impressions＇：　　for　to　have　the　power　of
self…movement；　as　also　of　feeling　or　of　thinking；　I　did　not
consider　to　appertain　to　the　nature　of　body：　　on　the　contrary；
I　was　rather　astonished　to　find　that　faculties　similar　to　them
existed　in　some　bodies。
　　　　　But　what　am　I；　now　that　I　suppose　that　there　is　a　certain
genius　which　is　extremely　powerful；　and；　if　I　may　say　so；
malicious；　who　employs　all　his　powers　in　deceiving　me？　　Can　I
affirm　that　I　possess　the　least　of　all　those　things　which　I
have　just　said　pertain　to　the　nature　of　body？　　I　pause　to
consider；　I　revolve　all　these　things　in　my　mind；　and　I　find
none　of　which　I　can　say　that　it　pertains　to　me。　　It　would　be
tedious　to　stop　to　enumerate　them。　　Let　us　pass　to　the
attributes　of　soul　and　see　if　there　is　any　one　which　is　in　me？
What　of　nutrition　or　walking　＇the　first　mentioned＇？　　But　if　it
is　so　that　I　have　no　body　it　is　also　true　that　I　can　neither
walk　nor　take　nourishment。　　Another　attribute　is　sensation。
But　one　cannot　feel　without　body；　and　besides　I　have　thought　I
perceived　many　things　during　sleep　that　I　recognised　in　my
waking　moments　as　not　having　been　experienced　at　all。　　What　of
thinking？　　I　find　here　that　thought　is　an　attribute　that
belongs　to　me；　it　alone　cannot　be　separated　from　me。　　I　am；　I
exist；　that　is　certain。　　But　how　often？　　Just　when　I　think；
for　it　might　possibly　be　the　case　if　I　ceased　entirely　to
think；　that　I　should　likewise　cease　altogether　to　exist。　　I　do
not　now　admit　anything　which　is　not　necessarily　true：　　to
speak　accurately　I　am　not　more　than　a　thing　which　thinks；　that
is　to　say　a　mind　or　a　soul；　or　an　understanding；　or　a　reason；
which　are　terms　whose　significance　was　formerly　unknown　to　me。
I　am；　however；　a　real　thing　and　really　exist；　but　what　thing？
I　have　answered：　　a　thing　which　thinks。
　　　　　And　what　more？　　I　shall　exercise　my　imagination　＇in　order
to　see　if　I　am　not　something　more＇。　　I　am　not　a　collection　of
members　which　we　call　the　human　body：　　I　am　not　a　subtle　air
distributed　through　these　members；　I　am　not　a　wind；　a　fire；　a
vapour；　a　breath；　nor　anything　at　all　which　I　can　imagine　or
conceive；　because　I　have　assumed　that　all　these　were　nothing。
Without　changing　that　supposition　I　find　that　I　only　leave
myself　certain　of　the　fact　that　I　am　somewhat。　　But　perhaps　it
is　true　that　these　same　things　which　I　supposed　were　non…
existent　because　they　are　unknown　to　me；　are　really　not
different　from　the　self　which　I　know。　　I　am　not　sure　about
this；　I　shall　not　dispute　about　it　now；　I　can　only　give
judgment　on　things　that　are　known　to　me。　　I　know　that　I　exist；
and　I　inquire　what　I　am；　I　whom　I　know　to　exist。　　But　it　is
very　certain　that　the　knowledge　of　my　existence　taken　in　its
precise　significance　does　not　depend　on　things　whose　existence
is　not　yet　known　to　me；　consequently　it　does　not　depend　on
those　which　I　can　feign　in　imagination。　　And　indeed　the　very
term　feign　in　imagination10　proves　to　me　my　error；　for　I
really　do　this　if　I　image　myself　a　something；　since　to　imagine
is　nothing　else　than　to　contemplate　the　figure　or　image　of　a
corporeal　thing。　　But　I　already　know　for　certain　that　I　am；
and　that　it　may　be　that　all　these　images；　and；　speaking
generally；　all　things　that　relate　to　the　nature　of　body　are
nothing　but　dreams　＇and　chimeras＇。　　For　this　reason　I　see
clearly　that　I　have　as　little　reason　to　say；　〃I　shall
stimulate　my　imagination　in　order　to　know　more　distinctly　what
I　am；〃　than　if　I　were　to　say；　〃I　am　now　awake；　and　I　perceive
somewhat　that　is　real　and　true：　　but　because　I　do　not　yet
perceive　it　distinctly　enough；　I　shall　go　to　sleep　of　express
purpose；　so　that　my　dreams　may　represent　the　perception　with
greatest　truth　and　evidence。〃　　And；　thus；　I　know　for　certain
that　nothing　of　all　that　I　can　understand　by　means　of　my
imagination　belongs　to　this　knowledge　which　I　have　of　myself；
and　that　it　is　necessary　to　recall　the　mind　from　this　mode　of
thought　with　the　utmost　diligence　in　order　that　it　may　be　able
to　know　its　own　nature　with　perfect　distinctness。
　　　　　But　what　then　am　I？　　A　thing　which　thinks。　　What　is　a
thing　which　thinks？　　It　is　a　thing　which　doubts；　understands；
＇conceives＇；　affirms；　denies；　wills；　refuses；　which　also
imagines　and　feels。
　　　　　Certainly　it　is　no　small　matter　if　all　these　things
pertain　to　my　nature。　　But　why　should　they　not　so　pertain？　　Am
I　not　that　being　who　now　doubts　nearly　everything；　who
nevertheless　understands　certain　things；　who　affirms　that　one
only　is　true；　who　denies　all　the　others；　who　desires　to　know
more；　is　averse　from　being　deceived；　who　imagines　many　things；
sometimes　indeed　despite　his　will；　and　who　perceives　many
likewise；　as　by　the　intervention　of　the　bodily　organs？　　Is
there　nothing　in　all　this　which　is　as　true　as　it　is　certain
that　I　exist；　even　though　I　should　always　sleep　and　though　　he
who　has　given　me　being　employed　all　his　ingenuity　in　deceiving
me？　　Is　there　likewise　any　one　of　these　attributes　which　can
be　distinguished　from　my　thought；　or　which　might　be　said　to　be
separated　from　myself？　　For　it　is　so　evident　of　itself　that　it
is　I　who　doubts；　who　understands；　and　who　desires；　that　there
is　no　reason　here　to　add　anything　to　explain　it。　　And　I　have
certainly　the　power　of　imagining　likewise；　for　although　it　may
happen　（as　I　formerly　supposed）　that　none　of　the　things　which
I　imagine　are　true；　nevertheless　this　power　of　imagining　does
not　cease　to　be　really　in　use；　and　it　forms　part　of　my
thought。　　Finally；　I　am　the　same　who　feels；　that　is　to　say；
who　perceives　certain　things；　as　by　the　organs　of　sense；　since
it　truth　I　see　light；　I　hear　noise；　I　feel　heat。　　But　it　will
be　said　that　these　phenomena　are　false　and　that　I　am　dreaming。
Let　it　be　so；　still　it　is　at　least　quite　certain　that　it　seems
to　me　that　I　see　light；　that　I　hear　noise　and　that　I　feel
heat。　　That　cannot　be　false；　properly　speaking　it　is　what　is
in　me　called　feeling；11　and　used　in　this　precise　sense　that　is
no　other　thing　than　thinking。
　　　　　From　this　time　I　begin　to　know　what　I　am　with　a　little
more　clearness　and　distinction　than　before；　but　nevertheless
it　still　seems　to　me；　and　I　cannot　prevent　myself　from
thinking；　that　corporeal　things；　whose　images　are　framed　by
thought；　which　are　tested　by　the　senses；　are　much　more
distinctly　known　than　that　obscure　part　of　me　which　does　not
e　under　the　imagination。　　Although　really　it　is　very
strange　to　say　that　I　know　and　understand　more　distinctly
these　things　whose　existence　seems　to　me　dubious；　which　are
unknown　to　me；　and　which　do　not　belong　to　me；　than　others　of
the　truth　of　which　I　am　convinced；　which　are　known　to　me　and
which　pertain　to　my　real　nature；　in　a　word；　than　myself。　　But
I　see　clearly　how　the　case　stands：　　my　mind　loves　to　wander；
and　cannot　yet　suffer　itself　to　be　retained　within　the　just
limits　of　truth。　　Very　good；　let　us　once　more　give　it　the
freest　rein；　so　that；　when　afterwards　we　seize　the　proper
occasion　for　pulling　up；　it　may　the　more　easily　be　regulated
and　controlled。
　　　　　Let　us　begin　by　considering　the　monest　matters；　those
which　we　believe　to　be　the　most　distinctly　prehended；　to
wit；　the　bodies　which　we　touch　and　see；　not　indeed　bodies　in
general；　for　these　general　ideas　are　usually　a　little　more
confused；　but　let　us　consider　one　body　in　particular。　　Let　us
take；　for　example；　this　piece　of　wax：　　it　has　been　taken　quite
freshly　from　the　hive；　and　it　has　not　yet　lost　the　sweetness
of　the　honey　which　it　contains；　it　still　retains　somewhat　of
the　odour　of　the　flowers　from　which　it　has　been　culled；　its
colour；　its　figure；　its　size　are　apparent；　it　is　hard；　cold；
easily　handled；　and　if　you　strike　it　with　the　finger；　it　will
emit　a　sound。　　Finally　all　the　things　which　are　requisite　to
cause　us　distinctly　to　recognise　a　body；　are　met　with　in　it。
But　notice　that　while　I　speak　and　approach　the　fire　what
remained　of　the　taste　is　exhaled；　the　smell　evaporates；　the
colour　alters；　the　figure　is　destroyed；　the　size　increases；　it
bees　liquid；　it　heats；　scarcely　can　one　handle　it；　and　when
one　strikes　it；　now　sound　is　emitted。　　Does　the　same　wax
remain　after　this　change？　　We　must　confess　that　it　remains；
none　would　judge　otherwise。　　What　then　did　I　know　so
distinctly　in　this　piece　of　wax？　　It　could　certainly　be
nothing　of　all　that　the　senses　brought　to　my　notice；　since　all
these　things　which　fall　under　taste；　smell；　sight；　touch；　and
hearing；　are　found　to　be　changed；　and　yet　the　same　wax
remains。
　　　　　Perhaps　it　was　what　I　now　think；　viz。　that　this　wax　was
not　that　sweetness　of　honey；　nor　that　agreeable　scent　of
flowers；　nor　that　particular　whiteness；　nor　that　figure；　nor
that　sound；　but　simply　a　body　which　a　little　while　before
appeared　tome　as　perceptible　under　these　forms；　and　which