笛卡尔+第一哲学沉思录+英文版-第18节

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


there　is　the　same　whiteness　or　greenness　that　I　perceive；　that
in　a　bitter　or　sweet　body　there　is　the　same　taste；　and　so　on
in　other　instances；　that　the　stars；　the　towers；　and　all　other
distant　bodies　are　of　the　same　figure　and　size　as　they　appear
from　far　off　to　our　eyes；　etc。　　But　in　order　that　in　this
there　should　be　nothing　which　I　do　not　conceive　distinctly；　I
should　define　exactly　what　I　really　understand　when　I　say　that
I　am　taught　somewhat　by　nature。　　For　here　I　take　nature　in　a
more　limited　signification　than　when　I　term　it　the　sum　of　all
the　things　given　me　by　God；　since　in　this　sum　many　things　are
prehended　which　only　pertain　to　mind　（and　to　these　I　do　not
refer　in　speaking　of　nature）　such　as　the　notion　which　I　have
of　the　fact　that　what　has　once　been　done　cannot　ever　be　undone
and　an　infinitude　of　such　things　which　I　know　by　the　light　of
nature　＇without　the　help　of　the　body＇；　and　seeing　that　it
prehends　many　other　matters　besides　which　only　pertain　to
body；　and　are　no　longer　here　contained　under　the　name　of
nature；　such　as　the　quality　of　weight　which　it　possesses　and
the　like；　with　which　I　also　do　not　deal；　for　in　talking　of
nature　I　only　treat　of　those　things　given　by　God　to　me　as　a
being　posed　of　mind　and　body。　　But　the　nature　here
described　truly　teaches　me　to　flee　from　things　which　cause　the
sensation　of　pain；　and　seek　after　the　things　which　municate
to　me　the　sentiment　of　pleasure　and　so　forth；　but　I　do　not　see
that　beyond　this　it　teaches　me　that　from　those　diverse　sense…
perceptions　we　should　ever　form　any　conclusion　regarding
things　outside　of　us；　without　having　＇carefully　and　maturely＇
mentally　examined　them　beforehand。　　For　it　seems　to　me　that　it
is　mind　alone；　and　not　mind　and　body　in　conjunction；　that　is
requisite　to　a　knowledge　of　the　truth　in　regard　to　such
things。　　Thus；　although　a　star　makes　no　larger　an　impression
on　my　eye　than　the　flame　of　a　little　candle　there　is　yet　in　me
no　real　or　positive　propensity　impelling　me　to　believe　that　it
is　not　greater　than　that　flame；　but　I　have　judged　it　to　be　so
from　my　earliest　years；　without　any　rational　foundation。　　And
although　in　approaching　fire　I　feel　heat；　and　in　approaching
it　a　little　too　near　I　even　feel　pain；　there　is　at　the　same
time　no　reason　in　this　which　could　persuade　me　that　there　is
in　the　fire　something　resembling　this　heat　any　more　than　there
is　in　it　something　resembling　the　pain；　all　that　I　have　any
reason　to　believe　from　this　is；　that　there　is　something　in　it；
whatever　it　may　be；　which　excites　in　me　these　sensations　of
heat　or　of　pain。　　So　also；　although　there　are　spaces　in　which
I　find　nothing　which　excites　my　senses；　I　must　not　from　that
conclude　that　these　spaces　contain　no　body；　for　I　see　in　this；
as　in　other　similar　things；　that　I　have　been　in　the　habit　of
perverting　the　order　of　nature；　because　these　perceptions　of
sense　having　bee　placed　within　me　by　nature　merely　for　the
purpose　of　signifying　to　my　mind　what　things　are　beneficial　or
hurtful　to　the　posite　whole　of　which　it　forms　a　part；　and
being　up　to　that　point　sufficiently　clear　and　distinct；　I　yet
avail　myself　of　them　as　though　they　were　absolute　rules　by
which　I　might　immediately　determine　the　essence　of　the　bodies
which　are　outside　me；　as　to　which；　in　fact；　they　can　teach　me
nothing　but　what　is　most　obscure　and　confused。
　　　　　But　I　have　already　sufficiently　considered　how；
notwithstanding　the　supreme　goodness　of　God；　falsity　enters
into　the　judgments　I　make。　　Only　here　a　new　difficulty　is
presented￥one　respecting　those　things　the　pursuit　or　avoidance
of　which　is　taught　me　by　nature；　and　also　respecting　the
internal　sensations　which　I　possess；　and　in　which　I　seem　to
have　sometimes　detected　error　＇and　thus　to　be　directly
deceived　by　my　own　nature＇。　　To　take　an　example；　the　agreeable
taste　of　some　food　in　which　poison　has　been　intermingled　may
induce　me　to　partake　of　the　poison；　and　thus　deceive　me。　　It
is　true；　at　the　same　time；　that　in　this　case　nature　may　be
excused；　for　it　only　induces　me　to　desire　food　in　which　I　find
a　pleasant　taste；　and　not　to　desire　the　poison　which　is
unknown　to　it；　and　thus　I　can　infer　nothing　from　this　fact；
except　that　my　nature　is　not　omniscient；　at　which　there　is
certainly　no　reason　to　be　astonished；　since　man；　being　finite
in　nature；　can　only　have　knowledge　the　perfectness　of　which　is
limited。
　　　　　But　we　not　unfrequently　deceive　ourselves　even　in　those
things　to　which　we　are　directly　impelled　by　nature；　as　happens
with　those　who　when　they　are　sick　desire　to　drink　or　eat
things　hurtful　to　them。　　It　will　perhaps　be　said　here　that　the
cause　of　their　deceptiveness　is　that　their　nature　is　corrupt；
but　that　does　not　remove　the　difficulty；　because　a　sick　man　is
none　the　less　truly　God's　creature　than　he　who　is　in　health；
and　it　is　therefore　as　repugnant　to　God's　goodness　for　the　one
to　have　a　deceitful　nature　as　it　is　for　the　other。　　And　as　a
clock　posed　of　wheels　and　counter…weights　no　less　exactly
observes　the　laws　of　nature　when　it　is　badly　made；　and　does
not　show　the　time　properly；　than　when　it　entirely　satisfies
the　wishes　of　its　maker；　and　as；　if　I　consider　the　body　of　a
man　as　being　a　sort　of　machine　so　built　up　and　posed　of
nerves；　muscles；　veins；　blood　and　skin；　that　though　there　were
no　mind　in　it　at　all；　it　would　not　cease　to　have　the　same
motions　as　at　present；　exception　being　made　of　those　movements
which　are　due　to　the　direction　of　the　will；　and　in　consequence
depend　upon　the　mind　＇as　apposed　to　those　which　operate　by　the
disposition　of　its　organs＇；　I　easily　recognise　that　it　would
be　as　natural　to　this　body；　supposing　it　to　be；　for　example；
dropsical；　to　suffer　the　parchedness　of　the　throat　which
usually　signifies　to　the　mind　the　feeling　of　thirst；　and　to　be
disposed　by　this　parched　feeling　to　move　the　nerves　and　other
parts　in　the　way　requisite　for　drinking；　and　thus　to　augment
its　malady　and　do　harm　to　itself；　as　it　is　natural　to　it；　when
it　has　no　indisposition；　to　be　impelled　to　drink　for　its　good
by　a　similar　cause。　　And　although；　considering　the　use　to
which　the　clock　has　been　destined　by　its　maker；　I　may　say　that
it　deflects　from　the　order　of　its　nature　when　it　does　not
indicate　the　hours　correctly；　and　as；　in　the　same　way；
considering　the　machine　of　the　human　body　as　having　been
formed　by　God　in　order　to　have　in　itself　all　the　movements
usually　manifested　there；　I　have　reason　for　thinking　that　it
does　not　follow　the　order　of　nature　when；　if　the　throat　is
dry；　drinking　does　harm　to　the　conservation　of　health；
nevertheless　I　recognise　at　the　same　time　that　this　last　mode
of　explaining　nature　is　very　different　from　the　other。　　For
this　is　but　a　purely　verbal　characterisation　depending
entirely　on　my　thought；　which　pares　a　sick　man　and　a　badly
constructed　clock　with　the　idea　which　I　have　of　a　healthy　man
and　a　well　made　clock；　and　it　is　hence　extrinsic　to　the　things
to　which　it　is　applied；　but　according　to　the　other
interpretation　of　the　term　nature　I　understand　something　which
is　truly　found　in　things　and　which　is　therefore　not　without
some　truth。
　　　　　But　certainly　although　in　regard　to　the　dropsical　body　it
is　only　so　to　speak　to　apply　an　extrinsic　term　when　we　say
that　its　nature　is　corrupted；　inasmuch　as　apart　from　the　need
to　drink；　the　throat　is　parched；　yet　in　regard　to　the
posite　whole；　that　is　to　say；　to　the　mind　or　soul　united　to
this　body；　it　is　not　a　purely　verbal　predicate；　but　a　real
error　of　nature；　for　it　to　have　thirst　when　drinking　would　be
hurtful　to　it。　　And　thus　it　still　remains　to　inquire　how　the
goodness　of　God　does　not　prevent　the　nature　of　man　so　regarded
from　being　fallacious。
　　　　　In　order　to　begin　this　examination；　then；　I　here　say；　in
the　first　place；　that　there　is　a　great　difference　between　mind
and　body；　inasmuch　as　body　is　by　nature　always　divisible；　and
the　mind　is　entirely　indivisible。　　For；　as　a　matter　of　fact；
when　I　consider　the　mind；　that　is　to　say；　myself　inasmuch　as　I
am　only　a　thinking　thing；　I　cannot　distinguish　in　myself　any
parts；　but　apprehend　myself　to　be　clearly　one　and　entire；　and
although　the　whole　mind　seems　to　be　united　to　the　whole　body；
yet　if　a　foot；　or　an　arm；　or　some　other　part；　is　separated
from　my　body；　I　am　aware　that　nothing　has　been　taken　away　from
my　mind。　　And　the　faculties　of　willing；　feeling；　conceiving；
etc。　cannot　be　properly　speaking　said　to　be　its　parts；　for　it
is　one　and　the　same　mind　which　employs　itself　in　willing　and
in　feeling　and　understanding。　　But　it　is　quite　otherwise　with
corporeal　or　extended　objects；　for　there　is　not　one　of　these
imaginable　by　me　which　my　mind　cannot　easily　divide　into
parts；　and　which　consequently　I　do　not　recognise　as　being
divisible；　this　would　be　sufficient　to　teach　me　that　the　mind
or　soul　of　man　is　entirely　different　from　the　body；　if　I　had
not　already　learned　it　from　other　sources。
　　　　　I　further　notice　that　the　mind　does　not　receive　the
impressions　from　all　parts　of　the　body　immediately；　but　only
from　the　brain；　or　perhaps　even　from　one　of　its　smallest
parts；　to　wit；　from　that　in　which　the　mon　sense27　is　said
to　reside；　which；　whenever　it　is　disposed　in　the　same
particular　way；　conveys　the