笛卡尔+第一哲学沉思录+英文版-第17节

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from　which　reason　repelled　me；　I　did　not　believe　that　I　should
trust　much　to　the　teachings　of　nature。　　And　although　the　ideas
which　I　receive　by　the　senses　do　not　depend　on　my　will；　I　did
not　think　that　one　should　for　that　reason　conclude　that　they
proceeded　from　things　different　from　myself；　since　possibly
some　faculty　might　be　discovered　in　me￥though　hitherto　unknown
to　me￥which　produced　them。
　　　　　But　now　that　I　begin　to　know　myself　better；　and　to
discover　more　clearly　the　author　of　my　being；　I　do　not　in
truth　think　that　I　should　rashly　admit　all　the　matters　which
the　senses　seem　to　teach　us；　but；　on　the　other　hand；　I　do　not
think　that　I　should　doubt　them　all　universally。
　　　　　And　first　of　all；　because　I　know　that　all　things　which　I
apprehend　clearly　and　distinctly　can　be　created　by　God　as　I
apprehend　them；　it　suffices　that　I　am　able　to　apprehend　one
thing　apart　from　another　clearly　and　distinctly　in　order　to　be
certain　that　the　one　is　different　from　the　other；　since　they
may　be　made　to　exist　in　separation　at　least　by　the　omnipotence
of　God；　and　it　does　not　signify　by　what　power　this　separation
is　made　in　order　to　pel　me　to　judge　them　to　be　different：
and；　therefore；　just　because　I　know　certainly　that　I　exist；
and　that　meanwhile　I　do　not　remark　that　any　other　thing
necessarily　pertains　to　my　nature　or　essence；　excepting　that　I
am　a　thinking　thing；　I　rightly　conclude　that　my　essence
consists　solely　in　the　fact　that　I　am　a　thinking　thin　＇or　a
substance　whose　whole　essence　or　nature　is　to　think＇。　　And
although　possibly　（or　rather　certainly；　as　I　shall　say　in　a
moment）　I　possess　a　body　with　which　I　am　very　intimately
conjoined；　yet　because；　on　the　one　side；　I　have　a　clear　and
distinct　idea　of　myself　inasmuch　as　I　am　only　a　thinking　and
unextended　thing；　and　as；　on　the　other；　I　possess　a　distinct
idea　of　body；　inasmuch　as　it　is　only　an　extended　and
unthinking　thing；　it　is　certain　that　this　I　＇that　is　to　say；
my　soul　by　which　I　am　what　I　am＇；　is　entirely　and　absolutely
distinct　from　my　body；　and　can　exist　without　it。
　　　　　I　further　find　in　myself　faculties　imploying　modes　of
thinking　peculiar　to　themselves；　to　wit；　the　faculties　of
imagination　and　feeling；　without　which　I　can　easily　conceive
myself　clearly　and　distinctly　as　a　plete　being；　while；　on
the　other　hand；　they　cannot　be　so　conceived　apart　from　me；
that　is　without　an　intelligent　substance　in　which　they　reside；
for　＇in　the　notion　we　have　of　these　faculties；　or；　to　use　the
language　of　the　Schools＇　in　their　formal　concept；　some　kind　of
intellection　is　prised；　from　which　I　infer　that　they　are
distinct　from　me　as　its　modes　are　from　a　thing。　　I　observe
also　in　me　some　other　faculties　such　as　that　of　change　of
position；　the　assumption　of　different　figures　and　such　like；
which　cannot　be　conceived；　any　more　than　can　the　preceding；
apart　from　some　substance　to　which　they　are　attached；　and
consequently　cannot　exist　without　it；　but　it　is　very　clear
that　these　faculties；　if　it　be　true　that　they　exist；　must　be
attached　to　some　corporeal　or　extended　substance；　and　not　to
an　intelligent　substance；　since　in　the　clear　and　distinct
conception　of　these　there　is　some　sort　of　extension　found　to
be　present；　but　no　intellection　at　all。　　There　is　certainly
further　in　me　a　certain　passive　faculty　of　perception；　that
is；　of　receiving　and　recognising　the　ideas　of　sensible　things；
but　this　would　be　useless　to　me　＇and　I　could　in　no　way　avail
myself　of　it＇；　if　there　were　not　either　in　me　or　in　some　other
thing　another　active　faculty　capable　of　forming　and　producing
these　ideas。　　But　this　active　faculty　cannot　exist　in　me
＇inasmuch　as　I　am　a　thing　that　thinks＇　seeing　that　it　does　not
presuppose　thought；　and　also　that　those　ideas　are　often
produced　in　me　without　my　contributing　in　any　way　to　the　same；
and　often　even　against　my　will；　it　is　thus　necessarily　the
case　that　the　faculty　resides　in　some　substance　different　from
me　in　which　all　the　reality　which　is　objectively　in　the　ideas
that　are　produced　by　this　faculty　is　formally　or　eminently
contained；　as　I　remarked　before。　　And　this　substance　is　either
a　body；　that　is；　a　corporeal　nature　in　which　there　is
contained　formally　＇and　really＇　all　that　which　is　objectively
＇and　by　representation＇　in　those　ideas；　or　it　is　God　Himself；
or　some　other　creature　more　noble　than　body　in　which　that　same
is　contained　eminently。　　But；　since　God　is　no　deceiver；　it　is
very　manifest　that　He　does　not　municate　to　me　these　ideas
immediately　and　by　Himself；　nor　yet　by　the　intervention　of
some　creature　in　which　their　reality　is　not　formally；　but　only
eminently；　contained。　　For　since　He　has　given　me　no　faculty　to
recognise　that　this　is　the　case；　but；　on　the　other　hand；　a
very　great　inclination　to　believe　＇that　they　are　sent　to　me
or＇　that　they　are　conveyed　to　me　by　corporeal　objects；　I　do
not　see　how　He　could　be　defended　from　the　accusation　of　deceit
if　these　ideas　were　produced　by　causes　other　than　corporeal
objects。　　Hence　we　must　allow　that　corporeal　things　exist。
However；　they　are　perhaps　not　exactly　what　we　perceive　by　the
senses；　since　this　prehension　by　the　senses　is　in　many
instances　very　obscure　and　confused；　but　we　must　at　least
admit　that　all　things　which　I　conceive　in　them　clearly　and
distinctly；　that　is　to　say；　all　things　which；　speaking
generally；　are　prehended　in　the　object　of　pure　mathematics；
are　truly　to　be　recognised　as　external　objects。
　　　　　As　to　other　things；　however；　which　are　either　particular
only；　as；　for　example；　that　the　sun　is　of　such　and　such　a
figure；　etc。；　or　which　are　less　clearly　and　distinctly
conceived；　such　as　light；　sound；　pain　and　the　like；　it　is
certain　that　although　they　are　very　dubious　and　uncertain；　yet
on　the　sole　ground　that　God　is　not　a　deceiver；　and　that
consequently　He　has　not　permitted　any　falsity　to　exist　in　my
opinion　which　He　has　not　likewise　given　me　the　faculty　of
correcting；　I　may　assuredly　hope　to　conclude　that　I　have
within　me　the　means　of　arriving　at　the　truth　even　here。　　And
first　of　all　there　is　no　doubt　that　in　all　things　which　nature
teaches　me　there　is　some　truth　contained；　for　by　nature；
considered　in　general；　I　now　understand　no　other　thing　than
either　God　Himself　or　else　the　order　and　disposition　which　God
has　established　in　created　things；　and　by　my　nature　in
particular　I　understand　no　other　thing　than　the　plexus　of
all　the　things　which　God　has　given　me。
　　　　　But　there　is　nothing　which　this　nature　teaches　me　more
expressly　＇nor　more　sensibly＇　than　that　I　have　a　body　which　is
adversely　affected　when　I　feel　pain；　which　has　need　of　food　or
drink　when　I　experience　the　feelings　of　hunger　and　thirst；　and
so　on；　nor　can　I　doubt　there　being　some　truth　in　all　this。
　　　　　Nature　also　teaches　me　by　these　sensations　of　pain；
hunger；　thirst；　etc。；　that　I　am　not　only　lodged　in　my　body　as
a　pilot　in　a　vessel；　but　that　I　am　not　only　lodged　in　my　body
as　a　pilot　in　a　vessel；　but　that　I　am　very　closely　united　to
it；　and　so　to　speak　so　intermingled　with　it　that　I　seem　to
pose　with　it　one　whole。　　For　if　that　were　not　the　case；
when　my　body　is　hurt；　I；　who　am　merely　a　thinking　thing；
should　not　feel　pain；　for　I　should　perceive　this　wound　by　the
understanding　only；　just　as　the　sailor　perceives　by　sight　when
something　is　damaged　in　his　vessel；　and　when　my　body　has　need
of　drink　or　food；　I　should　clearly　understand　the　fact　without
being　warned　of　it　by　confused　feelings　of　hunger　and　thirst。
For　all　these　sensations　of　hunger；　thirst；　pain；　etc。　are　in
truth　none　other　than　certain　confused　modes　of　thought　which
are　produced　by　the　union　and　apparent　intermingling　of　mind
and　body。
　　　　　Moreover；　nature　teaches　me　that　many　other　bodies　exist
around　mine；　of　which　some　are　to　be　avoided；　and　others
sought　after。　　And　certainly　from　the　fact　that　I　am　sensible
of　different　sorts　of　colours；　sounds；　scents；　tastes；　heat；
hardness；　etc。；　I　very　easily　conclude　that　there　are　in　the
bodies　from　which　all　these　diverse　sense…perceptions　proceed
certain　variations　which　answer　to　them；　although　possibly
these　are　not　really　at　all　similar　to　them。　　And　also　from
the　fact　that　amongst　these　different　sense…perceptions　some
are　very　agreeable　to　me　and　others　disagreeable；　it　is　quite
certain　that　my　body　（or　rather　myself　in　my　entirety；
inasmuch　as　I　am　formed　of　body　and　soul）　may　receive
different　impressions　agreeable　and　disagreeable　from　the
other　bodies　which　surround　it。
　　　　　But　there　are　many　other　things　which　nature　seems　to
have　taught　me；　but　which　at　the　same　time　I　have　never　really
received　from　her；　but　which　have　been　brought　about　in　my
mind　by　a　certain　habit　which　I　have　of　forming　inconsiderate
judgments　on　things；　and　thus　it　may　easily　happen　that　these
judgments　contain　some　error。　　Take；　for　example；　the　opinion
which　I　hold　that　all　space　in　which　there　is　nothing　that
affects　＇or　makes　an　impression　on＇　my　senses　is　void；　that　in
a　body　which　is　warm　there　is　something　entirely　similar　to
the　idea　of　heat　which　is　in　me；　that　in　a　white　or　green　body
there　is　the　same　whiteness　or　greenness　that　I　perceive；　that
in　a　bitter　or　sweet　body　there　is　the　same　taste；　and　so　on