笛卡尔+第一哲学沉思录+英文版-第16节

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But　if　the　question　turns　upon　a　pentagon；　it　is　quite　true
that　I　can　conceive　its　figure　as　well　as　that　of　a　chiliagon
without　the　help　of　my　imagination；　but　I　can　also　imagine　it
by　applying　the　attention　of　my　mind　to　each　of　its　five
sides；　and　at　the　same　time　to　the　space　which　they　enclose。
And　thus　I　clearly　recognise　that　I　have　need　of　a　particular
effort　of　mind　in　order　to　effect　the　act　of　imagination；　such
as　I　do　not　require　in　order　to　understand；　and　this
particular　effort　of　mind　clearly　manifests　the　difference
which　exists　between　imagination　and　pure　intellection。26
　　　　　I　remark　besides　that　this　power　of　imagination　which　is
in　one；　inasmuch　as　it　differs　from　the　power　of
understanding；　is　in　no　wise　a　necessary　element　in　my　nature；
or　in　＇my　essence；　that　is　to　say；　in＇　the　essence　of　my　mind；
for　although　I　did　not　possess　it　I　should　doubtless　ever
remain　the　same　as　I　now　am；　from　which　it　appears　that　we
might　conclude　that　it　depends　on　something　which　differs　from
me。　　And　I　easily　conceive　that　if　some　body　exists　with　which
my　mind　is　conjoined　and　united　in　such　a　way　that　it　can
apply　itself　to　consider　it　when　it　pleases；　it　may　be　that　by
this　means　it　can　imagine　corporeal　objects；　so　that　this　mode
of　thinking　differs　from　pure　intellection　only　inasmuch　as
mind　in　its　intellectual　activity　in　some　manner　turns　on
itself；　and　considers　some　of　the　ideas　which　it　possesses　in
itself；　while　in　imagining　it　turns　towards　the　body；　and
there　beholds　in　it　something　conformable　to　the　idea　which　it
has　either　conceived　of　itself　or　perceived　by　the　senses。　　I
easily　understand；　I　say；　that　the　imagination　could　be　thus
constituted　if　it　is　true　that　body　exists；　and　because　I　can
discover　no　other　convenient　mode　of　explaining　it；　I
conjecture　with　probability　that　body　does　exist；　but　this　is
only　with　probability；　and　although　I　examine　all　things　with
care；　I　nevertheless　do　not　find　that　from　this　distinct　idea
of　corporeal　nature；　which　I　have　in　my　imagination；　I　can
derive　any　argument　from　which　there　will　necessarily　be
deduced　the　existence　of　body。
　　　　　But　I　am　in　the　habit　of　imagining　many　other　things
besides　this　corporeal　nature　which　is　the　object　of　pure
mathematics；　to　wit；　the　colours；　sounds；　scents；　pain；　and
other　such　things；　although　less　distinctly。　　And　inasmuch　as
I　perceive　these　things　much　better　through　the　senses；　by　the
medium　of　which；　and　by　the　memory；　they　seem　to　have　reached
my　imagination；　I　believe　that；　in　order　to　examine　them　more
conveniently；　it　is　right　that　I　should　at　the　same　time
investigate　the　nature　of　sense　perception；　and　that　I　should
see　if　from　the　ideas　which　I　apprehend　by　this　mode　of
thought；　which　I　call　feeling；　I　cannot　derive　some　certain
proof　of　the　existence　of　corporeal　objects。
　　　　　And　first　of　all　I　shall　recall　to　my　memory　those
matters　which　I　hitherto　held　to　be　true；　as　having　perceived
them　through　the　senses；　and　the　foundations　on　which　my
belief　has　rested；　in　the　next　place　I　shall　examine　the
reasons　which　have　since　obliged　me　to　place　them　in　doubt；　in
the　last　place　I　shall　consider　which　of　them　I　must　now
believe。
　　　　　First　of　all；　then；　I　perceived　that　I　had　a　head；　hands；
feet；　and　all　other　members　of　which　this　body￥which　I
considered　as　a　part；　or　possibly　even　as　the　whole；　of
myself￥is　posed。　　Further　I　was　sensible　that　this　body　was
placed　amidst　many　others；　from　which　it　was　capable　of　being
affected　in　many　different　ways；　beneficial　and　hurtful；　and　I
remarked　that　a　certain　feeling　of　pleasure　acpanied　those
that　were　beneficial；　and　pain　those　which　were　harmful。　　And
in　addition　to　this　pleasure　and　pain；　I　also　experienced
hunger；　thirst；　and　other　similar　appetites；　as　also　certain
corporeal　inclinations　towards　joy；　sadness；　anger；　and　other
similar　passions。　　And　outside　myself；　in　addition　to
extension；　figure；　and　motions　of　bodies；　I　remarked　in　them
hardness；　heat；　and　all　other　tactice　qualities；　and；　further；
light　and　colour；　and　scents　and　sounds；　the　variety　of　which
gave　me　the　means　of　distinguishing　the　sky；　the　earth；　the
sea；　and　generally　all　the　other　bodies；　one　from　the　other。
And　certainly；　considering　the　ideas　of　all　these　qualities
which　presented　themselves　to　my　mind；　and　which　alone　I
perceived　properly　or　immediately；　it　was　not　without　reason
that　I　believed　myself　to　perceive　objects　quite　different
from　my　thought；　to　wit；　bodies　from　which　those　ideas
proceeded；　for　I　found　by　experience　that　these　ideas
presented　themselves　to　me　without　my　consent　being　requisite；
so　that　I　could　not　perceive　any　object；　however　desirous　I
might　be；　unless　it　were　present　to　the　organs　of　sense；　and
it　was　not　in　my　power　not　to　perceive　it；　when　it　was
present。　　And　because　the　ideas　which　I　received　through　the
senses　were　much　more　lively；　more　clear；　and　even；　in　their
own　way；　more　distinct　than　any　of　those　which　I　could　of
myself　frame　in　meditation；　or　than　those　I　found　impressed　on
my　memory；　it　appeared　as　though　they　could　not　have　proceeded
from　my　mind；　so　that　they　must　necessarily　have　been　produced
in　me　by　some　other　things。　　And　having　no　knowledge　of　those
objects　excepting　the　knowledge　which　the　ideas　themselves
gave　me；　nothing　was　more　likely　to　occur　to　my　mind　than　that
the　objects　were　similar　to　the　ideas　which　were　caused。　　And
because　I　likewise　remembered　that　I　had　formerly　made　use　of
my　senses　rather　than　my　reason；　and　recognised　that　the　ideas
which　I　formed　of　myself　were　not　so　distinct　as　those　which　I
perceived　through　the　senses；　and　that　they　were　most
frequently　even　posed　of　portions　of　these　last；　I
persuaded　myself　easily　that　I　had　no　idea　in　my　mind　which
had　not　formerly　e　to　me　through　the　senses。　　Nor　was　it
without　some　reason　that　I　believed　that　this　body　（which　be　a
certain　special　right　I　call　my　own）　belonged　to　me　more
properly　and　more　strictly　than　any　other；　for　in　fact　I　could
never　be　separated　from　it　as　from　other　bodies；　I　experienced
in　it　and　on　account　of　it　all　my　appetites　and　affections；
and　finally　I　was　touched　by　the　feeling　of　pain　and　the
titillation　of　pleasure　in　its　parts；　and　not　in　the　parts　of
other　bodies　which　were　separated　from　it。　　But　when　I
inquired；　why；　from　some；　I　know　not　what；　painful　sensation；
there　follows　sadness　of　mind；　and　from　the　pleasurable
sensation　there　arises　joy；　or　why　this　mysterious　pinching　of
the　stomach　which　I　call　hunger　causes　me　to　desire　to　eat；
and　dryness　of　throat　causes　a　desire　to　drink；　and　so　on；　I
could　give　no　reason　excepting　that　nature　taught　me　so；　for
there　is　certainly　no　affinity　（that　I　at　least　can
understand）　between　the　craving　of　the　stomach　and　the　desire
to　eat；　any　more　than　between　the　perception　of　whatever
causes　pain　and　the　thought　of　sadness　which　arises　from　this
perception。　　And　in　the　same　way　it　appeared　to　me　that　I　had
learned　from　nature　all　the　other　judgments　which　I　formed
regarding　the　objects　of　my　senses；　since　I　remarked　that
these　judgments　were　formed　in　me　before　I　had　the　leisure　to
weigh　and　consider　any　reasons　which　might　oblige　me　to　make
them。
　　　　　But　afterwards　many　experiences　little　by　little
destroyed　all　the　faith　which　I　had　rested　in　my　senses；　for　I
from　time　to　time　observed　that　those　towers　which　from　afar
appeared　to　me　to　be　round；　more　closely　observed　seemed
square；　and　that　colossal　statues　raised　on　the　summit　of
these　towers；　appeared　as　quite　tiny　statues　when　viewed　from
the　bottom；　and　so　in　an　infinitude　of　other　cases　I　found
error　in　judgments　founded　on　the　external　senses。　　And　not
only　in　those　founded　on　the　external　senses；　but　even　in
those　founded　on　the　internal　as　well；　for　is　there　anything
more　intimate　or　more　internal　than　pain？　　And　yet　I　have
learned　from　some　persons　whose　arms　or　legs　have　been　cut
off；　that　they　sometimes　seemed　to　feel　pain　in　the　part　which
had　been　amputated；　which　made　me　think　that　I　could　not　be
quite　certain　that　it　was　a　certain　member　which　pained　me；
even　although　I　felt　pain　in　it。　　And　to　those　grounds　of
doubt　I　have　lately　added　two　others；　which　are　very　general；
the　first　is　that　I　never　have　believed　myself　to　feel
anything　in　waking　moments　which　I　cannot　also　sometimes
believe　myself　to　feel　when　I　sleep；　and　as　I　do　not　think
that　these　things　which　I　seem　to　feel　in　sleep；　proceed　from
objects　outside　of　me；　I　do　not　see　any　reason　why　I　should
have　this　belief　regarding　objects　which　I　seem　to　perceive
while　awake。　　The　other　was　that　being　still　ignorant；　or
rather　supposing　myself　to　be　ignorant；　of　the　author　of　my
being；　I　saw　nothing　to　prevent　me　from　having　been　so
constituted　by　nature　that　I　might　be　deceived　even　in　matters
which　seemed　to　me　to　be　most　certain。　　And　as　to　the　grounds
on　which　I　was　formerly　persuaded　of　the　truth　of　sensible
objects；　I　had　not　much　trouble　in　replying　to　them。　　For
since　nature　seemed　to　cause　me　to　lean　towards　many　things
from　which　reason　repelled　me；　I　did　not　believe　that　I　should
trust　much　to　the　teachings　of　nature。