笛卡尔+第一哲学沉思录+英文版-第15节

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capable　of　being　inscribed　in　the　circle；　it　is　in　no　wise
necessary　that　I　should　think　that　all　quadrilateral　figures
are　of　this　number；　on　the　contrary；　I　cannot　even　pretend
that　this　is　the　case；　so　long　as　I　do　not　desire　to　accept
anything　which　I　cannot　conceive　clearly　and　distinctly。　　And
in　consequence　there　is　a　great　difference　between　the　false
suppositions　such　as　this；　and　the　true　ideas　born　within　me；
the　first　and　principal　of　which　is　that　of　God。　　For　really　I
discern　in　many　ways　that　this　idea　is　not　something
factitious；　and　depending　solely　on　my　thought；　but　that　it　is
the　image　of　a　true　and　immutable　nature；　first　of　all；
because　I　cannot　conceive　anything　but　God　himself　to　whose
essence　existence　＇necessarily＇　pertains；　in　the　second　place
because　it　is　not　possible　for　me　to　conceive　two　or　more　Gods
in　this　same　position；　and；　granted　that　there　is　one　such　God
who　now　exists；　I　see　clearly　that　it　is　necessary　that　He
should　have　existed　from　all　eternity；　and　that　He　must　exist
eternally；　and　finally；　because　I　know　an　infinitude　of　other
properties　in　God；　none　of　which　I　can　either　diminish　or
change。
　　　　　For　the　rest；　whatever　proof　or　argument　I　avail　myself
of；　we　must　always　return　to　the　point　that　it　is　only　those
things　which　we　conceive　clearly　and　distinctly　that　have　the
power　of　persuading　me　entirely。　　And　although　amongst　the
matters　which　I　conceive　of　in　this　way；　some　indeed　are
manifestly　obvious　to　all；　while　others　only　manifest
themselves　to　those　who　consider　them　closely　and　examine　them
attentively；　still；　after　they　have　once　been　discovered；　the
latter　are　not　esteemed　as　any　less　certain　than　the　former。
For　example；　in　the　case　of　every　right…angled　triangle；
although　it　does　not　so　manifestly　appear　that　the　square　of
the　base　is　equal　to　the　squares　of　the　two　other　sides　as
that　this　base　is　opposite　to　the　greatest　angle；　still；　when
this　has　once　been　apprehended；　we　are　just　as　certain　of　its
truth　as　of　the　truth　of　the　other。　　And　as　regards　God；　if　my
mind　were　not　pre…occupied　with　prejudices；　and　if　my　thought
did　not　find　itself　on　all　hands　diverted　by　the　continual
pressure　of　sensible　things；　there　would　be　nothing　which　I
could　know　more　immediately　and　more　easily　than　Him。　　For　is
there　anything　more　manifest　than　that　there　is　a　God；　that　is
to　say；　a　Supreme　Being；　to　whose　essence　alone　existence
pertains？21
　　　　　And　although　for　a　firm　grasp　of　this　truth　I　have　need
of　a　strenuous　application　of　mind；　at　present　I　not　only　feel
myself　to　be　as　assured　of　it　as　of　all　that　I　hold　as　most
certain；　but　I　also　remark　that　the　certainty　of　all　other
things　depends　on　it　so　absolutely；　that　without　this
knowledge　it　is　impossible　ever　to　know　anything　perfectly。
　　　　　For　although　I　am　of　such　a　nature　that　as　long　as22　I
understand　anything　very　clearly　and　distinctly；　I　am
naturally　impelled　to　believe　it　to　be　true；　yet　because　I　am
also　of　such　a　nature　that　I　cannot　have　my　mind　constantly
fixed　on　the　same　object　in　order　to　perceive　it　clearly；　and
as　I　often　recollect　having　formed　a　past　judgment　without　at
the　same　time　properly　recollecting　the　reasons　that　led　me　to
make　it；　it　may　happen　meanwhile　that　other　reasons　present
themselves　to　me；　which　would　easily　cause　me　to　change　my
opinion；　if　I　were　ignorant　of　the　facts　of　the　existence　of
God；　and　thus　I　should　have　no　true　and　certain　knowledge；　but
only　vague　and　vacillating　opinions。　　Thus；　for　example；　when
I　consider　the　nature　of　a　＇rectilinear＇　triangle；　I　who　have
some　little　knowledge　of　the　principles　of　geometry　recognise
quite　clearly　that　the　three　angles　are　equal　to　two　right
angles；　and　it　is　not　possible　for　me　not　to　believe　this　so
long　as　I　apply　my　mind　to　its　demonstration；　but　so　soon　as　I
abstain　from　attending　to　the　proof；　although　I　still
recollect　having　clearly　prehended　it；　it　may　easily　occur
that　I　e　to　doubt　its　truth；　if　I　am　ignorant　of　there
being　a　God。　　For　I　can　persuade　myself　of　having　been　so
constituted　by　nature　that　I　can　easily　deceive　myself　even　in
those　matters　which　I　believe　myself　to　apprehend　with　the
greatest　evidence　and　certainty；　especially　when　I　recollect
that　I　have　frequently　judged　matters　to　be　true　and　certain
which　other　reasons　have　afterwards　impelled　me　to　judge　to　be
altogether　false。
　　　　　But　after　I　have　recognised　that　there　is　a　God￥because
at　the　same　time　I　have　also　recognised　that　all　things　depend
upon　Him；　and　that　He　is　not　a　deceiver；　and　from　that　have
inferred　that　what　I　perceive　clearly　and　distinctly　cannot
fail　to　be　true￥although　I　no　longer　pay　attention　to　the
reasons　for　which　I　have　judged　this　to　be　true；　provided　that
I　recollect　having　clearly　and　distinctly　perceived　it　no
contrary　reason　can　be　brought　forward　which　could　ever　cause
me　to　doubt　of　its　truth；　and　thus　I　have　a　true　and　certain
knowledge　of　it。　　And　this　same　knowledge　extends　likewise　to
all　other　things　which　I　recollect　having　formerly
demonstrated；　such　as　the　truths　of　geometry　and　the　like；　for
what　can　be　alleged　against　them　to　cause　me　to　place　them　in
doubt？　　Will　it　be　said　that　my　nature　is　such　as　to　cause　me
to　be　frequently　deceived？　　But　I　already　know　that　I　cannot
be　deceived　in　the　judgment　whose　grounds　I　know　clearly。
Will　it　be　said　that　I　formerly　held　many　things　to　be　true
and　certain　which　I　have　afterwards　recognised　to　be　false？
But　I　had　not　had　any　clear　and　distinct　knowledge　of　these
things；　and　not　as　yet　knowing　the　rule　whereby　I　assure
myself　of　the　truth；　I　had　been　impelled　to　give　my　assent
from　reasons　which　I　have　since　recognised　to　be　less　strong
than　I　had　at　the　time　imagined　them　to　be。　　What　further
objection　can　then　be　raised？　　That　possibly　I　am　dreaming　（an
objection　I　myself　made　a　little　while　ago）；　or　that　all　the
thoughts　which　I　now　have　are　no　more　true　than　the　phantasies
of　my　dreams？　　But　even　though　I　slept　the　case　would　be　the
same；　for　all　that　is　clearly　present　to　my　mind　is　absolutely
true。
　　　　　And　so　I　very　clearly　recognise　that　the　certainty　and
truth　of　all　knowledge　depends　alone　on　the　knowledge　of　the
true　God；　in　so　much　that；　before　I　knew　Him；　I　could　not　have
a　perfect　knowledge　of　any　other　thing。　　And　now　that　I　know
Him　I　have　the　means　of　acquiring　a　perfect　knowledge　of　an
infinitude　of　things；　not　only　of　those　which　relate　to　God
Himself　and　other　intellectual　matters；　but　also　of　those
which　pertain　to　corporeal　nature　in　so　far　as　it　is　the
object　of　pure　mathematics　＇which　have　no　concern　with　whether
it　exists　or　not＇。
　　　　　
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Meditation　VI。
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
　　　　　Of　the　Existence　of　Material　Things；　and　of　the　real
　　　　　　　　distinction　between　the　Soul　and　Body　of　Man。

　　　　　Nothing　further　now　remains　but　to　inquire　whether
material　things　exist。　　And　certainly　I　at　least　know　that
these　may　exist　in　so　far　as　they　are　considered　as　the
objects　of　pure　mathematics；　since　in　this　aspect　I　perceive
them　clearly　and　distinctly。　　For　there　is　no　doubt　that　God
possesses　the　power　to　produce　everything　that　I　am　capable　of
perceiving　with　distinctness；　and　I　have　never　deemed　that
anything　was　impossible　for　Him；　unless　I　found　a
contradiction　in　attempting　to　conceive　it　clearly。　　Further；
the　faculty　of　imagination　which　I　possess；　and　of　which；
experience　tells　me；　I　make　use　when　I　apply　myself　to　the
consideration　of　material　things；　is　capable　of　persuading　me
of　their　existence；　for　when　I　attentively　consider　what
imagination　is；　I　find　that　it　is　nothing　but　a　certain
application　of　the　faculty　of　knowledge　to　the　body　which　is
immediately　present　to　it；　and　which　therefore　exists。
　　　　　And　to　render　this　quite　clear；　I　remark　in　the　first
place　the　difference　that　exists　between　the　imagination　and
pure　intellection　＇or　conception23＇。　　For　example；　when　I
imagine　a　triangle；　I　do　not　conceive　it　only　as　a　figure
prehended　by　three　lines；　but　I　also　apprehend24　these
three　lines　as　present　by　the　power　and　inward　vision　of　my
mind；25　and　this　is　what　I　call　imagining。　　But　if　I　desire　to
think　of　a　chiliagon；　I　certainly　conceive　truly　that　it　is　a
figure　posed　of　a　thousand　sides；　just　as　easily　as　I
conceive　of　a　triangle　that　it　is　a　figure　of　three　sides
only；　but　I　cannot　in　any　way　imagine　the　thousand　sides　of　a
chiliagon　＇as　I　do　the　three　sides　of　a　triangle＇；　nor　do　I；
so　to　speak；　regard　them　as　present　＇with　the　eyes　of　my
mind＇。　　And　although　in　accordance　with　the　habit　I　have
formed　of　always　employing　the　aid　of　my　imagination　when　I
think　of　corporeal　things；　it　may　happen　that　in　imagining　a
chiliagon　I　confusedly　represent　to　myself　some　figure；　yet　it
is　very　evident　that　this　figure　is　not　a　chiliagon；　since　it
in　no　way　differs　from　that　which　I　represent　to　myself　when　I
think　of　a　myriagon　or　any　other　many…sided　figure；　nor　does
it　serve　my　purpose　in　discovering　the　properties　which　go　to
form　the　distinction　between　a　chiliagon　and　other　polygons。
But　if　the　question　turns　upon　a　pentagon；　it　is　quite　true
that　I　can　c