笛卡尔+第一哲学沉思录+英文版-第12节

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He　should　ever　deceive　me；　for　in　all　fraud　and　deception　some
imperfection　is　to　be　found；　and　although　it　may　appear　that
the　power　of　deception　is　a　mark　of　subtilty　or　power；　yet　the
desire　to　deceive　without　doubt　testifies　to　malice　or
feebleness；　and　accordingly　cannot　be　found　in　God。
　　　　　In　the　next　place　I　experienced　in　myself　a　certain
capacity　for　judging　which　I　have　doubtless　received　from　God；
like　all　the　other　things　that　I　possess；　and　as　He　could　not
desire　to　deceive　me；　it　is　clear　that　He　has　not　given　me　a
faculty　that　will　lead　me　to　err　if　I　use　it　aright。
　　　　　And　no　doubt　respecting　this　matter　could　remain；　if　it
were　not　that　the　consequence　would　seem　to　follow　that　I　can
thus　never　be　deceived；　for　if　I　hold　all　that　I　possess　from
God；　and　if　He　has　not　placed　in　me　the　capacity　for　error；　it
seems　as　though　I　could　never　fall　into　error。　　And　it　is　true
that　when　I　think　only　of　God　＇and　direct　my　mind　wholly　to
Him＇；18　I　discover　＇in　myself＇　no　cause　of　error；　or　falsity；
yet　directly　afterwards；　when　recurring　to　myself；　experience
shows　me　that　I　am　nevertheless　subject　to　an　infinitude　of
errors；　as　to　which；　when　we　e　to　investigate　them　more
closely；　I　notice　that　not　only　is　there　a　real　and　positive
idea　of　God　or　of　a　Being　of　supreme　perfection　present　to　my
mind；　but　also；　so　to　speak；　a　certain　negative　idea　of
nothing；　that　is；　of　that　which　is　infinitely　removed　from　any
kind　of　perfection；　and　that　I　am　in　a　sense　something
intermediate　between　God　and　nought；　i。e。　placed　in　such　a
manner　between　the　supreme　Being　and　non…being；　that　there　is
in　truth　nothing　in　me　that　can　lead　to　error　in　so　far　as　a
sovereign　Being　has　formed　me；　but　that；　as　I　in　some　degree
participate　likewise　in　nought　or　in　non…being；　i。e。　in　so　far
as　I　am　not　myself　the　supreme　Being；　and　as　I　find　myself
subject　to　an　infinitude　of　imperfections；　I　ought　not　to　be
astonished　if　I　should　fall　into　error。　　Thus　do　I　recognise
that　error；　in　so　far　as　it　is　such；　is　not　a　real　thing
depending　on　God；　but　simply　a　defect；　and　therefore；　in　order
to　fall　into　it；　that　I　have　no　need　to　possess　a　special
faculty　given　me　by　God　for　this　very　purpose；　but　that　I　fall
into　error　from　the　fact　that　the　power　given　me　by　God　for
the　purpose　of　distinguishing　truth　from　error　is　not
infinite。
　　　　　Nevertheless　this　does　not　quite　satisfy　me；　for　error　is
not　a　pure　negation　＇i。e。　is　not　the　dimple　defect　or　want　of
some　perfection　which　ought　not　to　be　mine＇；　but　it　is　a　lack
of　some　knowledge　which　it　seems　that　I　ought　to　possess。　　And
on　considering　the　nature　of　God　it　does　not　appear　to　me
possible　that　He　should　have　given　me　a　faculty　which　is　not
perfect　of　its　kind；　that　is；　which　is　wanting　in　some
perfection　due　to　it。　　For　if　it　is　true　that　the　more　skilful
the　artizan；　the　more　perfect　is　the　work　of　his　hands；　what
can　have　been　produced　by　this　supreme　Creator　of　all　things
that　is　not　in　all　its　parts　perfect？　　And　certainly　there　is
no　doubt　that　God　could　have　created　me　so　that　I　could　never
have　been　subject　to　error；　it　is　also　certain　that　He　ever
wills　what　is　best；　is　it　then　better　that　I　should　be　subject
to　err　than　that　I　should　not？
　　　　　In　considering　this　more　attentively；　it　occurs　to　me　in
the　first　place　that　I　should　not　be　astonished　if　my
intelligence　is　not　capable　of　prehending　why　God　acts　as
He　does；　and　that　there　is　thus　no　reason　to　doubt　of　His
existence　from　the　fact　that　I　may　perhaps　find　many　other
things　besides　this　as　to　which　I　am　able　to　understand
neither　for　what　reason　nor　how　God　has　produced　them。　　For；
in　the　first　place；　knowing　that　my　nature　is　extremely　feeble
and　limited；　and　that　the　nature　of　God　is　on　the　contrary
immense；　inprehensible；　and　infinite；　I　have　no　further
difficulty　in　recognising　that　there　is　an　infinitude　of
matter　in　His　power；　the　causes　of　which　transcend　my
knowledge；　and　this　reason　suffices　to　convince　me　that　the
species　of　cause　termed　final；　finds　no　useful　employment　in
physical　＇or　natural＇　things；　for　it　does　not　appear　to　me
that　I　can　without　temerity　seek　to　investigate　the
＇inscrutable＇　ends　of　God。
　　　　　It　further　occurs　to　me　that　we　should　not　consider　one
single　creature　separately；　when　we　inquire　as　to　whether　the
works　of　God　are　perfect；　but　should　regard　all　his　creations
together。　　For　the　same　thing　which　might　possibly　seem　very
imperfect　with　some　semblance　of　reason　if　regarded　by　itself；
is　found　to　be　very　perfect　if　regarded　as　part　of　the　whole
universe；　and　although；　since　I　resolved　to　doubt　all　things；
I　as　yet　have　only　known　certainly　my　own　existence　and　that
of　God；　nevertheless　since　I　have　recognised　the　infinite
power　of　God；　I　cannot　deny　that　He　may　have　produced　many
other　things；　or　at　least　that　He　has　the　power　of　producing
them；　so　that　I　may　obtain　a　place　as　a　part　of　a　great
universe。
　　　　　Whereupon；　regarding　myself　more　closely；　and　considering
what　are　my　errors　（for　they　alone　testify　to　there　being　any
imperfection　in　me）；　I　answer　that　they　depend　on　a
bination　of　two　causes；　to　wit；　on　the　faculty　of　knowledge
that　rests　in　me；　and　on　the　power　of　choice　or　of　free
will￥that　is　to　say；　of　the　understanding　and　at　the　same　time
of　the　will。　　For　by　the　understanding　alone　I　＇neither　assert
nor　deny　anything；　but＇　apprehend19　the　ideas　of　things　as　to
which　I　can　form　a　judgment。　　But　no　error　is　properly
speaking　found　in　it；　provided　the　word　error　is　taken　in　its
proper　signification；　and　though　there　is　possibly　an
infinitude　of　things　in　the　world　of　which　I　have　no　idea　in
my　understanding；　we　cannot　for　all　that　say　that　it　is
deprived　of　these　ideas　＇as　we　might　say　of　something　which　is
required　by　its　nature＇；　but　simply　it　does　not　possess　these；
because　in　truth　there　is　no　reason　to　prove　that　God　should
have　given　me　a　greater　faculty　of　knowledge　than　He　has　given
me；　and　however　skillful　a　workman　I　represent　Him　to　be；　I
should　not　for　all　that　consider　that　He　was　bound　to　have
placed　in　each　of　His　works　all　the　perfections　which　He　may
have　been　able　to　place　in　some。　　I　likewise　cannot　plain
that　God　has　not　given　me　a　free　choice　or　a　will　which　is
sufficient；　ample　and　perfect；　since　as　a　matter　of　fact　I　am
conscious　of　a　will　so　extended　as　to　be　subject　to　no　limits。
And　what　seems　to　me　very　remarkable　in　this　regard　is　that　of
all　the　qualities　which　I　possess　there　is　no　one　so　perfect
and　so　prehensive　that　I　do　not　very　clearly　recognise　that
it　might　be　yet　greater　and　more　perfect。　　For；　to　take　an
example；　if　I　consider　the　faculty　of　prehension　which　I
possess；　I　find　that　it　is　of　very　small　extent　and　extremely
limited；　and　at　the　same　time　I　find　the　idea　of　another
faculty　much　more　ample　and　even　infinite；　and　seeing　that　I
can　form　the　idea　of　it；　I　recognise　from　this　very　fact　that
it　pertains　to　the　nature　of　God。　　If　in　the　same　way　I
examine　the　memory；　the　imagination；　or　some　other　faculty；　I
do　not　find　any　which　is　not　small　and　circumscribed；　while　in
God　it　is　immense　＇or　infinite＇。　　It　is　free…will　alone　or
liberty　of　choice　which　I　find　to　be　so　great　in　me　that　I　can
conceive　no　other　idea　to　be　more　great；　it　is　indeed　the　case
that　it　is　for　the　most　part　this　will　that　causes　me　to　know
that　in　some　manner　I　bear　the　image　and　similitude　of　God。
For　although　the　power　of　will　is　inparably　greater　in　God
than　in　me；　both　by　reason　of　the　knowledge　and　the　power
which；　conjoined　with　it；　render　it　stronger　and　more
efficacious；　and　by　reason　of　its　object；　inasmuch　as　in　God
it　extends　to　a　great　many　things；　it　nevertheless　does　not
seem　to　me　greater　if　I　consider　it　formally　and　precisely　in
itself：　　for　the　faculty　of　will　consists　alone　in　our　having
the　power　of　choosing　to　do　a　thing　or　choosing　not　to　do　it
（that　is；　to　affirm　or　deny；　to　pursue　or　to　shun　it）；　or
rather　it　consists　alone　in　the　fact　that　in　order　to　affirm
or　deny；　pursue　or　shun　those　things　placed　before　us　by　the
understanding；　we　act　so　that　we　are　unconscious　that　any
outside　force　constrains　us　in　doing　so。　　For　in　order　that　I
should　be　free　it　is　not　necessary　that　I　should　be
indifferent　as　to　the　choice　of　one　or　the　other　of　two
contraries；　but　contrariwise　the　more　I　lean　to　the
one￥whether　I　recognise　clearly　that　the　reasons　of　the　good
and　true　are　to　be　found　in　it；　or　whether　God　so　disposes　my
inward　thought￥the　more　freely　do　I　choose　and　embrace　it。
And　undoubtedly　both　divine　grace　and　natural　knowledge；　far
from　diminishing　my　liberty；　rather　increase　it　and　strengthen
it。　　Hence　this　indifference　which　I　feel；　when　I　am　not
swayed　to　one　side　rather　than　to　the　other　by　lack　of　reason；
is　the　lowest　grade　of　liberty；　and　rather　evinces　a　lack　or
negation　in　knowledge　than　a　perfection　of　will：　　for　if　I
always　recognised　clearly　what　was　true　and　good；　I　should
never　have　trouble　in　deliberating　as　to　what　judgment　or
choice　I　should　make；　and　then　I　should　be　entirely　free
without　ever　being　indifferent。
　　　　　From　all　this　I　recognise　that　the　power　of　will　which　I
have