the path of the law-第1节

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The　Path　of　the　Law

by　O。　W。　Holmes；　Jr。


10　Harvard　Law　Review　457　（1897）

When　we　study　law　we　are　not　studying　a　mystery　but　a　well…known　
profession。　　We　are　studying　what　we　shall　want　in　order　to　appear　
before　judges；　or　to　advise　people　in　such　a　way　as　to　keep　them　out　of　
court。　　The　reason　why　it　is　a　profession；　why　people　will　pay　lawyers　
to　argue　for　them　or　to　advise　them；　is　that　in　societies　like　ours　the　
command　of　the　public　force　is　intrusted　to　the　judges　in　certain　cases；　
and　the　whole　power　of　the　state　will　be　put　forth；　if　necessary；　to　
carry　out　their　judgments　and　decrees。　　People　want　to　know　under　what　
circumstances　and　how　far　they　will　run　the　risk　of　coming　against　what　
is　so　much　stronger　than　themselves；　and　hence　it　becomes　a　business　to　
find　out　when　this　danger　is　to　be　feared。　　The　object　of　our　study；　
then；　is　prediction；　the　prediction　of　the　incidence　of　the　public　force　
through　the　instrumentality　of　the　courts。

The　means　of　the　study　are　a　body　of　reports；　of　treatises；　and　of　
statutes；　in　this　country　and　in　England；　extending　back　for　six　hundred　
years；　and　now　increasing　annually　by　hundreds。　　In　these　sibylline　
leaves　are　gathered　the　scattered　prophecies　of　the　past　upon　the　cases　
in　which　the　axe　will　fall。　　These　are　what　properly　have　been　called　
the　oracles　of　the　law。　　Far　the　most　important　and　pretty　nearly　the　
whole　meaning　of　every　new　effort　of　legal　thought　is　to　make　these　
prophecies　more　precise；　and　to　generalize　them　into　a　thoroughly　
connected　system。　　The　process　is　one；　from　a　lawyer's　statement　of　a　
case；　eliminating　as　it　does　all　the　dramatic　elements　with　which　his　
client's　story　has　clothed　it；　and　retaining　only　the　facts　of　legal　
import；　up　to　the　final　analyses　and　abstract　universals　of　theoretic　
jurisprudence。　　The　reason　why　a　lawyer　does　not　mention　that　his　client　
wore　a　white　hat　when　he　made　a　contract；　while　Mrs。　Quickly　would　be　
sure　to　dwell　upon　it　along　with　the　parcel　gilt　goblet　and　the　sea…coal　
fire；　is　that　he　foresees　that　the　public　force　will　act　in　the　same　way　
whatever　his　client　had　upon　his　head。　　It　is　to　make　the　prophecies　
easier　to　be　remembered　and　to　be　understood　that　the　teachings　of　the　
decisions　of　the　past　are　put　into　general　propositions　and　gathered　
into　textbooks；　or　that　statutes　are　passed　in　a　general　form。　　The　
primary　rights　and　duties　with　which　jurisprudence　busies　itself　again　
are　nothing　but　prophecies。　　One　of　the　many　evil　effects　of　the　
confusion　between　legal　and　moral　ideas；　about　which　I　shall　have　
something　to　say　in　a　moment；　is　that　theory　is　apt　to　get　the　cart　
before　the　horse；　and　consider　the　right　or　the　duty　as　something　
existing　apart　from　and　independent　of　the　consequences　of　its　breach；　
to　which　certain　sanctions　are　added　afterward。　　But；　as　I　shall　try　to　
show；　a　legal　duty　so　called　is　nothing　but　a　prediction　that　if　a　man　
does　or　omits　certain　things　he　will　be　made　to　suffer　in　this　or　that　
way　by　judgment　of　the　court；　and　so　of　a　legal　right。　　

The　number　of　our　predictions　when　generalized　and　reduced　to　a　system　
is　not　unmanageably　large。　　They　present　themselves　as　a　finite　body　of　
dogma　which　may　be　mastered　within　a　reasonable　time。　　It　is　a　great　
mistake　to　be　frightened　by　the　ever…increasing　number　of　reports。　　The　
reports　of　a　given　jurisdiction　in　the　course　of　a　generation　take　up　
pretty　much　the　whole　body　of　the　law；　and　restate　it　from　the　present　
point　of　view。　　We　could　reconstruct　the　corpus　from　them　if　all　that　
went　before　were　burned。　　The　use　of　the　earlier　reports　is　mainly　
historical；　a　use　about　which　I　shall　have　something　to　say　before　I　
have　finished。　　

I　wish；　if　I　can；　to　lay　down　some　first　principles　for　the　study　of　
this　body　of　dogma　or　systematized　prediction　which　we　call　the　law；　for　
men　who　want　to　use　it　as　the　instrument　of　their　business　to　enable　
them　to　prophesy　in　their　turn；　and；　as　bearing　upon　the　study；　I　wish　
to　point　out　an　ideal　which　as　yet　our　law　has　not　attained。

The　first　thing　for　a　businesslike　understanding　of　the　matter　is　to　
understand　its　limits；　and　therefore　I　think　it　desirable　at　once　to　
point　out　and　dispel　a　confusion　between　morality　and　law；　which　
sometimes　rises　to　the　height　of　conscious　theory；　and　more　often　and　
indeed　constantly　is　making　trouble　in　detail　without　reaching　the　point　
of　consciousness。　　You　can　see　very　plainly　that　a　bad　man　has　as　much　
reason　as　a　good　one　for　wishing　to　avoid　an　encounter　with　the　public　
force；　and　therefore　you　can　see　the　practical　importance　of　the　
distinction　between　morality　and　law。　　A　man　who　cares　nothing　for　an　
ethical　rule　which　is　believed　and　practised　by　his　neighbors　is　likely　
nevertheless　to　care　a　good　deal　to　avoid　being　made　to　pay　money；　and　
will　want　to　keep　out　of　jail　if　he　can。　　

I　take　it　for　granted　that　no　hearer　of　mine　will　misinterpret　what　I　
have　to　say　as　the　language　of　cynicism。　　The　law　is　the　witness　and　
external　deposit　of　our　moral　life。　　Its　history　is　the　history　of　the　
moral　development　of　the　race。　　The　practice　of　it；　in　spite　of　popular　
jests；　tends　to　make　good　citizens　and　good　men。　　When　I　emphasize　the　
difference　between　law　and　morals　I　do　so　with　reference　to　a　single　
end；　that　of　learning　and　understanding　the　law。　　For　that　purpose　you　
must　definitely　master　its　specific　marks；　and　it　is　for　that　that　I　ask　
you　for　the　moment　to　imagine　yourselves　indifferent　to　other　and　
greater　things。　　

I　do　not　say　that　there　is　not　a　wider　point　of　view　from　which　the　
distinction　between　law　and　morals　becomes　of　secondary　or　no　
importance；　as　all　mathematical　distinctions　vanish　in　presence　of　the　
infinite。　　But　I　do　say　that　that　distinction　is　of　the　first　importance　
for　the　object　which　we　are　here　to　considera　right　study　and　mastery　
of　the　law　as　a　business　with　well　understood　limits；　a　body　of　dogma　
enclosed　within　definite　lines。　　I　have　just　shown　the　practical　reason　
for　saying　so。　　If　you　want　to　know　the　law　and　nothing　else；　you　must　
look　at　it　as　a　bad　man；　who　cares　only　for　the　material　consequences　
which　such　knowledge　enables　him　to　predict；　not　as　a　good　one；　who　
finds　his　reasons　for　conduct；　whether　inside　the　law　or　outside　of　it；　
in　the　vaguer　sanctions　of　conscience。　　The　theoretical　importance　of　
the　distinction　is　no　less；　if　you　would　reason　on　your　subject　aright。　　
The　law　is　full　of　phraseology　drawn　from　morals；　and　by　the　mere　force　
of　language　continually　invites　us　to　pass　from　one　domain　to　the　other　
without　perceiving　it；　as　we　are　sure　to　do　unless　we　have　the　boundary　
constantly　before　our　minds。　　The　law　talks　about　rights；　and　duties；　
and　malice；　and　intent；　and　negligence；　and　so　forth；　and　nothing　is　
easier；　or；　I　may　say；　more　common　in　legal　reasoning；　than　to　take　
these　words　in　their　moral　sense；　at　some　state　of　the　argument；　and　so　
to　drop　into　fallacy。　　For　instance；　when　we　speak　of　the　rights　of　man　
in　a　moral　sense；　we　mean　to　mark　the　limits　of　interference　with　
individual　freedom　which　we　think　are　prescribed　by　conscience；　or　by　
our　ideal；　however　reached。　　Yet　it　is　certain　that　many　laws　have　been　
enforced　in　the　past；　and　it　is　likely　that　some　are　enforced　now；　which　
are　condemned　by　the　most　enlightened　opinion　of　the　time；　or　which　at　
all　events　pass　the　limit　of　interference；　as　many　consciences　would　
draw　it。　　Manifestly；　therefore；　nothing　but　confusion　of　thought　can　
result　from　assuming　that　the　rights　of　man　in　a　moral　sense　are　equally　
rights　in　the　sense　of　the　Constitution　and　the　law。　　No　doubt　simple　
and　extreme　cases　can　be　put　of　imaginable　laws　which　the　statute…making　
power　would　not　dare　to　enact；　even　in　the　absence　of　written　
constitutional　prohibitions；　because　the　community　would　rise　in　
rebellion　and　fight；　and　this　gives　some　plausibility　to　the　proposition　
that　the　law；　if　not　a　part　of　morality；　is　limited　by　it。　　But　this　
limit　of　power　is　not　coextensive　with　any　system　of　morals。　　For　the　
most　part　it　falls　far　within　the　lines　of　any　such　system；　and　in　some　
cases　may　extend　beyond　them；　for　reasons　drawn　from　the　habits　of　a　
particular　people　at　a　particular　time。　　I　once　heard　the　late　Professor　
Agassiz　say　that　a　German　population　would　rise　if　you　added　two　cents　
to　the　price　of　a　glass　of　beer。　　A　statute　in　such　a　case　would　be　
empty　words；　not　because　it　was　wrong；　but　because　it　could　not　be　
enforced。　　No　one　will　deny　that　wrong　statutes　can　be　and　are　enforced；　
and　we　would　not　all　agree　as　to　which　were　the　wrong　ones。　　

The　confusion　with　which　I　am　dealing　besets　confessedly　legal　
conceptions。　　Take　the　fundamental　question；　What　constitutes　the　law？　　
You　will　find　some　text　writers　telling　you　that　it　is　something　
different　from　what　is　decided　by　the　courts　of　Massachusetts　or　
England；　that　it　is　a　system　of　reason；　that　it　is　a　deduction　from　
principles　of　ethics　or　admitted　axioms　or　what　not；　which　may　or　may　
not　coincide　with　the　decisions。　　But　if　we　take　the　view　of