philosophy of right-第62节

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and　as　a　moral　entity。　But　the　position　with　private　persons　is　that　they　are　under　the　jurisdiction　of
a　court　which　gives　effect　to　what　is　right　in　principle。　Now　a　relation　between　states　ought　also　to
be　right　in　principle；　but　in　mundane　affairs　a　principle　ought　also　to　have　power。　Now　since　there
is　no　power　in　existence　which　decides　in　face　of　the　state　what　is　right　in　principle　and　actualises
this　decision；　it　follows　that　so　far　as　international　relations　are　concerned　we　can　never　get
beyond　an　'ought'。　The　relation　between　states　is　a　relation　between　autonomous　entities　which
make　mutual　stipulations　but　which　at　the　same　time　are　superior　to　these　stipulations。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　331。

The　nation　state　is　mind　in　its　substantive　rationality　and　immediate　actuality　and
is　therefore　the　absolute　power　on　earth。　It　follows　that　every　state　is　sovereign
and　autonomous　against　its　neighbours。　It　is　entitled　in　the　first　place　and　without
qualification　to　be　sovereign　from　their　point　of　view；　i。e。　to　be　recognised　by
them　as　sovereign。　At　the　same　time；　however；　this　title　is　purely　formal；　and　the
demand　for　this　recognition　of　the　state；　merely　on　the　ground　that　it　is　a　state；　is
abstract。　Whether　a　state　is　in　fact　something　absolute　depends　on　its　content；　i。e。
on　its　constitution　and　general　situation；　and　recognition；　implying　as　it　does　an
identity　of　both　form　and　content；　is　conditional　on　the　neighbouring　state's
judgement　and　will。　

Remark：　A　state　is　as　little　an　actual　individual　without　relations　to　other　states　（see　§　322）　as
an　individual　is　actually　a　person　without　rapport　with　other　persons　（see　§　71　and　elsewhere）。
The　authority　of　a　state　and；　more　particularly；　so　far　as　its　foreign　relations　are　concerned；　of　its
monarch　also；　is　partly　a　purely　domestic　matter　（one　state　should　not　meddle　with　the　domestic
affairs　of　another）。　On　the　other　hand；　however；　it　is　no　less　essential　that　this　authority　should
receive　its　full　and　final　legitimation　through　its　recognition　by　other　states；　although　this　recognition
requires　to　be　safeguarded　by　the　proviso　that　where　a　state　is　to　be　recognised　by　others；　it　shall
likewise　recognise　them；　i。e。　respect　their　autonomy；　and　so　it　comes　about　that　they　cannot　be
indifferent　to　each　other's　domestic　affairs。　

The　question　arises　how　far　a　nomadic　people；　for　instance；　or　any　people　on　a　low　level　of
civilisation；　can　be　regarded　as　a　state。　As　once　was　the　case　with　the　Jews　and　the　Mohammedan
peoples；　religious　views　may　entail　an　opposition　at　a　higher　level　between　one　people　and　its
neighbours　and　so　preclude　the　general　identity　which　is　requisite　for　recognition。　

Addition：　When　Napoleon　said　before　the　Peace　of　Campoformio　that　'the　French　Republic
needs　recognition　as　little　as　the　sun　requires　it'；　what　his　words　implied　was　simply　the　thing's
strength　which　carries　with　it；　without　any　verbal　expression；　the　guarantee　of　recognition。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　332。

The　immediate　actuality　which　any　state　possesses　from　the　point　of　view　of
other　states　is　particularised　into　a　multiplicity　of　relations　which　are　determined
by　the　arbitrary　will　of　both　autonomous　parties　and　which　therefore　possess　the
formal　nature　of　contracts　pure　and　simple。　The　subject…matter　of　these　contracts；
however；　is　infinitely　less　varied　than　it　is　in　civil　society；　because　in　civil　society
individuals　are　reciprocally　interdependent　in　the　most　numerous　respects；　while
autonomous　states　are　principally　wholes　whose　needs　are　met　within　their　own
borders。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　333。

The　fundamental　proposition　of　international　law　（i。e。　the　universal　law　which
ought　to　be　absolutely　valid　between　states；　as　distinguished　from　the　particular
content　of　positive　treaties）　is　that　treaties；　as　the　ground　of　obligations　between
states；　ought　to　be　kept。　But　since　the　sovereignty　of　a　state　is　the　principle　of　its
relations　to　others；　states　are　to　that　extent　in　a　state　of　nature　in　relation　to　each
other。　Their　rights　are　actualised　only　in　their　particular　wills　and　not　in　a
universal　will　with　constitutional　powers　over　them。　This　universal　proviso　of
international　law　therefore　does　not　go　beyond　an　ought…to…be；　and　what　really
happens　is　that　international　relations　in　accordance　with　treaty　alternate　with　the
severance　of　these　relations。　

Remark：　There　is　no　Praetor　to　judge　between　states；　at　best　there　may　be　an　arbitrator　or　a
mediator；　and　even　he　exercises　his　functions　contingently　only；　i。e。　in　dependence　on　the
particular　wills　of　the　disputants。　Kant　had　an　idea　for　securing　'perpetual　peace'　by　a　League　of
Nations　to　adjust　every　dispute。　It　was　to　be　a　power　recognised　by　each　individual　state；　and
was　to　arbitrate　in　all　cases　of　dissension　in　order　to　make　it　impossible　for　disputants　to　resort　to
war　in　order　to　settle　them。　This　idea　presupposes　an　accord　between　states；　this　would　rest　on
moral　or　religious　or　other　grounds　and　considerations；　but　in　any　case　would　always　depend
ultimately　on　a　particular　sovereign　will　and　for　that　reason　would　remain　infected　with
contingency。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　334。

It　follows　that　if　states　disagree　and　their　particular　wills　cannot　be　harmonised；
the　matter　can　only　be　settled　by　war。　A　state　through　its　subjects　has　widespread
connections　and　many…sided　interests；　and　these　may　be　readily　and　considerably
injured；　but　it　remains　inherently　indeterminable　which　of　these　injuries　is　to　be
regarded　as　a　specific　breach　of　treaty　or　as　an　injury　to　the　honour　and
autonomy　of　the　state。　The　reason　for　this　is　that　a　state　may　regard　its　infinity
and　honour　as　at　stake　in　each　of　its　concerns；　however　minute；　and　it　is　all　the
more　inclined　to　susceptibility　to　injury　the　more　its　strong　individuality　is
impelled　as　a　result　of　long　domestic　peace　to　seek　and　create　a　sphere　of　activity
abroad。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　335。

Apart　from　this；　the　state　is　in　essence　mind　and　therefore　cannot　be　prepared　to
stop　at　just　taking　notice　of　an　injury　after　it　has　actually　occurred。　On　the
contrary；　there　arises　in　addition　as　a　cause　of　strife　the　idea　of　such　an　injury　as
the　idea　of　a　danger　threatening　from　another　state；　together　with　calculations　of
degrees　of　probability　on　this　side　and　that；　guessing　at　intentions；　&c。；　&c。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　336。

Since　states　are　related　to　one　another　as　autonomous　entities　and　so　as　particular
wills　on　which　the　very　validity　of　treaties　depends；　and　since　the　particular　will　of
the　whole　is　in　content　a　will　for　its　own　welfare　pure　and　simple；　it　follows　that
welfare　is　the　highest　law　governing　the　relation　of　one　state　to　another。　This　is　all
the　more　the　case　since　the　Idea　of　the　state　is　precisely　the　supersession　of　the
clash　between　right　（i。e。　empty　abstract　freedom）　and　welfare　（i。e。　the　particular
content　which　fills　that　void）；　and　it　is　when　states　become　concrete　wholes　that
they　first　attain　recognition　（see　§　331）。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　337。

The　substantial　welfare　of　the　state　is　its　welfare　as　a　particular　state　in　its　specific
interest　and　situation　and　its　no　less　special　foreign　affairs；　including　its　particular
treaty　relations。。　Its　government　therefore　is　a　matter　of　particular　wisdom；　not　of
universal　Providence　（compare　Remark　to　§　324）。　Similarly；　its　aim　in　relation　to
other　states　and　its　principle　for　justifying　wars　and　treaties　is　not　a　universal
thought　（the　thought　of　philanthropy）　but　only　its　actually　injured　or　threatened
welfare　as　something　specific。　and　peculiar　to　itself。　

Remark：　At　one　time　the　opposition　between　morals　and　politics；　and　the　demand　that　the　latter
should　conform　to　the　former；　were　much　canvassed。　On　this　point　only　a　general　remark　is
required　here。　The　welfare　of　a　state　has　claims　to　recognition　totally　different　from　those　of　the
welfare　of　the　individual。　The　ethical　substance；　the　state；　has　its　determinate　being；　i。e。　its　right；
directly　embodied　in　something　existent；　something　not　abstract　but　concrete；　and　the　principle　of
its　conduct　and　behaviour　can　only　be　this　concrete　existent　and　not　one　of　the　many　universal
thoughts　supposed　to　be　moral　commands。　When　politics　is　alleged　to　clash　with　morals　and　so　to
be　always　wrong；　the　doctrine　propounded　rests　on　superficial　ideas　about　morality；　the　nature　of
the　state；　and　the　state's　relation　to　the　moral　point　of　view。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　338。

The　fact　that　states　reciprocally　recognise　each　other　as　states　remains；　even　in
war　—　the　state　of　affairs　when　rights　disappear　and　force　and　chance　hold　sway
—　a　bond　wherein　each　counts　to　the　rest　as　something　absolute。　Hence　in　war；
war　itself　is　characterised　as　something　which　ought　to　pass　away。　It　implies
therefore　the　proviso　of；　the　jus　gentium　—　that　the　possibility　of　peace　be
retained　（and　so；　for　example；　that　envoys　must　be　respected）；　and；　in　general；
that　war　be　not　waged　against　domestic　institutions；　against　the　peace　of　fami